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ABSTRACT
The prime object of this thesis is to find out various problems 
of Hindu religious endowments in general, and private Hindu religious 
trusts in particular, and to provide suggestions which may be useful 
for any future comprehensive legislation in that field.
Though the thesis is on Hindu religious endowments, section 1 of 
the first chapter, providing a background to the main contention, 
deals with the provisions of the Constitution of India, which guarantees 
every individual in India the right to freedom of religion and management 
of religious affairs. The purpose of section 2 of the chapter is to 
show how far a Civil Court can intervene in religious affairs.
The second chapter deals with trusts in both English and Hindu 
law. The objects of this chapter are to enquire into those areas in 
which the influence of English concepts of law in the Indian field are 
evident and to make a brief comparative study between the two systems.
The main contention, which is related to various problems of private 
Hindu religious endowments or private debutters is expressed in the 
third, fourth and fifth chapters.
The sixth chapter deals with Hindu public religious trusts called 
maths; these are unique and one of the oldest Hindu religious institutions. 
Moreover, it is the problems existing in those institutions which have 
been investigated.
The seventh, and concluding chapter advances propositions relating 
to the contents of the thesis, in the hope that, if any future statute 
is introduced, the Indian Parliament will take into consideration the 
suggestions put forward by way of those propositions.
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9PREFACE
This thesis is an attempt to describe the laws relating to Hindu 
religious endowments in a particular way. Its prime aim is not simply 
to state the laws as they are but to evaluate them in the context of
current problems of Hindu religious endowments in general and Hindu
private religious endowments in particular. It is in the field of 
Hindu private religious endowments as in the case of Islamic wakfs, 
that we find endowments generally made principally for the benefit of 
the relations and descendants of the founder, and only nominally for 
religious and charitable purposes. Such practices are really devices 
to circumvent the law of succession and the revenue laws.
A brief discussion has been made in this thesis on the law of trusts,
specially the trusts of a religious nature, as administered in England, 
to show only the English parallels with India.
In so far as my knowledge goes, this is the only supervised thesis 
on the subject of Hindu religious trusts. So far as Hindu laws regarding 
religious endowments are concerned, every author is obliged to such well 
known writers as Mukherjea, Varadachari and Iyer, but I have referred to 
Derrett's works extensively because of the author's treatment of the 
contemporary problems of Hindu religious endowments. Moreover, on many 
occasions in attempting to find a solution to a thorny problem, I have 
considered various suggestions put forward by Derrett in his different 
works dealing with Hindu religious endowments.
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The thesis begins with a discussion on the Constitutional provisions, 
namely Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, protecting different 
religions through their direct link with religious beliefs, practices and 
institutions, including Hindu religious institutions. Caste questions, 
being at many points religious questions, have been dealt with to show 
the present position of the law relating to the Court's unique and complex 
jurisdiction in religious matters.
I am very conscious of the difficulties involved in estimating the 
level of legal, sophistication required in this kind of work which is 
addressed to readers who may be of so many different levels of intellectual 
attainment in various disciplines. The thesis is mainly based on judicial 
decisions, but on rare occasions I have had to include non-legal material 
which may be less familiar to lawyers. The inclusion of such material 
seems to be indispensable as a preliminary to a theory I have to offer 
relating to the development of a particular law.
Finally, one important point to be noted is that this thesis does not 
go into the now obsolete details of the question of the shebaits' and 
mahants1 proprietary right as formerly protected under Art. 19(l)(f) of 
the Constitution of India, but only touches on this matter where relevant. 
The amendment of the Article by the Forty-fourth Amendment in 1979 creates 
a great practical problem which, while it is deliberately excluded from 
the thesis because of its enormous implications over the whole field of 
law, offers me a valuable opportunity to point out certain avenues for 
attaining reforms, the need for which I hope to expound in what follows.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF RELIGION
a. Individual Freedom and Freedom of Religious Denominations
Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution of India deal with the right 
1
to freedom of religion but the fundamental rights , as guaranteed in
Articles 25 and 26, form the principal basis of the legal independence
of both individuals and associations of individuals, united by common
2
beliefs and practices. The formulation of clause (1) of Article 25 
(below) providing guarantee for the freedom of religion to all persons 
including aliens^ seems to betray the influence of the Irish Constitution
Zf.
(1937). But clause (2) of Article 25 does not relate directly to 
religious practices; it is associated with secular activities such as
5
economic and political ones. At this point because of their direct
1. K.P. Dubey, A Critical Study of the Indian Constitution, 1st ed.,
Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, i960, *f0. See also D.D. Basu,Introduction to 
the Constitution of India, 6th ed., Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 
1976, 98, where the learned author observes that "The attitude of 
impartiality towards all religions is secured by the Constitution by 
several provisions QArts. 25-283— "
2. D.E. Smith, India as a Secular State, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1963, 109: "Individual freedom of religion"
is "basically guaranteed in article 25 ..• collective freedom of 
religion is spelled out in article 26".
3. Ratilal v. State of Bombay AIR 195^ SC 388, 39^ * See below, this 
section.
*+. V.P. Luthera, The Concept of the Secular State and India, Oxford 
University Press, Calcutta, 1964, 110.
5« Clause (2) of Article 25 "constitutes in itself a revolution in the 
traditional conception of religion in India. It strips free religious 
practice of anything of a secular nature and authorises the State to 
go ahead with its wide programme of social and economic reform."
C.H. Alexandrowicz, "The Secular State in India and in the United 
States", Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 12 (1959-60),
273-296, 2&T.
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importance, Articles 25 and 26 may be reproduced below for ease of 
reference.
Article 25 reads:
"(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the 
other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled 
to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, 
practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any 
existing law or prevent the State from making any law
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political 
or other secular activity which may be associated with religious 
practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open 
of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all 
classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I.- The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall1 be 
deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II.- In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference 
to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons 
professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference 
to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.
26. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious 
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right -
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and 
charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with l a w ."2
The written protection as given in the Articles of freedom of religion 
was much needed in the context of India, especially to maintain communal
harmony between Hindus and Muslims. Religion played a tragic part resulting
in communal strife between Hindus and Muslims for many decades. By framing 
the Articles the framers of the Constitution have kept religion away from 
politics.^ The guarantee of freedom of religion as granted by the Constitution
1. Art. 27 forbids levy of taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any 
particular religion. Art. 28 prescribes inter alia that no religious 
instruction shall be provided in any state-maintained educational 
institutions. (See D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, 5th
ed., S.C. Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, 1967* 1&7; by the same author, 
Constitutional Law of India, New Delhi, 197S, 88-9.)
2. The Constitution of India, Commemorative Edition, Ministry of Law,
New Delhi, 1973, 10.
3. K.P. Dubey, op.cit., 41.
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1
to all persons, is also needed for their liberty, dignity and well-being.
The need for such a guarantee arises also,
Mfrom the fact that the minority might well suffer from the 
thoughtless or perverse arrangements which the majority might 
think fit to enact as laws, and communal harmony is best 
achieved if each individual is not only free to practise his 
religion but is also (in P.K. Tripathi's appropriate way of 
putting it) free from the religions of his2fellow citizens, 
whether of his own, or another community".
So far as the right to freedom of religion of any individual is concerned,
3
Art. 25 is the most important base of protection securing to him the
freedom of conscience, the right freely to profess, practise and propagate
religion (Art. 25(1)). But this freedom as guaranteed in the Article is
not an absolute one; it is subject to restrictions which may be imposed by
the State on grounds of (i) public order, morality and (ii) other provisions
of Part III of the Constitution (Art. 25(1)); (iii) regulating non-religious
activity associated with religious practice (Art. 25(2)(a)), and (iv) for
if
providing social welfare and reforms or throwing open of Hindu public
religious institutions to all sections of Hindus (Art. 25(2)(b)).
5
Art. 25 is concerned with the right of an individual to freedom of religion 
while Art. 26 provides for the right of every religious denomination or any 
of its sections^ to establish and maintain institutions for religious
1. P. Sarojini Reddy, Judicial Review of Fundamental Rights, National 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1976, 165.
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "Examples of Freedom of Religion in Modern India", 
Contributions to Asian Studies, Vol. 10, 1977* **2-51» +^2.
5. S.P. Sharma, "Freedom in Matters of Religion", in M. Imam (ed.),
Minorities and the Law, Indian Law Institute Publication, N.M. Tripathi, 
Bombay, 1972, 263-277, 266.
*f. M.C. Setalvad, Secularism, Publication Division (Govt, of India), New 
Delhi, 1967, 21.
5 . The right is not confined to Indian citizens only. "Art. 25 of The 
Constitution guarantees to every person and not merely to the citizens 
of India the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess 
practise and propagate religion". Per Mukherjea, J., Ratilal 
Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 195^  SC 388, 391*
6. It was held that Art. 26 covered both religious denominations and their 
sections such as mutts or spiritual fraternity. See K.R. Naik v. State, 
AIR 197^ Knt.129.
1*f
and charitable purposes (Art. 26(a)). Every religious institution is
entitled to manage its own affairs in matters of religion (Art. 26(b))
and to own and acquire movable and immovable property (Art. 26(c)). But
such property is to be administered by the religious denomination in accordance
with law (Art. 26(d)). The right as conferred on a religious denomination
under Art. 26 falls into two parts - the one. dealing with religion and matters
relating to it, and the other is concerned with matters which are not essentially
religious and fall into the category of secular activities being subject to
the ordinary laws of the land. Thus the State is empowered by law to control
the administration and management of property owned by religious denominations.
It was this power which led the states of Madras and Bombay to enact the
statutes of the Madras Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 and the
?Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.
Now, so far as the provisions of freedom of religion are concerned, there 
has been a difference of opinion regarding the question as to what matters 
constitute religious practices. The question was first dealt with by the 
Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa.^  In that case, the 
Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act (25 of 19^ 6) was impugned
on the ground that it contravened Art. 25 of the Constitution. Rejecting 
the contention of the defendant that polygamy was an integral part of the 
Hindu religion, Chagla, C.J. ruled that
1 Va sharp-distinction must be drawn between religious, faith and
1. The expression ’’denomination" includes denominations of all persons 
including those of aliens: S.K. Patro v. State of Bihar AIR 1959 Pat 39*+»
2. J.M. Shelat, Secularism: Principles and Applications, N.M. Tripathi, 
Bombay, 1972, 100-101.
5. AIR 1952 Bom Bk.
The case was followed and the principle was applied by the same Court 
in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji, AIR 1953 Bom 183. 
In that case the constitutional-validity of the Bombay Prevention of 
Excommunications Act (^ 2 of 19^ 9) was. challenged by the defendant on the 
grounds that it contravened Arts. 25 and 26, but the Court did not uphold 
that contention. The suit was filed by the plaintiff for a declaration 
that two excommunication orders passed by the Head Priest of the Dawoodi 
Bohra Community, the defendant,, were void and illegal.
belief and religious practices.What the State protects is religious 
faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public
Chagls,C,«J. followed the view held in Reynolds-T,United States US 98 145 
(1879)(coviction of a Mormon for polygamy), Reynolds* case has been dis­
cussed elaborately by T.Kawai in Religious Provisions in Indian and Ame­
rican Constitutions,Ph.D thesis(unpublished)» Professor £)errett has 
told me about this. The thesis is not seen by me, ?? has not yet been cata­
logued either by the Senate or by the SOAS/library, University of London*
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. 1
order, morality or health or a policy of social welfare upon 
which the State has embarked, then the religious practices must  ^
give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole.”
This is a point of view which could appeal to many observers versed in
United States constitutional law, and can be described as ’’cosmopolitan”.
The Madras High Court took the same line in Srinivasa Aiyar v. Saraswathi
Ammal as the Bombay High Court did in the above case of Narasu Appa,
where the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act (6 of 19^ 9) was
impugned on the ground that the Act was ultra vires, contravening
Art. 25(1) of the Constitution. Rejecting that claim of the petitioners,
the High Court held that
’’The religious practice therefore may be controlled by legislation 
if the State thinks that in the interests of social welfare and 
reform it is necessary to do so.”5
In another bigamy case (Ram Prasad v. State of U.P.)^  the petitioner, 
a state Government engineer, who had married in 193*+ ♦ had not any surviving 
male child, and wanted to marry again. At the instigation of his (the 
petitioner’s) wife, the Chief Engineer refused to give him permission to 
remarry without the permission of the Uttar Pradesh Government. He 
petitioned for a writ of mandamus commanding the State of U.P. to dispose 
of his two applications in accordance with the Sastra and contended that 
Rule 27 of the U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, which provided that 
a Government Servant could not marry a second wife, was violative of the 
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 25 of the Constitution. The High
1. The same view has been expressed in a different language and in a 
different context by Gajendragadkar when he says that ’’Though the Con­
stitution guarantees freedom to all religions, it recognizes that in 
certain aspects, and under certain conditions, religious practices
may infringe upon socio-economic problems and the Constitution has made it 
clear that whenever socio-economic problems or relations are involved, 
the State will have a right to interfere in the interests of public good." 
P.B. Gajendragadkar "Secularism: Its Implications for Law and Life in 
India” in G.S. Sharma (ed.) Secularism: Its Implications for .Law and Life 
in India, N.M. Tripathi,Bombay, 1966, 1 -b,, *f-5. '
2. AIR 1952 Bom 8*», 86. 3- AIR .1952 Mad 193*
4. AIR 1952 Bom 8*t. 5. AIR 1952 Mad 195, 1.96.
6. AIR 1957 A11.V11.
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Court of Allahabad did not uphold the contention of the petitioner..
Mehrotra, J. observed for the Court that ,
"I have come to the conclusion that the act of performing a 
second marriage in the presence of the first wife cannot be 
regarded as an integral part of the Hindu religion, nor can it be 
regarded as practising or propagating the Hindu religion which is 
protected under Art. 25 of the Constitution. Even if.bigamy 
be regarded as an integral part of the Hindu religion the impugned 
rule is protected under Art. 25(b) of the Constitution.
Thus the
"courts can discard as non essential anything which is not proved 
to their satisfaction ... to be essential, with the result that 
it would have no constitutional protection. The Constitution 
does not say 'freely to profess, practise and propagate th| 
essentials of religion,1 but this is how it is construed."
Moreover, the expressions 'social welfare and reform' in Art. 25(2)(b) of
the Constitution could evidently be used as an instrument for attacking
3
any profession or propagation of any religion and we have seen the use
of that instrument by both the Bombay and Madras High Courts in the bigamy
cases as mentioned above.
But this narrow 'cosmopolitan' interpretation of 'religion' confining it
in effect to religious beliefs, was not accepted by the Supreme Court of
India. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Hindu Religious
kEndowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, Shirur, in which 
Arts. 25 and 26 were relied on to invalidate certain provisions of the Madras 
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951* marked a radical 
departure from the view of religion as held by the Bombay High Court. In
1. AIR 1957 All 1^1, k'lk.
2. J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (hereafter referred
to as RLSI), Faber and Faber, London, 196b, *447-
3. Ibid., pp. Wf-V+5; see also Luthera, op.cit., 113, where, referring
to the limitation clause 1 of Art. 25, he says that "the provision, as
it stands, does vest authority in the state which empowers it to invade 
the realms of conscience of the individual on the grounds mentioned 
above."
*+. AIR 195^ SC 282. The Shirur Math Case. 'Math' has an alternative 
spelling, 'mutt'. .
1?
1
that case, the Mathadipathi of the Shirur Math alleged that several
provisions of the said Madras Act and action taken against him thereunder
infringed some of his fundamental rights and those provisions were, as
a result, void and unconstitutional. Mukherjea, J. as he then was,
delivering the judgement for the Supreme Court, observed that
’’The guarantee under our Constitution not only protects the 
freedom of religious opinion but it protects also acts done 
in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by the use 
of the expression 'practice of religion' in Art. 25.”2
The learned Judge was greatly influenced in his view by a decision of the
High Court of Australia and he observed that
"Latham, C.J. of the High Court of Australia while dealing with 
the provision of S.116, Australian Constitution which 'inter alia' 
forbids the Commonwealth to prohibit the 'free exercise of any 
religion' made the following weighty observation - vide Adelaide 
Company v. The Commonwealth, 67 CLR 116 at P. 127 (H):
"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of 
freedom of religion that, though the civil government should 
not interfere with religious 'opinions’, it nevertheless may 
deal as it pleases with any 'acts' which are done in pursuance
of religious beliefs without infringing with the principle of
freedom of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to main­
tain this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of S. 116.
The section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion 
and therefore it is intended to protect from the operation of any
Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion.
It also protects acts done in pursuance of religious belief as 
part of religion."3
Although the Indian Supreme Court quoted..an important Australian decision,
it must not be supposed that the concept was and is not thoroughly consistent
with Indian ideas and Indian needs. A 'cosmopolitan' definition of 'religion'
would ignore many facets of Indian (not merely Hindu) type as we shall see.
Again the Supreme Court dealt with the administrative aspect of a
religious denomination and held that so far as the administration of property
1. The same math figured later on in S.T. Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu 
Religious and Charitable Endowments’, Mysore (AIR 1963 SC 966). In that 
case, the petitioners challenged the validity of Section 51(1)(f) of 
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act (19 of 1951) unsuccessfully. The 
aforesaid sub-section empowered the Commissioner to remove a trustee of 
a math for several reasons, as stated in the sub-section.
2. AIR 195^ SC 280, 290. 5* Ibid., p. 290.
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belonging to a religious denomination was concerned, the right of a 
denomination to administer such property was a fundamental right guaranteed 
under Art. 26(d) of the Constitution but that right was subject to such 
regulations and restrictions as imposed by law. Thus the learned Judge 
ruled that
”It should be noticed however that under Art. 26(d), it is the 
fundamental right of a religious denomination or its representative 
to administer its properties in accordance with law; and the law, 
therefore, must leave the right of administration to the religious 
denomination itself subject to such restrictions and regulations 
as it might choose to impose.
MA law which takes away the right of administration from the 
hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in any 
other authority would amount to a violation of the right 
guaranteed under cl. (d) of Art. 26.”
Now Section 21 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments
Act, 1951 empowered the Commissioner and some persons to enter the premises
of any religious institution to discharge their duties or to exercise their
powers under the Act. That section was the only one which was struck down
under Art. 25 &/£ it did not provide any safeguards regarding the parts of
the premises, ceremonies of a religious institution, etc. In this context
the Court held that
”It is well known that there could be no such thing as an unregulated 
and unrestricted right of entry in a public temple or other religious 
institutions for persons who are not connected with the spiritual 
functions thereof. We think that as the section stands, it interferes
1. The principle was applied in many cases. It was reiterated by the same 
learned Judge in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 195^ SC 
588 which we will be discussing later in the present section. The case 
of Ratilal was followed and the principle was applied in Krishnan v. 
Guruvayoor Devashom, 1979 KLT 350 (FB) which has been discussed below.
The principle was also discussed in The State of MP v. Mahant Kamal Puri, 
AIR 1965 MP 183 which was related to the administration of the temple of 
Kali Mata at Basaiya,and the issue was the interpretation of a certain 
section of the Gwalior State Places of Worship and Religious Endowments 
Aid and Administration Act (Gwalior Act) (Samvat 1983). The High Court 
ruled that the language in the section was meant for ’’restoring proper 
managemait of a place of worship and its property for fulfilling the 
objects of the founder.” (Per Pandey, J. at 185).
2. AIR 195^  SC 282, 291.
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with the fundamental rights of the Mathadipathi and the 
denomination of which he is head guaranteed under Arts. 25 
and 26 of the Constitution.’’^
Referring to section 56 which empowered the Commissioner to call upon
the trustees to appoint a manager to administer the secular affairs of the
institution and in case of default, the Commissioner himself could make
such an appointment, the Court held that
’’the effect of the section really is that the Commissioner is 
at liberty at any moment he chooses to deprive the Mahant of 
his right to administer the trust property even if there is no 
negligence or maladministration on his part. Such restriction 
would be opposed to the provision of Art. 26(d) of the Constitution. 
It would cripple his authority as Mahant altogether and reduce his 
position to that of an ordinary priest or paid servant.”^
Again, rejecting the view of 'religion' as held by the Bombay High Court
following the rigid definition of religion as given in an American case,
(vide Davis v. Beason (1888) 133 US 333 at P.3^ 2), the Supreme Court gave
its own definition of religion when it held that
’’Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or 
communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well 
known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not
1. But the violation of rights of an individual as guaranteed under Art. 25 
by another individual is not within the scope of Art. 25. What is provided
in the Article is express prohibition of the legislative interference
with these rights. See Ushaben v. Bhagyalaxmi Chitra Mandir, AIR 1978 
Guj 13. The case was concerned with exhibiting a picture called ”Jai 
Santoshi Maa”. In that case, the High Court of Gujarat referred to the 
Supreme Court case of P.P. Shamadasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 
1952 SC 59» which ruled that Arts. 19 and 31 of the Constitution are 
not meant for protection of violation of rights by an individual. The 
Gujarat High Court seemed to extend the ruling of the Supreme Court for 
applying it in the case of Art. 25 as well.
2. Per Mukherjea, J. AIR 195*+ SC 282, 292.
3. Ibid., pp. 293-29^ . A more or less similar argument was applied in the 
facts of Narayan Pershad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 Hyd. 82, 86 in 
which the Hyderabad Endowments Regulation (135 8 H.) was impugned.
Referring to the decision in the present case, Ansari, J. observed that 
’’The decision appears to me to be sound on principle for if under
Art. 26(d) a State is to take away the right to:.administer the property 
there is no substance in allowing.the denomination to own and acquire 
property. Then by allowing administration according to the 3ay, the intention 
is that it must be by the persons entitled to it under the trust and not 
by the State on their behalf”..
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believe in God or in any Intelligent First Cause. A religion 
undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines 
which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive 
to their spiritual well-being, but it would not be correct to say 
that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion 
may not only lay down a code or ethical rules for its followers to 
accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies 
and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of 
religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to 
matters of religion.”
The Supreme Court also considered the question whether a mahant had a
proprietary right as then guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f)^  of the Constitution
and held that ’’the Mahant has the right to enjoy this property or beneficial
kinterest so long as he is entitled to hold his office.”
Thus the judgement of the Supreme Court in the Shirur Math case^
indicated the mahants* right of property and the right of a religious
denomination to manage its own affairs.
”This was a step that might have been more carefully considered 
in view of the attitude adopted later by witnesses before the 
Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, namely that in fact the 
mahant's interests were often adverse to the community or 
'denomination' which he was supposed to serve.”
Ho doubt, the decision in the present case was a pioneer one involving
important deliberations on different issues relating to both Arts.25 and 26.
But the learned Judge seemed to have overlooked some vital provisions of
both these two Articles. Thus Tripathi observes that
"For instance, in the course of the entire discussion while the 
Court had several occasions to mention "public order" "health" 
and "morality" as the overriding interests qualifying the right 
in Art. 25 the important reservation couched in the words "and 
to the other provisions of this Part" never seems to have been
1. Even offerings of food are matters of religion as held in S.A.
Srinivasmurthy v. Commr C. & H.R.I. & E, AIR 1973 AP 3^ 5; see also
Acharaj Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 19&7 Pat 114.
2. AIR 195^ SC 282, 290.
5» The provision under Art. 19(1)(f) which used to provide that every 
citizen had a fundamental right "to acquire, hold and dispose of 
property" is no longer in force due to the introduction of the Consti
tution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, in 1979*
k. AIR 1954 SC 282, 288. 5. AIR 195^ SC 282.
6. Derrett, RLSI, 9^5-^96. -
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noticed by the Court. Not at one place does this reservation 
seem to have been mentioned in .the entire judgment. To furnish 
another example of similar oversight, the following observations 
regarding the relative significance of the rights in clause (b) 
of article 26, on the one hand and of those in clause (c) and
(d) of the same article on the other may be noticed:
’It will be seen that besides the right to manage its own 
affairs in matters of religion, which is given by cl. (b) the 
next two clauses of Art. 26 guarantee to a religious denomination 
the right to acquire and own property and to administer such 
property in accordance with law. The administration of its 
property by a religious denomination has been placed on a different 
footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of 
religion. The latter is a fundamental right which no legislature 
can take away, whereas the former can be regulated by laws which 
the legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that 
the equations merely relating to administration of property belong­
ing to a religious group or institutions are not matters of religion 
to which cl. (b) of the Article applies.1-
’’The words the ’’latter is a fundamental right which no legislature 
can take away” seem to igricre the opening words' of article 26 which 
subject this right, as indeed all others in the article, to ’’public 
order, morality and health.”1
But if the aforesaid observations of Mukherjea, J. would have included the
words ’’Subject to public order, morality and health”, would it make any
difference so far as the principle as laid down in the observations was
concerned? In my opinion in the context of the management of a religious
denomination's own affairs in matters of religion, the ruling would have
been the same as above, whether or not the opening words of Art. 26 were
taken into account by any Court.
2
In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, the Supreme Court 
setting aside the order of the Bombay High Court, adopted the same reasoning as
in Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
3 *+Tirtha Swamiar, Shirur, popularly known as the Shirur Math case , and
1. P.K. Tripathi, Spotlights on Constitutional Interpretation, N.M. Tripathi, 
Bombay, 1973♦ 113»
2. AIR 195*+ SC 388. 3. AIR 1952* SC 282.
*+. In Sri Jagannath Rammanuj v. State of Orissa, AIR 193^ SC *+00, the 
petitioners challenged the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act 
(*+ of 1939) on constitutional grounds. In that case the grounds upon 
which the validity of the Orissa act was challenged were substantially 
the same as were urged in challenging the constitutionality of the Madras 
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1931 ia the Shirur Math 
case (AIR 193^ SC 282). The Supreme Court held that secs. 38, 39 
the provision of sec. *+6 were invalid, but the rest of the Act was valid.
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the case was decided in the same year as the Shirur Math case. In that
case, the petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay
Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Act 29 of 1950) passed by the Bombay Legislature
to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of the public
and religious trusts in the State of Bombay. The Act was assailed on the
ground that it was in conflict with the freedom of religion and the right of a
religious denomination or its sects to manage their own affairs in matters
of religion guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In that
case, the Bombay High Court adopted a negative approach towards freedom of
religion as guaranteed by the Constitution of India. But when the case was
before the Supreme Court, it had a "much wider view of the fundamental right
and a more realistic, as well as more traditionally Indian view of what
1
religion is and how its nature and content should be determined." Thus
Mukherjea, J. as he then was, observed again for the Supreme Court that
2
"subject to the restrictions which this Article imposes, every 
person las a fundamental right under our Constitution not merely 
to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his 
judgment or conscience but to exhibit his belief and ideas in such 
overt acts as are enjoined or sanctioned by his religion and further 
to propagate his religious views for the edification of others. It 
is immaterial also whether the propagation is made by a person in his 
individual capacity or on behalf of any church or institution. The 
free exercise of religion by which is meant the performance of outward 
acts in pursuance of religious belief, is, as stated above, subject 
to State regulation imposed to secure order, public health and morals 
of the people.
"What sub. cl. (a) of cl. (2) of Article 25 contemplates is not 
State regulation of the religious practices as such which are 
protected unless they run counter to public health or morality but 
of activities which are really of an economic, commercial or political 
character though they are associated with religious practices.
"In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management 
given to a religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no 
legislation cam take away. On the other hemd as regards administration 
of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and
1. Derrett, RLSI, 463-
2. The Article which was referred to there was Art. 25.
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acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to administer such property 
but only in accordance with law. This means that the State can 
regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws 
validly enacted, but here again it should be remembered that under 
Art. 26(d), it is the religious denomination itself which has 
been given the right to administer its property in accordance 
with any law which the State may validly impose."^
Thus the Supreme Court, rejecting the narrow view of religion taken by 
the Bombay High Court, demonstrated clearly the boundaries within which 
the religious rights of individuals and those of denominations as also 
the legislative interference in the management of properties belonging 
to such denominations, could affect each other.^
kIn Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore the appellants challenged 
the validity of the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act, 19^ 7» on the 
ground that the Sri Venkataramana temple at Moolky Petah was not a public
1. In Sangli Municipality v. Sheshappa Bala, AIR 1971 Bom 99» the local 
authority wanted to construct a road through a burial ground used by 
the Lingayat Community. It was held that in the absence of law made 
under Art. 252, the rights of a community based upon well established 
usage governing burial grounds, could not be encroached upon. But in 
more or less similar circumstances, the Allahabad High Court did not 
accept the arguments of the petitioner in Mohd. Ali Khan v. Lucknow 
Municipality AIR 1978 All 280, that the land on which a mosque stood and 
where a grave existed could not be the subject matter of acquisition in 
view of Arts. 25 and 26. But the right to property of an individual
professing a particular religion is not a religious right as held by the
Bombay High Court in Vasudo v. State, AIR 1976 Bora 9^ - In that case the 
appellant challenged the constitutional validity of the Maharastra Agri­
cultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act (27 of 1961). But as against 
the contention of the appellant that the Act was violative of Art. 25 of 
the Constitution, (at p.105) Masodkar, J. ruled that "Only because a 
person happens to be propagating or following a particular religion,
it can not be said that his right to property is also a religious right."
2. AIR 193** SC 388, 391-392.
3. But in K.W. Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Madras Legislature by providing in some Acts (for
example, the Madras Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) 
Act, 1963) for acquisition of properties belonging to religious denomi­
nations had not contravened Art. 26 of the Constitution. The "denomi­
nations can own, acquire properties and administer them in accordance 
with law. That does not mean that the property owned by them cannot
be acquired...Article 26 does not interfere with the right of the State 
to acquire property". - per Hegde, J. at 165* The same view has been 
reiterated by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Mahant Ram 
Kishan Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 1576, 1376-1577-
*+. AIR 1958 SC 255-
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temple. It was also contended that if the said temple was a public temple,
the Act was ultra vires in so far as it authorised Hindus of all sections
to enter it freely thereby infringing the rights of the denomination (Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins) or the community guaranteed under Art. 25(b) providing
a denomination's right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.
In short, the main question for decision was whether the right of a religious
denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, protected
under Art. 26(b), was subject to the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act,
19**7» a law protected by Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, throwing open
1
a Hindu public temple to all sections of Hindus. The Supreme Court solved
the issue by holding that the right guaranteed under Art. 25(2)(b) is
conferred on all classes and sections of Hindus
"to enter into a public temple and on the unqualified, terms of 
that Art., that right must be available, whether it is sought to 
be exercised against an individual under Art. 250) or against a 
denomination under Art. 25(b). The fact is that though Art. 25(1) 
deals with the rights of individuals, Art. 25(2) is much wider in 
its contents and has reference to the rights of communities, and 
controls both Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b)."^
Again, in that case, the Supreme Court could not be moved by the appellant's 
argument that the conflict between the rights under Art. 25(b) and Art. 25 
(2)(b) could be avoided if a religious institution of a public character 
would have been understood as meaning an institution dedicated to the Hindu 
community in general, but some sections of the community could be banned by 
custom from entering into it. The contention of the appellants was based
1. The right of entry to any public temple is meant for Hindus only. Thus 
in Kalyan Pass v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1973 Mad 26**, the petitioner 
challenge^^Ui^validity^T^uleT^XTramed under the power given to the 
Government under the Tamil Nadu Temple Entry Authorization Act (Act 5 
of 19*+7) allowing non-Hindus to enter Hindu Temples if the High Court 
held it as ultra vires. Rao, J. observed that "Prior to these enactments 
a social evil pervaded the Hindu community which excluded certain classes 
of Hindus firm enjoying certain privileges which included the rights of entry of 
such depressed classes into the temple. This ban was removed by legis­
lation. But it is to be noted that the ban was lifted in so far as it
•affected a part of the Hindu community and not non-Hindus." AIR 1973 
Mad 26**, 267.
2. Per Venkatarama Aiyar, J., AIR 193& SC 2551 268.
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on two cases of the Madras High Court, and in one of the cases (the
2
case of Venkatachalapathi ) the Court had approved the rule of the Agamas
that a temple was meant for all castes subject to some restrictions, viz.
that Sudras and Bahiyas could go into the hall of the temple. Pariahs
could not go even into the court of the temple, but the Brahmins could
go into the holy of holies. The Agamas contain the rules relating to
the installation of images, construction of temples, conduct of worship,
etc. The Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of the Madras Act was to
remove disabilities to which some sections of Hindus were subject by
custom and usage in respect of the entry into, and offering worship in,
Hindu temples but it offered an
"intelligent compromise, whereby all the religious objections 
of the community appeared to be preserved, while at the same 
time the benefit accorded to Harijans, and to others who though 
not Harijans would have been excluded because they were not 
members of the community, appeared not to have been diminished 
- for Temple Entry remained valid, save that the trustees and 
priests could exclude from the more sacred parts of the temple 
any one they chose during times when the idol was supposed to be 
resting or at times when those services were being conducted .. 
which only specially initiated persons were entitlted to attend."
But the fact is that in not accepting the Agamas, the Supreme Court has
ignored the right of some sections of Hindus based on Hinduism (as the
Agamas• is part and parcel of Hinduism) to exclude others from entering
a temple. It seems that the whole exercise of the Court.was to find social
equity and justice which were denied to the Harijans. In Shastri Yagna-
kpurushdasji v. Muldas, popularly known as the Satsang case , sec. 3 of 
the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorization) Act (3^  of 
1956) was challenged on the ground that it was violative of Art. 26(b) of 
the Constitution. Gajendragadkar, C.J., who spoke for the Supreme Court,
1. Venkatachalapathi v. Subbarayadu ILR (I89O) 13 Mad 293 and Gopala 
Muppanar v. Subramania (191*0 27 M U  253*
2. Ibid.
3. Derrett, BLSI, 468-^ 69- 
k. AIR 1966 SC 1119.
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pointed out that
"We do not think that by enacting S3, the Bombay Legislature 
intended to invade the traditional and conventional manner in 
which the act of actual worship of the deity is allowed to be 
performed only by the authorised poojaris of the temple... all 
that S3 purports to do is to give the Harijans the same right 
to enter the temple, to worship in the temple, to pray in it or 
. to perform any religious service therein which has been conferred 
by S3 is specially qualified by the Clause that the said right 
will be enjoyed in the like manner and to the like extent as any 
other Hindu of whatsoever section or class may do. The main 
object of the section is to establish complete social equality 
between all sections of the Hindus in the matter of worship 
specified by S3;"."'
Thus, the Supreme Court acted as a reformer of Hinduism in so far as
it granted the right of entry to the Harijans into the temple thereby allowing
them to participate on the same footing as other caste Hindus who were
2
allowed to enter into a temple freely but not authorised to perform the act
of actual worship. It is submitted that the judgement is sound according
to both the spirit and the letter of Art. 23(2)(b) of the Constitution. It
seems that in the present case, the Supreme Court unlike the case of Sri
Venkataramana Devaru,^  did not hand over a compromise formula between the
rule of Agamas and the claim of the Harijans.
if
In Sardar Sarup Singh v. State of Punjab the petitioners challenged the 
constitutional validity of the Punjab Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, on the ground 
that it violated their fundamental right conferred on them under Art. 26(b)
1. AIR 1966 SC 1119, 1127.
2. The case of Nar Hari Shastri v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee, AIR
1952 SC 2^ 5, was concerned not with the right of Harijans but with 
the right of entry of pandas into the Badrinath Temple along with 
their yajmans or clients. The pandas were Brahmins,and there was
no constitutional question relating to Arts. 25 and 26 involved in the 
case,and the court held that the pandas had a legal right of entry 
into the temple but with some restrictions which the committee might 
impose in good faith for maintaining the order aid decorum of the temple.
3. AIR 1958 SC 255.
k. AIR 1959 SC 860.
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of the Constitution by preventing direct election of officers to 
manage Sikh Gurdwaras on a universal denominational suffrage. It was 
held by the Supreme Court that the method of representation to the board 
to manage a Sikh Gurdwara was not a matter of religion. The Court observed 
obiter that "under article 26(b) a religious denomination or organisation 
enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rights and
1
ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold."
As we shall see it is not clear whether the implications of this apparently 
reasonable statement were fully understood at the time. The Court 
emphasised the word ’essential' and in fact, it had laid down the same
principles in the present case as it had done before eg. in the Shirur
2 3Math Case and in the case of Shri Venkataramana Devaru, popularly known
as Devaru's case.
kIn Moti Das v. S.F. Shahi, the appellants challenged the constitutionality
of certain provisions of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (1 of 1951)*
They submitted that the power given to the Boaidby the Act to alter or
modify the budget of a religious trust affected adversely the due observance
of religious properties in a temple and thus constituted an encroachment on
the freedom of religion guaranteed under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
Rejecting this contention of the appellants, Das, J. held that
"the provisions of the Act seek to implement the purposes for
which the trust was created and prevent mismanagement and waste
by trustees. In other words, by its several provisions, it seeks
to fulfil rather than defeat the trust.
1. Per Das, J., AIR 1959 SC 860, 865- 2. AIR 1952* SC 282.
3* AIR 1958 SC 255. AIR 1959 SC 9^ 2.
5. Ibid., p.950. The present case should not be mixed up with another
case namely, Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Shahi, AIR 1959 SC 95^ • Though 
in that case too the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act 1950 was 
assailed, unlike the present case, it was not challenged on the ground 
that it violated the fundamental right as guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 
26. The real controversy of the case centred round the issue whether 
the Board could call upon the appellant to file a statement of income 
and expenditure of the properties belonging to the temple at Salonna 
as alleged to be private properties by the appellant.
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Similarly in Sri Kanyakaparameswari Anna Satram Committee v. The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments the Andhra
Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act
(17 of 1966) was challenged on the ground that it infringed the right
of the denominational institution of the first plaintiff as guaranteed
under Art. 26, but the High Court ruled that
"In this case, by the appointment of the Executive Officer, 
there is no interference with the constitution of the Governing 
Body. But the Executive Officer is appointed for better manage­
ment of the Institution.
In Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Hussain Ali,^  the applicants challenged 
the DurgdiKhawaja Saheb Act, 1955» which was concerned with the adminis­
tration of the trust related to ’the durgah’ (tomb) of Khavaja Moinuddin 
Chisti, situated at Ajmer, to which both Hindus and Muslims made offerings 
and of which sometimes Hindus had been administrators, on the ground that 
it violated several constitutional provisions affecting the freedom of 
religion guaranteed under Art. 26(b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution. 
Rejecting the contention of the respondents, Gajendragadkar, J. speaking 
for the Supreme Court, held the same view as expressed earlier in the 
Shirur Math case' and in Devaru*s case that according to Art. 26(b) 
matters of religion included practices which were regarded by the particular 
community as integral parts of religion. Moreover, the learned judge 
sounded a note of caution when he added that
’’Whilst we are dealing with this part it may not be out of place 
incidentally to strike a note of caution and observe that in 
order that the practices in question should be treated as a part 
of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its 
essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular 
practices which are not an essential or an. integral part of religion, 
are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim 
for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of 
Art. 26. Similarly even practices though religious may have 
sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be 
extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless
1. AIR 1979 AP 121.
2. Ibid., p. 125.
3. AIR 1961 SC 1*+02.
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such practices are found to constitute an essential and 
integral part of a religion their claim for the protection 
under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinized; in other 
words, the protection must be confined to such religious 
practices as are essential and an integral part of it and 
no other.
Referring to the said important ’rjote of caution’ uttered by Gajendrag-
adkar, J., Tripathi observed that ’’The learned Judge ... was clear in his
opinion that the doctrine of autogenesis of denominational powers laid
2down by the Court in the Swamiar and Devaru cases needed severely to be 
restricted if not rejected.”^
The aforesaid ’’note of caution” had been accepted by the Supreme Court
A-at large, as has been pointed out by Dsrrett and quoted by Sinha, C.J.,
in his dissenting judgement in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v.
5 6State of Bombay, also known as the ’’Excommunication case”. In that case,
the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 19^ 9, was impugned on the
ground that the provisions of the Act infringed Arts. 25 and 26 of the
1. Ibid., p.1^ 15. In this context Ghouse points out that ’’There is nothing 
new in what Justice Gajendragadkar suggested. The dictum in Lakshmindra 
(AIR 195^  SC 282) that the essentialness of a religious practice should 
be determined with reference to the doctrines of the religion itself 
implied that this could be done on the basis of adduced evidence.” M. 
Ghouse, Secularism, Society and Law in India, Vikas Publishing House,
Delhi, 1973, 132. Here I cannot agree. On the contrary what is said 
develops unwarrantably and obiter what at best can be said to be latent 
in what was known before.
2. By this the learned author means Commissioner of Hindu Religious 
Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshimindra Thirtha Swamiar, Shirur, AIR
1954 SC 282.
3. P.K. Tripathi, op.cit., 117. Derrett, RLSI, V?8.
5. AIR 1963 SC 853* The case was referred to and the position of law relating 
to Arts. 25 and 26 as had been summarised in the case has been approved of 
in E.R.J. Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 15^ 6, 1593*
In that case, the pditioners, the hereditary archaks and mathadipatis 
of some ancient Hindu public temples in Madras, claimed that the Tamil 
Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1970 
infringed their freedom of religion secured to them by Art. 25 and 26 of 
the Constitution. But their claim was not upheld by the Supreme Court.
6. ”The modern, somewhat vague, urge towards liberty to hold any or no opinions 
at pleasure is thus confronted 'by the traditional and ancient institution
of excommunication, a sanction which can be imposed for delinquencies of 
many sorts, not confined to matters of personal conscience, and which may, 
in Asia, have terrible results for those who cannot escape into a new faith 
or new society” - Derrett in his critique on the judgement in the Supreme 
Court case in ’’Freedom of Religion under the Indian Constitution: Excom­
munication (based on Sardar S.T.Saifuddin v.State of Bombay(1963)12 
ICLQ 693-697, 69^ -695.
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Constitution. The main claim of the petitioner, the head priest of the
Dawoodi Bohra community, was that section 3 of the Bombay Act violated
the right of his community and his right as the Dai, the head priest of
that community, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion as embodied
in Art. 26(b) of the Constitution. Accepting, the argument of the petitioner
and reversing the decision of the Bombay High Court which followed the
1
judgement in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, the Supreme Court held 
that
"what appears however to be clear is that where an excommunication 
itself is based on religious grounds such a lapse from the orthodox 
religious creed or doctrine (similar to what is considered heresy, 
apostasy or schism under the Canon Law) or breach of some practice 
considered as an essential part of the religion by the Dawoodi 
Bohrahs in general excommunication cannot but be held to be for 
the purpose of maintaining the strength of the religion. It 
necessarily follows that the exercise of this power of excommuni­
cation on religious grounds forms part of the management by the 
community through its religious head, of its own affairs in matters 
of religion."
In the context of the judgement in the Supreme Court case Derrett 
comments:
"At this stage it might be argued that provided the parties plead 
and prove that the practice is essentially religious the Courts 
will protect it to the extent that the constitutional guarantee is 
not qualified by the well known formulae, ’subject to public order, 
morality and health, economic, financial ... activity’, 'social 
welfare and reform', 'throwing open of Hindu religious institutions
11«3 • • • • **
But the ruling of the Court has subjected an individual's freedom of 
conscience and his right to profess, practise and propagate freely to 
the rights of the community or the denomination, and the legislature 
intended to diminish those rights by way of reform. It is submitted that 
if Art. 23(2)(b) "providing social welfare and reform" is a paramount
Zf
clause controlling Art. 26 as ruled in Devaru's case, as was pointed out
1.
2.
3-
AIR 1932 Bom 84. See below, this section.
Per Das Gupta, J. AIR 1962 SC 833*869. But decision was widely dis­
approved by constitutional lawyers, on the grounds that it would encourage 
capricious and retrograde acts by religious leaders, masking conservative 
and even vengeful policies behind a facade of religion" - Derrett, RLSI,
Derrett, ibid,, p. 477. AIR 1958 SC 233, 256. 4?5, footnote 2*
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by the Attorney General in this case also, then the majority decision 
of the Court should not have been as it has been. In short, Art. 25(2)(b) 
has been subjected to Art. 26 by the decision in the present case thereby 
contradicting the Court's own ruling on the supremacy of Art. 25(2)(b)
-j
over Art. 26 in Devaru's case. Moreover, there is much force in Sinha, 
C.J.'s observation dissenting that "though the Act may have its reper­
cussions on the religious aspect of excommunication, in so far as it
protects the civil rights of the members of the community it has not gone
2beyond the provisions of Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitution".
Unfortunately, in most of the States, excommunication as the weapon of
3
community or caste discipline is still in vogue and valid "except for the
if
prohibition of the practice of untouchability".
5
In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan, a case of great 
significance for our thesis, the Goswami or the spiritual head of the 
Nathdwara temple and certain persons representing the Vaishnavas of the 
Vallabha cult, for whose benefit the temple was founded, challenged the 
constitutionality of the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act, 1939* The Act
1. AIR 1958 SC 255, 256. 2. AIR 1962 SC 853, 865.
3. S. Varadiah Chetty v. P. Parthararathy Chetty (196*0 2 M.L.J. *+33«
In that case, the main question for decision of the High Court was 
how far a decision of a sub-sect of a caste to impose social segregation 
to its ex-Headman could be held valid. The Court upheld the alleged 
resolution of the community taken through its panchayat which amounted 
to excommunication of its former Headman.
Manna v. Ram Ghulam AIR 1950 All 619; Ellappa v. Ellappa AIR 1950 
Mad **09; Panduram v. Biswambar AIR 1958 Ori 259* I& all these cases, 
excommunication had been held valid. Realistic assessment of the 
Indian society had been made by Narasimham, C.J. when he observed in 
the case of Panduram AIR 1958 Ori 259, 259 that "It is true that the 
Constitution does not recognise caste but social customs have not 
changed notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution...."
*+. Derrett, RLSI, *f73»
5. AIR 1963 SC 1638.
32
vested the right to possession and management of the properties in a 
statutory Board and the Goswami was to be a member of the Board. He 
could be removed like other members by the State Government in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act,and section 16 of the Act transferred some . 
important religious functions from the Goswami to the Board. Reversing 
the decision of the High Court, the Supreme Court upheld the provisions 
of the Act,and in arriving at its decision it relied upon a "Firman”
(order) issued by the Maharana of Udaipur in 193^  to establish that the 
Tilkayat was merely a temporary custodian or a manager or a trustee of 
the property of the deity, and the Udaipur Darbar (i.e. the state) had 
the absolute right to see that the said property was used for legitimate 
purposes. Moreover, by relying on the said 'firman* the Court also 
wanted to establish that the law of Udaipur was that the succession to 
the "Gaddi" (seat) of the Tilkayat was governed by the rule of primogeniture 
(ie. the light of succession belonging to the first-born)and that "the 
Udaipur darbar has the absolute right to depose any Tilkayat maharaj for 
the time being if in its absolute discretion such Maharaj is considered 
unfit....
It has been pointed out by Tripathi that the Tilkayat and his denomination
have been denied constitutional guarantees because of the fact that the
Court has imported here the restrictions and denials perpetrated by
autocratic rulers during the pre-Constitution era:
"What the Udaipur Darbar did in the wilful exercise of his 
uncontrolled and unguided power need not be consecrated as the 
Hindu concept of a Mahant's powers in relation to his Gaddi or 
in regard to the management of the religious and secular affairs 
of his institution."2
1. AIR 1963 SC 1638, 1650.
2. Tripathi, op.cit., 121. However, what Tripathi omits to notice is that 
the Tilkayat1s claims were never satisfactorily proved and that they 
could rely upon a constitutional guarantee remained and remains a 
mere hypothesis. He is, however, with respect, right in commenting on 
the Supreme Court's eagerness to take advantage of the one piece of 
evidence that served to buttress the state’s power in the interest not 
of the Tilkayat but of the institution (on which he was parasitic).
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Again, apart from the observances on different issues as involved
in the case, we are also aware of the consciousness of the Court
regarding these heads of religious sects and their supporters that they
really were under the impression that their status and powers were a
matter of religion*
"There cannot be any doubt (we may interject) that the worshippers 
of the idol or idols really believe that by making donations which 
reach the Tilkayat's, or a similarly placed individual’s pocket, 
some spiritual benefit accrues to them, and his willingness to 
receive these donations, whether on God’s behalf or his own, is a 
condescension from which they derive religious satisfaction. ’’1
Another case originating from Udaipur came before the Supreme Court.
2
Thus in State of Rajasthan v. Sajjanlal, the petitioners complained that 
the temple of Sri Rikhebdevji, a Swetambar Jain temple, had been illegally 
taken over by the Devasthan Department of the State cf Rajasthan, and they 
challenged the validity of certain provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts 
Act, 1959 on the ground that they contravened the provisions of Arts. 25 
and 26 of the Constitution. But like the case of Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji,^  
the Court upheld the firmans or rulings of the pre-Constitution period as 
valid. It was the finding of the Court that the management of the temple 
in question had been taken over by the Ruler of Udaipur State and it 
virtually vested in the State through the Constitution.
It is true that in many cases of religious denominations, legislative 
interference has been held to be violative of constitutional provisions, 
but in some cases where a state’s interference has been urgently needed 
for the better administration of properties belonging to religious Jt
L
denominations, where the State is in duty bound to look after properties
1. Derrett, RLSI, <+79. 2. AIK 1975 SC 706. 5- AIK 1963 SC 1638.
k. In a major study of administrative machinery relating to temples and' 
maths in Madras State as established by the Madras Hindu Religious and 
Charitable Endowments Act (19 of 1931) 35 amended in 1959* Mudaliar came 
to the conclusion that the establishment of Hindu Religious and Charitable 
Endowments Department in Madras "has stimulated the authorities of the 
religious institutions into action. The temples are being better looked 
after and maths are adopting programmes of religious and social education 
on a large scale". - Chandra Y Mudaliar, The Secular State and Religious 
Institutions in India, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 197^1 2^ 5.
5**
of religious institutions to avoid any maladministration of those
institutions, delaying factors are adopted especially by wrongdoers
alleging contravention of their alleged fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution. For example, in Digiadarsan R.R. Varu v. State of 
1
Andhra Pradesh, the petitioner, a suspended head of a mutt called Shri 
Swami Hathiramji Math Tripathy Thirumalla, challenged the constitutional 
validity of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu 
Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966, and urged for an issuance 
of a writ in the nature of mandamus and direction to the Commissioner of 
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, prohibiting him from exercising 
his powers under the Act. In that case, the petitioner was placed under 
suspension because of an enquiry which was pending against him. He was 
(as not seldom is the case) involved in serious charges including leading 
an immoral life and misappropriation. The main attack of the petitioner 
was against the power given to the Commissioner instead of the Court by 
the Act to make an enquiry into the charges against the roahant, and to 
try him and order his removal if those charges were established. The 
Supreme Court dismissed this contention on the ground that if any order 
of removal was made, that could be agitated in a Court or in an appeal to 
the High Court. The Court did not also accept the argument of the petitioner 
that the Andhra Pradesh Act had violated the rights of the petitioner as 
guaranteed under Arts. 25 a d^ 26 of the Constitution. The decision in 
this case seems to be correct.
2Again in Raja Bira Kishore Deb, v. State of Orissa, the petitioner,
Raja Bira Kishore, challenged the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath 
Temple Act, 195** (Orissa Act 11 of 1955) on the ground that it infringed his 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Originally,
1. AIR 1970 SC 181 = (1969) 2 SCWR 851. See below, sec. k of the 6th 
chapter.
2. AIR 196^  SC 1501.
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when the petitioner filed his suit he did it claiming that the Shri
Jagannath temple was his private property and he was the owner of the
temple. But he gave up the plea that the temple was his property when
the case came before the High Court. He contended inter alia that the Act
was hit by Arts. 26, 27 and 28. But the main reliance was placed on
Art. 26(d) providing that subject to public order etc., every religious
denomination had the right to look after its property in accordance with
law. The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention and held that
"As a matter of fact, the petition was filed on the basis that 
the appellant was the owner of the temple which was his private 
property. There was no claim put forward on behalf of any 
denomination in the petition. Under these circumstances we are 
of opinion that it is not open to the appellant to argue that the 
Act is bad as it is hit by Art. 26(d) . " 1
Before it came to its conclusion, the Court made a review of the provisions
of the Orissa Act and found that those provisions were for the better
management of the secular affairs of the temple and they did not interfere
in its religious aspects. Property is here clearly separated from religion.
As a result, the appeal was dismissed with costs. In my opinion, this is
not enough. Litigants trying to appropriate property, which at first sight
can be presumed not to belong to them, under the armour of the Constitutional
provisions, should be amenable to the criminal law. It is at least an
attempt to deprive the deity of its property and to misappropriate or
convert it dishonestly. It is criminal breach of trust under sec. k05 and
punishable under sec. **06 of the Indian Penal Code, i860 (Act of 1860).^
1. Per Wanchoo, J.1510-1511.
2. Sec.405» Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property or with 
any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to
his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property 
in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such 
trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, expressed or implied, 
which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers 
any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".
Sec. J+06. Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished 
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
three years, or with fine, or with both.
"A necessary element of the offence of the criminal breach of trust is 
that there should be entrustment of property to the accused. The entrust- 
ment may be in any manner'’ - V.B. Eaju, Commentaries on the Indian Penal 
Code, vol. 2, 3rd ed., Eastern Book Co., Lalbagh, 197311^ 31*
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The highest Court should not merely dismiss as infructuous cases naively 
revealing the ulterior motives of the petitioner. Nobody could afford to 
come to the Supreme Court for a meagre amount of money. In such circum­
stances, the Supreme Court dismissing a case with costs should take into 
account the time spent in dealing with it. In that case, litigants will 
think twice before they agitate baseless demands through appeals in the 
Supreme Court. Their attempts to buy time should be made most costly.
The Constitution is not designed to aid unscrupulous money-hunting persons 
seated somehow in privileged positions.
The Constitution is there to provide protection for the deprived, and 
the Court redresses grievances arising out of actual contraventions of 
constitutional provisions. Thus in Krishnan v. Guruvayoor Devaswom the 
Full Bench of the Kerala High Court accepted the claim of the petitioner 
that the Guruvayoor Act, 1971 (Act 6 of 1971) as amended by Act 28 of 1972, 
was unconstitutional and void on the ground that it was violative of Arts.
1*f and 26 of the Constitution. The Act was enacted to make provisions for 
what purported to be the proper administration of the Guruvayoor Devaswom, 
the Guruvayoor temple. An indirect effect of the Act's provisions would be 
to give the state extraordinary patronage. Almost all the arguments put 
forward by the petitioner were accepted by the Court. The Full Bench found 
that the operative provisions of the Act as contained in some sections as 
challenged by the petitioner were invalid,and as a result the entire statute 
was rendered ineffective and void. The Kerala High Court particularly found 
that
2
"the provision of Section k (1) of the Act must be held to be 
bad for the reason that the power of nomination conferred on 
the Government is naked and arbitrary without any safeguard 
being provided for ensuring that the Committee will be a body 
representing the denomination. The right to administer the 
Temple being vested in the denomination, any statutory provision
1. 1979 KLT 330 (FB) = AIE 1978 Ker 68 (FB).
2. Section k deals with the composition of the managing committee.
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which completely ignores the denomination in the matter of 
setting up the Committee to administer the religious 
institution belonging to the denomination will necessarily 
be violative of Article 26 of the Constitution."^
Further, we know that under Art. 25 of the Constitution all persons
are entitled to propagate their religions. Eut that right to propagation
had been hammered out, not at all easily, by the framers of the Constitution,
to be included in the provisions of Art. 25. It was felt by one or two
members of the Constituent Assembly that a right to propagate freely one's
own religion might lead the Hindus to be affected by Muslim and Christian 
2propagandists. But those persons were unaware of the fact that Sikhism
3 4as a recognised branch of Hinduism, had a proselyting programme like Islam
and Christianity. The Constituent Assembly ultimately recognised that the
right to propagate was part and parcel of both Christianity and Islam.
Now, this right is literally secured not only to Christians and Muslims
but also to any person in India.
5
In Yulitha Hyde v. State of Orissa, the applicants, Christians, challenged 
the Constitutional validity of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act (20 of 
1968) on the ground that it infringed the fundamental right guaranteed under 
Art. 25 of the Constitution. They also petitioned the Orissa High Court to 
quash several criminal cases and to declare the said Act as ultra vires the 
Constitution. Section 3 of the Act which read that "No persons shall convert
or attempt to convert either directly or otherwise, any person from one
1. Per Eradi, J. 1979 KLT 330, 377-378 (FB) = AIR 1978 Ker 68 (FB), 93-
2. M. Ghouse, op.cit., 5*
3. The Arya Samaj, which propagates its religion, is also regarded as a.
branch of Hinduism as held in A.S.E. Trust v. Director,Education AIR 1976
Del 207. The Lingayats also propagate. But the definition of Hindu 
covers Buddhism only "for the special purposes of sub-cl.(b) of cl.(2)
of Art. 25 and no other" as observed by Mudholkar, J. in Punjab Rap v. 
P.P. Meshram AIR 1965 SC 1179* 1184. In that case the main question was,
whether the defendant who once was a member of a scheduled caste but had
embraced Buddhism, was entitled to be a candidate for election to the 
State Legislative Assembly from a constituency reserved for members of 
the scheduled castes.
4. J.D.M. Derrett, "Examples of Freedom of Religion", Contributions to 
Asian Studies, vol. 10, 1977* 42-51* 44-45.
5. AIR 1973 Ori. 116.
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religious faith to another by the use of force or by inducement or 
by any fraudulent means, nor shall any person abet any such conversion" 
was directly concerned with Christians' right to propagation. The High 
Court of Orissa accepted the arguments of the petitioners and ruled that:
"(1) Article 25(1) guarantees propagation of religion and 
conversion as a part of the Christian religion.
(2) Prohibition of conversion by force or by fraud as defined 
by the Act would be covered by the limitation subject to which 
the right is guaranteed under Art. 25(1).
2
(3) The definition of the term 'inducement' is vague and 
proselytizing activities may be covered by the definition and 
the restriction in Art. 25(1) cannot be said to cover the wide 
definition."3
But in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, a statute (the
M.P. Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968) corresponding to the Orissa Act
as mentioned above was impugned, but that was upheld by the Madhya Pradesh
High Court. The Court did not accept the reasoning- cf the judgement in the
Yulitha case  ^as put forward by the Counsel for the petitioner. The main
claim of the petitioner was that secs. 3»  ^and 5 of the M.P. Act were
violative of his fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 25 of the Constitution.
Sec. 3 of the Act prohibited conversion by use of force or allurement or
by fraud. Sec. k provided for punishment for violation of Sec. 3* Sec. 5
required the person converting anyone to give information of the incident
to the District Magistrate. Tare, C.J., who delivered the judgement of
the Court, observed that
MWehave to determine whether the M.P. Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam,
1968 violates Article 25(1) of the Constitution of India. In this 
connection we may observe that it is not merely the penal pro­
visions which ought to be considered in exclusion [ sic~~j. What is
1. AIR 1973 Ori. 116, 120.
2. Inducement "shall include the offer of any gift or gratification
either in cash or in kind, and shall also include the grant of any
benefit, either pecuniary or otherswise,..." Ibid., p. 120.
3. Per Misra, J., AIR 1973 Ori 116, 123.
4. AIR 1975 MP 163- 5. AIR 1973 Ori 116.
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penalised is conversion by force, fraud or by allurement. The 
other element is that every person has a right to profess his 
own religion and to act according to it. Any interference with 
the right of the other person by resorting to conversion by 
force, fraud or allurement cannot in our opinion, be said to 
contravene Article 250) of the Constitution of India. On the 
other hand, it guarantees that religious freedom to one and all 
including those who might be amenable to conversion by force, 
fraud or allurement.
The decision of the High Court seems to be right, as pointed out by 
2
Derrett, because of reported further disturbance relating to conversions 
in the State.
The aforesaid two cases of the Orissa High Court and the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court came before the Supreme Court and as the questions as raised 
in those cases were similar, they were dealt with together by the Supreme 
Court in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh.^  Approving dictionary 
meanings of the word "propagate", the Supreme Court referred to Art. 250) 
and held that
"what the Article grants is not the right to convert another 
person to one's own religion, but to transmit or spread one's 
religion by an exposition of its tenets. It has to be remembered 
that Article 250) guarantees "freedom of conscience" to every 
citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular 
religion, and that in turn, postulates that there is no fundamental 
right to convert another person to one's own religion, because if 
a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to 
his religion, as distinguished from his effort to transmit or 
spread the tenets of his religion, that would impinge on the 
"freedom of conscience" guaranteed to all the citizens of the 
country alike."?
But the fact is that in so far as Christianity is concerned, propagation
and conversion go hand in hand,and the conversion of a person of a different
religion into Christianity is an essential of that religion,and this was
5
clearly pointed out in the case of Yulitha in one of the submissions of 
the petitioners relating to the Sixteen Documents of Vatican II that
"The Lord commanded;
"Go therefore and make disciples of all nations baptizing 
them in the name of the Father and of the Son ... Go into the
1. AIR 1975 MP 163, 6^8. 2. Derrett,"Examples of Freedom of Religion",
3. AIR 1977 SC 908. . 51.
?. Per Ray, C.J^ , ibid., p.911..' 5. AIR 1973 Ori 116.
^0
whole world, preach the gospel to every creature...”
So in the present case, the Supreme Court did not come to the rescue 
of Christians when the Acts of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh violated their 
right to freedom of religion guaranteed under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
b. The Cow-Slaughter Cases
Most of the cases so far discussed in this section were concerned with 
alleged violation of the rights of Hindus and those of Hindu religious 
denominations. But the cases concerning the ban of cow slaughter which 
the Supreme Court dealt with, concerned Muslims in general. Those cases 
are popularly known as cow-slaughter cases which came before the Supreme 
Court for its ruling on issues alleged to infringe the fundamental rights 
of Muslims as guaranteed by the Constitution. In M.H. Quareshi v. State
p
of Bihar, the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of three 
legislative enactments banning slaughter of certain animals including 
cows, passed by the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.
The petitioners were Muslim butchers. The said enactments were assailed 
on several grounds including economic and religious grounds. They contended 
that the impugned Acts would compel them to close their business and would 
practically deny them the right to carry on their occupation or trade in 
spite of the mandatory provisions of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
Against this contention of the petitioners, the Supreme Court held that 
in so far as the said Acts prohibited the slaughter of cows of all ages, 
they were valid, but total prohibition of slaughter of she-buffalloes, 
breeding bulls and working bullocks without prescribing any test as to 
their age or unfitness as in the provision of those Acts is violative of 
Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The important but sensitive issue
1. AIR 1973 Ori 116, 118. 2. AIR 1958 SC 731.
3. Art. 19(1)(g) provides that ail citizens have the right to practise 
any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
See D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th ed. ,vol.l,S.C. 
Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta, 1965* 5^ 3*
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of the case centred around the .alleged violation of the right of Muslims 
to practise their religion as guaranteed under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
The petitioners argued that insoferas ihe impugned Acts prohibited totally the 
slaughter of cows, they infringed their fundamental right secured to them
1
by the said Article. But the Supreme Court did not approve this contention
and held that the sacrifice of a cow on the Bakr-Id-Day was not Man
obligatory overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and
idea. In the premises, it is not possible for us to uphold this claim of 
2the petitioners.” The Court came to its conclusion only after its finding 
that
"The sacrifice established for one person is a goat, that for 
seven a cow or a camel. It is, therefore, optional for a 
Muslim to sacrifice a goat for one person or a cow or a camel 
for seven persons... The very fact of an option seems to run 
counter to the notion of an obligatory duty."^
Thus the Court found that the slaughter of a cow on Bakr-Id-Day was not an
essential or an integral part of Islam.
4In A.H. Quaraishi v. State of Bihar, the applicants challenged the 
constitutional validity of certain provisions of the amended Acts of Bihar, 
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. In this case, the Court followed its
5
earlier decision in M.H. Quareshi’s case except that it declared certain 
provisions of the impugned Acts as ultra vires.
1. In a critical assessment of the Supreme Court decision Derrett 
comments that "Perhaps in no country are such questions fraught 
with greater anxiety. And for this reason we may note that an 
unresolved conflict exists between those cases where the courts 
have attempted to define "religion" merely as the relation between 
the individual conscience and its Maker (or the equivalent in non- 
theistic faiths), a definition that will not be accepted by the doctors 
of any of the five major faiths of India, and those which seek to protect 
under Arts. 25 and 26 rights extending (as the words of the Constitution 
strongly suggest) far beyond matters of private belief." - "Decisions",
(1959) 8 ICLQ, 218-224, 224.
2. Per Das, C.J., AIR 1958 SC 751, 740.
3. Ibid. No Islamic authority for this theological-legal proposition was cited.
4. AIR 1961 SC 448.
5. AIR 1958 SC 731.
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In cow-slaughter cases, so in bigamy cases,
"The distinction between belief and practice is probably not 
interesting here as the recognition that the admitted presence 
of alternatives deprives the practice contended for its urgency 
when conflicting religious interests had to be resolved in the 
search for the welfare of the nation.”
But in Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh  ^the Court did not accept
if
the reasoning of the case of M.H. Quareshi that in coming to its conclusion 
regarding the issue of the reasonableness of restriction on freedom of 
trade, Hindu sentiments should be taken into consideration. In that case, 
a notification issued by the Governor of the Madhya Pradesh under the Madhya 
Pradesh Act 23 of 1956 resulting in the prohibition of slaughter of bulls, 
etc. was impugned on the ground that it affected adversely the petitioner's 
constitutional right to carry on his trade or occupation. The Supreme 
Court bravely accepted the argument of the petitioner that as the prohibition 
of the slaughter of certain animals was made only to respect the sentiments of
a. certain section of people, the restriction was not reasonable in the 
interest of the general public. Thus Shah, J. spoke for the Supreme Court 
that
"The sentiments of a section of the people may be hurt by permit­
ting slaughter of bulls and bullocks in premises maintained by a 
local authority. But a prohibition imposed on the exercise of a 
fundamental right to carry on an occupation, trade or business 
will not be regarded as reasonable, if it is imposed not in the 
interest of the general public, but merely to respect the sus­
ceptibilities and sentiments^of a section of the people whose way  ^
of life, belirf or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.”
1. See the discussion of the two cow-slaughter cases in V.K.S. Chaudhary's 
"The Supreme Court and the Anti cow-slaughter Laws," AIR 1962 Jnl. 25-27.
2. Derrett, RLSI, 7^3- 3- AIR 1970 SC 93.
k. AIR 1958 SC 731.
5. In a different context the Delhi High Court did not give any 
consideration to Jain sentiments when it gave its decision in 
Suresh Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1975 Del’168. In that case, the 
Government cultural programme for celebration of the 2500th anniversary 
of Mahavir was challenged by- some Jain and Hindu petitioners. The 
Jain petitioners claimed that some activities in pursuance of the 
programme were not contemplated by their religion and these activities 
hurt the religious sentiments of the Jains. The Court held that the 
programme was a secular and cultural one and it had nothing to do with 
religion.
6. AIR 1970 SC 93, 96-97.
^3
In cow-slaughter cases or in similar circumstances where sensitive
issues affecting religious harmony between two communities might arise,
the Courts could apply a useful theory of balancing of interests as
suggested by Ghouse when he observes that
"Unlike the mechanical rule evolved by the Indian Courts, 
this theory requires the scrutiny of the purpose and effect 
of the challenged legislation and not the essentials of the 
violated religious practice.
"Employment of this technique to ascertain the secular 
purpose and effect of the impugned Acts in Hanif Quareshi’s 
case would have compelled the Court to consider the policy 
underlying the challenged legislation within the framework of 
Article 25. The challenged laws could have been upheld only^  
as measures of "social welfare" under clause 2, Article 25."
2
Now reverting to Mohd. Faruk's case, it may be said that the Supreme
Court paid scant consideration to Hindu sentiments when it reached its
decision in the case, but did it do so rightly? In ray opinion, one cannot
shut one’s ears in a case of that kind to the sentiments of a section of
the people forming the overwhelming majority of the total Indian population.
Hindus, in general, do respect cows as they do different gods. I am not
arguing that the sentiments of the majority should prevail over or should
be preferable to those of members of different minority communities, but
in so far as the issue of cow slaughter is concerned, Hindu sentiments
should be given due consideration by the Court, at least for the sake of
public order,- because these sentiments led or may lead to communal riots.^
Economic factors should not prevail over the question of public order.
But the real assessment of the situation without any exaggeration has been
if
made in Das, C.J.'s observation in M.H. Quareshi’s case that
"There can be no gainsaying the fact that the Hindus in general 
hold the cow in great reverence and the idea of the slaughter 
of cows for food is repugnant to their notion and this sentiment 
has in the past even led to communal r i o t s ."5
1. M. Ghouse, op.cit., 136.
2. AIR 1970 SC 93* 3* M.H.Quareshi v.State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC
4. AIR 1958 SC 731. 5- Ibid., p. 7^ 5*. 7515 7^*
kk
It might sound strange to a non-Hindu that Hindus hold the cow as an 
object of veneration, but this is a fact of life in so far as the Hindu 
community is concerned. The cow-slaughter issue is a delicate one which 
must be tackled by the Court giving proper consideration to Hindu sentiments 
involved in it. To most Hindus "The cow is Heaven, the cow is Earth, the 
cow is Vishnu, Lord of Life” - one may not like it, but this is true.
But the point is that India is a secular State formally declared as
2such by the Constitution of India. Under Art. 25 all persons whether 
Hindus or not are equally entitled to the right to freedom of religion.
Cow slaughter cannot be banned totally^ without infringing fundamental 
rights of Indian Muslims. Under Art. 25 the Constitution of India protects 
not only religions but also practices associated with them. It is, therefore, 
clear that for Indian Muslims the slaughter of cows is a religious obligation, 
and to take away this obligation is or would seem to be interference with 
religious freedom.**
c. Protection of Religion under the Indian Penal Code.
Now one important point is that the freedom of religion as guaranteed 
under Art. 25 of the Constitution is not comprehensive and the protection 
of religion, in its real sense, would not have been possible but for some 
provisions in the Indian Penal Code providing protection of religion
1, Hymn 10 in Book X of Atharva Veda, Translation by Ralph Griffith as
cited at p. 7^5 in M.H. Quareshi's case (AIR 195& SC 73^ )*
2. See the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment Act), 1976, which inter
alia provides that "In the Preamble to the Constitution...for the 
words "SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC”, the words "SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST 
SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC" shall be substituted "
5. Jain’s argument that "Since reverence to the cow is a part of Hindu
culture, it is in the fitness of things that at least in India where
the overwhelming majority is that of Hindus, cow slaughter should 
have been banned in order to preserve the culture irrespective of any 
considerations. When we pay our veneration to some object it is a 
matter of faith and conscience, and economic factors should not be 
brought into it" - is not tenable because India is not a Hindu State, 
it is a country belonging not only to Hindus but also to Muslims, 
Christians, Buddhists and others. See P.C. Jain, Law and Religion; 
a comparative study of the Freedom of Religion in India and the 
United States, M/s Anup Chand Sarup Chand, Allahabad, 197^ ('?)» 292.
k. Derrett, RLSI, *t72.
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of both individuals and classes. Sec. 2$8 protects the religious
feelings of individuals and secs. 295 a d^ 295A deal with the protection
of religion of a class or classes,but this protection is achieved
indirectly through the provisions in the sections for preventing religious
or communal disturbances by penalising offenders. These three sections
are reproduced below for ready reference
Sec. 298. Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding 
the religious feelings of any person, utters any word or makes any 
sound in the hearing of that person or makes any gesture in the 
sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both.
Sec. 295. Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any place of 
worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons with the 
intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons 
or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider 
such destruction damage or defilement as an insult to their religion 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine or with both.
Sec. 295-A. Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of 
outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, 
by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, 
insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs 
of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to three years or with fine, or with both.
In Kitab Ali v. Santi Ranjan, the accused persons slaughtered a bullock
in an open space close to the house of the complainant. The slaughter was
carried on in spite of the protest of the complainant with the deliberate
intention of hurting his religious feelings. The Magistrate found all the
accused persons guilty under sec. 298. His finding was upheld by both the
Courts of the Sessions Judge and the Tripura Judicial Commissioner. Singh,
J.C. held that
Mthe .accused persons could pursue their religious practices so 
as not to offend the religious feelings of others which might 
cause breach of public order, i.e. the public tranquillity and 
peace. In the present case, as has been found by the learned 
Magistrate, the accused persons had caused the slaughter of the 
bullock in an open public space in spite of protest by the 
complainant, a Hindu.”
1. AIR 1965 Trip. 22. 2. Ibid., p. 25.
ke
In the present case, the Court for its decision, relied on Mir Chittan v. 
Emperor, m  which the accused slaughtered a cow m  full view of the houses 
of Hindus in broad daylight. The Court held him guilty of an offence under 
sec. 298.
But there was an authority to the effect that cow slaughter in a space
where Hindus might see it, was not an offence under the Penal Code. Thus
2in Queen-Empress v. Imam Ali, the accused were convicted by the Magistrate
for killing cows by the side of a public highway. Both the Sessions Judge
and the Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad disagreed with the decision
of the Magistrate's Court. In that case, the accused were tried^  under
4
sec. 295 whereas in the case of Kitab Ali the defendants were tried under
c
sec. 298. But the striking difference between the two cases is that in 
£
Kitab Ali's case, the finding of the Court was that the accused persons
slaughtered the bullock in an open public place in spite of protest by the
7
complainant whereas in the case of Imam Ali, there was no evidence to
1. AIR 1937 All 13.
2. ILR (1887) 10 All 150 (FB).
3. Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code does not apply to the cases 
where the religious sentiments of Hindus would be hurt by slaughtering 
cows. It is applicable to inanimate objects as held in Imam Ali's 
case ILR (1887) 10 All 150 (FB) 153* Thus the section inter alia 
reads "Whoever destroys ... any object held sacred by any class of 
persons, with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any 
class of persons ... shall be punished with imprisonment...." So a 
person for hurting Hindu sentiments by slaughtering a cow (an animate 
object) cannot be convicted under sec. 295 which applies to inanimate 
objects only. See Ali Muhammad v. Crown (1917) P.R. No. 10 of 1918 
(FB) which follows the Allahabad case cited above. See also Derrett, 
RLSI, 5^0, footnote 2, where he suggested a comparative study between 
the Tripura case, AIR 1965 Trip 22 and the two Full Bench cases 
referred to above.
k. AIR 1965 Trip 22.
5. See Sheik Amjad v. King Emperor ILR (19^ +2) Pat. 315* It was held there 
that there would not be any conviction under sec. 298 if any insulting 
gesture or uttering insulting words was made without deliberate intention 
of offending religious feelings. The accused person's killing a cow on 
the occasion of Bakr-I-Id was held done not with the object of hurting 
Hindu religious feelings.
6 . AIR 1965 Trip 22. 7. ILR (1887) 10 All 150 (FB).
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the effect that the accused ever meant to hurt religious feelings by- 
slaughtering cows.
1
Again in Ramji Lai Modi v.State of Utta Pradesh, the accused was
the editor, printer and publisher of a monthly magazine devoted to cow
protection. The High Court of Allahabad held that the article in question
was published deliberately by the accused with the intention of offending
religious feelings of Muslims and the accused was guilty under sec. 295A.
In appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court. In
that case, the accused argued that sec. 295A was void as it interfered
with his fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 190)(a) of the Constitution
providing right to freedom of speech and expression. The contention was
that the impugned section could not be accepted as a law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right under Art. 190)(a)
as provided in clause 2. Cl..2 of Art. 19 empowers a State to make laws
in the interest cf the sovereignty and integrity of India, public order,
decency, morality, etc. The Supreme Court held that sec. 295A "is well
2
within the protection of Cl (2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing reasonable 
re&triction on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed by Art. 190)(a).M^
if
The case of Sant Das v. Babu Ram was concerned with the publication of
two books by one of the two branches of the Ifedhasoami faith at Agra. It was
alleged that the books were written in such a manner as to outrage the
AIR 1957 SC 620. 1 ‘ ' ~
2. The issue of interpretation and scope of cl. (2) of Art. 19 was the 
main question in both Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 
SC 12*+, involving an English journal called The Cross Roads, and 
Brij Bhuhsan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129, involving an English
weekly in Delhi, called The Organizer. Both these two cases were
referred to in the present case of Ramji Lai. Sastri, J. gave the 
majority decision on the point when he observed that "cl. (2) of Art. 19 
having allowed the imposition of restrictions of the freedom of speech 
and expression only in cases where danger to public security is involved, 
an enactment which is capable of being applied to cases where no such 
danger could arise, cannot be constitutional and valid to any extent"
p. 129.
3. Per Das,C.J., AIR 1957 SC 620, 623. If. AIR 1969 All 3^6.
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religious feelings of one of the branches, Radhasoami Satsang Sabha,
which filed a complaint against the manager of a press and the printer
of the said two books, under sec. 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Against
the contention of the defendants that sec. 295A was violative of both
Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, Singh, J. spoke for the High Court
of Allahabad that "This Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code does not
at all ... come in conflict with either Article 25 or Article 26 of the
Constitution and cannot by any stretch of imagination, be said to be
violative of those provisions.”
It may be pointed out that the right to freedom of speech and expression
as provided by Art. 19 of the Constitution implies also the right to use
loudspeakers for the expression of a person's views in public places. In
2Indulal v. State of Gujarat, the petitioner challenged the constitution­
ality of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 particularly sec. 53 of the Act 
empowering the Commissioner and the District Magistrate to regulate the 
use of loudspeakers in or near public places. Though the claim of the 
petitioner failed in that case, Miabhoy, J., gave his opinion on the right 
to the use of loudspeakers when he ruled that
"If the journalist can avail himself of the mechanism of his 
press for reaching a wider circle of audience, there is no reason 
why a person, who has at his disposal a more modest instrument 
like the microphone, should not avail himself of that instrument. 
There is ample authority for the proposition that the freedom of 
speech and expression includes the freedom of circulation.
The aforesaid right to the use cf microphones, is not confined to the circu­
it
lation of political views only, it is available to any person for the 
purpose of religious propaganda subject to public order, morality
and health. In Masud Alam v. Commr. of Police,^  some mosques in Calcutta
1. AIR 1969 All 436, A39. 2. AIR 1963 Guj 259-
3. Ibid., p. 26^ .
k. In that case, a party named "Ahmedabad Samiti" was formed to contest 
a local municipal election.
5. AIR 1956 Cal. 9.
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introduced electrical loudspeakers for calling prayers five times a day.
The Police Commissioner issued licences to two mosques for using loud­
speakers but refused to grant permission to others to use them on the 
ground of the complaint of several residents about their use. The High
Court upholding the refusal approved the ruling of Chagla, C.J. in a
1
Bombay High Court case which incidentally was not about public order but
of social reform, to the effect that religious practices going against
public order were to give way to the good of the public at large. Sinha, J.,
as he then was, was very critical of random use of loudspeakers in religious
festivals, especially in Hindu religious ones. It is worth quoting his
remarks because of their clear depiction of the effect of the use of
microphones in Calcutta in religious houses and festivals. Thus his
Lordship observed that
"The indiscriminate use of the electric loudspeaker in connection 
with religious festivals in the city is a standing grievance of 
every peace-loving citizen. The most offending instances are the 
uses to which it is put in connection with Hindu festivals, when 
the city is racked with the raucous cacophony of a thousand loud­
speakers, doling out cheap jazz or cinema music, which is not
only singularly inappropriate to such occasions, but to my mind,
destructive of public health and morals."5
I fully agree with the view of the learned Judge and there is no doubt that
public health is already in a deteriorating condition in that unfortunate
4city. Sinha, J. mentioned the use of loudspeakers in religious houses 
or festivals only, but he omitted to tell us about the use of those things 
even in private social occasions like marriage ceremonies. In this over­
crowded city, the elderly men and women, patients in serious conditions, 
and even babies who need rest literally in pin-drop silence, are not cared
1. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84. But the judgement
in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji Koicha AIR 1953
Bom 'l83» which followed the view of religion held in Narasu Appa Mali*s
case was rejected by the Supreme Court on appeal in Sardar Syedna Taher 
Saheb v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853.
2. Emphasis is mine. 5* AIR 1956 Cal 9i 10.
4. The city is unfortunate for several reasons. Once it was the capital of
the whole of British India, then it was the capital of undivided Bengal
until 14th August, 19^ +7 and thereafter it has been stripped of much of its 
importance. Moreover, it has become one of the most crowded cities due 
to the influx of Hindu refugees from the then East Pakistan and poor 
job hunters from neighbouring states.
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for by those who express their personal or religious feelings through 
amplifying devices. In my opinion, the use of loudspeakers on such 
occasions should be banned solely on the ground of public order. Tie fundamental 
right of religion or that of speech must give way to the good of patients, 
elderly people and babies.
Now, the protection afforded to religion by the Indian Penal Code is
not really the protection of religion as such, but the provisions in the
Code are actually intended for keeping peace among different communities.
Many offences punishable under sec. 295 or sec. 295A are directed to
communal ends. Thus in Sheo Shankar v. Emperor, the complainant, a Ahir
(a Sudra), in pursuance of the ambition to obtain . social and religious
ranking,took to the wearing of a sacred thread reserved for (twice born)
initiates. Some Brahmins beat him and tore off the sacred thread. The
High Court did not accept the case as one involving offending of the
complainant’s religious feeling as to fall under the purview of sec. 295*
Thus the Court held that
”in the circumstances at the present case where persons observing 
the same religion, broke the thread of some one whom they regarded 
as an upstart wearing something which he was not entitled to wear, 
either the victim of assault would be likely to consider that act 
an insult to his religion or the assailants would be considered to 
have the knowledge that he was likely so to do. The truth of the 
matter is that it was not the religious susceptibilities of the 
complainant Gajodhar which were injured but his dignity and there­
fore we do not think that a conviction under sec. 295i Penal Code, 
is sustainable.”^
3
. In S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E.N. Ramaswami, Naicker, a clay
image of the god Ganesa held sacred by many Hindus was broken publicly by
the accused "as part of a political campaign, possibly with the object of
4
opening the eyes of the masses (?)”. The Supreme Court did not share the 
view expressed by the Court below that as the image was not consecrated 
it was not to be considered an object held sacred. In short, the Supreme
1. AIR 19^ 0 Oudh 3^ 8.
3. (1959) 22 SCJ. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 351.
4. Derrett, RLSI, M*9.
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Court did not accept the argument that the image was not an idol in 
the sastric sense. Sinha, J. as he then was, held for the Court that
’’Any object however trivial or destitute of real value in 
itself if regarded as sacred'by any class of persons would 
come within the meaning of the penal section. Nor is it 
absolutely necessary that the object, in order to be held 
sacred, should have been actually worshipped. An object may 
be held sacred by a class of persons without being worshipped 
by them.”1
The facts of the present case illustrate the view that
’’The majority can no more insult the religions of the minorities 
than the latter can set out to outrage the religious feelings of 
the majority. This is a feature of India which goes far to 
justify the claim to be a secular state in the sense that there 
is no preference for the religion of the majority of the 
inhabitants.
d. The Secular State of India
India was not formally a secular State until the introduction of the
Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976. But judging the different
provisions of the Constitution, different legal and political thinkers
expressed their opinions on the subject whether India was a secular state
or not,and they were by no means unanimous in their opinion about it. Some
examples might be given to this effect. Thus Luthera, in his pioneer work,^
accepting the United States Constitution as the criterion for judging a
constitution to be secular or not, has expressed the view that India is
not a secular state, it is rather religiously impartial. He observes that
’’The term 'Secular State' denotes a definite pattern of State- 
Church relationship which is not incorporated in the Indian 
Constitution. Its continued use is bound to give a wrong 
impression about the nature of the State in India. It has been 
already indicated that in terras of the western patterns, India 
can be described as a jurisdictional state. If a simpler term 
is to be used it would perhaps be appropriate to describe it 
as a 'religiously impartial* or non-communal (non-denominational) 
state.
1. (1959) 22 SCJ 1, 5- 2. Derrett, RLSI, M+9.
J>. V.P. Luthera, The Concept of the Secular State and India, Oxford 
University Press, Calcutta, 196 .^
k. Ibid., p. 195*
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Derrett supports Luthera’s view to the extent that India cannot be
described as a secular state when he speaks in the context of reforms
relating to the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 > that
"Dr. Luthera is right in detecting that a state which acts 
so cannot call itself a secular state on a pattern known to 
the United States, for example. In this approach to India,
Professor Donald Smith and Dr. Luthera are virtually agreed.
It can hardly be a secular State which has as one of its admitted aims 
a programme to which the accepted and acknowledged religious 
authorities of the majority of the inhabitants (not merely a 
minority) are determinedly opposed."*1
In his masterpiece, Smith analysing and weighing various factors, raises
the question to himself about whether India is a secular state. Thus the
learned author questions and observes that
"Is India a secular State? My answer is a qualified 'Yes’.
It is meaningful to speak of India as a secular State, despite 
the existence of problems ... India is a secular State in the 
same sense in which one can say that India is a democracy."^
But Galanter gives an unqualified yes to the question when he says that 
"The Constitution is openly and determinedly secular. Religious discrim­
ination on the part of the State is forbidden. Freedom of religion is 
guaranteed."^ Gajendragadkar consistently stresses the point in his various
works that India is a-secular state. In the recent edition (4th) of B.K.
5
Mukherjea’s "The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts," he
1. Derrett, RLSI, 453-454.
2. D.E. Smith, India as a Secular State, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1963* 499-500.
3. Marc Galanter, "The Problem of Group Membership: Some Reflections on
the Judicial View of Indian Society", Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 
1962, vol. 4, 331-358, 347.
4. P.B. Gajendragadkar, "Secularism: Its Implication for Law and Life
in India" in G.S. Sharma (ed.) Secularism Its Implications for Law 
and Life in India, N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1966, 1-B, 5; See also by 
the same author, The Indian Parliament and the Fundamental Rights,
Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1972, 53-54.
5. Calcutta, 1979* P.B. Gajendragadkar along with P.M. Bakshi have edited 
the present book. See also Gajendragadkar's book, Secularism and the 
Constitution of India, University of Bombay, Bombay, 1971. He has 
observed (at p.173) in the book "that secularism under the Indian 
Constitution is not a merely political doctrine. It is not a positive 
or negative doctrine. It is a comprehensive, forward-looking, dynamic 
doctrine."
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expresses clearly that
"Secularism as enshrined in the relevant provision of the 
Constitution is neither anti-God nor anti-religion. At 
the same time, the Republic of India has no official 
religion of its own. It tolerates all religions. It 
guarantees freedom to all religions which are practised in 
India and treats each one of them with equal respect.""'
The concept of a secular State and that of freedom of religion go hand
in hand and freedom of religion, a different expression of protection of
2religion, is a volatile subject, dealt with by philosophers, jurists and 
political thinkers alike. In so far as the Constitution of India is con­
cerned, the Forty-Second Amendment (1976) Act has not changed the colour 
of the Constitution in this context; it remains much the same as it was 
before the Act came into force. Luthera is right in so far as he holds 
the view that India is not a secular State in the same sense as the United 
States is, but in my opinion, India could not even be categorized as a 
religiously neutral state. In so far as minority religions are concerned, 
no doubt protection to them has been greatly achieved by the provisions 
of the Constitution, but the Constitution does not seem to stand 
impartially on the religion of the overwhelming majority of the population 
because of the reasons shown in Derrett's aforesaid observation relating 
to, for example, the Untoubhability Act, 1955»renamed as the Protection of 
Civil Rights Act by the introduction of the Untouchability (Offences) 
Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1976 (Act 106 of 1976). The 
Constitutional provisions seem to be peace-keeping formulae for maintaining 
harmony among different religions, and they heavily tilt against the 
religious interests of the majority population. But it must be stressed 
that the provisions reveal in effect a tolerance and magnanimity on the 
part of the majority towards minority religious communities.
To conclude this study it may be said that protection of religion as
1. Mukherjea, op.cit., *+th ed., 396.
2. V.M. Bachal, Freedom of Religion and Indian Judiciary, Shubhada Saraswat, 
Poona, 1975t 1•
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guaranteed by Art. 25 of the Constitution of India is very limited due to 
the important proviso in the Article that matters concerning social reform 
and those relating to public order, morality and health take precedence 
over religious freedom however defined. Under Art. 25(2)(b) the state 
legislature is empowered to enact laws in the interests of social welfare 
and of reform. Apparently Art. 25 may be taken as the embodiment of 
provisions providing for every individual the right freely to profess, 
practise and propagate religion, but proper scrutiny of the provisions will 
reveal that non-religious or secular provisions in the Article, e.g. providing 
for social welfare and reform, have curtailed much of the content of the 
right to freedom of religion. In so far as Art. 25 is concerned, freedom 
of religion seems to be a show piece and most of that freedom has been 
subsumed by the provision for ’social welfare1 and 'reform1.
In so far as excommunication is concerned, the Courts should not- allow 
any community to expel a member resulting in his loss of civil rights, 
even on the ground of an offence against his religion. In my opinion, no 
community should be allowed to compel its members to follow its religion 
if that member does not believe in that faith at all, and that community 
should not be permitted to excommunicate him resulting in loss of civil 
rights. From the standpoint of humanity and constitutionally accepted 
aims of the social welfare of every individual, a community should not 
be allowed to throw a disbeliever in the streets where he might not have 
any means for his survival. Moreover, India is not a welfare state which 
can look after its citizens from cradle to grave. Any human life is more 
important than a religious dogma. Religion itself is for individuals but 
not the other way round. No doubt this point of view reflects the modern 
age in which the total solidarity of the collective society is neither 
worked for nor found.
1. For example, Art. 38 of the Constitution of India reads: MThe State shall
strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as 
effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic 
and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.”
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SECTION 2. CIVIL PROCEDURE C^ DE: THE COURT'S JURISDICTION IN MATTERS 
OF RELIGION 
a. The Court and Matters of Religion
The origin of clause (b) of Article 26 of the Constitution of India 
that every religious denomination is entitled "to manage its own affairs 
in matters of religion" can be traced ultimately to Explanation I of 
section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended by the Code 
of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 10^  of 1976). The only 
explanatory clause of the old section 9 has been numbered as Explanation I by 
the Act 10^  of 1976 which has introduced Explanation II as a new provision 
of the section. Because of its importance in our present study and for 
ease of reference the section, as it stands now, may be reproduced below:
Section 9* The Courts shall (subject to the provisions 
herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a 
civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is 
either expressly or impliedly barred.
Explanation I. A suit in which the right to property or to 
an office is contested is a suit of civil nature, notwithstanding 
that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions 
as to religious rites and ceremonies.
Explanation II. For the purposes of this section, it is 
immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office 
referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is 
attached to a particular place.
The term "civil" in sec. 9 of the Civil Procedure Code excludes all
criminal proceedings, but it cannot be taken as merely opposite to the
word 'criminal', for there are suits which though they are not concerned
with matters of crime, yet they are not classified as of a civil nature.
Thus Explanation I implies that suits as to religious rites or ceremonies
involving no question of right to property or to an office, are not suits
of a civil nature. It is neither a province nor a duty of a Civil Court
to pronounce on religious tenets or to regulate purely religious rites or
duties,and to this effect law seems to be firmly laid down in a long line 
1
of authorities.
1. Vasudev v. Vamnaji ILR (1880) 5 Bom 80.; Lokenath Misra v. Dasarathi 
Tiwari ILR (1905) 52 Cal 1072; Thiruvenkatchariar v. Krishnasami 
Thattachariar AIR 1915 Mad 877; Advocate-General of Bombay v. Yusuf Ali
(continued on next page)
56
In Advocate-General v. Yusuf Ali Ebrahim which was concerned with 
charities of the Dawoodi Borahs, Marten, J. had observed that
’’speaking very generally, the protection of the law in religious 
matters is confined to the protection of religious property 
or a religious office. The Court will not decide mere questions 
of religious rites or ceremonies (see C.P.C. 5*9) nor will it,
I think pronounce on religious doctrine (see Attorney General 
v. Pearson) unless it is necessary to do so in order to determine 
rights to property, as in Free Church in Scotland (General 
Assembly) v. Qvertown (Lord)."^
But the pioneer case on the subject concerned is that of Vasudev v. 
Vamnaji.^  In that case, the plaintiffs representing a management committee 
of a temple, brought the suit to compel the defendants, hereditary priests, 
to take out certain ornaments from the treasury and to put them on the image 
of a God on such days as might be appointed by the committee and they also 
sought a declaration that the defendants would be responsible for the safe 
keeping of the ornaments after they had been taken out from the treasury.
The High Court pointed out that in both the lower Courts no question as to 
jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain the suit had been raised.
Melvill, J. delivered the judgement for the Bombay High Court. Thus his 
Lordship observed that
"Both the lower Courts have awarded the claim. It does not appear 
that in either Court any question was raised as to the jurisdiction 
of a Civil Court to entertain such a suit; nor is any objection of 
the kind set forth in the memorandum of appeal to this Court. But 
on the first statement of the case, it appeared to us more than 
doubtful whether a Civil Court is competent to issue an injunction, 
which could only be enforced by imprisonment, to compel the 
performance of the ceremonialcfidol worship; and we, therefore, 
expressed a wish that arrangements should be, in the first instance, 
directed to this point...
(continued from previous page)
AIR 1921 Bom 368; Devchand Totaram v. Ghanashyam AIR 1935 Bom 361; 
Narayana Mudali v. Kalathi Mudhali AIR 1939 Had 9^^  *» Appadorai v. 
Annangarachariar AIR 1939 Mad 102; Bachaspatimayum v. Aribam 
AIR 1955 NUC *+5^ 6; Sinha Ramanu.ia v. Ranga Ramanu.ja AIR 1961 SC 1720; 
Ramchandra v. Gavalaksha (1973) 75 Bom LR 668; Ushaben v. Bhagyalaxmi 
AIR 1978 Guj 13.
1. AIR 1921 Bom 338.
2. Ibid., p. 355.
3. ILR (1880) 5 Bom 80.
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"...The regulation of religious ritual is not within the 
province of the Civil Courts. In England, no doubt, there 
are courts which have power to compel the due performance 
of public worship; but they are Courts specially constituted 
for the purpose; and this circumstance itself indicates that 
there is no such jurisdiction inherent in the ordinary civil 
Courts ... It is the policy of the State to protect all 
religions, but to interfere with none. It is for those who 
profess any form of religion to adopt such ritual as they 
think fit, and to make and enforce such rules as may be 
necessary to secure its due observance".^
The last two sentences of the aforesaid observation of Melvill, J.
seem to coincide in different language with the statement of Mukherjea, J.
2as he then was, in the Shirur Math case that
"a religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete 
autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and 
ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the 
religion they hold and no outside authority has any juris= 
diction to interfere with their decision in such matters".
In Sinha Ramanuja Jeer v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer, the main question 
for decision was the maintainability of a suit regarding honours and per­
quisites in the temple of Athinathalwar in Alwar Tirunagari. But the Supreme 
Court while dealing with the main question had also given its deliberation
5
on the scope of Explanation of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. Subba
Rao, J. as he then was, who delivered the judgement of the Supreme Court,
held that
"Section 9 of the Code of the Civil Procedure describes the 
nature of suits which a court has jurisdiction to entertain.
It can entertain any suit of a civil nature excepting suits of 
which its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
As a corollary to this, it follows that a Court cannot entertain 
a suit which is not of a civil nature. Prima facie suits raising 
questions of religious rites and ceremonies only are not maintain­
able in a civil Court, for they do not deal with legal rights of 
parties. But the explanation to the section accepting the said 
undoubted position says that a suit in which the right to property 
or to an office is contested is a suit of civil nature notwith­
standing that such right may depend entirely on the decision of a
question as to religious rights or ceremonies. It implies two
1. ILR (1880) 5 Bom 8o, 81-82 2. AIR 1954 SC 282.
3. Ibid.,p.291. See above, pp.20-21. 4. AIR 1961 SC 1720.
5. There was no Explanation II in the Code of Civil Procedure when the
Supreme Court case was decided,and the Explanation as referred to above 
by 'the Supreme Court is Explanation I in the amended Code.
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things, namely (i) a suit for an office is a suit of a civil 
nature; and (ii) it does not cease to be one even if the 
said right depends entirely upon a decision of a question as 
to the religious rites or ceremonies. It implies further 
that questions as to religious rites or ceremonies cannot 
independently of such a right form the subject-matter of a 
civil suit. Honours shown or precedence given to religious 
dignitaries when they attend religious ceremonies in a temple 
cannot be placed on a higher footing than the religious rites 
or ceremonies, for they are integral parts of the said rites 
or ceremonies in the sense that the said honours are shown to 
persons partaking in the ceremonies”.^
2Then the learned Judge cited many cases and summarised the law on the 
subject relating to religious honours and privileges and held that ”A 
suit for a declaration of religious honours and privileges simpliciter 
will not lie in a civil court”.^
Quite often serious disputes, involving potential breaches of the peace, 
start as differences over rights or in respect of temples, their management, 
or ceremonies. Social status is often marked by such matters and denial 
of a customary or traditional right can, to the affected parties, be more 
damaging than mere denial of a pecuniary or other property claim. Further­
more tension between conservative and reforming parties can express itself 
in the form of overt disputes to which someone, presumably the state, as 
impartial arbiter, is expected to provide a solution.
' k
In Ramachandra Keshav Gore v. Gavalaksha Gangadhar Swami the plaintiffs
1. AIR 1961 SC 1720,
2. The law on the subject was already firmly laid down in innumerable 
decisions of different High Courts. See Striman Sadgopa v. Kristna 
Tatachariar (1862-63) 1 Mad HCR 301; Sangapa v. Gangapa ILR (1878)2 Bom 
7^6; Shankar v. Malhar AIR 1931 Bom 273; Chitti Babu v. Venkatasubbu AIR 
1933 Mad 26^ ; Thathachariar v. Iyengar AIR 193# Mad 33M Suryanaray- 
anamurthi v. Rama Rap AIR 1933 Mad 701; Shivagnanam v. T.M» Chidam- 
barathanu ILR (193*0Tra-Co 1338. See also Athan Sadgopachariar v. 
Elayavalli (1913) MWN 289; Periayanan v. Mahadevan AIR 1933 Mad 679;
Sri Emberumanar v. Board of Commrs, H.R.E. AIR 1936 Mad 973*
But a contrary decision had been reached in a very old case (Narayan 
v. Balkrishna (1872) 9 BHCR M 3) of the Bombay High Court. It had been 
held there that the defendants violated the plaintiff's exclusive right 
of breaking a curd-pot in a part of the temple in question by breaking 
their own curd-pot in the same place, thereby entitling the plaintiff 
to damages.
3. AIR 1961 SC 1720, 1727.
M  (1973) 75 Bom LR 668.
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brought a suit for an injunction directing the defendants, trustees of 
Shri Rama Temple at Chafal, to instal the original idol of Shri Rama 
only and restraining them from installing new idols in the holy of holies 
of the renovated and reconstructed temple. Vaidya, A.C.J., who delivered 
the judgement of the case, followed the principles enunciated in Sinha 
Ramanu j a1s case and fully approving the view of Melvill, J. on the
2subject as expressed one hundred years earlier in Vasudev v. Vamnaji
h,eld that
’’Although the Madras case in the Supreme Court decision related 
to namams claimed by the plaintiff in that case, it is clear 
that the principle on which the case was decided was that in 
religious and ceremonial matters, the civil Court could not 
grant any relief as it did not relate to civil rights.■ In my 
judgement the dispute in the present case is completely covered 
by the judgement of Melvill, J. which has stood the test of time 
all these years and which clearly laid down that although the 
policy of the State is to protect all religions it has also not 
to interfere with any. Even assuming that the plaintiffs had 
some religious rights to worship Shri Ram’s idol without any 
other idols being installed, the defendants and others who 
support the installation of other idols had also the right to 
worship in their own way. In such matters which are purely 
religious^a civil Court will not interfere as it is not a civil 
dispute”.
But it must be remembered that the question of form of worship, ceremony,
etc. are not on the same footing as the question of a right to worship.
India neither did, nor does, take a strict $zjuj[c\rr^ t , standpoint here. A
right to worship is a civil right and a suit filed to restrain persons
from interfering with such a right is a suit of a civil nature. This
position of law is firmly established and has been vindicated in many
kdecisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
1. AIR 1961 SC 1720. 2. ILR (1880) 5 Bom 80.
5. (1973) 75 Bom LR 668, 673-
k. Ata-Ullah v. Azim-Ullah ILR (1890) 12 All kyk. It had been held in that
case that every Muslim had a right of prayer in a mosque. Jangu v. Ahmed
Ullah ILR (I89I) 13 All *fl9 (FB). In that case it had been held that 
right of worship in a public mosque was open to all Muslims who went 
there for religious purposes; Thirumalai v. Srinivasachariar AIR 1917 
Mad 903; Vela.yudha Gonundan v. Ponnuswami Udayar AIR 19^5 Mad 
Manogobinda Panda v. Sachchidananda Swami AIR 1953 Ori 131; Md. Wasi
v. Bachchan Sahib AIR 1955 All 68. It was held there that right of
prayer in a mosque belonged to all sects of Islam; P.Mailissae Islamia
(continued on next page)
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A case apparently concerned only with a matter of ceremonies may
really involve substantial civil rights. The case of Ugam Singh v.
1
Kesrimal was concerned with the dispute between two sects, the Digamber
and the Swetamber sects of the Jain religion regarding the right of
worship of the Digamberi sect of the idol of Adeshwarji, the first Jain
Tirthankar, in the temple named after him at Paroi. It was alleged in
the suit that the defendants, belonging to the Swetamberi sect, had attempted
to convert the said idol as the idol of Swetamberi sect by putting artificial
eyes on it. In that case, the main argument put forward by the defendants
was that ’’the civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the religious rights
2of the parties nor is it a dispute of a civil nature.” Reddy, J. delivering 
the judgement for the Supreme Court referred to two cases^ of the Supreme
Court and the Privy Council and held that "a right to worship is a civil
 ^ 5right, interference with which raises a dispute of a civil nature....”
6Now the law as laid down in both the cases of Sinha Ramanuja and
(continued from previous page)
v. Sheik Muhammad, AIR 1963 Ker 9^- In that case it was held that the 
right of a Muslim to offer prayer was a civil right. Madhavan Nair, J. 
who delivered the judgement of the case observed (at p.50) that "In 
Nar Hari Shastri v. Sri Badrinath Temple, AIR 1952 SC 2k5 the Supreme 
Court held that the right of entering the temple was not a precarious 
or a permissive right depending for its existence upon the arbitrary 
discretion of the temple authorities, but a legal right to the true 
sense of the expression. It is a clear pronouncement that the right 
of worship is a civil one and comes squarely with the cognisance of 
the civil Courts of the State”; Ugam Singh v. Kesrimal AIR 1971 SC 
25*+0; Dayalal v. Pyar Chand AIR 1972 Raj 1^ 9; Kuber Mahapatra v. 
Nilakantheswar Dev AIR 197*+ Ori 21; Muniandi Kone v. Arulmigu Manga- 
lanathaswami Temple (1982) MU 20.
1. AIR 1971 SC 25*+0.
2. Ibid.
3. Nar . Hari Shastri v. Shri Badrinath Temple, AIR 1952 SC 2*+5i and Hukum
Chand v. Mahara.i Bahadur Singh AIR 1933 PC 193. In the latter case the
Privy Council had dealt with questions relating to practices observed by 
both the Digamberi and the Swetamberi sects on the Parasnath Hill.
*f. But there is a difference of opinion regarding the issue whether the right
to perform spiritual duties is a civil right. See Appendix 1.
5. AIR 1971 SC 25*+0, 25^ 5. 6. AIR 1961 SC 1720.
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Ugam Singh, is that questions as to religious rites and ceremonies alone
cannot form the subject-matter of a civil suit. Moreover , in Shirur Math »s 
2case, the Supreme Court pointed out that questions as to essentials of a
particular religion would be judged by the community itself. But in.
decisions of High Courts in bigamy cases^and in judgement of the Supreme
Courts in cow slaughter cases, the principles as ha\e been laid down by
kMelvill, J, in Vasudev's case as approved by the Supreme Court in Sinha 
5 6Ramanuja’s and Ugam Singh’s cases,and by different High courts in decisions
7
cited above, have not been strictly adhered to. In bigamy cases polygamy 
was not accepted as an integral part of the Hindu religion. The ruling of the 
Courts left no doubt about the fact that the Courts had pronounced on the 
matter belonging to essentials of Hinduism, for polygamy was a social result
g
of belief as expressed in religious and other terms. Again, in Hanif 
Q
Quareshi’s case, the Supreme Court held that slaughtering cows was not an
essential of Islam as professed by the appellant Muslims. But in the Shirur 
10Math case, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that the community, not 
the Court was entitled to decide what rites and ceremonies were essential 
according to the tenets of its religion.
1. AIR 1971 sc 2540:-
2. AIR 1954 SC 282.
3. Ram Prasad v. State of U.F., AIR 1957 All 411 and State of Bombay v.
Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84.
4. ILR (1880) 5 Bom 80.
3. AIR 1961 SC 1720.
6. AIR 1971 SC 2540.
7. AIR '1957 All;41V and AIR 1952 Bom 84.
8. Derrett, RLSI, 447.
9. M.H. Quareshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731• In that case, it was
held that sacrifice of a cow on the Bakr-Id-Day was not an ’’obligatory
overt act for a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea" -
per Das, C.J. at 740.
10. AIR 1954 SC 282.
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b. The Court and questions of Caste
Though suits filed for the enforcement of one's rights relating to caste
are suits of a civil nature, they are not cognizable by the Courts as
such. Purely caste questions cannot form the subject-matter of a civil 
2
suit, and this view has been expressed in many decisions of many High
Courts in India.^ It is well to recognise at this stage that caste questions
were decided by the Hindu kings of the pre-British period.
Before we discuss the judicial treatment of the question, let us find
out the meaning of the expression "caste". The description of the word
1+
"caste" as given by Farran, J. in Raghunath v. Janardhan, in which the 
plaintiff initiated the suit claiming damages and for a declaration that 
his excommunication by the caste,depriving him of his social privileges 
such as his right to be invited to dinner, was illegal and the Bombay High 
Court held that the Court had no power either to compel the other members 
of the caste to give the defendant dinner or to pay him damages, seems to
5
be the best one as acclaimed by Ragnekar, J. in Nagindas v. Somnath.
Thus his Lordship said that
1. "During the British Period, the courts generally recognised the autonomy 
of castes". A. Gledhill, Fundamental Rights in India, Stevens and Sons, 
London, 19551 101.
2. Sir John George Woodroffe and Frank James Mathew, Civil Procedure in 
British India, second edition, Thacker, Spink and Co., Calcutta/
Simla, 1916, 85.
3* Murari v. Suba ILR (1882) 6 Bom 723; The Queen v. Sankara ILR (1883)
6 Mad 381; Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami ILR (I89M  17 Mad 222;
Abdul Kadir v. Pharma ILR (1895) 20 Bom 190; Coopooswami Chetty v. 
Duraisami Chetty ILR (1910) 33 Mad 67; Naraindas v. Valabdas AIR 1929
Sindh 1; Ram Dulari Saran v. Yogeshwar AIR 1969 All 68.
k. ILR (1891) 15 Bom 399.
3. AIR 1932 Bora 122 (FB), 126. In that case, the plaintiffs belonging to 
a section of the Lohar caste had filed the suit for a declaration that 
they were entitled to inspect accounts and the documents of the caste.
The Court following Haroon v. Haji Adam (1909) 11 Bom LR 1267 in which
the parties belonged to the Cutchi Memon Jamat of Bombay and commenting 
on it, held that all members of the caste were entitled to inspect 
account books regarding the management of caste property by its managers.
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"The caste is a social combination, the members of which 
are entitled by birth, not by enrolment. Its rules consist 
partly of resolution passed from time to time, but for the 
most part of usages handed down from generation to generation.
The caste is not a religious body, though its usages, like all 
other Hindu usages, are based upon religious feelings. In 
religious matters strictly so called, the members of the caste 
are guided by their religious preceptors and their spiritual 
Heads. In social matters they lay down their own laws.^
Sumptuary laws are laws that concern social matters in one 
respect and like al^ other social laws are liable to be changed 
from time to time".
Though we have found a very good description of the expression ’caste1,
as given by Farran, J., it seems to be difficult to give a definite answer
to the question "what is a caste question?" Ragnekar, J. in Nagindas1^
case suggested a workable definition which the learned judge made out of
kthe observation of Ranade, J. in Appaya v. Padappa concerning a dispute
involving parties belonging to two branches of a family of Pujaris of a
Jain temple that "I think, a caste question is to use the words of Ranade,
J. in Appaya v♦ Padappa, a question which relates to matters which affect
5
the internal autonomy of the caste and its social relations".
6In Ram Dulari Saran v. Yogeswar the petitioner challenged the right of 
the fifth defendant called Mahabir Dev, to succeed to Mahantship of a 
temple at Mohalla Ram Kot, on the ground that he was not a Brahmin, because 
of his being a member of the non-Brahmin Bhumihar Community. The main point 
for consideration was the status of caste in Hindu society. Katju, J. laid 
down the law on the subject when his lordship spoke for the Allahabad High 
Court that
1. "A caste being a self-governing body with civil rights and autonomy
necessary for its existence, it is vested with certain powers, some
of which are, in a sense, judicial, and others are, in a sense,
legislative. These powers are not the creation of any legislative
enactment, though they are recognised in law, and their nature and 
extent are mainly dependent upon the custom obtaining in the particular 
caste" - D.F. Mulla, Jurisdiction of Courts in Matters Relating to the 
Rights and Powers of Castes, printed at the Caxton Printing Works, 
Bombay, 1901, 39*
2. ILR (1891) 15 Bom 399,611* 3. AIR 1932 Bom 122 (FB).
4. ILR (1898) 23 Bom 122. 5. AIR 1932 Bom 122 (FB) 126.
6. AIR 1969 All 68.
6*+
"Whether the Bhumihars are Brahmins or not is a question 
which has to be determined primarily by Bhumihars themselves 
and relatively the other sections of Hindu Society. The 
question of caste in the Hindu Society, has always been a 
matter primarily for the caste itself and for the Hindu Society.
All that a Court could do is to recognise what has been declared 
and decided by the people themselves on the evidence before it.
It is true that sometimes a Court has to decide the precise 
status of a particular caste in a dispute between the parties, 
but primarily the decision of the Court would deal only with 
the controversy between the contending parties before it. A 
Court would neither take upon itself the task of finally and 
conclusively declaring for all times the status of a particular 
caste or section of the Hindu Society nor could it expect that 
its verdict would be the last word on the subject".*'
Though no case law was cited in the present case the learned judge seems
to have stated the general law on the subject correctly, and it is markedly
at variance with the practice of the state in pre-British times.
In Murari v. Suba, the plaintiff Murari, a member of the Mahar caste,
had instituted the suit to establish his right as guru to certain annual
fees from the defendants as his Sishyas (disciples), but the defendants
denied that the plaintiff was their guru. Referring to Shankara v. Hanma^
in which the plaintiff claimed to be the hereditary holder of the office
of certain position in the Lingiat caste of Bagalkot, Sir Charles Sargent,
C.J. of the Bombay High Court had held that
"a claim to a caste office and to be entitled to perform the 
honorary duties of that office or to enjoy privileges and 
honours at the hands of the members of the caste in virtue of 
such office is a caste question and not cognizable by a civil 
court; and indeed, we think the same rule ought to apply when 
there are fees appertenant to the office".'
The same . learned Judge had held in Abdul Kadir v. Pharma^ where the
1. AIR 1969 All 68, 71
2. ILR (1882) 6 Bom 725*
3. ILR (1877) 2 Bom *+70. this view
ILR (1882) 6 Bom 725i 727 • But/ is now obsolete in view of the provision 
in Explanation II of section 9 according to which any suit relating to 
the right to any office, a caste office or not, paid or honorary, is 
of a civil nature, cognizable by a Civil Court.
5. (1895) 20 Bom 190.
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members of a certain caste, came to an agreement to make individual
contributions to the caste funds for paying off the debts of the caste
and the managers of the caste had instituted a suit against some of its
members to enforce the agreement, that
"the agreement referred to in the plaint simply embodies 
an arrangement come to between members of the caste for 
the purpose of paying off the debts of the caste out of 
certain contributions to the caste funds and as such 
involves a caste question. We must therefore, discharge 
the rule with costs.
It will be appreciated that .in refusing to decide caste questions the
courts were indirectly strengthening the significance of the power of
excommunication in respect of all Hindus (and many Muslims and Christians)
who valued (as most of them did) membership of their community.
The aforesaid two cases were often cited in subsequent decisions on the
2subject. Thus in Mehta Jetulal v. Jamiatram Lalubhai and Giridhar v.
Kalya,^  Sir Charles Sargent had held that as the plaints involved caste
questions, the suits were not of a nature cognizable by a civil court. The
if
Assistant Judge in Giridhar!s case referred to the Full Bench decision in 
Nemchand v. Savaichand.^  In Nemchand’s case some members of a caste (Shravak 
caste at Surat) had instituted the suit for a decree declaring them to be
the proper persons to receive half of the compensation granted by the
Collector to buy certain shops belonging to the same caste. One of the 
questions as raised by the District Judge was "Is this a caste question 
with which a court cannot interfere by law?"^ The Judge decided the question
1. (1895) 20 Bora 190, 192.
2. ILR (1887) 12 Bora 225.
3. ILR (1880) 5 Bom 83. 
k. Ibid.
5. S.A. 591 of 1865 (unreported) see footnote at ILR (1880) 5 Bom 83, 8*f.
6. ILR (1880) 5 Bora 83, footnote at
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in the affirmative and held that
"The question of plaintiff's right to half the temple 
property is simply a caste question; it is not a 
right of any individual, nor can it be looked on as  ^
affecting the separate individual right of the parties.
It is a question solely affecting the well-being of the  ^
caste, and as such, I consider the court cannot interfere".
The ruling of the District Judge was upheld by the Full Bench of the Bombay
High Court.
Now it is clear that in cases where the question raised is either
entirely a caste question^ or the principal issue in the case is a caste 
kquestion, the civil Courts cannot have jurisdiction over them. At this 
point, it is to be remembered that the law hitherto discussed is the general 
law in so far as the Civil Procedure Code is concerned. The fact is that 
the exclusion of caste questions proper is more relevant to the Bombay High 
Court than any other High Court in India because of sec. 21 of the Bombay 
Regulation II of 1827 providing inter alia that
"no interference on the part of the Court in caste questions 
is hereby warranted beyond the admission and trial of any 
suit instituted for the recovery of damages on account of an 
alleged injury to the caste and character of the plaintiff 
arising from some illegal act or unjustifiable conduct of the 
other p a r t y ” .5
1. "Thus a caste may frame rules for the management of its affairs, 
and for the guidance of its members, and the civil Court has no 
jurisdiction to enquire into the validity of the rule, provided 
the punishment for its breach is limited to social caste sanctions"
- L.T. Kikani, Caste in Courts. Or Rights and Powers of Castes in 
Social and Religious Matters as Recognised by Indian Courts, printed 
at the Ganatra Printing Works, Rajkot, 1912, 15*
2. ILR (1880) 5 Bom 83, footnote at 8^ .
3. Shankara v. Hanma ILR (1877) 2 Bom 7^0; Raghunath Damodhar v. 
Janardhan Gopal ILR (1891) 13 Bom 399; Kaji Bavla v. Arjun Shamji 
ILR (1893) lo Bom 113; Nathu v. Keshwaji ILR (1902) 26 Bom 17*+.
k. • Naraindas v. Valabdas AIR 1929 Sindh 1.
3* See Pragji Kalan v. Govind Gopal ILR (1887) 11 Bom 53^ , footnote
at 335; see also Nathu Velji v. Keshwaji ILR (1902) 26 Bom 17^+, 
at 180 as reproduced by Chandavarkar, J.
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The spirit of this written law has been accepted by all the High Courts 
in India except the Calcutta High Court. In so far as the High Court of 
Calcutta is concerned it is guided by Sec. 8 of the Bengal Regulation III 
of 1793 which empowers a civil Court to take cognizance of all suits
including complaints relating to rights connected with a caste.
2In Appaya v. padappa, it was held that the civil Court had jurisdiction 
to make inquiry into the validity of the sentence of excommunication.^
In that case, Ranade, J. had cited many cases involving caste disputes 
proper where the civil Court could not have jurisdiction. Thus his 
Lordship observed that
’’Claims between rival factions of the same caste to common ... 
property, claims to leadership of caste, claims to require 
voluntary offerings and honours and presents to be paid to 
particular members, claims to officiate as priests against 
the consent of the caste, claims for compulsory invitations 
to dinners &c. - Girdhar v. Kalys; Dullabh v. Narayan; Murar v. 
Nagria; Murari v. Suba; Archakam v. Udayagiri; Gossain Doss v.
Gooroo Doss; Krishnasami v. Krishnama; Dayaram v. Jethabhat; 
Maya-Shankar v. Harishankar; Karuppa.v. Kolanthoyan;, Joy Chunder. 
v. Ramchurn; Sudharam v. Sudharam; Shankara,v. Kanma; Striman v. 
Kristna - These are matters which affect the internal autonomy 
of the caste and its social relations, and suits in regard to 
"them have been properly held to be barred by Section 21 of 
Regulation II of 1827 and similar other enactments in other 
parts of India.
1. Sec. 8 of the Regulation III of 1793 reads that ’’The zillah and city 
courts respectively are empowered to take cognizance of all suits and 
complaints respecting the succession or right to real or personal 
property, land-rents, revenues, debts, accounts, contracts, partnerships, 
marriages, caste, claims to damages for injuries ... and generally of 
all suits and complaints of a civil nature in which the defendant may 
come within any of the descriptions of persons &c.” See Sudharam v. 
Sudharam (1869) 3 BLR 91» footnote 2 at 9^  •
2. ILR (1899) 23 Bom 122.
3. The sentence of excommunication was held valid when it was made to 
maintain the strength of the religion and it was proved that the 
practice was essentially religious. See Sardar Sydena Taher 
Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 833- Also see above.
Appaya v Padappa ILR (1899) 23 Bom 122, 129-130.
Galanter*s conjecture needs critical approach# Caste is withering away—  
since 1966 many things have happened. His prophesy has&'proved to he wrong# 
Caste system is reasserting;new castes are emerging.Caste is a base and/or 
idetified with economicahd political power.One minister(of Bihar)wanted all 
the secretaries of the €fisi$ caste#
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With due respect to the eminent Judge, it is suggested that the High
Court of Calcutta had dealt with the above cited two cases (Sudharam v.
Sudharam (1869) 3 BLR 9^  and Gossain Doss v. Guru Doss (1896)16 WR 19S),
taking into consideration the provisions of the said Bengal regulation..
of 1793* Suits which would have been barred by the Bombay or other High
Courts, had been taken cognizance of by the Calcutta High Court and even
suits declaring restoration to caste had been cognized of in Sonaram v.
1
Obhayram Gazor. In that case, the two lower Courts had upheld the claim 
of the plaintiff that he had been injured in caste when he had been invited 
to a ceremonial and the defendants turned him out of the assembly. The 
main issue in the case was the right to regain caste. Though the High Court 
sent back the case to the lower court for proper disposal, it ordered that 
■a special appeal be admitted'- .
Caste questions are, no doubt, intermingled with religious questions, but
their privilege is not necessarily reconcilable with the needs of the present 
2Indian society. India to-day needs change but that change, or reform, 
cannot be brought about without dealing with delicate caste questions. In 
the Hindu community, the caste system stands as an evil making divisions 
in the community. Members of the lower castes have every reason to feel 
deprived of the dignity which the members of the higher castes enjoy. From 
the humanitarian point of view, the caste system should be abolished, but 
that can be done only by reforming Hinduism. However, the question is 
MCan it be reformed?" It is suggested that if reform can be brought about
1. (18^ 7) SDA 106.
2. "Notwithstanding the common rhetoric about the casteless society, the 
Constitution is quite unclear about the position of the caste group in 
Indian life. While there are guarantees to preserve the integrity of 
religious and linguistic groups, there are none for the caste group - 
it would not seem to enjoy any constitutional protection as such. This 
silence may represent an anticipation that caste* will wither away and 
have no important place in the new India. Or it may represent an 
implicit ratification of the old policy of non-interference" - M. 
Galanter, "The Religious Aspects of Caste: A Legal View" in D.E.
Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, 227-3^ 0, 30^ .
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in this aspect, the initiative of bringing it should be left to the 
eastrls or the religious pundits. As parliamentarians are not experts 
in religious matters, they can at best ventilate the needs for a change 
in a community or communities.
To sum up: where a matter of the Hindu religion is of the substance
of a dispute, the first question is whether the State will adjudicate.
If a constitutional right is infringed the Courts must provide a remedy.
We have seen that the Courts are generous in some respect and are 
particularly solicitous to prevent the community or any spokesmen for 
a community interfering with the liberty of another community; yet they 
are solicitous on the part of the state itself to refuse relief where 
the pretended or real religious interest would defeat an object which 
the State holds dear, e.g. reform. On the other hand the present state 
of Hindu caste discipline is recognized - to confirm the solidarity of 
caste in its religious aspects the Court will decide no religious question 
and no caste question unless property right is at stake, while the castes* 
right to excommunicate members for religious offences is everywhere 
recognized as a fundamental right so long as castes care to use it or 
individuals are amenable to it.
We are now in a position to apply our minds to what are ostensibly 
exclusively property matters, in which the factor of religion is sufficiently 
prominent for the question to be asked: ’’Will the state adjudicate so as
to protect religious interests, and if so, within what limits and to what 
effect?”
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CHAPTER II
TRUSTS IN ENGLISH AND HINDU LAWS
INTRODUCTION
English judges in British India were generally careful not to interfere 
with native family laws, but when the texts were silent or principles of 
a particular system could not give clear guidance, they did not hesitate 
to draw on English or any other legal principles to meet new situations.
The doctrine of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience was introduced to that 
effect.
"Where the rights of parties are not clearly governed by a 
particular personal law, where the personal law is silent, 
where a code has a lacuna, and where the source fails, or 
requires to b^  supplemented, J.E.G.C. may properly be 
referred to".
The importance of this doctrine in giving shape to Anglo-Hindu law cannot 
2be overstressed. Moreover, English laws on different subjects were 
introduced either to replace native laws or to fill a gap in native legal 
systems. Thus, the present Indian Penal Code, which was introduced in
■Z
India in i860, is a codified English Criminal Law and the Indian Trusts
Act (Act II of 1882) is based on English laws or Chancery notions on the 
if
subject. Sec. 3 of the Act clearly points to that effect when it provides 
that
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Justice, Equity and Good Conscience in India", in 
Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law (hereafter referred to as 
ECMHL)., vol. 4, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 197&, 8-17, 9*
2. J.D.M. Derrett, Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (hereafter referred to 
as IMHL), Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1963, 9*
3. N.J. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, Cambridge University Press, 
1971, 18*+.
*+. "The Law of Trusts as administered in India closely resembles the English 
law in the general principles applied" - W.F. Agnew, The Law of Trusts in 
British India, Thacker, Spink 8c Co., Calcutta, l882, 1.
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nA trust is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property 
and arising out of a confidence reposed in and accepted by  ^
the owner ... for the benefit of another ... and the owner ...M
The rule against perpetuities or the law of perpetuities as applicable to
2 3Hindus or non-Hindus has been incorporated in several statutes and the
V
cy pres doctrine has been contained in sec. 92 of the present Code of Civil
Procedure as amended in 1976. Both,the rule against perpetuities and the
cy pres doctrine^have been applied and discussed in cases of both Hindu
!{.
religious endowments and Muslim religious trusts (wakfs).
The fact that technical ideas of Chancery jurisprudence have been used
in cases of law of Hindu religious and charitable trusts and still they
are in use, reveals that there are very few materials which Hindu lawgivers
might have supplied to tackle the issues raised in connection with the
disputes relating to Hindu religious endowments. Thus Pandit Prannath
Saraswati observed that
"The actual facts discovered might be very few but in exploring 
such fields we would be in the position of the geologist 
patiently sifting the dust of ages in ancient beds, thankful
if mere fragments of fossil bones should be discovered ..."
But we have not yet found any fossil; instead we have seen commendable
1 • D.V.Chitaley and S.Appu Rao, The AIR Manual, vol.21, 3rd ed., 1974, 3^ 3.
2. B.K. Mukherjea, Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, 4th ed.,
Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1979i 137.
3. In Sec. 114 of the Indian Succession Act (Act XXXIX of 1925) see 
P.L. Paruck, Indian Succession Act, 5th ed., N.M. Tripathi, Bombay,
1966, 239 and in sec. 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, *6th
. ed., N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1973i HO* On this point see also 
Fazlul Rabbi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 1722, 1727.
4. For example, the rule against perpetuities has been discussed in 
M. Kesava Gounder v. D.C. Rajan, AIR 1976 Mad 102 and had been 
applied in both the Mahommedan law (wakf) cases of Abul Fatah 
Mahomed Ishaqi v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdry, (1894-95) 22 IA 76 and 
Fazul Rabbi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 1722. In Fazul 
Rabbi’s case the Supreme Court approved the ruling in ‘ Abul Fatah*s 
case that under Mahommedan law a perpetual family settlement as made 
expressly as wakf was not valid merely on the ground that the settle­
ment contained an ultimate but illusory gift to the poor. In State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Bansidhar, AIR 1974 SC IO85 and in Ratilal v.
State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 366, for example, the Supreme Court
discussed the circumstances where the doctrine of cy pres could be
applied.
5. The Hindu Law of Endowments, Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, 1897* 13*
* See Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
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observations and judgements on the subject of Hindu religious endowments,
as made by both eminent English and Indian judges, giving us a developed
law on the subject concerned. The modern law of Hindu religious
endowments is essentially a judge-made law and the judges with thejr.English
2legal background have made a valuable contribution to.the subject.
So, it will not be out of place if a discussion of the English Law of Trusts 
is offered in a nutshell.
SECTION 1. ENGLISH LAW OF TRUSTS
a. 3rief History
The invention and development of the notion of the English trust is
regarded as the most important exploit of Equity.
"This perhaps forms the most distinctive achievement of English 
lawyers. It seems to us almost essential to civilization,
and yet there is nothing quite like it in foreign law".
The germ of agency can hardly be distinguished from this branch of
English law, the use, trust or confidence. The English word "use" is
not derived from the Latin term "usus" but* it•originates from the Latin L'
term "opus"-which according to:old French is "os" or "oes". The
"earliest history of the "use" is the early history of the 
phrase ad opus. Now this both in France and England we may
find in many ancient days. A man will sometimes receive money
to use (ad opus) of another person; in particular money is 
frequently being received for the King’s use".
The law of trusts has its root in the law of the middle ages and assumed
its modern shape and importance in the sixteenth century. It has made its
impact to a large extent on both English private and public laws. In
1. Shanti Sarup v. R.S. Sabha AIR 1969 All 248, 264.
2. "It should be noted that the modern Hindu law of religions and charitable 
endowments is essentially a judge-made law and our courts, including the 
Supreme Court, are still busy in their endeavour to develop and interpret 
-the law of endowments in our modern context" - P. Diwan, Modern Hindu Law. 
Codified and Uncodified, 2nd ed., Allahabad Law Agency, Allahabad, 1974, 413.
3. F.W. Maitland, Equity, Cambridge University Press, 1920, 23.
4. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, vol. 2, 2nd ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 1968, 229.
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English legal history
"There was a*..period^ when the law of contract was appealed to to 
explain the origin of society; and there was yet a later 
period when complete freedom of contract was supposed to be 
the cure for all social ills of the body politic.. Trusts 
likewise have, from the sixteenth century onwards, played a 
part in the development of ... public law, larger and more 
direct than played by contract".^
b: Role of the Chancery Court
The modern English trust is the product of the equitable jurisdiction
of the Chancellor. The distinctive characteristic of the English trust
is the direct result of the unique way in which the principles of equity
2were developed in England by the Court of Chancery.
Practice grew up from the early thirteenth century of conveying land
for permanent purposes. A landowner was entitled to convey land for
different purposes, under an ordinary common law, to persons called feofp^^
to uses, giving direction to them to hold the land for the benefit of other
persons, called cestui- que use, who might include the feoffor himself. But
the common law refused to recognise uses and it in fact treated the feoffees
to uses as the owners of the property disregarding the claims of the 
3
cestui'- que use. Inadequacy of the procedure of the Common Law was one
of the reasons for its refusal to entertain cases involving breaches of trust.
If
But this refusal led obviously to frauds of the "grossest description".
It was rather disturbing that feofpe^^to uses could be able to disregard
the dictates of good faith and honour. From the early fifteenth century,
the Chancellor, began to intervene by compelling them to carry out the
5
directions given to them by feoffors for dealing with the land.
1. Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol.*4-,3rd. ed. ,2nd impression, 
Methuen & Co. and Sweet &• Maxwell, London, 1973? *+08.
2. Ibid.
3* P.H. Pettit, Equity and the Law- of Trusts, t^h ed., Butterworth, London,
1979, 10.
4. Sir William Holdsworth, op. cit;, vol. *+, 3rd ed. , -^18.
3* Pettit, op.cit., *+th ed., 10.
7^
"The use has its origin in the insistence of the Chancellor 
that the feofees to uses should administer the property in 
a particular way —  to the use and benefit of cestui.- que 
use. Similarly with the trust, "Equity did not say that 
the cestui que trust was the owner of the land, it said 
that the trustee was the owner of the land, but added that 
he was bound.to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui 
que trust"."
The Court of Chancery employed a procedure, suitable to discover and 
remedy breaches of trust. The Court could summon the parties for examining 
before it and was in a position to know the facts of those private arrange­
ments to which the origin of uses could be generally traced. Whether
"we look at the ethical principles upon which the Chancellor 
interfered, or at the procedure of the Court of Chancery, or 
at its freedom from mixed forms of action, we can see that 
the Chancellor and his Court were strikingly fitted, as the 
common law courts were^strikingly unfitted, to assume juris­
diction over the use".
The device of the use made it possible to evade some feudal incidents. 
According to feudal law, the lord was entitled to a payment in case of an 
heir’s succession to a feudal land and to other dues arising in case of 
the holding of the land by a minor heir. In the absence of an heir to 
the feudal land he was also entitled to the right of escheat. Further, 
the employment of use introduced new methods of conveyancing and helped 
create new types of interests in land which the common law could not make 
possible."^
The system of uses was entirely beneficial to small tenants but was 
totally harmful to the King, because he was the "Lord of all", being a 
"tenant of none". Henry VIII attacked uses for the restoration of the 
revenues of the uses and the Statute of Uses, 15351 was introduced to limit 
• them severely. The Statute did not put an end to all uses. For example, 
after the introduction of the Statute, the creation of equitable interests 
was possible by imposing a use on a term of years. Again, "what would 
happen if a second use were imposed? If land were limited to A to the
1. Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity, 10th ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 
1976, 15-^ 6.
2. Holdsworth, op. cit., vol. 3rd ed., +^19.
3. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit,, 10th ed., 8.
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use of *Bf to the use of C; is it possible to argue that the first use will
be executed, and that B will hold the legal estate to the use of C"? Such
a solution was reached by 1700 A.D. The second use is regarded as trust.
A shorter form which became a settled practice was to omit A, and to make
2the disposition "unto and to the use of B in trust for C". The result 
was the restoration of duality of ownership, "B being the legal and C the 
equitable owner. The use was in effect, resuscitated under the name of 
trust."-5
c: Definition and Nature of English Trusts
No one has yet succeeded in giving a wholly satisfactory definition of 
k
a trust. "No doubt we should like to begin our discussion with a definition
5of a 'trust*. But I know not where to find an authoritative definition".
Many legal thinkers including Underhill have made attempts to define a trust
and among the many definitions on trust as put forward by them, Underhill's
definition has been most widely accepted. He defines trust as
"an equitable obligation binding a person (who is called a 
trustee) to deal with property over which he has control
(which is called the trust property), for the benefit of persons
(who are called the beneficiaries or cestuis que trust), of 
whom he may himself be one and any one of whom may enforce the 
obligation".
But this definition is not wide enough to include trusts for purposes as 
7
well. In other words, charitable trusts are not covered by Underhill's
1. But the second use, after the introduction of the Statute of Uses, used
to have been held void for a long time. For an example, TyrrePs case,
ER73 Rep. (1979) 536 = (1557) 2DY 155A. In that case it had been held
that "an use cannot be ingendered of an use". - 337-
2. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 10th ed., 8.
3. Pettit, op. cit., *+th ed., 11.
b, Lewin on Trusts, 16th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 196^ , 3*
3. Maitland, op.cit., bj,
6. Underhill's Law relating to Trusts and Trustees, 13th ed., Butterworths, 
London, 1979* 1*
7. Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973*
87 = 28th ed., Sweet & Madwell, London, 19&2, 90.
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definition. But the definition of a trust as given by Keeton and 
Sheridan seems to be the most comprehensive one. They define a trust 
as
"the relationship which arises wherever a person called the 
trustee is compelled in Equity to hold property, whether 
real or personal and whether by legal or equitable title, 
for the benefit of some persons (of whom he may be one and 
who are termed cestui, que trust) for some object permitted 
by law, in such a way that the real benefit of the property 
occurs, not to the trustee, but to the beneficiaries or other 
objects of the trust".
It is said that three things are "indispensable to constitute a valid
trust; first, sufficient words to raise it; secondly, a definite subject;
2and thirdly, a certain or ascertained object."
Though it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory definition of 
a trust, it is easy to grasp the general idea which is expressed by saying 
that one person in whom property is vested called a trustee, is compelled 
in equity to hold the property not for his benefit but for the benefit of 
another person, called the cestui que trust or for some other purposes.
Though the trustee is the legal owner of the trust property, he is only a 
nominal owner, but the real or the beneficial ownership of the trust property 
belongs to the cestui que trust.
d: Private and Public Trusts
In English law, trusts have been classified in different ways, but the
main division is between private and public or charitable trusts. A private
trust is for the benefit of ascertainable individuals. A public or a
3 ^charitable trust stands for purposes which are treated in law as charitable 
or for purposes which are for the benefit of the community at large. In
1. G.W. Keeton and L.A. Sheridan, Law of Trusts, 10th ed., Professional 
Books, London, 197^i 3*
2. J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as administered in England 
and America, vol. 2, l*+th ed., Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1916, 6^ 9*
3. Charitable "purposes mean purposes which are exclusively charitable 
according to the law of England and Wales" - H. Picarda, The Law and 
Practice delating to Charities, Butterworths, London, 1977,
k. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 10th ed., 3^ 6.
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so far as charitable trusts are concerned the
’’Attorney-General represents the Crown as parens patriae 
in litigation, and the Crown has a prerogative right to 
protect all charitable trusts. The Attorney-General may 
institute proceedings against charitable trustees, provided 
his attention is drawn to abuses and that he thinks the 
matter suitable for legal proceedings.”
e. Definition of Charity in English Law
No one has yet been able to produce a satisfactory definition of a 
2charity. In its widest sense the word '"charity” denotes
"all the good affections that men ought to bear towards each 
other. In its most restricted and common sense it denotes 
relief of the poor. The word is not employed in either of 
these senses by the Court, and the legal meaning of the word 
is neither dependent upon nor conterminous with its popular 
sense. Before the coming into force of the Charities Act, I960, 
a purpose was charitable if it fell within the letter or spirit 
and intendment of the preamble of the Charitable Uses Act, 1601, 
and was for the benefit of the public and not merely for the 
benefit of private individuals."3
However, the starting point for a definition of charity is the statute kj Eliz.
ij.
I. C k (The Charitable Uses Act, 1601). The Act was passed for the remedying 
of abuses which had grown up in the administration of charitable trusts, but 
the preamble of the Act contained a general catalogue of charitable objects 
furnishing a guide to the English Courts in determining the legal meaning 
of charity. The Act was repealed by the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act,
1888'but the preamble was retained to some extent by S.13(2) of the Act 
which itself was repealed by the Charities Act, i960, but sec. 38(*0 
provides: "any reference in any enactment ... to a charity within
the meaning ... of the Charitable Uses Act, 1601 ... shall be construed as a 
reference to a charity within the meaning which the’ word bears ... according 
to the law of England and Wales." Though the preamble is no longer in the
1. G.W. Keeton and L.A. Sheridan, The Modern Law of Charities, 2nd ed., 
Northern Ireland Legal Inc., Belfast, 1971* 12.
2. The position has been succinctly explained by Keeton and Sheridan when 
they say in the preface of their book that "we are as far away as ever 
from any satisfactory definition of a charitable purpose".
3 . Tudor on Charities, 6th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1967* 1•
k. E.L. Fisch, D.J. Freed and E.K. Schachter, Charities and Charitable
Foundations, London Publications, Pamona, New York, 197^ +» 227.
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statute book, it serves as the guide to the English Courts. For a
trust to be legally charitable, its purposes must fall within the
spirit and intendment of the Statute of 1601. "Those purposes are
considered charitable which that Statute enumerates, or which by
1
analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment". In other
words, purposes will be regarded as charitable if they are within the
2equity of the statute and the question whether a particular trust is of
charitable status is a question of law.^
Now, the general rule is that for a trust to be of charitable status
it must satisfy three conditions. First, a trust is charitable if it is
of a charitable character within the spirit and intendment of the preamble
of the Elizabethan Statute. Secondly, in order to be charitable a trust
if
must promote the public benefit. Finally, a trust is charitable only
5
when it is wholly and exclusively charitable.
The purposes as set out in the preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth
are, in modernised English, as follows:
"The relief of aged, impotent and poor people, the maintenance 
of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schbols of learning and 
scholars in Universities; the repair of bridges, ports, havens, 
causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways; the education and 
the preferment of orphans; the relief, stock or maintenance for 
houses of correction; the marriages of poor maids, the supportation,
1. Per Sir William Grant M.R., Morice v. Bishop of Durham [[1803--13]} All ER 
Rep *+51, *+5*+* The view has been reaffirmed in many recent decisions. 
For example, Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society, Ltd. v. 
Glasgow City Corporation | 196? I 3 All ER 215; Re Banfield T 968 j 2 All
ER 276; Ashfield Municipal Council v Joyce Ql978J AC 122(PC).
2. Incorporated Council of Law Reporting v. Attorney-General |_1972[] Ch. 731 
87-88. Earlier Leach V.-C had observed (at p. 76) in Attorney-General 
v. Hellis (182*0 2 Sim & St 67, that "It is not material that the
particular public or general purpose is not expressed in the Statute of
Elizabeth, all other legal, public organised purposes being within the 
equity of that Statute".
3- Royal Choral Society v. Inland Revenue Ll9*+3] ^  ^11 ER 101, CA.
*+. Re Cole f19581 Ch. 877, CA, 891.
3. Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1803) 10 Ves. 522 = [jl883-13]} All ER Rep.*+51;
Hunter v. Attorney-General £l8993 AC 309*
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and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons 
decayed; the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; 
and the aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of 
fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.
The catalogue of purposes, as mentioned above, is charitable by statute-
but "the legislature did not declare that omitted purposes were not 
2
charitable". The position was best explained by Lord Reid in Scottish
Burial Reform and Cremation Society, Ltd. v. Glasgow City Corporation^ in
which the main issue was whether the appellants, a non-profit-making company
whose main object was to promote cremation in an expensive but sanitary way,
were a charity. His Lordship ruled that the
"preamble specifies a number of objects which were then recognised 
as charitable. But in more recent times a wide variety of other 
objects have come to be recognised as also being charitable. The 
Courts appear to have proceeded first by making some analogy between 
an object mentioned in the preamble and the object with regard to 
which they had to reach a decision. Then they appear to have gone 
further, and to have been satisfied if they could find an analogy 
between an object already held to be charitable and the new object 
claimed to be charitable".
Again, a trust to be of charitable status is to be determined by the 
consideration whether a purpose in question falls within the classification 
of trusts set down by Lord Macnaughten in Income Tax Special Purposes Com­
missioners v. Pemsel  ^as later exemplified "by the cases decided in accordance 
with it".^ In that case, the main question for determination was whether 
the purposes of the trust in question (which was made to apply its income 
for the purposes of maintaining missionary establishments of the Moravian
missions; among heathen nations)were charitable within the provisions of the
7
Income Tax Act, 18^ 2. Lord Macnaughten classified charitable purposes
1. P.H. Pettit, op.cit., ^th ed., 173*
2. Keeton and Sheridan, The Modern Law of Charities, op.cit., 2nd ed., 22.
3. £1967] 3 All ER 213 (HL).'^ C(XS^  OL^r^f^ **
k. Ibid., p. 218. V-NcMuiUn $gt,
5. £1891] AC 531 = ^ 1891-9^1 All ER Rep 28.
6. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 10th ed., 373*
7. The first attempt to categorize charity in Macnaughen1s line had been 
made by Sir Samuel Romily in 180^ + - see B. Nightingale, Charities, Allen 
Lane, London, 1973? 36.
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into four heads when he had observed that
""Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: 
trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement 
of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts 
for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling 
under any of the preceding heads".
3
Lord Macnaughten's classification has been referred to in many decisions
and has been reaffirmed in Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society, Ltd.
kv. Glasgow City Corporation by Lord Wilberforce, but his Lordship added
three of his comments:
"first, that since it is a classification of convenience, there
may well be purposes which do not fit neatly into one or other
of the headings; secondly, that the words used must not be given 
the force of a statute to be construed; and thirdly, that the
law of charity is,_a moving subject which may well have evolved
even since 1891".
To come to his decision regarding the question whether a trust is charitable
or not, a judge is not affected by the settlor's opinion about the trust.
The purpose of the trust must be determined by the Court as was held in
Gilmour v. Coated,where a trust fund was held not to be charitable as the
trust fund was only meant for contemplative nuns of an association which did
not have any activities outside their convent.
Again to determine whether or not the object of an organisation or a
society is charitable or not, the cardinal test is whether it stands for
7
the public benefit. In National Anti-Vivisection Society v. Inland Revenue
1. The first three classes of charity have been borrowed from Sir Samuel 
Romily's argument in Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves 522,
Tudor on Charities, op.cit., 6th ed., 1967, 3»
2. £1891] AC 531, 583.
3. For example, Seef^.e Banfield £1968 }^ 2 All ER 276, in which half the
residue of the estate was to fund a community for leading a pious life.
It has also been applied recently in Ashfield Municipal Council v. Joyce, 
[[1978]] AC 12 (PC). In that case the issue was whether the vacant land
of the trust used as a car park by church goers was exempt from paying
rates payable under the local Govt. Act, 1919 of New South Wales.
4. [196?2 3 All ER 215,(HL). 5. Ibid., p. 223.
6. [5-949J 1 All ER 848,(HL). JThe case approved the view as had been expressed
in Re Hummeltenberg f1923*1 1 Ch. 237* Vis'tkU is
7. Re Hummeltenberg f"l923~J 1 Ch. 237; Re Grove-Grady, Plowden v. Lawrence
L1929J 1 Ch. 537.
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1
Commissioners, the appellant society whose main object was the total
abolition of vivisection including all experiment on living animals claimed
exemption of income tax on its income on the ground that it was an associ-
2ation established for charitable purposes only. Lord Wright approved the
that
"If a testator by stating or indicating his view that a trust 
is beneficial to the public can establish that fact beyond 
question, trusts might be established in perpetuity for the 
promotion of all kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) 
objects, of which the training of poodles to dance might be a 
wild example. In my opinion the question whether a gift is or 
may be operative for the public benefit is a question, to be 
answered by^the Court by forming an opinion upon the evidence 
before it".
Recreational Charities
Mention must be made regarding one class of charities relating to village 
halls, recreation grounds, etc.. The definition of charity has been extended 
by the Recreational Charities Act 1958. But the definition does not 
restrict the purposes which are already recognised in law as charitable. 
Under Sec. 1(1) of the Act it is "charitable to provide, or assist in the 
provision of, facilities for recreation or other leisure-time occupation, 
if the facilities are provided in the interests of social welfare". Under 
this category a trust to be charitable must be made both for the public 
benefit and for the interests of social welfare.^ So promotion of social 
welfare alone is not enough for a trust to be of charitable status under 
this head.
f. Nature and Scope of English Trusts of a Religious Nature
With reference to such English trusts which fall under the separate head
5. Snell’s Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 1^ 9.
6. Wynn v. Skegness U.D.C. Q.966] All ER 336, 3^ 5~3^ 6, a case which was 
concerned with a holiday centre for Derbyshire miners, wives and families.
opinion of Russell, J. as he then was, as expressed in Re Hummeltenberg^
1. Ql9^7] 2 All ER 217,(HL).
5.
2. Ibid., p. 221. 
k. Ibid., p. 2bZ.
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of charity (i.e. trusts for the advancement of religion), under Lord
Macnaughten*s classification it may be pointed out that though the
Statute of Elizabeth refers only to the repair of churches as a matter
relating to the purposes of religion, many religious purposes have been
1
held, nevertheless, to fall within its spirit and indentment..
The Court does not make any distinction between one religion and the
other. As long as a religion is not subversive of public morality, it can
2 3be the object of a charitable gift. In Thornton v. Howe the testatrix
bequeathed by her will all her real and personal estate for the purpose of
publishing and propagating the writings of one Joanna Southcotfc' who
’’was...a foolish, ignorant woman, of an enthusiastic turn of 
mind, who had long wished to become an instrument in the 
hands of God to promote some great good on earth. By constantly 
thinking of this, it became in her mind an engrossing and im­
movable idea, till at last she became to believe that her wish 
was accomplished, and that she had been selected by the Almighty 
for this purpose."^
Sir John Romilly, M.R., pronounced for the Court of Chancery that
"I am of opinion, that if a bequest of money be made for the 
purpose of printing and circulating works of a religious ten­
dency or for the purpose of extending the knowledge of the 
Christian religion, that this is a charitable bequest and the 
Court will, upon a proper application being made to it, sanction 
and settle a scheme for this purpose... In this respect, I am 
of opinion that the Court of Chancery makes no distinction 
between one sect of religion and another. They...are equally 
bequests which are included in the general term of charitable 
bequests.
"Neither does this Court, in this respect, make any distinction 
between one sect and another. It may be that the tenets of a 
particular sect inculcate doctrines adverse to the very foundations 
of all religion, and that they are subversive of all morality.
In such a case, if it should arise, the Court will not assist the 
execution of the bequest, but will declare it to be void. The
1. Pettit, op.cit., *fth ed., 179-180.
2. "In the course of four centuries, the law of charities has moved from 
the extreme of exclusiveness, in which only gifts for the national 
church were recognised as charitable, to the position in which any 
religion, which is not subversive of public morality, is capable of 
being the object of a charitable gift" - Keeton and Sheridan, The Law 
of Trusts, op.cit., 10th ed., 162.
3. (1862) 31 Beav. lb. 4. Ibid., p. 18..
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general immoral tendency of the bequest would make it void, 
whether it was to be paid out of pure personalty or out of 
real estate. But if the tendency were not immoral, and although 
this Court might consider the opinions sought to be propagated 
foolish or even devoid of foundation, it would not, on that account, 
declare it void or take it out of the class of legacies which 
included in the general terms charitable bequests.”
2Thornton v. Howe is good law and it is unquestionably the leading case 
on the subject of English trusts of a religious nature. The case has been 
cited with approval inter alia in Bowman v. Secular Society, Limited  ^where 
the House of Lords held the object of the society in question, registered as 
a company, to promote the principle that human conduct should not be based 
upon supernatural belief • but on natural knowledge, did not render the
company incapable of acquiring property by gift and that a bequest upon trust
k 5for the society was valid. Thornton v. Howe was referred to in Re Price
where the testator gave half of her residuary estate to the Anthroposophical
Society in Great Britain to be used inter alia by the chairman of the society
for carrying on the teachings of its founder, one Dr. Rudolf Steiner; and the
Court held that the gift under the terms of the will was a valid charitable
gift. But very recent citation of the case with approval has been made in
Barralet v. Attorney-General  ^where the main issue to be decided was whether
the objects of the society were for the advancement of religion.
7
But the most relevant case to Thornton v. Howe is Re Watson Hobbs v.
g
Smith and Others. In that case the trust in question was made by a spinster 
daughter for the publication and distribution to the public of the religious 
works of her father, H.G. Hobbs. The law as laid down in the decision in 
Thornton v* Howe was applied in the facts of the case and Plowman, J. observed 
for the Court of Chancery that,
1. (1862) 31 Beav. 1*4, 19-20.
3. (J-917J AC *406 HL.
*4. (1862) 31 Beav. 1 *4, 20-21.
5.
7. (1862) 31 Beav. 1*4.
2. Ibid.
6. ii9Soj 3 All ER 918.
8. il973j s All ER 678.
8*f
"First of all, as Romilly MR said in Thornton v. Howe, 
the court does not prefer one religion to another 
and it does not prefer one sect to another. ■
Secondly, wnere the purposes in question are of a religious 
nature - and,in my opinion, they clearly are here - then 
the court assumes a public benefit unless the contrary is 
shown...
"And thirdly, that having regard to the fact that the 
court does not draw a distinction between one religion and 
another or one sect and another, the only way of disproving 
a public benefit is to show, in the words of Romilly MR in 
Thornton v. Howe, that the doctrines inculcated are - 'adverse 
to the very foundation of all religion, and that they are 
subversive of all public morality'."*'
Now any gift for the advancement of religion in general terms is a
charitable gift but many gifts for specific religious purposes, e.g. for
the improvement of the services of a church or for the improvement of the
2
fabric of a church, are also held charitable. A gift made for the main­
tenance of a churchyard along with the tombs in it is charitable^ but a
bequest or gift for the maintenance of a particular tomb in a churchyard
kis not charitable.
In so far as the trusts of a religious nature are concerned, all religions,
Christian or non-Christian, are equally treated in English law. This point
5
was made clear in Neville Estates Ltd. v. Madden, a case relating to the
purchase of three plots of land for the purposes of a synagogue, where
Cross, J. pronounced for the Court of Chancery that "As between different
religions the law stands neutral, but it assumes that any religion is at
6
least likely to be better than none."
1. Q-973J 3 AUER 678, 688.
2. Keeton and Sheridan, The Law of Trusts, op'.cit., 10th ed., 163-
3. Re Par doe Q1906J 2 Ch
*+. Keeton and Sheridan, The Law of Trusts, op.cit., 10th ed., 163-
5. 0L962J Ch. 832.
6. Ibid., p. 833*
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g. Administration of Charities including English-Religious Trusts 
The law relating to religious and other charitable trusts was brought 
up to date by the Charities Act, i960. Before the introduction of the 
Act -there were major problems, inter alia, relating to the narrow limits 
of the doctrine of cy pres which hindered bringing up to date a number 
of old charitable trusts, the gap between the established charities, and 
the statutory services of the State and the lack of information on the 
existing charities.^
3
The general management of any charity is vested in its trustees.
However, because of the specific circumstances of charities, e.g. the
usual absence of any beneficiary who can enforce the charitable trust
and the duration of most of the charities on a perpetual basis, some
official bodies are charged to supervise them and to that effect a number
4
of special rules have been made.
Persons and Bodies controlling Charitable Trusts
1. The Charity Commissioners
The Charity Commissioners consist of the Chief Charity Commissioner
and other Charity Commissioners, of whom there must be a minimum of three,
two of whom must be barristers or solicitors. Though they are appointed
by the Home Secretary, they are independent of his department in day-to-day
administration.^ The general function of the Charity Commissioners as
provided in sec. 1(3) of the Charities Act, i960 is to promote
"the effective use of charitable resources by encouraging the 
development of better methods of administration, by giving 
charity trustees information and advice on any matter affecting 
the charity and by investigating and checking a b u s e s . "8
1. Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed., 203.
2. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 1981, 496.
3. Snell’s Principles of Equity,- op.cit., 27th ed., 165* 4. Ibid., p.165.
5. D.B.Parker and A.R.Mellows, The Law of Trusts, 4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
London,1979i 215.
6. On this point see Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 496; Snell's
Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 166; Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed.,
204"
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But it must be nc-ted that tie powers of Charity Commissioners are those of
advisers and overseers only,, but they "shall have themselves no power
1
to act in the administration of a charity."
The Commissioners have powers equal to those of the High Court in 
charity proceedings, inter alia, for establishing schemes, for appointing
2
or removing charity trustees generally on the application of the charity.
But they are not allowed to exercise their jurisdiction in any case 
involving among others a special question of law which they may think 
appropriate for adjudication by the Court. But there are provisions 
relating to an appeal against an order of the Charity Commissioners to the 
High Court with a certificate either from the Commissioners or leave of a 
Chancery Judge.^
Apart from the powers of the Charity Commissioners discussed above,
their main powers or functions are, inter alia, to maintain a register of
charities, to initiate enquiries regarding charities or a particular
charity either generally or for particular purposes, to call for and audit
accounts of any charity, to authorise transactions which may be expedient
kin the interests of the charity. All these provisions regarding the powers
and functions of the Commissioners are provided in secs. 18 and 19 of the
. If-CL
Charities Act, I960.
2. The Official Custodian for Charities
The Official Custodian for charities is a public officer; the position
was created by sec. 3 of the Charities Act, I960. Here is a corporation
5
sole having perpetual succession using an official seal. The property of 
a charitable trust may be vested in him as a custodian trustee by charity
1. Sec.l (k) of the Charities Act, I960.
2. Pettit, op.cit♦, *+th ed., 206.
3. Sec.18 (11) of the Charities Act, i960.
4. ^Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th ed., op.cit., 166.
mti (j f a
5. Pettit, op.cit., t^h ed., 208.
!*/
However, the situation regarding these/matterfs not ideal .Tor the problems 
arising from^esent state of law ,'See Schlackman Report(1978).
Compare the concept in Hindu law under prakirnaka(a kind of residuary or 
miscellaneous jurisdiction of the king);Kane, vol.3,op.cit,932;Lingat, 
o p .cit,237-241.
1
trustees. But he is simply a custodian trustee; the actual management
2of a charity lies in the charity trustees.
3. Visitors
Ecclesiastical and eleemosynary corporations are subject to the jurisdiction 
of visitors relating to their internal affairs.^ Ecclesiastical corporations
stand Mfor the furtherance of religion and perpetuating the rights of the
4 5Church." They are generally visitable by the Ordinary.
The jurisdiction of visitors covers all matters of internal management
6 7including all questions of disputed membership and complaints by members.
The power of the visitor is absolute in relation to any matter within his
jurisdiction and no appeal lies from any of his decisions unless the statutes
g
of a corporation so provide.
4. The Attorney-General
The Attorney-General acts in cases of charitable trusts on behalf of the
30-
Crown as parens patriae.and a duty is imposed on him to intervene for the
purpose of protection of charitable trusts and affording advice to the Court
9
in the administration of charities. In Wallis v. Solicitor-General for New 
10Zealand , where the main point of determination centred over the grant of
land by the Maori chiefs to a certain bishop and his successorsswhere the
Privy Council refused to approve the course adopted by the Solicitor-
General for New Zealand in relation to the grant in question, Lord Macnaghten
pronounced for the Judicial Committee that
"It is the province of the Crown as parens patriae to enforce the 
execution of charitable trusts, and it has always been recognised 
as the duty of the law officers of the Crown to intervene for the 
purpose of protecting the charities and affording advice and assistance 
to the Court in the administration of charitable trusts.
1. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit*, 11th ed., 496.
2. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., 4th ed., 215*
3. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 9^7-
Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed., 213*' 5* Ibid., p.213*
6 . Cf. the role of smarthas in religious enquiry. See below,sec.4 of the 6th
7. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 9^7* Chapter.
8. Thorne v. University of London []l966j 2 All ER 338, 339 •
Pettit,op. cit. ,4th ed.,209. 10 £19033 AC 173- 11. Ibid.,pp.l8l-l82.
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This principle has been accepted by the Charities Act, i960. It is the 
Attorney-General who is the only one entitled to take action against
2supposed trustees for establishing the existence of a charitable trust.
He or the charity trustees are the only persons who can start proceedings
to recover the property of the trust from a third person.^ Only the
Attorney-General and the Court are empowered to authorise the trustees of
4a charity to make ex gratia payments out of a charitable trust fund.
5 . The Court
The Court has an inherent jurisdiction over charitable trusts; it can
enforce them, redress -a breach of trust, and direct a scheme for enforcing
5
the attainment of the charitable objects. It can also take steps to alter 
and amend the charitable trusts under the doctrine of cy pres.^  In
7
Attorney-General v. The Governors ... of Sherborne Grammar School where
the school in question was founded and endowed by King Edward the Sixth
Sir John Romilly MR observed that the
"Court has authority to redress a breach of trust, where the
objects of the founder have been prevented or neglected. It has
also authority to direct a scheme, in order to enforce the more 
complete attainment of +hose objects. This Court has a further 
power and authority when the objects contemplated by the founder 
cannot be carried into effect, to direct the application of the 
revenues of the charity to promote objects in accordance with
the spirit of the original foundation, the actual compliance
with which has become impossible."^
But the jurisdiction of the Court is based primarily on the existence of 
9
a trust , and in a case where a testator has given property by way of trust
to an institution which was not in existence, but where it was found that
there was a general charitable intention the Court has jurisdiction and 
will direct a scheme."1^
1. Snell’s Principles of Equity, 168.
2. Hauxwell v. Barton-upon-Hurober UPC Q1973] 2 A11ER 1022, 1032.
5. Ibid., p. 1032. 4. Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed., 209.
5. Pettit, ibid., p.211. 6. Pettit, ibid., p.211.
7. (1854) 18 Beav 256. 8. Ibid., p.280. 9- Pettit, op.cit.,4th ed., 212.
10. Pettit, ibid., p.212.
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h. Appointment of Trustees;____ Removal of Trustees;____ Schemes
1. Appointment of Trustees
The rules which govern the appointment of trustees of private trusts
are generally the same as those governing the appointment of charity 
1
trustees. The first trustees are normally appointed by the settlor or
2the testator creating the trust. In the case of a trust created by a will
the fact that it fails to appoint any trustee or that the trustees appointed
predecease the settlor or that the appointed trustees refuse to act, the
general rule is that the trust will not fail.^
A trust is held by trustees as joint tenants and if any of the trustees
die the survivors are the trustees; they and their successors have the
k
same powers and duties as the original trustees. On the death of a sole
trustee the property vests in his personal representatives who become 
5
trustees. They are entitled to exercise any power which the deceased 
trustee could have performed as long as the trust instrument does not 
contain any contrary direction.^
There are different ways in which the appointment of trustees may be made. 
1 (a) Appointment under an express order.
7
The trust instrument may confer an express power to appoint new trustees.
The extent of such a power depends on the construction of the words used in
8 9a particular instrument and the power should be construed strictly.
1. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., *+th ed., 220.
2. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 525*
3. Moggridge v. Thackwell (1803) 7 Ves 3 6; He Willis, Shaw v. Willis £1921]] 
1 Ch 44; Re Armitage, Ellam v. Norwich Corporation! 1972 [ Ch 438;
Snell's Principles of Equity, op.cit., 2?th ed., 191•
4. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed. , 523*
5. Ibid., p. 525.
6. Snell's Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 192.
7. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit. 11th ed., 526. 8. Ibid., p. 526.
9. Stones v. Rowton (1853) 17 Beav. 308; Re Norris (1884) 27 Ch.D 333;
Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed., 236.
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1(b) Appointment under statutory powers.
Section 36 of the Trustee Act, 1923, confers wide powers for appointing
nev; trustees, but these powers are subject to any contrary provision in
1 2 the trust instrument. Under this section, in certain circumstances a new
trustee can be appointed, for example, inter alia if a trustee is dead^  or
if the trust instrument does not contain any provision for appointing a new 
if
trustee. It may be interjected here that the aim of the Trustee Act, 1925
5
is to ensure the appointment of new trustees in all events.
Under section 36 an appointment must be made in writing^ and it need not
7
be in an instrument executed for that purpose. The statutory power of 
appointing a new trustee may be exercised by persons nominated in the trust 
instrument, the existing trustees, and the personal representatives of the 
sole surviving trustee.^
1(c) Appointment by the Court.
Subsection 1 of section kl of the Trustee Act, 1925 confers on the Court
g
wide powers of appointing new trustees in certain circumstances, inter alia,
when it is found that it is difficult or impracticable to do so without the
10assistance of the Court. In the absence of any exceptional circumstances
the Court will not exercise its power of ordering an appointment of a new
trustee if any advantage can be taken either of a provision in the trust
11instrument or of a statutory power.
1. Snell's Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 192.
2. Ibid., pp. 192-193; Parker and Mellows, op.cit., t^h ed., 23^ -235*
3. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 526.
Parker and Mellows, op.cit., ^th ed., 231.
5. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 528.
6. Snell’s Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 193*
7. Pettit, op.cit., *fth ed., 2*f2.
8. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., kth ed., 231.
9. Snell's Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 196.
10. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 529*
11. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., kth ed., 238.
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Under the Mental Health Act, 1959 the Court may make an order appointing
a trustee in substitution for a trustee being incapable due to mental
1
disorder within the meaning of the Act.
It may be pointed out that before the introduction of the Trustee Act,
1850, the Court had no statutory power of appointing new trustees but the
appointment of a new trustee used to be made by the Chancery Court under its
2inherent jurisdiction to supervise trusts and trustees, and this jurisdiction
can still be validly exercised by the Court, because no legislation has yet 
3
taken it away. But, practically, the Court does not have to rely on this 
jurisdiction because of the wide powers given to it by section 4l of the
4
Trustee Act, 1925*
1(d) Appointment by the Charity Commissioners.
The Charity Commissioners have concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court
to make an order for appointing a charity trustee^ generally only on the
application of the charity.^ Under section 20(4) of the Charities Act, i960
they may appoint trustees in certain circumstances, inter alia, where there
are no charity trustees, or there is a single trustee, or where it is necessary
to increase the number of the trustees for the proper administration of the 
7
charity.
Though generally the rules which are applicable to the appointment of 
trustees of private trusts are the same rules to be applied for the appointment 
of charity trustees, there is a major exception in that the restriction on 
the number of trustees imposed by the Trustee Act, 1925 is not applicable
g
to charitable trusts. Moreover the mode of appointing new trustees of a
1. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed;., 529-530.
2. Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed., 245-246.
5. Pettit, ibid., p. 246. 4. Pettit, ibid., p. 246.
5. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., 4th ed., 217.
6. Pettit, op.cit., 4th ed., 206. 7* Pettit, ibid., p. 207.
8. Parker and Mellows, o£.cit., 4th ed., 
op.cit., 11th ed., 501*
220. See also Hanbury and Maudsley,
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charitable trust seems to be a convenient strategy, for a new trustee in 
a charitable trust may be appointed at a meeting provided the person 
presiding signs a memorandum of the appointment or this can be done in a 
different manner prescribed by the meeting and attested by two witnesses.
2. Removal of Trustees
Section 18 of the Charities Act, I960 empowers the Charity Commissioners
to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court for certain purposes,
2inter alia, to make order for removal of a trustee. If the Commissioners 
are satisfied as the result of an enquiry held under section 6 of the Act 
that there has been misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of a 
charity and that it is necessary to act for the protection of the charity, 
then they may remove a charity trustee. A charity trustee may be removed 
in specific circumstances, inter alia, when he is responsible for mismanage­
ment or bankruptcy or refuses to act for the charity.^
3. Schemes
i+
A charitable trust does not fail for uncertainty and under its inherent
jurisdiction the Court may make an order for the direction of a scheme,
5
inter alia, to remedy uncertainty in the substance of a trust or to get 
rid of some administrative difficulty of the charity.^ Such a scheme is 
not necessarily a scheme^to be appliedjfor the property)cy pres.^
The Charity Commissioners have the same power as the High Court in
g
establishing schemes relating to the administration of a charity. Although
1. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., *+th ed., 221.
2. Parker and Mellows, ibid., p. 217.
3. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 301. 
k. Re Gott ri9^ 3  1 All ER 293.
3. Re Bennett (JL959J 3 All ER 295.
6. Pettit, op.cit., 217.
7. Pettit, ibid., p. 217-
8. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 9^9*
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the Court is empowered to establish schemes it may be pointed out that
the vast majority of schemes for the administration of charitable trusts
1
are made by the Commissioners. ’’Much of their day to day work consists
of making schemes and orders to help the trustees of charities to
administer them more efficiently and make better use of their funds 
2and property.” When the Court directs that a scheme relating to the 
administration of a charity be established it may refer the matter to 
the Charity Commissioners for settling the scheme and the order of the 
Court may direct such a scheme to come into effect without further reference 
to it.^
To conclude this study it may be pointed out that though the Charity
Commissioners are given wide powers e.g. relating to appointing a new
trustee or the removal of a trustee for the protection of the charity,
subsection 11 of section l8 of the Charities Act, I960 provides inter
alia that an appeal against an order of the Commissioners regarding an
appointment or removal may be brought in the High Court 'either by the
charity or the trustees or any person removed from any office by an order
(unless he is removed inter alia with the concurrence of the charity
trustees) with a certificate of the Commissioners or with the leave of
ka judge of the High Court attached to the Chancery Division.
SECTION 2. HINDU LAW ON RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
Introduction
In so far as Hindu religious endowments or trusts are concerned, the
1. Parker and Mellows, op.cit., bth ed., 217•
2. Hanbury and Maudsley, op.cit., 11th ed., 9^9*
3 . Pettitt, op.cit., *+th ed. , 218.
k. Childs v. A-G pL973J 2 All ER 108.
9^
main characteristic which distinguishes them from English charitable
trusts is^that in Hindu religious trusts, no dual ownership is involved
in the endowed or the trust property. A trustee, in the English senss,
is a legal owner of the trust property but the beneficial ownership
of that property goes to the person or the purpose for which the trust
property is conveyed by the donor. But in a Hindu religious endowment,
a property which is dedicated to an idol or the deity (Sanskrit
(devata), called debutter, vests in the deity itself. The dedication
signifies Ma compendious expression of the pious purposes for which
1
the dedication is designed” and the deity, as representing those
pious purposes of the donor, "is the juristic person recognised by law
2and m  this juristic person the dedicated property vests". So the 
property of the deity as dedicated to it,is legally owned by it. It 
must be stressed that the idol as a material image in itself is not 
the juristic person; it is said to be an exploded theory that the 
idol becomes a legal person only when it is consecrated and vivified 
by a religious ceremony called the Pran Pratistha ceremony,^ since 
the debutter cannot be denied vesting till the ceremony is performed.
Again, in Hindu law the person who looks after or manages the property 
of the idol and the idol itself, called shebait, is not a trustee as 
one under an English trust. He is the manager of the dedicated property 
or the debutter.
1. Per Jenkins, C.J., Bhupati v. Ram Lai ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 
(EB), 1*f0. The case is discussed in section 3 of this chapter.
2. Per Ramaswami, J., Jogendra Nath v. Income-Tax Commissioner, 
AIR 1969 SC 1089, 1092.
3. Ibid., p. 1091.
95
MThe distinction between a manager or a shebait of an idol 
and a trustee where a trust has been created is well 
recognised. The properties of the trust in law vest in  ^
the trustee whereas in the case of an idol or a Sansthan 
they do not vest in the manager or the shebait. It is the 
deity or the Sansthan which owns and holds the properties.
It is only the possession and the management which vest in 
the manager."
For the present we shall place a caveat against the word ‘only’ which is 
per incuriani.^
In Hindu law, religious endowments or trusts can be e/rtker private x>r* 
kpublic. But in English law, religious trusts must always be public.
In a private Hindu religious endowment',the specified persons only or members
of the family»are entitled to worship the deity and the bounty is meant
5
in reality for the kith and kin of the settlor. In other words, in such
an endowment the dedication of the property is made nominally for the
maintenance or worship of a family idol and the benefit of the endowment
is limited to the members of a particular family or group. But in the
case of a public Hindu religious endowment, the dedication of the property
7
is made for the benefit of the general public or a section thereof.
1. It means religious foundation.
2. Per Grover, J., Kalanka Devi Sansthan v. M.R.T. Nagpur, AIR 1970 SC
439, 442. In that case the main issue was whether the appellant 
Sansthan, a private religious trust, could take advantage of the 
provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Act, 195&, by 
claiming possession of the land from the existing tenant on the 
ground of cultivating the land on its own.
3. See below, Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 in
sec. 1 of the ftth chapter, pp. 218-219.
4. M.N. Srinivasan, Principles of Hindu Law, vol. 3, 4th ed., Law
Publishers, Allahabad, 1970, 2552. The point will be dealt with in
detail in the next chapter.
5. V.K. Varadachari, The Law of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, 
2nd ed., Eastern Book Co., Lucknow, 1977i 20-21.
6. H.S. Gour, The Hindu Code, 3rd ed., Butterworth, Calcutta, 1929, 1176.
7. Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-62), Govern- 
ment of India, Ministry of Law, Delhi, 1962, 32; Deoki Nandan v. 
Murlidhar AIR 1957 SC 133* In .that case, the main point for determin­
ation was whether a particular deity was open to the public.
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a. Kutta
In the context of this study it may be pointed out that the
proposition, as has been brought out in the observations of eminent
judges and writers including B.K. Mukherjea to the effect that a trust
in the English legal sense of the term, involving dual ownership, was
unknown to Hindu law, is without foundation. B.K. Mukherjea observed
in his book The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts that
"the Trust in its origin was a highly artificial concept which 
had its foundations upon a dual system of law and a dual 
system of property which had come into existence in England 
under peculiar political and historical conditions. You 
could not naturally expect to find a trust in this form 
in the Hindu system.
In Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami a Privy Council case which was related
to certain lands belonging to a math (orthodox college) in Madura, Mr. Ameer
Ali, delivering the judgement for the Privy Council, observed, that "It
is ... to be remembered that a "trust" in the sense in which the expression
4is used in English law, is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple".
It is submitted that the aforesaid view of B.K. Mukherjea that "you
could not naturally expect to find a trust" in an English form and the
statement of Mr. .. Ameer Ali to the effect that a trust in English
form was not known to Hindu law, as approved both by Gajendragadkar, J.,
as he then was, in Zain Yar Jung v. Director of Endowments, AIR 1963 SC
985, 988, and Shelat, J. in Ramachandra v.Shree Mahadeoji, AIR 1970 SC
4^ 8, 464, are not true.
In some parts of India (certainly in the Andhra - Orissa regions)}there
5
existed a peculiar class of land-tenure called "kutta" which seemed to be 
more akin to the Chancery or the English conception of a trust. According
1. Emphasis supplied.
2. 4th ed. , Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1979» 5-6.
3. AIR 1922 PC 123 = (1920-21) 48 IA 302.
4. AIR 1922 PC 123, 126 = (1920-21) 48 IA 302, 311.
(f. On  ^  u ifcu 5 e e £ • N . L cur / v/ 1 Br'c cut I L c t D^
C  $c>r\Jkc i cl^JL A ilhal f £ / e t !^81l  f 2^7
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to that transaction a
"man takes a house or lands and so on from their original 
owner and both the profit and the loss therefrom accrue to 
the tenant-in-kutta i.e. must be borne1 by himself and there 
is a special contractual terra to this effect. Moreover - 
the technical definition of this right proceeds - the tenant, 
with the aid of the house, lands and so on, carries out the 
funeral and subsequent religious rites appertaining to the 
original owner of the property and pays off the debts which 
he has incurred, and if any balance remains over he may  ^
appropriate it, while if there be none it cannot be helped”.
It was a practice in vogue in Andhra-Orissa areas for persons in poor
health or persons who had no sons or grandsons who could help them in
the work of their lands or could look after them, to make arrangements
for the payment of their debts, the repose of their souls or the
maintainance of the necessary oblations to gods and ancestors regularly,
to give a part or the whole of their lands to strangers >who would have to
give an undertaking to see that all the obligations, legal or spiritual,
were discharged after their death.
It is true that the tenant-in-kutta is practically the owner of the 
land in all but name. The ownership comes to him by the conditional 
gift, but
”the original owner, the donor, retains so much of his ownership 
as will serve to prevent alienations in fraud of the stipu­
lations and to recover (vicariously, in the person of the 
donor’s heir) the whole property for default in performing the 
conditions. There are thus two owners, the property is. 
sarriSnya []i.e. in common]], and the tenant-in-kutta (Skt. 
k'auttika) cannot alienate validly even with the original owner's 
assent: the act must be that of the original owner himself”.^
So we have found in kutta an element of dual ownership which is character­
istically, to a large extent, similar to the conception of trust,^ involving
1. J.D.M. Derrett, "Kutta: A class of Land-tenures in South India”, in 
ECMHL, vol. 1, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1976, 280-302, 282.
2. Derrett, ibid., p. 283.
3. The statement of Mr. Ameer Ali in Vidya Varuthi’s case, AIR 1922 PC 
123, 126 that the "conception of a trust apart from a gift was 
introduced in India with the establishment of Moslem rule” is not true. 
For, the transaction of Kutta as discussed above, was already there in 
South India, Andhra-Orissa area. On this point see also Derrett's 
IMHL, 9^6, footnote 1.
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dual ownership, in the English system.
Now, it should be noted that a trust in the English sense, as 
distinguished from a Hindu religious endowment, can be created for 
the benefit of a deity, where the ownership of the trust property
vests in trustees. To this effect, Jenkins, C.J., referring to the
2 3Tagore case, observed in Bhupati v. Ram Lai that
"this at least seems clear that the rule which requires 
relinquishment should be to a sentient person does not 
forbid the gift of property to trustees for a religious 
purpose, though that purpose cannot in strictness be. 
called a sentient person (Ramtonno Mullick's case)".
5
The rule was firmly laid down in Sri Sri Sridhar Jiew v. Manindra Kumar. 
In that case one of the main points for decision was whether there could 
be a trust in Hindu law in the sense as expressed in English law rwhere 
properties vested in trustees*and it was held by the Calcutta High Court 
that trusts in the English sense had been recognised and administered 
in the Indian Courts.
b. Religious purposes and Charity under Hindu Law
Neither the Statute of Elizabeth^ nor the Mortmain and Charitable Uses 
7Act as amended in 1891* as abolished by the Charities Act, i960 or the
1. N.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, Principles and Precedents, 6th ed.,
M.L.J. Office, Madras, 1970, 65*+.
2. (1872) 9 BLR 377 = IA Sup. Vol. 47.
3- ILR (1910) 37 Cal.128.
4. ILR (1910) 37 Cal.128 (FB) 140.
5. ILR (1940) 2 Cal.285.
6. As stated in the argument of the appellant’s counsels in Runchordas 
Vandrawandas v. Parvatibhai (l899“99) 26 IA 71* 75; B.K. Mukherjea, op. 
cit., 4th ed., 73»
7. Mortmain - "Mortmain signifies an alienation of lands and tenements to
any guild, corporation or fraternity, and their successors; e.g. bishops,
parsons, vicars, etc.... The common modern use of "Mortmain" counts land 
alienated to, or for the purposes of a CHARITY".
"The chief statutes of Mortmain are 7 Edw 1; Charitable Uses Act,1736 
(c.36); Mortmain and Charitable Uses Acts,l888 (c.42); 1891 (c«73)*,r 
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary,vol.3* 4th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1973, 1711.
"The "English Law of Mortmain" does not extend to India" - per Davar, J., 
Jamshedji C. Tarachand v. Soonabai, ILR (1909) 35 Bom. 122, 188.
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law relating to superstitious uses and trusts (i.e. the law that
holds disposition of real or personal estate for propagating religious
2
rites, not sanctioned by law, void) has ;ic application in Hindu law.
But for a long time the
"Courts in India have...adopted the technical meaning of 
charitable trusts and charitable purposes which the Courts 
in England have placed upon the term 'charity1 in the Statute 
of Elizabeth, and therefore, those which according to English 
law are charitable will be charitable under Hindu law,.... 
there are other purposes in addition which are recognised as 
charitable purposes. Hence, what are purely religious purposes 
and what religious purposes will be charitable purposes must be 
decided according to Hindu notions and Hindu law".-^
In Fatmabibi v. Advocate»General of Bombay, a case where the main 
question for determination was whether the plaintiff could revoke the 
trusts (wakfs) declared already by an indenture, West, J., approving the 
view expressed earlier in Khushalchand1s case  ^pronounced that in deter­
mining whether a particular purpose was charitable,the Courts
"must in general, apply the standard of customary law and common 
opinion amongst the community to which the parties interested 
belong. Objects which the English law would possibly regard as 
superstitious uses, are allowable and commendable according to 
Hindu law. Khusalchand v.Mahadevgiri, 12 Bonn H.C. Rep. 21 *+."6
7
In Saraswati Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal , where the main question for 
determination was whether a dedication for a tomb was a Hindu religious 
purpose, the Supreme Court held that
"It cannot...be disputed that under Hindu law religious or 
charitable purposes are not confined to purposes which are 
productive of actual or assumed public benefit. The acquisition 
of religious merit is also an important criterion."8
1. Khushalchand v. Mahadevgiii (1873) 12 BHCR 21*+. In that case, a
grant had been made to one Rajendragiri, disciples and their successors 
for generation after generation mainly for the purpose of worshipping 
the goddess of wealth and it was observed there that "Objects...might 
according to English notions, be deemed superstitious uses are allowable 
and commendable in Hindu law" - 216.
2. Jowitt's Dictionary of English L§iw, vol.2, 2nd ed., Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 1977, 1725.
3. Per Shelat, J., Ramachandra v. Shree Mahadeoji AIR 1970 SC *+5&, *+6*+.
In that case, the main point for determination was whether the trust in 
question was a valid Hindu religious trust.
*+. ILR (l88l) 6 Bom *+2. 5. (1875) 12 BHCR 21*+.
6. ILR (1881) 6 Bom *+2, 50. 7. AIR 1953 SC *+91. 8 ., Per Jagannadhadas, J.',
ibid., p .49*+.
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In so far as Hindu law is concerned, there is no difference between
1
religious and charitable purposes. "In the Hindu system there is no
line of demarcation between religion and charity. On the other hand,
2charity is regarded as part of religion."
3
A religious endowment to be valid in Hindu law ^ must have valid
4objects or purposes as well. In Nagu Reddiar v. Banu Reddiar in which
the main issue was whether raising a sam&ahi was an object of charity,
Kailasam, J., speaking for the Supreme Court held that "what are purely
religious purposes and what religious purpose will be charitable must be
5
entirely decided according to Hindu law and Hindu notions." The Court,
in the same case, following the rules as laid down in the Saraswati Ammal
case  ^ruled that
"In Saraswati Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal ... it was held that the 
determination of what conduces to religious merit in Hindu law 
is primarily a matter of Shastric injunction and therefore any 
purpose claimed to be a valid one for perpetual dedication on 
the ground of religious merit though lacking in public benefit, 
must be shown to have a Shastric basis so far as Hindus are 
concerned."?
Now, in my opinion, in deciding the question whether a particular purpose
/ .
is religious or not, the Courts instead of giving stress on what Setstris
g
say about it, should look for the prevalent belief or practice of the
1. S.M.N. Thangaswami v. I-T Commr.,Madras, AIR 1966 Mad 103.
2. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 11.
3• "Endowment is dedication of property for purposes of religion or charity
having both the subject and objects certain and capable of ascertainment." 
- N.R. Raghavachariar, op.cit., 6th ed., 646.
4. AIR 1978 SC 1174.
5* Ibid., p. 1177* On this point see Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 9; 
Mayne’s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11th ed., Higginbotham & Co.,
Madras, 1950, 9^ 2; S.V. Gupte, Hindu Law in British India, 2nd ed.,
N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1947, 828.
6. AIR 1953 SC 491. 7. Per Kailasam, J., 1179-
8. In Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal, AIR 1953 SC 491, see below, 
this section, the Supreme Court (at p. 495) accepted that there might 
be Hindu beliefs and practices without sastric basis.
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community also. Today,Hindus in general do not believe in sati or 
accept the idea of devadasis (dancing girls), in spite of the fact 
that they are of sastric basis.^ So people say, what they
think about a purpose, in short, what they believe in currently should 
be the guiding factors for a Court in reaching its decision about whether 
a particular purpose is religious or not. If by this criterion the 
trust is religious, the Court will enforce it.
c. The scope of Pharma
Before we go into the details of the controversial issue whether a 
bequest or a gift for dharma or for that of samadhl is void for uncertainty or 
otherwise, let .us find out what the concept of dharma really means.
d. What is Dharma?
The ultimate basis of Hindu law is the dharmasastra^, which is again
elaborated from the dharmasutras dealing with instructions for governing
the different varnas (castes) under adramas (stages). Dharma is the
5
subject-matter of the dharmasastra which
Mis a comprehensive code to regulate human conduct in accord­
ance with the unalterable scheme of creation, and to enable 
everyone to fulfil the purpose of his birth. The whole life 
of man, considered as an individual and as a member of groups
1. Criticising the narrow view of religion taken by Chagla, C.J. and
Shah, J. of the Bombay High Court in Ratilal v. State (1953) 55
Bom LR 86 and referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
same case, Ratilal v. State of Bombay, AIR 195^  SC 3^ 8, in appeal 
which rejected the narrow Bombay view of religion, Derrett comments 
that "It is no wonder that the Supreme Court put the matter straight, 
and incidentally made it clear that the ultimate test of what is 
religious, though within the court’s jurisdiction, is to be applied 
to materials furnished by the community or sect itself: the court
does not force any religious group to express its beliefs in a form 
predetermined by the law”. RLSI, 6^5; emphasis mine.
2. Derrett, ibid., p. 103*
3* J.D.M. Derrett, Hindu Law: The Dharmasastra and the Anglo-Hindu Law -
scope for further comparative'study, Ferdinand Enke Verlag, Stuttgart, 
195 ,^ 202.
U.C. Sarkar, Epochs in Hindu Legal History, 1st ed., Vishveshvaranand 
Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur, 195&, 20.
5- Derrett, RLSI, 100.
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(small and large) as well as man’s relation to his fellow 
men, to the rest of animated creation, to superhuman beings, 
to cosmos, generally and ultimately to God come within the 
purview of Dharmasastra. Among the duties it lays down are 
both selfregarding and altruistic, those to the living and 
to the dead, those who are alive and those who are yet to 
be born.""'
The dharmasastra is regarded as the Indian classical science of righteous- 
2ness, dharma and every Indian Hindu ideal must be consistent with dharma, 
3
or righteousness, which has no fixed content, i.e. dharma is relative 
to caste and as'rama.
The concept of dharma can be described but it cannot be easily defined.
"Dharma is one of those Sanskrit words that defy all attempts at an exact
rendering in English or any other tongue. That word has passed several 
4vicissitudes". Even in the consistent style of the Code of Manu, the
word is used in many different ways. Thus in Book 1. 98 of the
Manusmriti, it is said that "the very birth of a Brahmana is an eternal
incarnation of the sacred law (dharma); for he is born to (fulfil) the
5
sacred law, and becomes one with Brahma". Again in Book 4.239* the term 
has been used in a different sense, "For in the next world neither father, 
nor mother, nor wife, nor sons, nor relations stay to be companions; 
dharma alone remains".^ But the general meaning of the term can be
1. K.V. Eangaswami Ayyangar, Some Aspects of the Hindu View of Life 
According to Dharmasastra, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1952, 62.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 2.
3* J.D.M. Derrett, "Social and Political Thought and Institutions", in 
A.L.Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India., Oxford University 
Press, 1975, 124-1^07*127^
4. P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, vol. 1, pt. 1, 2nd ed., B.O.R.I., 
Poona, 1968, 1.
5. Bharuci’s Commentary on the Manusmriti, translated by J.D.M. Derrett,
vol. 2., Franz Steiner Verlag , Wiesbaden, 1975* 2.
6. Ibid., p. 9»
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1 2 3 found in its Sanskrit root dhr, meaning to uphold, to support,
to nourish. Thus Lingat observes that the
’’most general sense is provided by its root, dhr, which 
signifies the action of maintaining, sustaining, or 
supporting and which has produced 1fre1 in Latin (fretus, 
depending upon, daring to) and fir (firmus, strong in the 
physical and moral sense whence solid, hard, durable)..
Dharma is what is firm and durable,"^
The concept of dharma as applied to the universe means the eternal 
law which regulates and maintains the world. The
’’unbroken tradition of Hindu legal scholarship has been to 
emphasise the concept that the Hindu law concerns itself 
with eternity and with morality judged against the greater 
background, and not with the material, temporal considerations.
Though the word ’dharma* passed different stages carrying different
meanings, it became significant when it covered privileges, duties and
obligations of man as a member of his caste and community.^ Thus the
concept transformed Hindu law as a code of duties, but that does not mean
that specific rights, e.g. father's right against the person and property
7
of his son, were not known to Hindu law.
e.. Bequests for dharma and the like
In Hindu law, the word ’’dharma" as used in gifts and bequests means
g
the ishta (Skt. ista) and purtta gifts. Saraswati had observed
1. Kane, op.cit., vol. 1, pt. 1, 2nd ed., 1.
2. It is in the sense cf the action of upholding that the word ''dharma” has
been used in the Rgveda I. 187.I ... See R.T.H. Griffith, Hymns of
the Rigveda (translated), vol. I, E.J. Lazarus & Co., Benares, 18891 323*
3. It has been used as meaning support in the Rgveda X 92.2. Griffith,
ibid., vol. b, 1892, 296.
b. R. Lingat, The Classical Law of India, translated from French into 
English by J.D.M. Derrett, University of California Press, Berkeley 
and London, 19731 3*
3. J.D.M. Derrett, "Religion and Law in Hindu Jurisprudence." AIR 195^
Jnl., 79-8^, 80.
6. K.R.R. Sastry, Hindu Jurisprudence, Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1961, 3*
7. U.C. Sarka*, op.cit. , 1st ed. , 21.
8. Rangrao Bhagwan v. Gopal Pundik (1958) 60 Bom LR 673> 677* In that case,
the will in question was contended by the plaintiffs on one of the grounds 
that it was void for uncertainty. On the question of dharma as related
(continued on next page)
104
"From very ancient times the sacred writings of the 
Hindus divided works productive of religious merit into two 
divisions named ishta and purtta, a classification which 
has come down to our own times. So much so that the entire 
objects of Hindu endowments will be found included within
1 2 -zthe enumeration of ishta and purtta^ works.'v
Approving the view of Saraswati,. Subrahmania Ayyar, J., in his judgement
4in Parthasarafey Pillai v. Thiruvengada Pillai, a case in which the 
direction in the charitable bequest in question was that the executors 
could utilise the properties for dharman (dharma) if the daughter of the 
settlor died before attaining majority, pronounced that "in connection 
with gifts of property”, the word "dharma” "has a perfectly well-settled 
meaning. In that context the word denotes objects indicated by the terms 
ishta and noorta.
At present, except in certain states,^ bequests for dharma or words
of similar import, without specifying any objects, are void for uncertainty.
This disturbing position of the law on the subject is due to the contro-
7
versial decision in Punchordas Vandrawandas v. Parvatibhai. In that case,
(continued from previous page)
to gifts, the judgement referred to Parthasarathy Pillai v. Thiruvengada 
Pillai, ILR (1907) 30 Mad 3^0. The same view was held by A.S. Nataraja 
Ayyar in "Dharmo Rakshati Rakshitaha”, Vyavahara Nirnaya, Delhi, vol. 4
(1955), 63-96, 88.
1. The word ishta refers to gifts "to include the sacrifice as well as 
the sacrificial gift." Pandit Prannath Saraswati, The Hindu Law of 
Endowments, Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, 1897,
2. The definition of purtta covers gifts made not for the purposes of 
sacrifice but for construction of works relating to the storage of water,
tanks, wells, temples for gods, the relief of the sick, etc. Ibid., p.27;
purtta gifts mean charities, Mayne's Hindu Law, op.cit., 11th ed., 9^2.
3. Saraswati, op.cit., 18.
k. ILR (1907) 30 Mad 3^0. 5- Ibid., p. 3^2.
6. Sec. 10 of the Bombay Trusts Act, 1930 provides that "a public trust
shall not be void, only on the ground that the persons or objects for 
the benefit of whom or which it is created are unascertained or 
unascertainable. Explanation: A public trust created for such objects
as dharma, dharmada or punyakarya, punyadan shall not be deemed to be void, 
only on the ground that the objects for which it is created are unascer­
tained or unascertainable. Sec. 3 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act,
1939 follows Sec. 10 of the Bombay Act verbatim except an omission of 
the word "punyada" in the explanation clause of Sec. 10, the Bombay Act.
7. (1898-99) 26 IA 71.
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the main submission of the plaintiff that "the bequests in the will
1
for dharam were void" was upheld by the Privy Council when it ruled
that the "objects which can be considered to be meant by that word are
too vague and uncertain for the administration of them to be under any 
2
control". The ruling of the Privy Council has been subject, to severe 
criticism in different judgements, especially by Hindu judges of some 
High Courts, but the rule holds good in so far as decisions^ on the 
subject of some High Courts are concerned.
It may be pointed out that before the decision of the Privy Council,
If
Farran, C.J. of the Bombay High Court in Vundravandas v. Cursondas,
(which went up in appeal as the Privy Council case discussed above),
pronounced his opinion about a bequest for dharma. In spite of being
bound by the law $  laid down in Advocate-General v. Damothar,^ Pranjivandas
6 7Tulsidas v. Devkuvarbai and other cases of the Bombay High Court, that 
a devise in dharma was void for uncertainty, his Lordship suggested in 
his judgement that the law on the subject
"shall have been expounded by a superior tribunal. It is 
doubtless the case that this interpretation of the law 
defeats, in innumerable instances, the cherished wishes of the 
Hindu testator. Few Hindu wills, that we have met with, are 
without a devise of this nature, though some testators define 
with precision the objects of their dharam, and it may well 
be that the Court would have acted with more regard to native 
feelings and ideas if, instead of considering the broad 
signification that the word "dharam" indisputably bears, 
which appears to be as wide as the words philanthropy, or 
piety, or charity, in its untechnical sense, they had con­
sidered objects which the Hindu Shastris and Hindu testators 
would consider to be embraced within the term and construed
1. (1898-99) 26 IA 71, 80.
2. Per Sir Richard Couch (1898-99) 26 IA 71, 81.
3* For example: the Patna High Court followed the decision of the Judicial
Committee and applied in Mohan Lai v. Habibullah, AIR 1963 Pat *+30 where
it was held that a bequest to charity for salvation was void for vagueness.
*+. ILR (1897) 21 Bom 6*+6.
5. (1852) Perry’s Oriental Cases 526 as cited in ILR (1897) 21 Bom 6*+6,665»
6. (1862-65) 1 BHCR 76, footnote
A very old case on the point is Sibchunder Mullick v. Soondry Dosee (l8*+2) 
Fulton’s Rep.98 as cited in the Runchordas1 case (1898-99) 26 IA 71, 76.
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1
it in reference to the Hindu sacred law relating to dharam.n
With acute satisfaction B.K. Mukherjea comments on this statement that
MI cannot help expressing my appreciation for the imagination and wisdom
2
which are evident in these observations.u It is submitted that the
observations of Farran, C.J. reflect the correct view of the law on
bequests of dharma, which has been given recognition in different High
Z<JL
Court judgements as discussed below.
In Parthasararathy Pillai v. Thiruvengada Pillai,^  the sole question to 
be determined was the interpretation of the word ^dharma" as contained in 
the terms of the bequest in question. Disagreeing with the decision of the 
Privy Council, arriciting many authorities on Hindu law in his dissenting 
judgement, Subrahamnia Ayyar, J. observed that "There can, it seems to me, 
be no doubt that the word * dharma1 is a compendious term referring to certain
prescribed classes of pious gifts ... and that it is not a mere vague and
if 5
uncertain expression." In Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lai where the decision
was concerned not directly with the interpretation of the word 1dharma' but
with a bequest for the establishment of an image and the worship of a Hindu
deity after the death of the testator, Sir Asutosh Mookerjee referring to the
decision in Runchodras Vandrawandas v. Parvatibhai^ pronounced that
"in that particular instance there is room for doubt whether 
the actual decision was, in view of the texts to which attention 
was invited by Sir Subrahmania Ayyar in Parthasarathy Pillai v. 
Thiruvengaga Pillai quite in harmony with the true doctrine of 
Hindu jurisprudence."7
It may be interjected here that in coming to its conclusion the Privy
Council referred inter alia to the meaning of the term 'dharma1 as given
g
in Wilson's Dictionary meaning 'law, virtue, legal or moral duty' and
1. ILR (1879) 21 Bom 646, 665-666. 2. Op.cit., 4th ed., 11?. 2 •
3. ILR (1907) 30 Mad 340. 4. Ibid., p. 344.
5. ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 (FB), 6. (1898-99) 26 IA 71.
7. ILR (1910) 37-Cal 128 (FB), 161.
8. Mukherjee, op.cit., 4th ed., 117.
2a# InvComm» I.T.,Delhi v, Bijli Cotton Mills (1979)' 11 SCG 496 even ' 
Supreme Court held that a dharmada (dharma) surcharge on sales creatin 
- a .trust for charity (exempt:'from Income-tax) was not void for va<menpoc S 
and uncertainty. ness
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with reference to that context B.K. Mukherjea comments that
"With all respect to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, it may be pointed out, that the dictionary meaning 
of the word "charity" is equally wide and indefinite, but 
what the English Judges proceed upon is not the dictionary 
meaning of the word, but the technical meaning that it has 
come to acquire on the basis of the Statute of Elizabeth.
As Farran, C.J. rightly pointed out, it is not impossible 
to lay down with definiteness what 'dharma1 means and 
includes according to the Hindu scriptures and the list of 
objects included in it would not certainly be more extensive 
than the list of charities under English law."**
2
In Brij Lai v. Narain Das where the will in question contained directions
to spend the trust funds on three accounts, namely dharmarth (dharma), a
dharmashala and Sanskrit education, Jailal, J. approving the view of
Subrahmania, J. as expressed in relation to the word "dharma", referring
to the decision of the Privy Council and the decision of the Chief Court
of the Punjab in Gurdit Singh v. Sher Singh (78 PR, 1912) observed that
"I am bound to follow their authorities, though not without 
some hesitation. It seems to me, that the true significance 
of the expression 'dharamarth* as understood among the Hindus 
has not been fully taken into consideration. I am in this 
respect fortified by the view of the learned Judges of the 
Madras High Court in Parthasarathy Pillai v. Thiruvengada 
Pillai and respectfully agree with the opinion expressed by 
Subrahmania Ayyar, J. as to the real meaning of the dharmarth." \
But the most moving appeal for widening of the Court's jurisdiction for
entertaining trusts formerly held vague by the Privy Council, was made by
A.S. Nataraja Ayyar when he pointed out that
"This decision is considered unique by judges like Sir Asutosh 
Hookerji in ILR 3 Calcutta 128 and by text-writers like 
Srinivasa Ayyangar in his version of Mayne’s Hindu Law and 
Kane in his History of Dharma Sastra and Bijan Kumar Mukherjea 
in his Law of Hindu Religious and Charitable Trusts. We might 
add that the Mimamsa Sastra has held that Dharma stands for
the acts like yoga ... gifts ... and for Dana ... in general.
Popular usage is also quoted by the Mimamsa Sastra.
But it has become clear for a long time that in the case of a bequest 
containing terms like dharma or similar words, the Court can appoint
1. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 118.
2. ILR (1933) 1** Lah. 82?. 3. Ibid., p. 832.
*+. "Dharmo Rakshati Rakshitaha", op.cit., 88.
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trustees for spending the income or wealth of the bequest on an 
object which is regarded as dharma according to the religion directed 
by the testator. As the old authorities do not represent the true 
position of the law, the judiciary of the states, which have not yet 
changed the law, may well follow the correc't position disregarding the 
old view on the subject.
nTo do differently would be to maintain the present unsatis­
factory distinction between gifts to an institution and gifts 
for a purpose. At present gifts to an existing institution, 
however absurd, corrupt, or useless cannot be hindered. But 
a gift nominally for a charitable purpose (and a religious 
purpose is a charitable purpose if it has a public element, as 
is generally accepted) can be refused recognition unless the 
purpose is admitted as unquestionably charitable, complete with 
the requirement of public benefit. The whole question needs 
much more careful thought."**
Bequests to God
At present a general bequest for the worship of God like a bequest for
dharma without specifying an object stands on the same footing. In
2
Chandi Charan v. Haribola, the document in question under which the
endowment was to have been established, conveyed property to one Shantirara
Bairagi for the purpose of serving (seva) of God. In that case, the
High Court of Calcutta following Phundan Lai v. Arya Prithi Nidhi Sabha^
had laid down the rule that "under the Hindu system of law, a general
endowment for the worship of God, without giving the name of the deity
for whose benefit the endowment is to take effect, is not valid".^
5
But in Veluswami Goundan v. Dandapani where though the decision was 
not directly related to the question whether a general bequest to God 
without naming any deity was valid, Patanjali Sastri, J. rejecting the 
views as expressed in the aforesaid decisions of both the Calcutta and 
the Allahabad High Courts, remarked obiter to the effect that a
1. J.D.M. Derrett, A Critique of Modern Hindu Law (hereafter referred to 
as Critique), N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1970, 235-
2. ILR (1919) ^6 Cal 931. 3. ILR (1911) 33 All 793- ^  ILR (1919) ^6
5. ILR (19^7) Mad 47. Cal 951’
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general bequest to God was valid. Thus the learned Judge observed 
that
"a gift for Mthe worship of GodM discloses a general 
charitable intention and the Court can apply the doctrine 
of cy pr^s upholding the gift as a public trust,even where 
it is not possible to ascertain with any degree of certainty 
how the donor intended the trust to be carried out.”"*'
2In Jogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-tax where the main 
issue to be decided was "Whether a Hindu deity can be treated as a unit 
of assessment under sections 3 and ^ of the Income-tax Act, 1922"^ the 
Supreme Court explained and accepted the concept of Hindu deity and that 
of God. It made clear that the worship of various gods is in effect the 
worship of God. Raraaswami, J. speaking for the Court, observed that
"It is a basic postulate of Hindu religion that different 
images do not represent different divinities, they are really 
symbols of One Supreme Spirit and in whichever name or form 
the deity is invoked, the Hindu worshipper purports to worship 
the Supreme Spirit and nothing else."^
The above observation of Ramaswami, J. is in effect the ruling made obiter
in the judgement of Patanjali Sastri, J. as he then was, in Veluswami1s 
5
case that the
"notion that Hindus worship only particular deities and not 
one Supreme Being is not correct. It might seem pedantic 
to refer at length to Hindu scriptural texts to show that 
the idea of one God is a basic creed of the Hindu faith, but 
we may perhaps, be excused, under the circumstances, for 
referring to the well known verse in the Vishnusahasranama, 
often recited on various ceremonial occasions among Hindus 
which says that ’Vishnu, the one Supreme Being, the Great 
Soul and Ruler of~the universe, pervades the three worlds 
and protects countless beings of different species'."6
It is a pity that in explaining the Hindu concept of God, the Supreme
Court, in that case did not refer to the admirable observation of
Patanjali Sastri,J., or to indeed any reputable Hindu theologian.
1. ILR (19^ 7) Mad V?, 37- 2. AIR 1969 SC 1089.
3. Ibid., p. 1090.
*+. AIR 1969 SC IO89, 1093* See below, sec. 1 of the 3rd Chapter.
5. ILR (19^ 7) Mad 7^. 6. Ibid., p. 56.
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It is submitted that general bequests for 'God* are not too vague 
to be given effect to by the Courts. In giving effect to such bequests, now 
the Courts can be fortified by the ruling of the Supreme Court on the 
Hindu concept of God as expounded along the lines suggested by Patanjali 
Sastri, J.
Bequests for raising samadh'i's or tombs
In so far as the law is concerned, it is settled that bequests for
raising samadhls or tombs or provisions in a bequest for worshipping
1
thereat are invalid. But whether this is good law, is a debatable
issue. Before we go into the details of the discussion it should be
remembered that the conservative approach by the judiciary of India will
not solve the problems in dealing with the question of the validity of a
bequest providing the raising of a samadhi or tomb over the remains of
one's ancestor. Whether or not a particular object is religious is not
to be determined merely by what the judges think about it. The "correct
test to apply is that of usage, proved in evidence by witnesses in Court 
2
or by affidavit". Custom may be hard to create ex nihilo, but not 
religion, which can crop up spontaneously as with the celebrated New 
Religion^of Japan
kIn Saraswati Ammal v Rajagopal Ammal the settlor was buried and
1. Kunhamutty v. Ahmad Musaliar AIR 1935 Had 29; Draiviasundaram v. 
Subramania AIR 19^5 Had 217; Veluswami v. Dandapani AIR 19^ -6 Mad A85 
Saraswati Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal AIR 1953 SC ^ 91; Rangrao
Bhagwan v. Gopal Pundik (1958) 60 Bom LR 675» R.K. Karuppanan
v. V.P. Tirumalai AIR 1962 Had 500; Sundara Kothanar v. Sellam 
Pillai (19^9) LSCWR 699; Gangapalli Moorthanna v. G. Chinna 
Ankia AIR 1975 AP 97; Nagu Reddiar v. Banu Reddiar AIR 1978 
SC 117 .^
2. J.D.H. Derrett, "The Definition of Religion in Indian Law, (1959)
6l Bom L.R. Jnl. 17-23, 22.
3. For example, Soka Gakkai. For its ideals and basic doctrines see 
D. Ikeda, A Lasting Peace, 1st ed., Weatherhill, New York/Tokyo,
1981, 235-2i+9^
AIR 1953 SC A9I.
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entombed according to his wishes and a person was appointed to conduct
worship at his samadhi. In that case, the main question was whether
the properties were dedicated for religious purposes or whether perpetual
dedication of property for worship at a samadhi was valid among Hindus.
The Court ruled in the negative;
"what conduces to religious merit in Hindu law is primarily 
a matter for sastric injunction. To the extent, therefore, 
that any purpose is claimed to be a valid one for perpetual 
dedication on the ground of religious merit though lacking 
in public benefit, it must be shown to have a sastric basis 
so far as Hindus are concerned."^
2In Sundara Kothanar v. Sellam Pillai the issue m  question was whether
the suit property was dedicated for the purpose of worshipping the idols
installed in a samadhi or maintaining the samadhi itself. Accepting the
finding of the lower Court that the dedication was meant mainly for
maintaining the samadhi the Supreme Court following Saraswati1 Ammal!s
case^ held that "a perpetual endowment of property for the purpose of
samadhi kainkaryam, i.e. worship of and at the samadhi (tomb) of a person
was not valid under the Hindu law".
The principles as laid down in Saraswati Ammal1s case^ on the subject
in question have been again applied by the Supreme Court in Nagu Reddiar
v. Banu Reddiar.^ In that case, the issue to be determined was directly
related to whether the dedicating of properties for conducting worship
at a samadhi was for religious purposes. The Court has made a distinction
between a provision for the purpose of worshipping at a samadhi of an
ordinary person and tie arrangements for conducting worship in the tombs over
the remains of saints and it has been held that
"the rule that a provision for the purpose of puja over the 
tomb of the remains of a person is invalid, is subject to
1. Per Jagannadhadas, J., AIR 1953 SC 491, 495. See above, p. 100.
2. (1969) 1 SCWR 669. 3. AIR 1933 SC 491.
4. Per Bachwat, J. (1969) ISCWR 669, 670. 5- AIR 1953 SC 491.
6. AIR 1978 SC 1174.
112
certain exceptions ... there have been instances of Hindu 
saints having been deified, and worshipped but very few 
at all have been entombed. Such cases stand on a different 
footing from the case of an ordinary^private individual who 
is entombed and worshipped thereat."
In so far as the question of a bequest for dharma is concerned the
leading case is unquestionably Saraswati Ammal’s case but let us
see whether the case has been adjudged by the Supreme Court correctly.
2It is regretted that the Court did not accept the authorities’ holding 
that bequests or gifts for maintaining tombs are valid in Hindu law.
P.R. Ganapathi Iyer's observation"^  that "Gifts for the maintenance
of tombs or samadhis of private persons have been regarded as valid under
li­
the Hindu law", and the ruling of the Madras High Court, in Most Reverend
5
Joseph Colgan v. Administrator-General of Madras in which the dispute 
centred round a bequest made by an Armenian, that "where dedication of 
property in perpetuity for the performance of religious ceremonies,
maintenance of tombs and other purposes ... has always been lawful amongst
6 7Hindus and Muhammadans", could not convince the Court to accept the view
7*that raising a samadhi was a religious purpose recognised by the Hindus. 
Instead the Court observed that "we are unable to find any support from
g
our knowledge and experience"; it is questionable, perhaps, however, 
how relevant experiential judicial knowledge is in a case of this kind.
At this juncture, one really wonders whether the Court was actually ignorant 
or was reluctant to accept a view not supported by its decision. In 
my opinion, it was the second alternative by which the Court was influenced
1. Per Kailasam, J., AIR 1978 SC 117^ , 1179-1180.
2. AIR 1953 SC 491, ^95* 3« Ibid., p.*+95 mentioned there.
k . P.223 of P.R. Ganapathi Iyer’s Hindu and Mahomedam Endowments, 2nd ed.
as mentioned in the case,AIR 1933 SC ^911 ^95 •
3. ILR (1892) 15 Mad kZk. 6. Ibid., p. M+6.
7. AIR .1953 SC-^91, ^95. 7 ‘<5L 8. Ibid.
l£
7a. The scriptures and the beliefs of Murti Puiald QWP+aB1>,0 T *
mine whether a bequest for Swamivatsal feasts at Pajusan are rel?8’deter“
charitable or merely meritorious. See-Shah Chhotalal • S10us»
: Comm., Bombay (1965) 67 BomiR 432.  ’---- ^l-^aHubhai v. Charity
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to reach its decision. Otherwise it could not but be convinced by the
1
convincing ruling enunciated in H.R.E. Board v. Narasimham, that the
test of whether a particular act is religious
”is not whether it conforms to any particular Agarr.a Sastras.
We think that the question must be decided with reference to 
the view of the class of people who take part in the worship.
If they believe in its religious efficacy, in the sense that 
by such worship they are making themselves the object of the 
bounty of some superhuman power, it must be regarded as 
religious worship.*1^
In whatever way the Court might try to brush aside the ruling of the
3 ^Narasimham1s case e.g. by saying that the case was a "curious" one,
it could not escape from the force of the observation as expressed in
the last sentence of the learned scholar, Varadachari ;, J. The learned
Judge has spoken impressively as to what should be the test to see whether
or not a particular purpose is religious.
In this context,it may be pointed out that among the Bengali Hindus
(I admit that I have no knowledge about the customs of Hindus of other
areas of the sub-continent) it is common practice to raise or to think
5 6of raising samadhis over the remains of ancestors. Bengali Hindus in
general think that it is a pious obligation to construct a samadhi otherwise
called a math. It seems that only the economic factor prevents poorer
Hindus from constructing maths or samadhis over the remains of their dear
ones so that they could satisfy their spiritual instinct. They believe
that there is something religious in doing that, as I personally verify.
The fact that so many cases involving the question whether the raising of
< >
a samadhi or performing worship thereat is a religious purpose have come 
to the Supreme Court, and the different High Courts testify to the fact'
1. AIR 1939 Mad 13*f. 2. Per Varadachariar,JJ.,ibid.,p. 135. Emphasis
mine
3- AIR 1939 Mad 13*f. A. AIR 1933 SC 491, 495.
5. In Bengali they are called maths as distinguished from maths as
we understand as one kind of Hindu religious institutions.
6. I have seen at least three samadhis (maths) of ordinary persons at
Kishorganj, Bangladesh where I was born and lived up to the age of nineteen 
within a quarter mile of my residence there. One of the samadhis was built 
over the remains of the father (the late Mahesh Gupta) of Bhupesh Gupta, 
formerly an M.P. of the Indian Parliament, wellknown all over India.
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that people in general believe that it is a religious practice to
raise a samadhi or to worship thereat.
MThe definition of religion itself, and the determination of 
the content of a particular religion, as well as the decision 
as to what practices are or are not enjoined by religion 
(and so protected by the Constitution) must all be left to 
the community itself, and the Court^  cannot substitute its 
own judgement or skill for the beliefs and theological 
techniques of the community in question."*?
To find the correct test to apply to determine what purposes are religious
the Supreme Court does not have to look far; it can look to its own
admirable judgement delivered by B.K. Mukherjea, J., as he then was,
in Ratilal v. State of Bombay  ^where the Court happily approved the
4commendable ruling of Davar, J. in Jamshedji V. Tarachand v. Soonabai
that a secular judge was bound to accept the belief of the community
and held that "No outside authority has any right to say that they are
not essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular authority
5
of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner they like...." 
and in the same breath it can be said that it is not open to any secular 
judge to determine purposes as religious in whatever way he likes. As 
raising a samadhi is believed by some Hindus to be of religious merit, 
bequests for raising samadhi or making worship thereat must in the 
appropriate case be held valid.
f. Classes of Religious and Charitable Trusts or Endowments
Endowments, either religious or charitable, are practically gifts or 
bequests for religious or charitable purposes.^ Endowments, in relation 
to dedications involved in them, may be classified under different headings. 
The most important ones are (a) religious and charitable, (b) private and 
public, (c) real and nominal and (d) absolute and partial. As the questions
1. Emphasis supplied.
2. J.D.M. Derrett, "The Definition of Religion in Indian Law" (1959) 6l
Bom LR Jnl. 17-23, 23*
3. AIR 1954 SC 388.
5. AIR 1954 SC 388, 392.
4. ILR (1909) Bora 122.
6. S.V. Gupte, op.cit., 2nd ed., 826.
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relating to the heads, i.e. private and public, real and nominal and 
absolute and partial endowments, will be dealt with in detail in 
the next chapter, a bare outline of the subjects concerned may be 
given below.
Religious and Charitable Endowments
An endowment or a trust is called religious when it is the outcome 
1
of benevolence and it is intended by the founder to acquire religious 
2merit. "The acquisition of religious merit ... is an important 
criterion . .."^  A religious endowment stands for an object or a purpose 
which is essentially spiritual in nature. But in the case of a charitable 
trust or an endowment, which is the outcome of piety, the object can be
to establish a university or to support a hospital or to benefit fellow
A 5creatures including animals or even to run a hostel for Hindu women.
A religious endowment may be made in favour of an idol or the deity
or a religious institution, viz. a math. In this context one important
point should be remembered,viz. that the property in a religious endowment
when dedicated in favour of an idol or the deity, called devata, is called
’debutter1. An idol representing a deity is a symbol of certain religious
aspirations. It is called by the deity's name and for all practical
purposes it is the deity itself. The dedicated property, which means
debottaram, is in Anglo-Indian jargon debutter.^ Debutter in its literal
7sense means belonging to the deity. Again, it should be remembered that
1. N.H. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, vol. 1, 7th ed. , Ki.L.J. ,Madras, 1980, 632.
2. Mayne's Hindu Law, op.cit., 11th ed., 9^ •
3. Saraswati Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal, AIR 1933 SC . 
k. Raghavachariar, op.cit., vol. 1, 7th ed., 632.
3. V. Sridhar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1978) 1 MLJ *+37*
6. Derrett, IMHL, 9^^ 5 P.R. Ganajpati Iyer, The Law Relating to Hindu and 
Mehomedan Endowments,Printed at the Scottish Press by Graves, Cookson 
& Co., Madras, 1905, XCIX.
7. Raghavarchariar, op.cit,, 7th ed., 6^ 6.
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there is a distinction between a debutter property and a property 
belonging to a religious institution, called math. In a debutter 
property the deity occupies the central position but in the case of a 
math, it is the mahant or a religious teacher who is the presiding element.
Public and Private Endowments
In Hindu law, a religious endowment may be either public or private
and unlike English law, there is no distinction between a public and a
2private religious endowment. There is no hard and fast rule which will
decide the question whether a particular endowment is public or private.
3
Thus in Sarjoo v. Ayodhya Prasad, where the main point for determination 
was whether the temple in question was public or private, Shukla, J., 
delivering judgement for the Allahabad High Court, held that
"it is impossible to characterise any single circumstance as 
conclusion of the fact as to whether the temple is private 
or public. The question must be answered on the totality 
of circumstances.
5 6In each case it is a question of fact. In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar,
the main issue to be decided by the Supreme Court was whether the deity
in question was open to public worship. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. spoke
for the Court that
"The distinction between a private and a public trust is that 
whereas in the former, the beneficiaries are specific individuals, 
in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof.
While in the former, the beneficiaries are persons who are 
ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they 
constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment."?
1. Ram Kishore v. Anantaram, 36 (1970) 1 CLT 229, 2kk.
2. S.Roy, Customs and Customary Law in British India, Hare Press, Calcutta,
3. AIR 1979 All. Ik.
1911,
k. Ibid., pp, 76-77.
3. S.V. Gupte, Hindu Law, op.cit., 2nd ed., 8^ 0.
6. AIR 1937 SC 133-
7. Ibid., p. 136.
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In the case of a private religious endowment the bounty is intended
to serve the kith and kin of the donor but in a public endowment the
1
benefit of the trust is conferred on the members of the public.
Absolute and Partial Debutter
A dedication of a religious endowment may be either absolute or partial.
In the case of an absolute dedication, the deity, as a juristic person,
is the owner of the property, i.e. the dedicator gives his property out
2
and out to the deity. But in the case of a partial dedication, the
3 ^property is still a secular property subject only to a charge for expenses
of performing religious ceremonies, worship of the deity, etc.
Real and Nominal Endowments
In a real endowment, the dedicator divests himself of the property to
5
the extent of interests transferred. In a dedication where the paramount
intention of the settlor is not so much to acquire religious merit as to
benefit his chosen few, then it is a case of illusory or nominal endowment
which will not be entertained by any Court.
"A gift to a deity must be a substantial gift however small in 
value, and the Court will not protect a purporting gift in 
charity which is really a covert provision for the founder’s 
nominees."6
In a nominal or illusory endowment the settlor’s prime intention is to
7create a perpetuity in favour of his relatives or nominees.
1. M. Kesava Gounder v. D.C. Rajan AIR 1976 Mad 102, 111-112.
2. Iswari Bhubaneswari v. Brojo Rath AIR 1937 PC 183.
3. S.S. Pillai v. K.S. Pillai AIR 1972 SC 2069-
Benigopal v. S. Gangadhar, AIR 19^ 9 Ajmer '23; Phani Busan v. Kenaram
Bhuniya AIR. 1980 Cal 233* -Mayne’s Hindu Law, op.cit., 11th ed.,
923.
5. N.R. Raghavachariar, op.cit., 6th ed., 6^ 7*
6. Derrett, IMHL, *+95.
7. Ganeshji Maharaj v. Krishna Putt, ILR (i960) 1 All.678.
118
SECTION 3. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The rule against perpetuities is a Chancery idea ’'designed to restrict
1
the extent to which future vesting could be postponed”. In the history 
of English law the word ’’perpetuity” has been used at least in three 
senses
"as meaning (a) an unbarrable entail, (b) an inalienable 
interest,and (c) an interest which vests at too remote a 
date ... the third is the most recent and ... only proper 
one today”.
Perpetuity as meaning
’’unlimited duration: exemption from intermission or ceasing
... is odious in law, destructive to the common-wealth and 
an impediment to commerce, by preventing the wholesome 
circulation of wealth”.-^
In other words, when it appears clearly from a direction in a disposition
of property as regards the corpus that it is meant to be kept for ever and
the income of the property is to be enjoyed generation after generation,
k
’’the direction amounts to a perpetuity”. In this context it must be pointed 
out that in so far as the rule against perpetuities is concerned, it
5
regulates the vesting of interests only and in no way their duration.
Now, old texts of Hindu law are silent on the question of perpetuities.
We:
"may be surprised to find that there is nothing in the texts 
of that system which has any direct bearing on the question of 
pjerpetuities. Twist our texts as we may, we search in vain 
for any in which the matter may be supposed to be even remotely 
dealt with.”6
1. Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity, op.cit., 10th ed., 333*
2. J.H.L. Morris and W.B. Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 2nd ed.,
Stevens & Sons, London, 1962, 7«
3* Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, vol. 2, 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell,
London, 1977, 1352.
k. S.V. Gupte, op.cit., 2nd ed., 778. ;
5. Keeton and Sheridan, The Modern Law of Charities, op.cit, 2nd ed., 202.
6. Asutosh Mukhopadhyay (the future Sir Asutosh Mookerjee), The Law of
Perpetuities in British India, Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, 1902,
58-59.
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An early judgement of the Privy Council in effect and some decisions
of the Calcutta High Court were against applying the English doctrine
of perpetuities to Hindu bequests. In Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty
1
Juggutsoondree Dossee where the only question to be determined was the ' 
"question of the construction to be put upon a Hindoo will", Turner, L.J. 
delivering the judgement for the Privy Council held
"with reference to the testamentary power of disposition by 
Hindoos, that the extent of this power must be regulated 
by the Hindoo law."^
Giving a wider meaning to the Privy Council’s ruling, Peacock, C.J. in
Kumara Asima v. Kumara Kumara,^  a case also involving the question of the
construction of a will, observed that
"I am not aware of any rule of the Hindu law, by which grants 
inter vivos, or gift by will, in perpetuity, are expressly 
prohibited; but it appears to me to be quite contrary to the 
whole scope and intention of Hindu law, and that there are no 
means according to the Hindu law by which such gifts or grants 
can be effected.
In this context it may be pointed out, with due respect, that the statement 
of B.K. Mukherjea that
"In Juggatsundary v. Manickchand it was held by the Judicial 
Committee that the extent of the testamentary powers of the 
Hindus must be regulated by the Hindu law and the peculiar 
doctrine of the English law against perpetuity, a doctrine 
of a technical character not found on any principle of general 
jurisprudence, was inapplicable"^
involves serious discrepancies. First of all, the case decided by the
Judicial Committee was not Juggutsoondree v. Manickchand. Manickchand was
not a party to the suit when the case was decided by the Privy Council.
Manickchand, as a defendant, was a party to the suit when the case was
(1859-61) 8 MIA 66. 
2. Ibid., p. 85*
5. (1869) 2BLR OJ-C 11, 3^ .
*t. Ibid. , p.36. The same learned .Judge earlier had ruled in Goberdhone
Bysak v. Sham Chand, Bourke 282 to the effect that "English law against 
perpetuities could not be engrafted upon a Hindu will" (1869) 2BLR QJ-
c 11, 32.
5. Mukherjea, op.cit., +^th ed., 135«
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in the Supreme Court but he died intestate. The present appeal to the 
Privy Council was ’’brought from the decretal Order of the Supreme Court 
oh the *+th of August, 1857" after the death of Manickchand Bysack.
Secondly, the case was decided by the Judicial Committee in l839i not 
in 1857 as cited by B.K. Mukherjea. Thirdly, though the question of 
perpetuity was raised by the appellant’s counsel in that case, the 
Judicial Committee never ruled as such that the rule against perpetuities 
was not applicable to Hindu law. The ruling of the Privy Council that 
the Hindu testamentary disposition should be governed by Hindu law, had
2been given wider meaning by Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J. in Kumara v. Kumara
when Sir Barnes observed that
"The Judicial Committee appears to us to have determined the 
question of perpetuity; that question was raised in the suit 
by Jagatsundari. Sir J. Colvile,^ in his judgement in that 
case gave effect to the rule against perpetuities. The Privy 
Council did not expressly refer to the question, ..."*+
Finally, the aforesaid statement of Mukherjea,
"...and the peculiar doctrine of the English law against 
perpetuity, a doctrine of a technical character not founded 
on any principle of general jurisprudence, was inapplicable"^
meaning as a rule of the Judicial Committee, cannot be traced in the judge­
ment of the case. He might have taken, inadvertently, the argument of the 
appellant's counsel that "the peculiar doctrines of the English law against 
perpetuities; doctrines of a technical character, and not founded on any 
principle of general jurisprudence"^ with some modification in wording, as 
a part of the decision of the case.
But eventually the rule against perpetuities was introduced in India in
1. (1859) 8 MIA 66, 81.
2. (1869) 2 BLR OJC 11.
3. The judgement of the case was delivered by Turner, L.J., not by Sir J.
Colvile as stated there.
(1869) 2 BLR 0J-C.11, 3^ . Emphasis mine.
5. Mukherjea, op.cit., t^h ed., 135*
6. (1859) 8 MIA 66, 82. •
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statutory form in Sec. 101 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865? corres­
ponding to Sec. 11^ + of the present Succession Act, 1925? which reads:
"No bequest is valid whereby the vesting of the bequeathed 
may be delayed beyond the life-time of one or more persons 
living at the testator’s death and the minority of some person 
who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, 
and to whom, if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is 
to belong."
ft
The provision of this section was later on extended to Hidus by Sec. 2(a)
A
of the Hindu Wills Act, 1870 providing that Sec. 101 of the Indian Succession 
Act, 1865 would apply to "all wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Jaina, 
Sikh or Buddhist on or after the first day of September, 1870." The rule 
was also subsequently embodied in Sec. 1^ + of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Sookmoy Chaunder Pass v.
1
Srimati Konohurr Dasi confirmed the application of the doctrine against 
perpetuities in Hindu law, when declaring the will in question invalid, it 
held that the object of the testator appeared "to have been to create a 
perpetuity as regards the estate, and to limit, for an indefinite period,
2
the enjoyment of the profits of it which would not be allowed by Hindu law."
But the rule against perpetuities is not applicable to a religious
endowment"^ in favour of a temple or to a bequest for the purpose of worship
k
of an idol or for any other religious or charitable purposes. In Prafulla 
Chunder v. Jogendra Nath^ in which the suit was for different reliefs 
including the construction of a will, Sale,J. held that in
"order to constitute a valid endowment all that is necessary is 
to set apart specific property for specific purposes and where 
these purposes are, as in the will, clearly religious and 
charitable in their nature, the trust is not invalid merely 
because it transgresses against the rule which forbids
1. (1895) 12 IA 105. 2. Per Sir Richard Couch, ibid., p.108
5. Mull a ' s Principles of Hindu Law, l*+th ed. Reprint, N.M. Tripathi,
Bombay, 1978, 48^; Sir Ernest John Trevelyan, Hindu Law, 3rd ed.,
Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta/Simla, 1929? 583•
k. Asutosh Mukhopadhyay, op.cit., 136. 5* (190^-5) 9 CWN 528.
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creation of perpetuity (Mayne’s Hindu Law, ^th ed. ,
Para 395)»M"*
2
The doctrine as laid down in Tagore v. Tagore that a gift to an
unborn person is not valid has never been applicable in cases of gifts
3 ^or trusts as made for religious purposes. In Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lai
where the main question was
’’Does the principle of Hindu law, which invalidates a gift 
other than to a sentient being capable of accepting it, 
apply to trustees for the establishment of an image and the 
worship of a Hindu deity after the testator’s death and make 
such a bequest void?”,^
Sir Asutosh Mookerjee answered that
’’the doctrine laid down by the Judicial Committee in the cases 
of Tagore v. Tagore and Bai Motivahu v. Bai Mamubai^ as to 
gifts in favour of sentient beings, has no application to 
directions for the dedication of property for the establishment 
of images and for the worship thereof.”
An endowment for a religious or charitable purpose starts life mostly
as a gift or a bequest for such purposes. Almost all rules governing
gifts inter vivos and gifts by will govern endowments for religious or
charitable purposes as well, except that a religious or charitable endowment,
9
because of its special characteristics, is regulated on a different footing.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that recent decisions of both 
the Supreme Court and some High Courts relating to cases of Hindu religious 
endowments, where the question of the interpretation of a will or a trust is 
generally involved, unmistakably point to the fact that the Courts are
1. Ibid., p. 533* The same learned Judge had earlier ruled in Bhuggobutty
Prosonno v. Gooroo Prosonno, ILR (1898) 23 Cal 112, 123, a case relating to
the construction for will that no dedication would be invalid merely 
because of the reason that it transgressed against the rule against 
perpetuities.
2. (1872) 9 3 LR. 377 = (1872) IA, Sup. Vol. V?.
3. Mayne’s Hindu Law and Usage, op.cit., 11th ed., 888. •
*f. ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 (F3). 5- Ibid. , p. 13*f.
6. (1872) IA Sup. Vol. 47. • 7. ILR (1897) 21 Bom 709-
8. ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 (FB), 156.
9. S.V. Gupte, op.cit., 2nd ed., 826.
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reluctant to allow the disputed properties to be tied up as absolute 
debutter, free from the rule against perpetuities. Whereas for long 
it was assumed that the Court’s prime task was to effectuate a testator’s 
or settlor’s intention and to protect Indian religious institutions, 
Independent India is coming to realise that even the strongest fiscal 
devices are not preventing the accumulation of capital in unproductive 
forms, hostile to the nation’s development. In other words, it seems that 
keeping social needs in view, the Courts tend not to construe wherever 
possible instruments nominally, as opposed to actually, dedicating property 
for religious purposes as creating an absolute debutter so that they could 
transgress the rule against perpetuities. The Courts are leaning against 
absolute rather than partial debutter, thus enlarging the availability of 
capital for intestate succession and so enlarging amounts of property 
assessable to the full range of fiscal devices including Estate Duty and 
Gift Tax.
In Jadu Gopal v. Pannalal where the issue was the interpretation of a
trust, the Supreme Court without accepting the meanings involved in some
2
clauses of the trust, to suit its own judgement, chose two clauses to 
support its decision that the suit property was not absolute debutter. If 
the Court had wanted to reach the opposite conclusion, it could have found 
valid grounds in mary other clauses^ where it could be seen to be spelt out 
that the donor intended his dedication as an absolute one, i.e. he divested
himself of the interests in the dedicated property.
1. AIR 1978 SC 1329. See below, sec. 3(b) of the,third Chapter.
2. "Clauses 4 and 15 read together, seem to indicate that the settlor 
had not completely and permanently divested himself of the property 
covered by this deed." - 33&.
3. In clauses 1, k , 6, 13 &nd 16 the settlor clearly speaks out his mind
that he intended the dedicated property to be absolute debutter.
Moreover, in clause 16 he spoke of a possible appointment of Government
administrator of the trust property in case all the trustees and 
shebaits became extinct and it was the clear indication that he did 
want his property to be absolute debutter property.
1
In Phani Bhusan v. Kenaram Bhunia, the Calcutta High Court did not 
accept the findings of the lower Courts that the suit property was absolute 
debutter property. Moreover though the Court accepted two documents 
pointing to the fact that the property in question was absolute debutter 
and it also added in its judgement that "The plaintiff could not adduce 
any clear and cogent evidence to rebut the presumption arising out of the
2
entry in the C.S. Khaitian regarding the debutter character of property," 
even then the Court ruled that the property was a partial debutter property,
i.e. it was alienable but subject to a charge of expenses for performing 
religious functions.
Peverting specifically to the rule against perpetuities, in M. Kesava
Gounder v. D.C. Pajan^ the Madras High Court had to interpret some documents
and the Court readily accepted the plea of the appellant’s counsel to re- 
k
examine a particular document called "Ex. A-1" to find out whether the 
bequests involved providing inter alia for the erection of the statue of 
the father by the son, would offend against the rule against perpetuity.
It did not accept the argument of the respondent's counsel that the grant 
in the document (Ex. A-1) was a private trust for religious purposes; it 
rather held that the grant was an attempt to give a colourful garb settling 
the property in perpetuity on the nominees of the donors. Pao, J. observed 
for the Court that
"restraints in alienations and the rule against remoteness being 
the two principles well knit as between each other ought not to 
be encountered by courts of law, which administer not only law 
but also equity and good conscience. It is in this background that 
the recitals in Ex.A-1 have to be adjudged to find whether they 
offend the rule against perpetuity.
"On a prima facie reading of Ex.A-1, it is clear that the 
first defendant has tied up the circulation of the properties 
and has created devices whereby certain benefits are conferred 
only upon certain named individuals and their heirs and thus
1. AIP I98O Cal 255 cited below, see sec. 3(b) of the 3rd Chapter.
2. Ibid., p. 237. 3. AIP 1976 Mad 102.
*f. Ibid. , p. 109.
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the course by normal inheritance is tampered with. Though 
of course Ex-A1 begins with a dedication for the purpose of 
erecting a statue for the first defendant’s living father 
... yet the other bequests therein ... make it clear that the 
dedication is not the real one . .."^
pOnce designated as a "peculiar doctrine of the English lav/ against perpetuity” 
the principle has been accepted by the modern Indian judiciary as a 'well- 
known rule'. The social undesirability of religious foundations, particularly 
family foundations of a perpetual character, has evidently made itself felt 
in these quarters irrespective of considerable lip-service to traditional 
religious beliefs and practices.
It is true that when the community at large is deemed to have benefited 
religiously by an endowment we might not repine. But a question mark hovers 
over the well recognised Hindu disposition called ’private religious endow­
ment (debutter)' which is a dedication nominally in favour of a private 
idol, because here both the religious and the material benefits go not to 
the members of the public but to some ascertainable individuals of a family. 
Moreover, because of the inapplicability of the rule against perpetuities 
in religious endowments and the fact that there is very restricted alienability^ 
of debutter properties, the income from them goes generation after generation 
virtually to a particular family, thereby affording an accumulation, thus 
serving practical, no less than 'pious', purposes. In my opinion, in the case 
of a private endowment where there is a vast sum of accumulated wealth, 
leaving a sufficient amount to cover the expenses relating to the purposes 
of the endowment the State should, giving some compensation, confiscate 
the rest of the v/ealth for the good of the poor.
1. AIR 1976 Mad 102, 109.
2. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 135*
3. As a general rule debutter property is inalienable but a shebait or a 
mahant can alienate it on grounds of necessity or the benefit to the 
estate - Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1874-75) 2 IA 145,
151. See below, sec. 1, 5th Chapter, where this important case is 
dealt with in detail.
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SECTION b. THE CY PRES DOCTRINE - ITS APPLICATION IN HINDU LAW
a., English law on the subject.
The phrase "cy pres" means ’near to it1. The cy pres doctrine as
2evolved by the Chancery Courts, is a doctrine of construction and one 
main principle of this doctrine is that
"where there is a gift on trust for a charity which can be 
substantially, but not literally, fulfilled, it will be 
effectuated by moulding it so that as nearly as practicable 
the intention of the benefactor may be carried out."'''*
This legal concept, cy pres, as established by judicial decisions, is to
satisfy the question as to whether or not a particular trust should fail or the
trust property should be utilised for other charitable purposes when it
is found that the charitable purposes for which a certain property is given
k"cannot be carried out in the precise manner intended by the donor.”
An important pronouncement on the origin of the doctrine of cy pres
5
was made by Lord Eldon m  Moggnde v. Thackwell the subject matter of 
which was concerned with the construction of a certain will. His Lordship 
observed that
"In what the doctrine originated, whether, as supposed by 
Lord Thurlow in White v. White (1 Bro. c.c. 12), in the 
principles of the Civil Law, as applied by charities, or 
in the religious notions entertained formerly in this country,
I know not: but we all know, there was a period, when in
this country a portion of the residue of every man’s estate 
was applied to charity; and the Ordinary thought himself 
obliged so to apply it; upon the ground that there was a 
general principle of piety in the testator. ... I have no
1. Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1977, 3^ 0.
2. Wharton’s Law Lexicon, l^ th ed., 3rd impression, Stevens & Sons/Sweet 
and Maxwell, London, 19*+9, 29^-.
3. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, vol. 1, *+th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1971, 670.
b. Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity, op.cit., 10th ed., A21.
5. (1803), 7 ves 36.
6. (1878) 1 Bro c.c. 12.
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doubt, that cases much older than those I shall cite 
may be found; all of which appear to prove, that if the 
testator has manifested a general intention to give to 
charity the failure of the particular mode in which the 
charity is to be effectuated, shall not destroy the charity; 
but, if the substantial intention is charity, the law will 
substitute another mode of developing the property to charitable 
purposes, though the formal intention as to the mode cannot be 
accomplished,
It is on the basis of this principle, as expounded in the last sentence of 
Lord Eldon's observation, that the cy pres doctrine is applied in trusts.
Again, originally the jurisdiction of applying charitable gifts cy pres 
belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts, but later on, specifically after 
1600, the Court of Chancery took over the jurisdiction; it also assumed 
the rules, developed by Church Courts, including the doctrine of cy pres. 
Two
"factors contributed to the liberal construction of gifts to 
charity. First, there was the wholesale reception of the civil 
law rules of construction into the church courts, of which the 
doctrine of cy pres was one. Secondly, the theoretical impli­
cations of legacies of religious charities, which were deemed 
to confer spiritual benefits on the testator, had the natural 
result of the emphasis being placed on the object rather than 
the mode."2
The cy pres doctrine "is essentially a device for keeping in existence a 
gift to charity so that it rpay continue as a public benefit from generation 
to generation."^
If a private trust fails the beneficial interest comes back or results
4 5to the settlor i.e. there is an implied or a resulting trust for the
1. (1803) , 7 Ves 36, ; 69 - emphasis is mine.
2. L.A. Sheridan and V.T.H. Delany, The Cy-pres Doctrine, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 19591 9*
3* Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable 
Trusts (Nathan Committee Report), Cmd 8710, H.M.S.O., London, 1952, 
para. 7'11
Pettit, op.cit., kth ed., 221.
3* The difference between an implied trust and a resulting trust is one of 
terminology. Snell's Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 172.
An implied 'or resulting' trust arises "whenever upon a conveyance, 
devise or bequest it appears that the grantee, devisee or legatee was
(continued on next page)
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settlor.
"A common case of an implied or resulting trust arises where 
a settlor conveys property upon trusts which in the event 
do not exhaust the whole of the beneficial interest in the 
property, as where the trust is for A for life and then 
equally among his children, and A dies a bachelor. Here the 
beneficial interest, so far as it is not effectively disposed 
of, results to the settlor, or, if he is dead, to his 
residuary devisee or legatee, or the persons entitled under 
his intestacy. What a man does not effectually dispose of 
remains vested in him.”
The position in the case of a charitable trust may be the same as that of
a private trust, but in practice the property of a charitable trust is
commonly saved by the application of the cy-pres doctrine.-^
"Where property is given for charitable purposes and the 
purposes cannot be carried out in the precise manner intended 
by the donor, the question is whether the trust should fail, 
or whether the property should be applied for other charitable 
purposes. The cy-pr^s doctrine, where it applies, enables the 
court (or now the commissioners) to make a scheme for the 
application of the property for other charitable purposes as 
near as possible to those intended by the donor.
As a condition precedent to the cy pres application, it must be shown 
that there was an intention to benefit charity. Before the introduction 
of the Charities Act, I960, the rule was that the doctrine could be applied 
only when it
"was impossible or impracticable to carry out the declared 
trust. The rule covered both the case where the declared trust 
was initially impossible, and the case of supervening impossi­
bility, and also cases where there was a surplus of funds after 
the particular charitable purpose had been fulfilled."
(continued from previous page)
intended to take the legal estate..., the equitable interest or so .much 
thereof as is left undisposed of, will result, if arising out of the 
settlor's reality, to himself, or his heir, and if out of his personal 
estate to himself, or to his personal representatives" - F.W. Maitland, 
Equity, Cambridge University Press, 1920, 77*
1. Snell’s Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 160.
2. Ibid. , p; 172. J. Pettit, op.cit. , *+th ed., 221.
k. Kanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity, op.cit., 11th ed., 1981, 50^ .
3. G.W.Keeton and L.A.Sheridan, The Modern Law of Charities, op.cit., 2nd
ed., Belfast, 1971, 136.
6. Pettit, op.cit., kth ed., 222.
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The old rule has been modified by the Act which makes it unnecessary to 
decide the issue whether there is impossibility in the sense of the old 
rule.^
Now, to find a general charitable intention of the donor out of a
certain trust deed is a question of construction. If a general charitable
intention cannot be made out, the trust will fail. The cardinal rule that
the application of the cy pr^ s doctrine is permissible only when a paramount
intention of charity has been manifested by the donor, can be traced to
2the classic statement of Parker, J. in Re Wilson in which a testator 
bequeathed all his property to his three daughters on condition that if 
all of them should die without any surviving issue, the whole principal of 
their fortune together with interest should be utilised for other purposes 
including appointing a teacher. Parker, J. had ruled that
"I think the authorities must be divided into two classes. First 
of all we have a class of cases where, in form, the gift is given 
for a particular charitable purpose, but it is possible taking 
the will as a whole, to say that, notwithstanding the form of the 
gift, the paramount intention, according to the true construction 
of the will, is to give the property in the first instance for a 
general charitable p u r p o s e ,3 and to graft on to the general gift 
a direction as to the desires or intentions of the testator as to 
the manner in which the general gift is to be carried into effect.
In that case, though it is impossible to carry out precise 
directions, on ordinary principles the gift for the general 
charitable purpose will remain and be perfectly good....
"Then there is the second class of cases, where, on the true 
construction of the will, no such paramount general intention can 
be inferred, and where the gift being in form a particular gift,
- a gift for a particular purpose - and it being impossible to  ^
carry out that particular purpose, the whole gift is held to fail.
In my opinion, the question whether a particular case falls within 
one of those classes of cases or within the other is simply a 
construction of a particular i n s t r u m e n t ."5
In that case, since it appeared from the construction of the will that no
general charitable intent was there, Parker, J. held that the gift in question
failed altogether.
1. Snell's Principles of Equity, op.cit., 27th ed., 161.
2. £191321 1 Ch. 3. Emphasis mine.
k. This principle could have been applied in the facts of Bansi Dhar v. State 
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 197^ + SC 108^ , as discussed in the end of this section.
5. D-913J 1 Ch. 31^, 321.
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b . The doctrine of cy pres as applied by the Indian Courts specially 
in Hindu law.
Most of the principles of the cy pres doctrine as expounded by the
judicial decisions of the English courts have been adopted and applied
1
by the Indian Courts.
At the outset, it must be remembered that the performance of directions 
as given in a bequest that the income or the property should be spent for 
a charity, will be supervised by a Court only when the indicated purpose 
is certain and charitable. Unless the purposes can be defined, the Court 
does not frame a scheme for trusts even if a general intention can be 
ascertained from the construction of a particular trust. If in a given 
bequest, the directions are given to the trustees to make a choice among 
objects which are undoubtedly charitable, the bequest is good.
"If, on the other hand, the testator is specific, the purpose is 
charitable and he has manifested a general intention to give 
to charity, but the charity he chooses is not extant at his 
death, and not capable of being brought into existence under 
the rule that saves gifts to non-existent idols or has become 
impractical thereafter, the Court will apply the property cy 
prbs to a charitable purpose nearest to the testator's intention."
On the question of application of the doctrine where there arises a 
surplus of funds after the fulfilment of a particular charitable purpose, 
the leading authority is the Privy Council case of Mayor of Lyons v. 
Advocate General of Bengal. In that case, there was a surplus on the 
original bequest and the Judicial Committee applied it cy pres and declined
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit. , *+th ed.
2. The rule that to attract the application of the doctrine of cy pres, the
first condition to be satisfied is that the donor has clearly evidenced a 
general intention to give to charity, has been explained in Vadivelu v. N.S. 
Rajabada AIR 1967 Mad 175* In that case, the main point for determination 
was whether the cy pres doctrine; could be applied, to increase the allowance
of the descendants of the donor, in the surplus of the charity fund. It
was ruled there that "where a fund to charity is not exhausted by the 
particular purpose specified by the donor, the surplus will be applied
cy pres if the donor had a general charitable intention." - Per Ramachandra
Iyer, C.J.at179* The decision of the High Court was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Rajabathar v. Vadivelu (1970) 2 SCR 299*
3. Derrett, IMHL, 488-^89. (1876) 3 IA 32.
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to accede to the claim of other charities who are entitled to the surplus.
The Judicial Committee ruled that a general principle could not be laid 
that the doctrine of cy pres was invariably displaced when there was a
surplus on an original bequest.
1
In Kamaswami v. Aiyasami, the main points for determination were
whether the trust in question was a valid one and whether a scheme could
be framed for its further management. Moreover, in that case, the intention
of the testator was not clearly specified. The Madras High Court ruled
that a scheme to achieve the purpose of feeding the poor could be arranged
to effect the management of the trust property. In other words, it was
ruled that the trust property could be applied cy pres. But the Court will
not substitute any alternative method where the purpose is clear and
2
practicable. In Advocate-General v. Fardoonji, a testator made a bequest 
of seven thousand and five hundred rupees for the purpose of distributing 
brass pots among the members of his caste and the Saraswat Brahmins in 
Bombay. He made provisions in another bequest for distribution of copper 
pots and sugar candy to the members of his caste and the Saraswat Brahmins in 
many villages in Cutch. The Advocate-General, at the relation of the 
plaintiffs, filed the suit, contending that it was impracticable to carry 
out the bequests and he also submitted that in the event of their being 
declared invalid, the Courts should apply them cy pres to some other 
most useful charitable object under a scheme framed by it. Holding the 
bequest as valid, Davar J. ruled that
"In cases of charitable bequests, the Court has no right to set 
aside the wishes of the testator and substitute another charity 
in the place of one directed to be established by him, simply 
because the one might not be so useful as some other the Court 
might substitute. This question is settled so definitely and 
the principles are laid down with such clearness, that I think 
it is unnecessary to enter into a further legal discussion on 
the subject.M3
1. AIR I960 Mad. kG7.
3. Ibid., p.3^1.
2. (1911) .13 Bom LR 332.
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The point of view adopted is characteristic of the last century and
the first half of this present century when the rights of the proprietor
were regarded as of paramount importance. However, on referring to the
new insertion of sub-section (3) to section 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Act 3 of 1908) by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
Act, 1976 (Act 10^  of 1976), it would seem that a Court may alter the
original aims of a trust and allow the trust property to be applied cy
pres to allied and common purposes.
Generally, the cy prves doctrine cannot be applied if the charitable
gift is contingent on the fulfilment of certain conditions. In other
words, to attract the application of the doctrine of cy pres, the gift
must be an absolute, not a conditional one. In Sreemutty Santana Roy
2
Advocate-General of Bengal, the settlor intended his debts to be
discharged out of the income of his zemindari properties and, out of the
balance, an amount of five hundred rupees should be spent every month by
the trustees for medical and educational charities within the Zemindary.
Subsequent events made the fulfilment of every condition impossible. Sir
Asutosh Hookerjee, J., observed,
"In the circumstances, the case, in our opinion, falls within 
the principle that where a charitable gift is made upon a 
condition precedent, the gift fails if the condition is not 
satisfied, a principle of fundamental importance which has 
been repeatedly recognised by the C o u r t s . "3
It was further pointed out by the learned Judge that the cy pres doctrine
was applied only in wills and not in deeds. Thus be observed that "There
is ... weighty authority for the proposition that the doctrine of cy pres
A 3is applied only in wills and not in deeds." But • a different view,
1. See below Appendix IIB.
2. (1920-21) 23 CWN 3^3. 3- Ibid., pp. 3^3,353-
A. The view was approved and the principle was applied in Havana v. Vana 
AIR 1962 Mad. 300.
5. (1920-21) 25 CWN 3^3, 333.
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viz. that the doctrine.can be applied to deeds or gifts inter vivos
as well, especially in charitable cases, was favoured by the Andhra
1
Pradesh High Court in Venkata Kama v. Venkatappayya in which the
main point for decision was whether a particular village was dedicated
2 3for tope for the public benefit and in Potti Swami & Bros, v. Govindarajulu
which related to the question of recovery of subscriptions paid to a
certain hospital association. The view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
has been accepted by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v.
*+Bansidhar where the Court has discussed the doctrine of cy pres and
pointed out its different modes of application. K. Iyer, J. observed for
the Supreme Court that
"we are inclined to the view that, both testamentary and non- 
testamentary gifts for public charitable purposes must be saved 
by a wider intervention of the Court, for public interest is 
served that way. Neither principle nor precedent bars this c 
broader invocation of the court’s beneficient jurisdiction. n>/
In so far as the question of tte applicability of the doctrine of cy pres
in an Hindu religious endowment is concerned, the Supreme Court case,
£
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bansi Dhar seems to be the most important one.
7
In Patilal v. State of Bombay, though the Supreme Court dealt with the 
matter of the application of the cy pres doctrine to a charitable trust, 
its prime concern was to determine the issues relating to the provisions 
of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution (which deal with freedom of religion).
g
But in Bansi Dhar’s case, the judgement of the Court was directly related to
1. AIR I960 AP 3 5.
2. This word signifies inter alia, mango or other such grove . The Concise
Oxford Dictionary, H.W. and F.G. Fowler (ed.), 5th edition, Oxford
University Press, London, reprinted, 19731 1368. In the case at issue, 
the tope in question was dry land with tamarind trees meant inter alia, 
for a resting place for the members of the village - AIR i960 aP 33* 36.
3. AIR I960 AP 605.
*+. AIR 197^  SC 108*+.
5. Ibid., pp. 1090 -1091. 6. AIR 197*+ SC 108**.
7. AIR 195*+ SC 388. 8. AIR 197*+ SC 108*+.
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the question of the application of the doctrine in particular circumstances.
In that case, an old man gave thirty thousand rupees on the basis of a
matching contribution by the Government for establishing a women's hospital
in memory of the donor's wife. But the construction of the hospital was
long delayed. After the legal action taken by the sons of the deceased
old man for the recovery of the sum donated for a six-bedded women's
hospital, the Government, in the meantime, constituted a new committee and
built a hospital with twenty-two beds in the same proposed location. But
the new hospital was a total departure from the original project which
induced the donor to make the conditional gift of thirty thousand rupees.
The main point for determination by the Court was as preliminary to the
application of the cy pres doctrine, the nature of the charitable object -
whether it was general or specific. To attract the application of the
doctrine, K. Iyer, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, held that
"there must be a larger intention to give the property, in the 
first instance, secondly, there must be impossibility, not in 
the strict physical sense but in the liberal diluted sense, 
of impracticability. Even here it must be mentioned, however, 
that the cy_ pres application of the gift funds assumes a com­
pleted gift. It is essential that a gift has been made 
effectively before its actual implementation by application of 
the funds literally or as nearly as may be, arises."
Holding that the gift in question was a conditional but not an absolute one,
the Court ruled also that "where the donor has determined with specificity
a special object or mode for the course of benefaction, the Court cannot
2
innovate and undo". In that case, as the conditions failed, the learned 
Judge observed that "the charity proved abortive, and the legal consequence 
is a resulting trust in favour of the donor. The State could not keep the 
money and the suit was liable to be decreed."^
1. AIR 19?4 sc 1084, 1091.
2. Ibid., p.1093. This ruling of the Court seems to be the affirmation of the 
principle in a different language, as laid down by Davar, J. in Fardoonji's 
case (1911) 13 Bom LR 332, discussed earlier in the section that the Court 
has no right to replace the charity, intended and directed to be established 
by the testator, by another charity.
3. Ibid., pp. 1093-1094.
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It is suggested that in the context of India to-day, the Courts 
should be more discriminating and apply the doctrine of cy pres 
sparingly in religious endowments, otherwise, more lands or other 
properties will be tied up because of the inapplicability of the rule 
against perpetuities. Social needs demand the availability of more 
lands for secular purposes.
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CHAPTER III 
TRUSTS IN FAVOUR OF IDOLS - DS3UTTER
Section 1. IDOLS AS JURISTIC PERSONS AND THEIR LIABILITY Ta< TAXATION
a. Idols as Juristic Persons
Hinduism accepts the doctrine of Karma according to which good deeds
will result in good results in this life or lives to come. Success and
prosperity in this life and in the hereafter can be achieved by donations
to idols or by being liberal to the poor and other deserving causes. It
is believed that the grace of the deity will be available to sincere
worshippers and sincerity of worshippers is judged in part by their 
1
generosity. In this context it may be pointed out that in the Vedic
period there were no images or temples of images and as a result no trace
2
of idol worship could be found. Thus F. Max Mifller observed that "the
3
worship of idols in India is a secondary formation, the later degradation
4
of more primitive worship of ideal gods."
But it must be stressed that though no trace of idol worship could be 
found in the Vedic period, the existence of idols as such could be traced 
to that period. In an important study (a critique of the famous Privy 
Council case of Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar, AIR 1925 PC ^39) A.3.
Keith quoting from the Rig-Veda pointed out that "we have the highest
1. Derrett, RLSI, 48. .
2. J.C. Ghose, The Hindu Law of Impartible Property Including Endowments, S.C. 
Auddy & Co., Calcutta, 190S, 243-244.
3- But the exact period of introduction of idol worship is not known. See
B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 24.
4. Chips from a German Workshop, vol. 1, Longmans, Green & C., London,
1867, 36. On this point see also Will Durant's The Story of Civilization 
(Our Oriental Heritage), pt. 1, Simon and Schuster, New York, 19^ +2^  405*
5. "The Personality of an Idol"(1926) 30 CWN, xlviii-xlix. Cited also by 
G-D. Sontheimer (at p.48, footnote 8) in his article which is cited below 
in this section; see also Derrett, RLSI, 486, footnote 2.
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authority for the conception of an idol as a piece of merchandise. . . 11
Derrett clarifies the position when he observes that}"Since Rigvedic
times we have known of people who kept idols and loaned them to people
for magical purposes, and thereby, no doubt, made a substantial income 
2from them."
In the Vedic times gifts were made to the gods by oblations in the fire
which was thought to be the carrier to the gods. "The fire was therefore
called Hutabaha, the carrier of sacrifices. At a later stage, making
ita valid gift by way of dedicating property became common. The logical
conclusion is that there was no use in dedication of property for the
5
worship of idols in the Vedic times.
But modern Hinduism is not the same as the Vedic religion^ though the
former owes its origin and some of its aspects to the latter and the Vedan^as.
To-day no one can question the view that a Hindu idol is capable of being
endowed with property. In so far as the law is concerned there is no distinction
between a family idol and a public idol, between an idol made of bronze and
7
an idol made out of stone. Whether an image made either of stone or of
/ 8bronze is a representative of the deity is entirely determined by the Sastra.
9
In Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram, West, J. (a painstaking
1. Keith, op.cit., xlix.
2. RLSI, 486.
3. J.C. Ghosh, op.cit., 242.
4. N.C. Sen-Gupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, Arthur Probsthain, London ad 
Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1953, 246-247.
5. J.C. Ghose, The Hindu Law..., op.cit., 243.
6. Prannath Saraswati, op.cit., 38, where the learned author points out that
the evidence of the existence of images as we find them in Hinduism of
today can be found in the later Vedic literature.
7. Derrett, INHL, 493-494.
8. P.V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra, vol. 2, pt. 2, 2nd ed., B.O.R.I.,
Poona, 1974, 896-903*, Derrett, -RLSI, 484.
9. ILR (1887) 12 Bom 247. The decision of the Bombay High Court was upheld
by the Privy Council in Chotalal v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar ILR (1900)
24 Bom 50 (PC).
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student of the Hindu law) accepting the contention of the plaintiff’s
argument that the defendants as sevakas of the deity of the temple of
Dakor were "as recipients of the offerings at the idol's shrine, accountable,
1
as trustees, for the right disposal of the property thus acquired", ruled 
that
"The Hindu law, like the Roman law and those derived from 
it, recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights of
property vested in the corporation apart from its individual
members, but also the juridical persons or subjects called 
foundations..."
His Lordship referring to the deity in question further commented that
"if there is a juridical person, the ideal embodiment of a
pious or benevolent idea as the centre of the foundation,
the artificial subject of rights is as capable of taking 
offerings of cash and jewels as of land."
Vest,J.’s observation is unquestionably a leading authority to support the
view that a Hindu idol is a juristic person capable of being endowed with
the property of land, but the same view that a gift can be made to a deity
khad been expressed long ago in Kumara Asima Krishna v. Kumara Kumara Krishna vhere 
Markby, J. remarked, "it being assumed to be a principle of Hindu law that a 
gift can be made to an idol which is a caput roortuum.
A Hindu idol having a juridical status can vindicate its rights by suit.
It is said that the attribution of juristic personality to a Hindu deity is
only a legal fiction, based on Hindu religious ideas. In Pramatha Nath v.
7
Pradhyumna Kamur where the questions as raised were related generally to 
the management and worship of a family idol and where a specific question 
for decision was the nature of an idol, Lord Shaw observed for the Judicial
1. ILR (1887) 12 Bom 2^ 7, 258.
2. Ibid., p. 263*
3. Ibid., p. 265-
k. (1869) 2 BLR O.J-C 11. 5. Ibid., p. V?.
6. S.R. Baj, "Juristic Personality of 
(1963) Jaipur Law Journal, vol. 3i
an Idol in Hindu Legal Philosophy", 
229-236, 235.
7. AIR 1923 PC 139 = (1923) 32 IA 2k3.
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Committee that
nA Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, 
founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus and the 
recognition thereof by courts of law, a juristic entity.
It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being 
sued.
Now, when a donor dedicates his property absolutely for the worship
of an idol or a deity, the dedicated property vests in the idol itself,
2as a juristic person. Approving the view regarding the vesting of the
dedicated property as clarified by Mukherjea,^ Grover, J. observed in
kKalanka Devi Sansthan v. M.R.T. Nagpur that, "Now it is well known that
when property is given absolutely for the worship of an idol it vests in
the idol itself as a juristic person."^
Though the view that the dedicated property vests in the idol itself
as owner had been affirmed long before by the Privy Council in both Maharanee
Shibessouree Debia v. Moothooranath Acharajo,^  a case where an issue for
determination was whether the tenure connected with the talook as dedicated
to the idol in question was hereditary and Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab 
7
Chand Baboo, a case dealing with the question relating to the power of a 
shebait to alienate an idol's estate, in those two cases the Judicial 
Committee did not formulate the ruling regarding the nature of an idol as
clearly as we find it expressed in later cases.
g
In Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar, Mr. Ameer Ali speaking for the Privy 
Council held that "under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu
1. AIP 1923 PC 139, 1^ 0.
2. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., *+th ed., 157-' 2nd ed., Eastern Law House, Calcutta,
3. Ibid. 1962,
*+. AIR 1970 SC *+39. 5. Ibid. , p. *+*+1.
6. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270, 273.
7. (l87*+-5) 2 IA 1*+5, 130-131. The case is very important for our thesis 
and it will be dealt with in detail in the 3th chapter when we will
be discussing the question whether the alienation of a debutter property 
is permissible.
8. (1921) *+8 IA 302. Supra pp. 217-218.
1A0
pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a "juristic entity", vested with
1
the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property." But it is in the
2pronouncement of Lord Shaw in Pramatha Nath’s case, as pointed out above,
that we find the clear view of the legal nature of a Hindu idol. So far
as Hindu law is concerned nobody can question the proposition that a Hindu
idol is a juristic person - which is well-established by a long series of
3judicial decisions.
kIn Prosunno Mukari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo the Judicial Committee
held that "It is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong
to an idol."^ Again, in Maharaja Jagadindra Nath v. Rani Hemanta Kumari^
where the issue was whether the right of the plaintiff as a shebait was
barred by the provision of the Limitation Act (XV) of 1877* Sir Arthur Wilson
observed for the Judicial Committee that "there is no doubt that an idol
may be regarded as a juridical person capable as such of holding property,
7
though it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held." These 
remarks as they stand are rather confusing: 'ideal1 or not the sense is a
legal sense. Yet the view has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Deoki
g
Nandan v. Murlidhar where Venkatarama Ayyar, J. pronounced that "It has
1. Ibid., p. 311. 2. AIP 1923 PC 139.
3. For example, Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1921) *+8 IA 302; Pramatha
Nath v. Pradhyuna Kumar AIP 1923 PC 139? Tarit Bhusan v. Sridhar Salagram 
AIR 19^ 2 Cal 99; Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar AIP 1937 SC 1331 136; Jogendra 
Nath v. I-T Commr. AIP 1969 SC 1089, 1090: a detailed discussion of the
case is offered below in the next sub-section; Kalanka Devi Sansthan 
v. M.P.T. Nagpur AIR 1970 SC *+391 *+*+1; Panna Banerjee v. Kali Kinkcr 
AIR 197*+ Cal 126, 1*+6; Pooranchand v. Idol, Radhakrishnaji AIP 1979 
MP 10, 11.
*+. (l87*+-73) 2 IA 1*+5. 5- Ibid. , p. 152.
6. (190*+) 31 IA 203. 7. Ibid. , p. 209.
8. AIR 1937 SC 133* "The case, which is of great general interest,
establishes the proposition that the dedication to an idol is for the 
benefit of worshippers. Here the 'Old' and the 'New' India overlap: 
the 'Old' see dedication as intended to produce merit (hence benefit) 
for the donor; the 'New* sees it as intended to conduce to the beauty 
and religious atmosphere of the shrine (from the point of view of 
visitors, not all of whom will be donors" - Derrett, RLSI, *+8*+, footnote 2.
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been repeatedly held that it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is
the owner of the endowed properties." The phrase "in an ideal sense"
as referred to above, was given interpretation by Jenkins, C.J. as he
2then was, in his judgement in Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lai. Thus his Lordship
observed that the expression "in an ideal sense meant that the dedication
to a deity is a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the
dedication is designed."^ This hardly less confusing formula is the ruling
one to this day - over seventy years later.
The problem regarding the question whether an idol is a legal person
cannot be said to have been solved beyond further discussion. Discussing
both western theories on juristic persons and purvamimamsa doctrines, and
approving the view expressed by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J., in Bhupati Nath’s 
4case S.C. Bagchi came to the conclusion that
"the juridical construct, applicable to a corporation sole, cannot 
apply to a deity in Hindu law. A deity is not a complete 
juristic person... j- Religious endowments can be assimilated to 
purpose-trusts....,5
But an endowment as intended in favour of a deity is never made for an
abstract purpose nor is it made to a deity in a figurative sense as held by
the Calcutta High Court. A gift to a deity "is always directed to the god
7
indicating his name..." Again supporting the present position of the deity 
as a juristic person the late mimamsa scholar A.S. Nataraja Ayyar concluded
1. Ibid., p. 136.
2. ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 (F3).
3. Ibid., p. 140. 4. Ibid.
3. Juristic Personality of Hindu Deities, Calcutta University Press, Calcutta,
1933, 78.
6. In Champa v. Panchiram AIR 1963 Cal. 551; where the question for determination 
was whether a dedication of land to a Hindu deity was a transfer of land 
within the meaning of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West 
Bengal Act 1 of 1954"). Bachawat, J. of the Calcutta High Court observed 
(at p.553) that the "dedication is a gift for a religious purpose, and in 
a figurative sense is a gift to the deity as the ideal embodiment and symbol 
of the religious purpose." See also Derrett, RLSI, 486, where the case was 
cited and the law was stated.
7. G-D. Sontheimer, "Religious Endowments in India: The Juristic Personality 
of Hindu Deities", Z.V.R. 67/1 (1964) 45-100, 71.
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in his study somewhat controversially that the juristic personality has
been developed on safe foundations and we need not take the help of "the
law of trusts for giving the idol a secure foundation...for the preservation,
2management and improvement of the endowments of the idol."
But in so far as the law is concerned regarding the vesting of the
dedicated property, B.K. Mukherjea's clarification of the legal position^
is plausible when he says that
"the deity stands as the representative and symbol of the 
particular purpose which is indicated by the donor; it can
figure as a legal person and the correct position i^  that in that
capacity alone the dedicated property vests in it."
But, in practice, when a donor dedicates his property to an idol he
relinquishes his property in the same way as he would have given it to
somebody else with a secular motive. A Hindu dedicates his property to a
deity with the purpose of receiving grace from the deity. An ordinary Hindu
believes that the dedicated property vests in an idol in a real sense and
not in an ideal sense. This view was nearly admitted by the Supreme Court
5
in Jogendra Nath Naskar v. Commr. of I-T, Calcutta, when it was observed 
there that..
"It is however possible that the founder of the endowment or the 
worshipper may not conceive on the highest spiritual plane but 
j_actually^ J hold that the idol is the very embodiment of a personal 
God, but that is not a matter with which the law is concerned."
The Supreme Court "declines to accept the man in the street's point of view"
even when it admits that "the man in the street may well believe that
7
property belongs to an idol."
The controversy centring round the question, in whom does the dedicated 
property vest, springs from the fact that "the donor never declares the
1. "Juristic Personality of Deities in Hindu Law", V.yavahara Kirna.ya, A 
Journal of the Law Faculty, University of Delhi, 195*+? Vol. 3, 106-177.
2. Nataraja Ayyar, ibid., p.176.
3. Derrett points out that J.C. Ghosh in his book (op.cit., 273)1 has fairly
treated the legal position. RLSI, 485, footnote 1.
4. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 39*
5. AIR 1969 SC IO89. Infra pp.147-148. 6. Ibid., p. 1093-
7. Derrett, Critique, 3^ 1.
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person [[as suchH in whom the property is to be vested; all that he intends,
is that the rents and profits of the dedicated property must be appropriated 
1 2to the worship.” The fiction that the deity is the juristic owner of the 
dedicated property has been introduced
"by lawyers and judges for convenience, but it is not absolutely
necessary that the property must be deemed as vested in the
deity or in a fictional person.”^
In so far as a Hindu religious endowment is concerned, what is required is
the machinery for the management of the endowed property to give effect to
/+
the intention of a settlor. For Hindus are not so concerned with the
5
way the dedicated assets are spent as they are with their right to 
dedicate something to a deity. They make dedications to objects of dharma 
and it is the act of dedication which counts.^
b • Idols * Liabilities to Pay Taxes
One of the attractions of dedicating property to a public or a family
idol was that a capital reserve could grow up out of which some section of
the community or a selected few could benefit. A public temple could serve
as a bank or a private endowment might have a similar function on a smaller 
7
scale. Taxation as a source of revenue existed in India before the British
1. G. Sarkar Sastri, Treatise on Hundu Law, 6th ed., Eastern Law House, 
Calcutta, 1927, 785* 'As such' is inserted by me to clarify the sense.
2. But the "fiction” was not introduced by British judges or British courts 
in the Indian legal arena and Laik, J.'s view on this point as expressed 
in Commr. I-T, Calcutta v. Jogendra Nath, Aik 1965 Cal 570, 596, is
not well-founded. The concept was popular long before "it became a 
part of the Anglo-Indian law" - Derrett, RLSI, *+84-5.
5. G. Sarkar Sastri, op.cit., 6th ed., 785*
4. Sontheimer, op.cit., 99*
5. Chhotabhai v. Jnan Chandra ILR (1935) 57 All 330 (PC), 3^ 3* The parties 
in the case were the members of the Radha Swami religion.
6. Derrett, Critique, 376-7*
7. J.D.M. Derrett, "The Liabilities of Deities to Pay Taxes", (1969) 71
Bom L R Jnl. 38-45, 39* See also Gurcharan Prasad v. Krishnanand AIR
1968 SC 1032. Facts revealed that the mahants pursued a moneylending business
for a long time.
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rule but bona fide dedications of lands to temples were exempt from land
1
tax or were taxed nominally by the native rulers.
People would not mind if endowments were not taxed or were taxed
nominally even after the introduction of the Income-Tax Act and Estate
Duty but for the existence of two incompatible theories involved in a Hindu
religious endowment. In the case of a debutter property the dedicated
property vests in the idol as a juristic person but on the other hand the
manager of an idol known as the shebait has a proprietary interest not
2 3only in his office but also in the assets of the idol. "So the religious
endowment was one way in which rich people could stay rich, and prevent
their assets from being reduced like those of people who would not dispose
4of capital in that manner.” So it could be used to perpetuate a socially 
privileged section of the community but recently the public, considering 
the nation's needs., began to feel it unwise to allow people to be shebaits 
only to escape inCome-tax and estate duty. National calamities and 
national necessities ■ could no longer be laid at the door of aggrieved 
deities, nor could pleasing deities be an alternative to contributing to the 
nation's coffers.
Prior to the amended provision of the Income-Tax Act,196l religious
endowments enjoyed several tax advantages.^ After the introduction of
£
the Income-Tax Act, 1961 these privileges have been reduced. In particular,
1. Derrett, "The Liabilities of Deities to Pay Taxes", op.cit., 39*
2. "The contortions through which the law has gone attempting both to admit, 
and to limit, the shebait's right of property not merely in his office 
but also in the assets or income of the idol, are a prime example of the 
Anglo-Hindu law's unreality and inability to come to terms with itself or 
with facts. A law made up of individual cases arising sooradically and 
unpredictably can be expected to produce such confusion, and readers who 
knew the Anglo-Hindu law as it was a while prior to 1955/6 will confirm that 
it was a repellent mess of ill-digested theories and misunderstandings" -
Derrett, Critique, 383*
3. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293; Moti Das v. S.P.Shfihi AIR 1959 SC 942.
4. Derrett, "The Liabilities of Deities to Pay Taxes", op.cit., 39*
5. Ibid.; N.N.Kher, "Tax Exemption in Ancient India", Indian Historical
Quarterly (1963), 59*68 as cited in the above article at p. 39*
6. R. Dhavan, "The Supreme Court and the Hindu Religious Endowments 1950-1975", 
(1978) 20 JILI, 52-102, 60.
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the advantages of private religious endowments i.e. the exemption of
private religious endowments from paying income tax, in comparison with
those of public religious trusts seem to be negligible in the sense that only
that portion of the income of the debutter which is actually spent for
1
religious purposes is exempt from income tax. It is said that this is
justified on the ground that an. endowment can make a fraud dodge the revenue 
2department. No wonder examples of fraud on the revenue department or
manipulations through endowments could be traced even in medieval India,
where a settlor used to make endowments in such a way that his nominees
3
took the beneiits of the endowments tax free.
Before 1961, religious endowments were governed by sec. 4 (3) of the
If
Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (Act 11 of 1922). That provision made the Act 
(of 1922) inapplicable to the following:
(i) "any income derived from property held under trust or other
legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes, 
in so far as such income is applied or accumulated for appli­
cation to such religious or charitable purposes as relate to 
anything done within the taxable territories, and in the case 
of property so held in part only for such purposes, the 
income applied or finally set apart for application thereto";
(ii) "the case of income derived from business carried on on behalf 
of a religious or charitable institution, unless the income 
is applied wholly for the purposes of the institution..."
(iii) "any income of a religious or charitable institution derived
from voluntary contributions and applicable solely to religious 
or charitable purposes."
1. See C.I.TiW.B. v. Jagannath Jew AIR 1977 SC 1523, 1536, cited below,
this section, where the observation of K. Iyer, J. has been quoted and which
is to the effect that the portion.of the income which is actually spent for
religious purposes is exempted from being assessed; see also the AIR Manual, 
Vol. 11, AIR Ltd., Bombay, 197X S13 N1, pp. 1192-1193 where it is mentioned 
that cases under the Income-Tax Act, 1922 have to be viewed in the light of 
sec. 13 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which inter alia provides that the income 
of a private religious endowment is liable to assessment. S 13 N1 of the 
AIR Manual refers inter alia to C.I.T,Madras v. Estate of late Sri T.P. Rama-
swami Pillai (1962) 46 I TR 666 where it was held that the portion of the
income of the trust applied for religious purposes was exempted from being 
assessed.
2. K.D.Gaur, "Crimes Relating to Income Tax in India” (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis)
London University, 1971* In his opinion the law must be more rigorous "to
stop tax dodgers". Seep„ 124.
3. Derrett, ECMHL. , Vol. 1, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1976-, 260-264.
4. See next page.
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At present, exemption relating to incomes of religious endowments is 
governed by the provisions of secs. 11-13 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 
(Act 4-3 of 1961). The provisions may be summarised as follows:
(i) The property from which the income is derived must be "held 
under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes..."
(ii) The "income derived from" such a property "to the extent to 
which such income is applied to such purposes in India..."
(iii) The accumulated "income derived from property held under
trust wholly for charitable purposes" is exempt "to the extent
to which the income so accumulated is not in excess of twenty-
five per cent of the income from the property or rupees ten 
thousand, whichever is higher."
(iv) Where the property is "held under trust in part only" for 
charitable or religious purposes and the trust is created 
before 1st April, 1962, and when any income from the property so 
held "is finally set apart for application to such purposes in 
India", that income is exempt "to the extent to which the income 
so set apart is not in excess of twenty-five per cent of the 
income from the property held under trust in part..."
Sec. 11 of the 1961 Act deals mainly with the circumstances when and
to what extent a religious or a charitable endowment can claim exemption.
Sec. 12 provides a special case where an endowment can claim exemption. 
Thus, when any income of a trust for charitable and religious purposes is 
derived from voluntary contributions and that income is applied wholly for 
such purposes, it is not subjected to taxation.
Sec. 12A. This section was not originally under the Act (of 1961); it
1
was inserted by the Finance Act, 1972. The section provides inter alia
that a trust to claim exemption of its income from tax "should get itself
registered with the Commissioner within the time prescribed by s. 12A...
(The Commissioner has discretion to entertain an application for registration
2
filed out of time)."
(from previous page5
4. Foracritical and constructive approach to the endowments/income-tax issue 
see Derrett’s article,(1969) Bom LR 38-45. See T.V. Viswanatha Aiyar 
"Taxation of Charities and Trusts" in Proceedings of Seminar...1963*
Madras Provincial Bar Federation (1964), 321-41. In that article Vis­
wanatha Aiyar explains the effects of Income-tax Act 1961 from the 
conservative point of view. See Derrett, "The Liabilities..." cited above,40.
1. N.A.palkhivala and B.A.Palkhivala, Kanga and Palkhivala's The Law and practice 
of Income Tax, Vol. I, 7th ed., N.M.Tripathi, Bombay, 1976, 288.
2. Palkhivala and Palkhivala, ibid., p. 259*
1V?
Sec. 13 provides the following cases where exemption is not granted 
under the present Act;
(I) Any income"from the property held under a trust for private religious 
purposes which does not enure for the benefit of the public."
(II) If the income of a trust for religious or charitable purposes 
created after 1st April, 1962, is "for the benefit of any particular 
religious community or caste" or the benefit of the trust so created is
for direct or indirect benefit of the author or his relatives.
In the sixties several important cases relating to disputes over the 
right of taxing deities’ properties came to the High Courts and in one case, 
the Supreme Court had to give its deliberations on the question whether a
Hindu deity was assessable to income-tax.
2
In I-T Commr. v. Jogendra Nath, a case the decision in which was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court, is also very important for the purpose of the present
topic, the main point for determination was whether the assessments of the
deities in question through the shebaits under sec. ^1 of the Income-Tax 
Act, 1922 were in accordance with law. Before we go into the details of the 
case it may be pointed out that the law to be applied in the present case 
was the Income-tax Act, 1922. Under sec. Vl of that Act, names of some 
specific classes of persons e.g. Wards of Courts, were mentioned and through 
whom income-tax could be assessed, but the.name of the shebait as such was 
omitted in the section. P.B. Mukharji, J., as he then was, pronounced for 
the Calcutta High Court that "on the facts and in the circumstances of the 
case the assessments of the deities through the shebaits under the provisions
1. Jogendra Nath v. Commr. of I.T. AIR 1969 SC 1089*: Below, next page. But see 
Derrett's criticisms of the judgement which are severe but constructive
and very few will disagree with them. In his opinion Jogendra Nath's case 
is "The most interesting Supreme Court judgement which without in any way 
departing from the previous case-law, sought to explain why income-tax is 
payable on behalf of a deity, has obfuscated rather than illuminated in the
declared interest of accuracy" - Critique, 379*
2. AIR 1965 Cal 570. See Derrett's critique of the two separate judgements
of both P.B. Mukharji and Laik JJ. of the Calcutta High Court 
in his "The Liabilities of Deities...", op.cit. , *+1-^ 3*
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of sec* 41 of the Indian Income-tax Act were in accordance with law....M
In the same case, though Laik, J. shared the same view with Mukharji, J.
relating to the interpretation of sec. 41, his Lordship rejected the opinion
2
that a Hindu deity as such was liable to income-tax. But when the case,
3
Jogendra Nath v. I-T Commr. Calcutta, came .on appeal to the Supreme Court,
4
Ramaswami, J. upheld the view of Mukharji, J. and observed for the Court that
"there is no principle why a deity as such a legal person should 
not be taxed if such a legal person is allowed in law to own 
property even though in the ideal sense and to sue for the 
property, to realise rent and to defend such property in a 
Court of law again in the ideal sense. Cur conclusion is that 
the Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of holding property 
and of being taxed through the shebaits who are entrusted with 
the possession and management of its property.
It is submitted that the decision of the case is not helpful to the body
of worshippers.^ Religious endowments are to be protected not for the sake
of deities who neither really possess them nor enjoy the benefits of the
endowments but for the spiritual needs of the body of worshippers. The
judgement of the case has been drawn in such a way as to increase the amount
7
of revenue of the state by extracting money from the religious endowments.
Should religious endowments be taxed specially heavily, such endowments will 
be reduced in number and amount; as a result it will not be the deities who 
will suffer but rather the worshippers whose benefit will be correspondingly 
reduced; fewer temples will be built and as a result fewer places will be
g
available for the worshippers to satisfy their spiritual instincts.
1. AIR 1965 Cal 570, 579. 2. Ibid , p. 597.
5. AIR 1969 SC 1089.
4. The Supreme Court reiterated the view in Off. Trustee v, Commr.,
Income-tax (197*0 93 ITR 3*+3 (SC). —  L»
5. AIR 1969 SC 1089, 1095.
6. With due respect I disagree with the view expressed by Gaur that this 
decision is above criticism. See K.D.Gaur, op.cit., 119.
7. Derrett, Critique..., 379-
8. "Gifts for offerings to a deity, worship and ritual, and the paraphernalia 
of a divine court on earth imitating the supposed divine court in heaven, 
must be maintained by kings because unless this worship is properly 
performed the supernatural health of the kingdom will fail" - Derrett, ibid.,
pp. 377-378.
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1
Earlier the Calcutta High Court, in Sri Sridhar v. I-T Officer, did
not accept the submission of the plaintiff that as the Income-tax Act
of 1961 provided expressly for the assessment of the income of a juridical
person like a deity, as there had been no such express provision in the
1922 Act (Income-tax), it was not within the contemplation of the Act of
1922 to subject the income of the deity to taxation. The Court referred inter alia
2
to the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sodra Devi. In Sodra Devi's
case, the point for determination was whether the word ’’individual" as
embodied in sec. 16(3) of the 1922 Act included also a female and whether 
the income of minor sons from a partnership business would be liable to 
be included in the income of the mother who was also a partner in the 
business. In the present case, Banerjee, J. quoting from the observation 
of Bhagawati, J. in Sodra Devi’s case^ held that
".‘..the word ’individual* has not been defined in the Act and 
there is authority for the proposition that the word ’individual’ 
does not mean only a human being but is wide enough to include a
group of persons forming a unit. It has been held that the word
’individual’ includes a corporation created by a statute, e.g. a
university or a bar council or the trustees of a baronetcy trust
by a Baronetcy Act,...'
"To the list appearing in the quotation above, an idol or a deity 
may not be an unnecessary addition. ... Now, if a baronetcy trust 
can be an individual, there is no reason why a religious trust, 
namely an estate dedicated to an idol and the spiritual object  ^
which is the holder of the property, may not be an 'individual'".
Hindu religious endowments, which were not created through any trust, 
used to fall within the scope of the words "other legal obligation" in 
sec. 4(3)0) of the old Act of 1922. Any income, derived from property 
held in trust or other legal obligation, which was meant for applying 
wholly for religious purposes, used to fall within the purview of exemption 
cases under sec. 4(3)0). In Shree Shree Iswar Gopal Jiew v. Commr. of
1. (1963) 30 ITR 480 = AIR 1966 Cal 494.
2. (1957) 32 ITR 615.(SC).• 3* Ibid., p. 620
4. (1963) 30 ITR 480, 483-
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Income-tax, the question arose whether the income of the deities in
question was liable to income-tax. Sinha, J. relying on the decision
2
in Tribune Trustees v« Income Tax, a case where Sir George Rankin held that
the phrase ’’other obligation” of sec. M3) would include Hindu religious
endowments and Muslim wakfs, observed that
’’Hindu endowments which are not through the medium of trust are
included in the words ’other legal obligation'.... But if they 
are religious they can only be effected if they can be said to 
be ’private religious trusts'. In any other case, income 
derived from property held under a legal obligation to apply 
it wholly for religious purposes is within the ambit of the 
exemption in section M 3 ) 0 ) « M^
The High Court did not also approve the view that the shebait of the deity
could be assessed as a guardian of the deity under sec. kO of the Income-tax
Act, 1922. The judgement of the present case was in effect opposite to the
views held in the aforesaid two cases of the Calcutta High Court where it
was held that the deity would be liable to pay income tax i.e. the income
of any endowment would be subject to income-tax.
k
Again, a unique approach has been made m  I-T Commr. v. TJma Kaheswari
where the point for determination was whether a Hindu deity as owner of 
property could claim earned income relief under the Income-tax Act, 1922.
The Patna High Court held that
’’for all legal purposes, the shebait and the idol are one; any income 
earned by the shebait...while functioning as the shebait of the 
deity must be deemed to be the income earned by the idol. The 
separation of the personality of the shebait from that of the idol 
for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Act will not be 
in consonance with the Hindu law.”5
Next, one of the advantages of religious endowments is that they do not 
die. Like other secular establishments they are not subjectto estate duty 
and if they are also business concerns^ they are in a more advantageous
1. (1950) 18 ITR 7^3. 2. (1939) 7 ITR Vl5 = (1938-39) 66 IA 2M.
3. (1950) 18 ITR 7M, 751 • M  AIR 1969 Pat. 95*
5. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
6. Gurcharan Prasad v. Krishnanand, AIR 1968 SC 1032. see above P.1A3.
See also Guru Estate v. Commr. of Income-Tax. AIR 1963 SC 1^52, where 
Pandas collected money from the pilgrims to utilise the amount for the 
bhog of Jagannathji to be enjoyed by them and the people of the district 
to which the donors belonged.
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position than Hindu business enterprises such as firms and Hindu joint
family businesses, because the latter are subject to estate duty losing
1
some of their capital every time a partner dies. In Pran Krishna v.
2
Controller, Estate Duty the donor dedicated some of his house property 
to the family deity absolutely with the exception that he reserved a right 
of residence in one portion of the ground floor of the house. After the 
death of the donor, the Asst. Controller, Estate Duty, argued that the 
properties were subject to assessment under the provisions of the Estate 
Duty Act, 1953. When the case came to the Board of Revenue the Board also 
did not accept the contention of the applicant that the property in question 
was absolute debutter. Cn appeal the High Court of Calcutta came to the same 
conclusion that as the settlor did not divest himself of a part of the 
property, that is to say that the settlor reserved his right of residence 
in one part of the property, estate duty was payable on that part of the 
property.
The decision in that case seems to be a sound one, but there could be a
serious implication if some remarks of that judgement were given effect. In 
3
Angurbala’s case the Supreme Court laid down the rule that the shebait had
a proprietary interest in an idol’s properties and this was referred to in
the decision of the present case. Though the remarks were obiter it must
be taken seriously because they involve a judicial opinion. The obiter
observation may be reproduced below:
"If this (i.e. the shebait's ownership) be the position of a 
shebait then whether he retained seme sort of interest in the 
debutter estate, expressly under the deed of endowment, e.g., 
as in the instant case, a right of residence in one of the
houses; or whether he did not do so, but merely constituted
1. Derrett, "The Liabilities of Deities...", op.cit. , bj>.
2, AIR 1968 Cal ^96 See the evaluation of the judgement of the Calcutta
High Court by Derrett (at pp. b^-b^>) of the article mentioned above.
5. AIR 1951 *?C 293. This is the most important case for the purpose of this 
thesis, oee below, p.219.
b . Derrett, "The Liabilities of Deities...", op.cit., bb.
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himself as the shebait, that fact alone will endow the shebait 
with some sort of beneficial interest in the dedicated property 
and by functioning as the shebait he would be enjoying some 
beneficial interest in the properties dedicated to the deity.
This would attract the mischief of section 10^ of the Estate 
Duty Act because it cannot be said that a shebait after ded­
ication ceases to have any benefit or enjoyment in the dedi­
cated property.”2
In my opinion the above exposition of law involved in the decision in
3
Angurbala v. Debabrata and the logical conclusion as derived from that
decision is correct, but the implications of such an exposition of law are
unquestionably devastating. All properties of deities may be subjected to
estate duty whether or not a shebait expressly reserves any right in them,
because he has a beneficial interest in the properties and the dedicated
properties will be deemed to pass after he dies. "In course of time all
k
iaols1 estates would pass to the Government of India."
3
It is submitted that the actual decision in pran Krishna's case is sound.
It is implied in the decision that when the settlor dedicates his property
along with all the interests in it the property is exempt from estate duty
but if he reserves any interest to himself, in that case the property will
be liable to estate duty to the extent affected by that interest.
However, a provision giving a right of residence to the shebait for the
purpose of carrying out worship of the deity itself will not change the
£
absolute character of a dedication. Thus in Sree Sree Iswar Sridhar Jew 
7
v. Sushila Bala where the point for determination was the construction of
1. Sec. 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1955 reads: Property taken under any gift,
whenever made, shall be deemed to pass on the donor's death to the extent
that bona-fide possession and enjoyment of it was not immediately assumed
by the donee and thenceforward retained to the entire exclusion of the
donor or of any benefit to him by contract or otherwise....
2. Per Banerjee, J., 505• 5» AIR 1951 SC 295•
if. Derrett, "The Liabilities of Deities...", op.cit., kk .
5. AIR 1968 Cal ^96.
6. Gnanendra v. Surendra AIR 1920-PC 27. In that case the will in question
was challenged on the ground that there was no valid dedication for
religious purposes. It was provided in the will that the shebait for the 
time being would reside in the house which was dedicated to the family idols.
7. AIR 195^ SC 69-
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the will i.e. to find out whether the dedication involved was absolute
or partial, the Supreme Court held that a provision giving shebaits the
right to reside in the properties dedicated to a family idol to carry
out religious worship does not change the quality of the dedication from
2
absolute to partial. But recent decisions in some cases suggest that the
Court may so construe a dedication as to secularise property which otherwise
would be absolute debutter, free from the rules against perpetuity, and so
increase assets available for assessment to taxation. In Jadu Gopal v.
3Pannalal v/here the point for determination was the interpretation of a
trust, it appears that keeping social needs in view, the Supreme Court in
construing the grant in question as partial debutter, leaned against
absolute debutter, thus enlarging the amount of property assessable to the
revenue lav/s as property of individuals.
Now public religious endowments, because of their element of public or
sectional utility are exempt to some extent, as we have already seen, even
from paying income tax. But no income tax statute is more lenient to public
religious endowments than the Madras Agricultural Income-tax Act (Act 5 of
1955)* In Madras, religious endowments are exempt from paying agricultural
income tax for the income of the lands held in trust wholly for religious
and charitable purposes. The Act seems to be so liberal that it is not
concerned at all with the way the income is spent except how the lands are
held. The provisions of granting exemption of income-tax to religious
endowments are embodied in sec. *+ of the Madras Act. In Sadayapillai Trust
k
v. Agricultural I-T Officer, the Madras High Court rejected the view of 
the commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax that "if any excess out of the 
income derived from the properties remained after the performance of the
' \ , The view was accepted in Nirmala Bala v. Balai Chand AIR 1965 SC 1871, 1883,
a case concerning construction of a will.
2. For example, Jadu Gopal v. Pannalal AIR 19?8 SC 13^9 and Phani Busan v.
Kenaram Bhunia AIR 1980 Cal 255»
3. AIR 3-978 SC 1393- See below, section Jo of this chapter.'
k . AIR 1967 Mad 396.
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objects of the trust, such excess income might be appropriated for himself
1
by the turn-trustee for the time being.” But instead Veeraswami, J.
2referring to two decisions held that
’’Reading the document in its entirety and having regard to the 
substance and extent of dedication, there is no doubt that this 
was a case of endowment of the entirety of the properties and 
the same as a whole being held as trust. The properties, therefore, 
fall within the first limb of sec. A. ”3
ADerrett's view that "any part of the income for the expense of worship
and the god's needs (depreciation of the temple structure, etc.) should be
5
exempt from assessment to revenue...” seems to have found expression in
the decision in C.I.T, W.B. v. Jagannath Jew  ^where K. Iyer, J. ruled that
"we may state that all income earmarked for religious and charitable purposes
conforming to sec. A(3)(i) read with Explanation to sec.A(3) of the 1922
7
Act shall not be included in the total income.” Moreover, the Supreme
g
Court’s ruling that shebaits' income from remuneration and other allowances
(e.g. personal use of carriages, horses, etc.), to be provided out of the
9
income of the debutter, can be included in the total income of the deity, 
for the purpose of income-tax assessment, is commendable. Otherwise a 
shebait's personal income would be income-tax free in contrast to the 
personal income of a person having no connection with any Hindu religious
1. AIR 1967 Mad 396, 396.
2. M. Dasaratharami Reddi v. D. Subba.A'ao AIR 1957 SC 797* the subject- 
matter of which was whether the dedication involved in the will in 
question was complete or partial. Vadivelu Mudaliar v. N.S. Rajab&ds 
AIR 1967 Mad 175, a case dealing with the construction of a will.
3. AIR 1967 Mad 396, 397.
A. One may wonder why 3.K. Mukherjea's or Varaaachari's book has not yet
been referred to in this section. With due respect to the learned 
authors, the writer has not got any help from their works for this 
section and is obliged to point out that no critical approach has been 
made in their books. See Mukherjea, op.cit., Ath ed., 5^8-533 snd 
V.K. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 322-33^.
5. Critique, 389. 6. AIR 1977 SC 1523-
7. Ibid., p. 1536. 8. Read 1536 with 1527-
9. The same view was held by the Patna High Court in Commissioner of I.-T.,
Bihar v. Uma Maheshwari AIR 1969 Pat 95* See above, this section.
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endowment and that would have been discriminatory. A shebait’s income
from the debutter is generally spent in the same way as any other person’s
income (e.g. for maintaining his family and himself). It may be suggested
that all income of the debutter not spent by the shebait on the debutter
purposes (worship, repairs, etc.) should be deemed as the shebait’s and
assessed along with his other income for tax purposes.
Again, the capital necessary to defray expense concerning the maintenance
of the temple should be exempt from estate duty because that capital ’’cannot
1
be deemed to belong to the shebait beneficially.” So the actual decision
2
in Pran .Krishna’s case is commendable. As long as worship is performed out 
of the income of a genuine private endowment, there is, according to Hindu 
law, jagathitam involving public benefit."'* "Hindu law, according to the 
original sastras...never made any distinction between public and private 
religious purposes.
 ^/
"Religion, according to Hindu sastras... is always for universal good and
universal welfare. Dedication whether made by an individual or otherwise
k
privately is always for the good of the universe, ’jagathitaya*".
In so far as Hindu religious endowments are concerned legislators should
not be deceived into thinking of an’endowment as private as opposed to public
because a private endowment is a well accepted legal institution of Hindus I
"The Hindu view of the character of private endowments must be 
accepted at its face value. Thus, only the surplus/income is 
properly assessable to tax. And by the same token it is less 
desirable to have, as at present, a fixed proportion of the 
income of a public endowment freed of income-tax, than to have 
a valuation in each case of the income not spent on worship and 
the maintenance of the endowment."5
Now even imposition of the maximum level of tax on the surplus amount will
1. Derrett, Critique, 389* 2. AIR 1968 Cal +^96.
3. Derrett, Critique, 389.
*+. Per Laik, J. I-T Commr. v. Jogendra Nath AIR 1965 Cal 570, 583*
5* Derrett, Critique, 390.
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not do any harm to the purpose of any endowment. As long as the worship 
of the deity is not hampered, it is better for society to get the means 
to fulfil its other commitments. The Hindu religion does not evaluate 
the pleasing of the deities in terms of the amount actually spent on worship 
- the latter reflects, or creates, the social standing of donors in which 
the law is not interested. A problem may be thought to arise if an endowment 
is made out of an untaxed amount or an amount which has been earned immorally. 
In such a case, if the donor divests himself of all the interests in the 
amount in favour of the deity, the income-tax department cannot assess the 
dedicated amount because the deity not the founder is the owner of the 
amount. Here in so far as the deity is concerned the money is not the 
income of the endowment, it is the capital amount. The Court cannot declare 
it an illusory endowment, for it is not a device to dodge revenue or any 
other laws. It is suggested that in such a case '' ' tne assess©.-. v
. alone be
or- his legal representative should^ looked to for
— * C Cr7 an endowment may be redefined as valid only when it
is made out of a legally named and taxed amount or a property bought cut
of that amount. The mimamsa however is clear that illegality or immorality
1
does not attach to assets when transferred and if the law does not provide 
for the following of the funds the assets are effectively dedicated.
1, Derrett, HLSI, 5th chapter 1^-1V?, see also p. 13*f.
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Section 2. FORMALITIES 07 DEDICATION TO IDOLS.
When benefits are sought to be obtained from a debutter the starting
point in any dispute that arises are the questions whether, when, by whom
and to what effect dedication was made.
When a property is dedicated to an idol a Hindu generally performs the
usual religious ceremonies of sankalpa (the formula of resolve) and samarpana
(delivery). But the performance of these ceremonies is not essential in
2
creating a valid endowment. In both these cases the ceremony includes
recitation of hymns and delivery of prescribed articles either on the ground
or to the person considered to be the recipient of the gift of the endowment.^
But the presence of ceremonies is merely a corroborating factor for the
*+purpose of determining the real intention of the donor. In Pinchai v.
5
Commr. H.R. 8c C. Endowments Board, where the power of the Deputy Commissioner,
Religious Endowments Board, to frame a scheme under the Madras Hindu Religious
Endowments Act (Act 22 of 1959) was challenged, the Madras High Court ruled
that '‘An endowment can be created by making a dedication pure and simple
without any provision for performance of ceremonies."^
The question whether there has been any dedication is to be determined on
the basis of the evidence produced in each case. In Idol Murli Manoharji v.
7
Gopilal where the main point for determination was whether or not the suit 
property was a dedicated property, Lodha, J. spoke for the Rajasthan High 
Court that
1. For the meanings of 'Sankalpa and Samarpana see Mayne's Hindu Law, 
op.cit., 11th ed., 921.
2. Mu11a, op.cit., l*+th ed., *+80; V.K. Varadachari, op.cit., 79.
3. M.N. Srinivasan, op.cit., vol. 3» f*th ed., 2505.
*+. B.K. Kukherjea, op.cit., *+th ed. , 106.
5. AIR 1971 Mad *+05-
6. Per Krishnaswamy Reddy, J. , ibid. , p. *+10.
7. AIR 1971 Raj 177.
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"the law seems to be well settled that even in the absence of a- 
document and ceremony such as sankalpa or samarpana dedication 
may be established by other evidence. The question whether 
there has been a dedication of a certain property to a temple 
is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of the 
evidence produced in each case.""*
In order to constitute a valid dedication it is necessary that the settlor
should have completely divested himself of the interest dedicated. There
should be an unambiguous expression of intention on the part of a donor
2of the divestment of the interest dedicated. It is the intention of a
settlor which is the most important test of a valid dedication and it is
this point which has been given stress by the Supreme Court in Decki Nandan 
3
v. Murlidhar where Venkatarama Ayyar, J. held that
"an endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or 
temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, 
provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed 
his intention in that behalf."^
A mere intention to dedicate property is not sufficient, the settlor must
5
part with his rights in the property dedicated, and whether he has expressed 
his intention unambiguously can be deduced from his conduct or from the 
conduct of his nominees.^
7
Again, a aedication is valid even if it is made verbally. No writing, 
nor any specific kind of 'deal' is necessary to constitute a valid Hindu
g
religious endowment and the performance even of once considered indispensible
Q
formalities is not necessary for the purpose of a dedication. But there
should exist clear evidence of such am endowment. Thus in Konwur Doorganath
10v. Ram Chunder Sen the subject-matter of which centred upon the question
of the possession of a Kehal, the Privy Council held that a party seeking a
declaration, for setting aside an alienation of lands on the ground that the
lands were debutter, must produce strong evidence of existence of an endowment.
_  1971 Raj 177, 180.
2. State of Madras v. S.S.M. Paripalana Sangham AIR 1962 Mad 48.
3- AIR 1957 SC 133. Supra p. 140. 4. Ibid., p. 140.
5. Venkatachalapathi v. China Muna (1922) 42 MLJ 258.
6. Govt, of Madras v. A.S. Navaneethakrishna Pillai AIR 1971 Mad 472.
7. Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1638. See above, sec. 
la of the 1st chapter. Mayne's Hindu Law, op.cit., 11th ed., 920.
8. R.V. Reddiar v. Krishnaswamy AIR 1971 Mad 262.
9. Kisha Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1972 All 273• 10. (1876) 4 IA 52. Infra
_____   _____  9 * 208.
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In Ramchandra v. Shree Kahadeoji where the main question for determination 
was whether the trust in question as created for maintaining an akhara 
(perpetuity) was a valid religious trust, Shelat, J., summed up the important 
elements of a dedication:
MA dedication of property for a religious or a charitable purpose 
can, according to Hindu lav/, be validly made orally and no 
writing is necessary to create an endowment except where it is 
created by a will (cf. Dasaratharami Reddi v. D. Subba Rao, 1957 
SCR 1122 at 1128 = AIR 1957 SC 797 at p. 800) , 2 It can be made 
by a gift inter vivos or by a bequest or by a ceremonial or 
relinquishment. An appropriation of property for specific 
religious or charitable purposes is all that is necessary for a 
valid dedication.
The principle as laid down in the said observation may be taken as virtually
the exposition of law made long ago by the statement of West, J. in Manohar 
4Ganesh's case that "A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable
institution flay, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it....
5
A trust is not required for this purpose...."
In short, the most important element of dedication is the divestment or 
renunciation of property (utsarga) in favour of God with a dear intention 
that the income of the property will be applied for worship of the deity 
represented by a properly consecrated idol having its definite name in a 
defined place.
1. AIR 1970 SC 458.
2. Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, observed there that "The principles 
of Hindu law applicable to the consideration of questions of dedication 
of property to charity are well settled. Dedication of property need 
not necessarily be by instrument or grant. It can be established by 
cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of 
the property...." In that case the question for decision had centred 
upon a particular compromise decree.
3. AIR 1970 SC 458, 464.
4. ILR (1887) 12 Bom 24?. (l8?l-72)
5. IbicLp.2634 Ihe lawwasQaid down in Jugget Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Bossee,/
i^Tmia 289, 302.
6. Derrett, IKHL, 493.
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Section 3. KINDS OF HINDU RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS
a* Real and Nominal Debutter
A dedication of property in favour of the deity must not be illusory,
it must be real. A religious endowment cannot be used as a cover to fulfil
some secular purpose. Nominal debutters are known to the law and the
properties of a nominal family debutter are certainly partible between
2
members of the family. In order to constitute a valid dedication, the
3
donor must divest himself of the interests dedicated. But a mere intention 
to divest interests in a property evidenced by a deed or the mere execution 
of a deed is not enough; it must be shown that divestment has already taken 
place.^
3
In M.A. Ramanujacharyulu v. M. Venkatanarasimhacharyulu the settlor 
created an endowment of certain lands which fell to his share in the family 
division. Later on, he bought a building at a certain village in the name 
of his wife with the purpose of converting the building into a choultry and 
to run it for charitable purposes such as for the benefit of the poor passer­
by and other deserving purposes. Again, to run the choultry a settlement 
of certain lands in the same village was also made by the settlor. The 
appellant filed the suit for a declaration that the properties as settled 
by the settlor for the purpose of maintaining the choultry were not endowed 
properties but they were joint family properties. In short, the point for 
determination was whether the suit properties were real or nominal debutter.
Refusing to accept the plea of the appellant, Kondaiah, J. of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court observed that
1. Derrett, IKHL, 495. On this point see Sri Ganeshji v. Krishna (i960)
ALJ 678. See also Niranjan Parasad v. Behari Lai (1929) A U  324.
2. Dukhi Dibya v. Landi Dibya AIR 1978 Cri 182.
3. Mulla, op.cit., l4th ed., 481.
4. Lai Chand v. Vinayak Rao AIR 1953 Nag 35"! ; Brojobala Dasi v. Sree Sree 
Saradiya Durgamata ILR (1953) 2 Cal 268; Kahani Dasi v. Paresh Nath AIR 
1954 Or i 198; Ram Char an v. Giri janandini AIR 1959 All ”472; Sri Gopal Jiew 
Thakur v. Pravasina AIR 1967 Ori” 85"
5. AIR 1974 AP 316.
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"An endowment can be created by the execution of a deed of 
dedication by the donor. But, however, it must be noted 
that the mere execution of a deed of dedication without 
the donor intending to act upon the terms of the deed, would 
not create a valid endowment. In other words, to constitute 
a valid endowment, it must be established that the donor 
intended to divest himself of his ownership in the property 
dedicated. An endowment may be real or nominal. Whether a 
particular endowment is real or nominal, is a question of 
fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
In order to determine whether an endowment is nominal or real, 
the factors relevant and material are (i) whether in fact any 
endowment has been created or not, and (ii) the conduct of 
the parties and surrounding circumstances."
2
In Mahani Dasi v. Paresh Nath, the main question to be decided was 
whether both the oral and the documentary evidence would warrant an inference 
that the properties in question were, in fact, dedicated to the deity. 
Panigrahi, C.J., rejecting the views held by the lower Courts, held that
"the Courts below have rested their decision relying on a 
recital of a deed to the effect that certain properties 
belong to the deity. But this by itself is not sufficient 
to prove that there had, in fact, been a dedication. To 
prove this fact it must further be established that the 
executants had intended to divest themselves of their 
ownership in the properties dedicated."
To determine whether a particular dedication is real or nominal the
conduct of the parties, i.e. their dealing with the endowed property, is an 
kimportant factor. It must be remembered that "the Court will not protect
a purporting gift in charity which is really a covert provision for the
5 6founder’s nominees." In Thakurji v. Sukdeo Singh where the donor practically
made an apparent dedication of his whole property to the deity, the Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court approving the finding of the Court of
first instance that the whole transaction was not prompted by religious
1. Ibid., p. 317*
2. AIR 195^ Ori 198.
3. Ibid., p. 200. It may be pointed out that this decision of the Orissa 
High Court was reversed by the Supreme Court in Paresh Nath v. Kahani 
Dasi (i960) 1 SCR 271, 273? on a technical ground that "a High Court, 
on second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however erroneous 
the findings of the fact recorded by the Courts of fact may be."
b. Ramchandra v. Ran jit Singh ILR (1900) 27 Cal. 2^+2, 251.
5* Derrett, IMHL, 9^5*
6. ILR (1920) b2 All 395 (FB).
162
motives held that "the donor's motive was to tie up the property and to
1
render such property inalienable for generation after generation."
2
In Durga Prosad v. Sri Sri Rameswar Jew Siba Thakur, a Hindu widow,
a limited owner, purported to dedicate a substantial portion of landed
property to the deity by executing a deed arpannama (a deed of dedication)
exceeding her limit to alienate the property. In this connection it may
be pointed out that a Hindu female could under the system generally obtaining
until 1956 validly alienate or dedicate only a fraction of the property, of
which she was a limited owner, for the benefit of the soul of the deceased 
3
owner. In the present case, the Court of first instance accepted the
version of the plaintiff that the widow's eldest son obtained the fictitious
document of dedication f/a^his mother who could not understand its contents,
and decreed the suit. The document would have given, in practice, to the
widow's sons control and ownership over a substantial portion of the property.
But the appellate Court reversed the decision of the lower Court and accepted
the document as a valid one without evaluating the subsequent conduct of the
parties. The High Court of Calcutta rightly reversed the decision of the
lower appellate Court and upheld the verdict of the original Court. Maitra,
J. delivering the judgement for the Court pronounced that
"the document...purported to create an illusory endowment and 
she did not intend to divest herself of the property.... I 
further hold that she exceeded her limit by making such 
improper alienation, that the disputed deed...was not acted 
upon and it was a sham and paper transaction."^
A classic example of illusory endowment is Niranjan Prasad v. Behari Lai. ^
1. Ibid., p. kOO.
2. AIR 1981 Cal. 92.
3. Sardar Singh v. Kunj Bihari Lai AIR 1922 PC 261. The point for deter­
mination was whether a Hindu female on whom the property devolved upon the 
death of the husband or son or father as a limited estate could alienate 
any part of the property for religious purposes. Mr. Ameer Ali (at p.266) 
pronounced for the Judicial Committee that "Hindu law recognises the 
validity of the dedication or alienation of a small fraction of the property 
by a Hindu female for the continuous benefit of the soul of the deceased owner.'
k. AIR 1981 Cal. 92, 9^-95. 5- AIR 1929 All. 302.
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In that case the testator disposed of the whole of his property in a will 
and out of that property he purported to dedicate some items to the deity. 
It was found that the shebaits used the endowed property in such a way as 
rather to satisfy their secular motives than to fulfil the purposes of the 
endowment. The shebaits did not even keep any accounts of any income of 
the property. Declaring the endowment a nominal one the High Court of 
Allahabad ruled that
"we are not satisfied that any expenditure whatever has been 
incurred for the purposes of worship etc. of the idol and in 
our opinion the endowment is purely illusory or colourable.
The testator’s intention was to preserve the property in his 
family and to let his two sons and their descendants enjoy the  ^
income of the property without having the power of alienation."
2
Again, in Ganga Narain v. Brindabun where the issue to be decided was 
whether the dedication was bona fide or nominal, the testator, within a 
fortnight of the endowment, transferred half the endowed property to his 
brother. The finding of the Court was that the settlor simply treated his 
property as his own, so it was held that the endowment was a nominal one.
To constitute a real debutter the intention of the donor to divest 
himself of property might be an important factor but it is not enough.
He must act to show that actual divestment has occurred. In Watson & Co.
3
v. Ramchand where two deeds of endowment by one Padmalochun were executed 
but not acted upon, the Judicial Committee ruled that
"it was not the intention of Padmalochun or of his brothers 
that the deeds should be acted upon, or that Padmalochun 
should thereby divest himself of his share of the property.
The deeds were fictitious...."^
1. Ibid. , p. 304. In Tagore v. Tagore (1872-73) IA Sup Vol. 47, the
Judicial Committee held that a Hindu could not dispose of his property
by a bequest to a person who was not born in fact and in law at the 
moment of his death. But this rule of Hindu law was modified by 
several statutes inter alia by the Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916 
(now repealed). See Derrett, M L , 464-465* Now the Hindu Transfers
and Bequests Act, i960 applies to the whole of India except the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. According to this Act a gift to an unborn person is 
valid. However, such a gift should not offend the rule against 
perpetuity. See Derrett, IMHL, *+63; Diwan, op.cit. , 2nd ed. , 4p3*
2. (1883) 3WR_ 142. 3. ILR (1881) 18 Cal. 10 (PC). 4. Ibid., p. 18.
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In other words, a dedication may well be construed as invalid if the
profits of the endowment are spent not for the purpose of worship of
1
the deity but for the benefit of the donor and his nominees.
But the evidence that only some portion of the income of the endowment
has been spent for worship of an idol is not enough for the determination
of the character of the property as debutter. In Konwur Doorganath Roy
2
v. Ram Chunder Sen the Privy Council held that the mere fact that the
rents of a particular property had been applied to the worship of an idol
for a long time was not by itself sufficient to establish that the property 
3
was debutter. To retain discretion whether to apply or not is to argue
that dedication did not occur.
In order to show that a particular dedication was a real not a nominal
one the conduct of the parties (i.e. how they have dealt with the endowed
property) is an important factor and the fact that the settlor and his
nominees have not used the property for their own use warrants an inference
that the dedication is a real one.^ In Abhiram v. Shyama Charan Nandi^
in which the main question to be decided was whether the mouzah in question
was debutter, Sir Andrew Scoble observed for the Privy Council that
’’the mere fact of the proceeds of any land being used for the 
support of an idol may not be proof that those lands formed 
an endowment for the purpose... but it is a fact that may well 
be taken into consideration....M?
Though the subsequent conduct of the donor or his nominees is important
to establish the intention of the donor or of his nominees, it is not
sufficient to determine the validity or invalidity of a dedication. For,
1. Sree Sree Iswar Lakshmi v. Kshitish Chandra (1532) 55 CU 26, 31.
2. (1876-1877) 4 IA 52. 3. Ibid., p. 60-61.
4. The point that the subsequent conduct of the party is an important
factor has been stressed in Durga Prosad v. Sri Sri Rameswar Jew Siba 
Thakur AIR 1981 Cal. 92, 94; Ganga Narain v. Brindabun Chunder (1883) 
3WR"152.
5* Sri Sri Gopal v. Radha Binode AIR 19?5 Cal. 996.
6. (1908-09) 36 IA 148. 7. Ibid., p. 164.
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naturally, when the intention of the donor is established a mere breach
of a trust of a shebait in dealing with the endowed property contrary to
his terms of appointment will not invalidate a dedication. In Sree Sree
2
Iswar Sridhar Jew v. Sushila Bala where the main contention of the
defendants (appellants in the Supreme Court) was that the suit properties
were not debutter^ and where they claimed adverse possession of the suit
properties, approving the observations of Rankin, C.J., as he then was,
4
-+n Surendra Krishna v, Iswar Bhubaneswari, Bhagwati, J. held that
"We are in perfect accord with the observations of Rankin, C.J.
If a shebait by acting contrary to the terms of his appointment 
or in breach of his duty as such shebait could claim adverse 
possession of the dedicated property against the idol it would 
be putting a premium on dishonesty and breach of duty on his 
part and no property which is dedicated to an idol would be 
safe. The shebait for the time being is the only person 
competent to safeguard the interest of the idol, his possession 
of the dedicated property is the possession of the idol whose 
shebait he is, and no dealing of his with the property dedicated 
to the idol could afford the basis of a claim by him for adverse 
possession of the property against the idol."
But it may be pointed out that the aforesaid principle as laid down by the
Supreme Court as ascribed to the observations of Rankin, C.J. had been laid
down long before by the Judicial Committee in Jngget Mohini Dossee v.
Sokheemoney Dossee^ which was concerned with a breach of trust. The Privy
Council upheld the claim of the appellants that the lands in question were
debutter in spite of the fact that those lands were being possessed adversely
by the defendants who claimed that they were the title holders of the land
as bona fide purchasers of value!
Simulated dedications happen often enough, but we come to know only about 
those cases which are challenged in the Courts. It is suggested that in 
every state where private religious endowments are common e.g. 'West Bengal, 
a Government department should be set up to keep a record of all private
1. Ram Ratan v. Kashinath AIR 1966 Pat 235*
2. AIR 195*+ SC 69- 
A. AIR 1935 Cal 295.
6. (1871-72) 14 M I A 289.
3. Ibid., p. 71- 
5. AIR 195*+ SC 69, 73.
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religious endowments and to investigate the way all those endowments 
are used. The listing of Muslim endowments (wakf) including private 
wakfs in South Asian countries under Wakf Acts shows that this is at 
least theoretically possible.
b . Absolute and Partial Debutter
A dedication may be either absolute or partial. In a dedication where
a donor divests himself of all the beneficial interests of the property
in favohr of an idol and the idol takes that property as an owner, the
property comprised in the dedication is regarded as the absolute debutter
property of the idol or the deity. In such a case a settlor gives his
1
property out and out to the deity, but the property will be regarded as
2
a partial, debutter when he dedicates his lesser interest in the property
to the deity. In the former case, "the property ceases altogether to
belong to the donor and becomes vested in the idol as a juristic person",^
but in the latter case, the property is still a secular property with the
5
incidence of heritability, alienability and partibility, subject only to 
a charge^ for expenses of performing religious ceremonies, worship of the 
deity, etc.
There is yet a third phenomenon, namely where lands free of land revenue
7
are transferred to the priests provided they render service to the deity.
1. Iswari Bhubaneswari v. Brojo Nath AIR 1937 PC 185. The main question of
the case was the efficacy of an instrument of dedication.
2. N.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, Vol. 1, M.L.J. Madras, 1980, 629.
3 . Per Sir George Rankin, Hemanta Kumari v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 19^1 PC 38, 
k2. For facts and principles see below, . this section.
k . S.S. Pillai v K.S. Pillai, AIR 1972 SC 2069-
5. Benigopal v. S. Gangadhar, AIR 19^9 Ajmer 23; Phani Bhusan v. Kenaram
Bhuniya AIR 1980 Cal 255.
6. Balaram Raj v. Ichha Patrani AIR 1950 C'ri. 225; Jagannath Hahaprabhu v. 
Bhagaban Das AIR 1951 Ori, 255-
7- For an illustration see Sri Vallabharaya v. Deevi Hanumancharyulu AIR
1979 SC 1147.
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This is a less interesting case and we need not pursue it. The policy 
whether such lands should remain entirely free of revenue is one for the 
state to decide.
In this connection, it should be noted that in the case of a partial
dedication, it need not necessarily be a dedication of a limited interest
1
in a property in favour of a deity. In Kemanta Kumari v. Gauri Shankar,
the controversy centred upon the claim of the plaintiff to the ownership
2
of a bathing ghat on the banks of the Ganges at Benares. Sir George
Rankin who delivered the judgement of the Privy Council, observed that:
"A bathing ghat on the banks of the Ganges at Benares is a
subject-matter to be considered upon the principles of Hindu
lavr. If dedicated to such a purpose, land or other property 
would be dedicated to an object both religious and of public 
utility, just as much as is a dharmashala or a math, notwith­
standing that it be not dedicated to any particular deity ... 
Partial dedication may take place not only where a mere charge 
is created in favour of an idol or other religious object, but 
also, as Mr. Mayne in his well-known work was careful to notice, 
"Where the owner retained the property himself but granted the 
community or part of the community an easement over it for certain 
specified purposes (Hindu Law and Usage, 6th edn. , 1900, S. *+38, 
page 567)'".10
*+
In Chairman of Howrah Municipality v. Kshetra Krishna Mitra, the suit
had been concerned with the title of a bathing ghat on the bank of the
River Hooghly. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J.’s observation in that case as
5
approved in Hemanta Kumari's case seems to be the established law on the 
subject. Sir Asutosh observed that
"An owner may appropriate land to public use and yet retain in 
himself all such rights in the soil as are compatible with full 
exercise and enjoyment of the public use to which the property 
has been devoted. It is not essential to constitute a valid 
dedication that the legal title should pass from the owner ... 
nor is it inconsistent with an effectual dedication that the 
owner should continue to make any and all uses of the land which 
do not interfere with the uses for which it is dedicated.
1. AIR 19*+1 PC 38. . .Reprint,
2. The observation of Mulla in his Hindu Law, l*+th ed.,/ *+82, is not correct
when he says that in Hemanta Kumari v. Gauri Shankar, "it was held that 
the plaintiff is the owner and that there was no dedication". For the 
ruling of the Court was that it was a case of partial dedication.
3. air 19*+i pc 38, Vi. V  (1906) *+ c u  3V3-
5. AIR 19*tl PC 38, *+2. 6. (1906) *+ C U  3^3, 3^9-
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Cases of dedication of the above type are not found often among Hindus.
The mode of dedication through formality or legal instruments as found in
dedications in favour of idols, does not seem to be followed by Hindus in
cases of bathing ghat or burning ground. The latter is not so popular as
the former. The reason might conceivably be that prudent Hindus may find
that dedication in favour of bathing ghats or burning grounds are not such
materially profitable investments as gifts in favour of idols.
Again, the character of a dedication as absolute, is not affected because
of the fact that the dedication of the property is meant for carrying on
worship of images later to be immersed in water after worship. In Purna
2Chancra v. Kalipada Roy the Calcutta High Court did not accept the argument
of the counsel for appellants that the document in question did not create
a valid or an absolute debutter because the property was not dedicated to
a permanent image. It ruled that a permanent image of a deity was not
necessary before a valid gift could be made under Hindu law.^
Moreover, the nature of a dedication, whether complete or partial, is
not affected by the question whether an endowment is public or private.
In other words, ’’the distinction between a complete or partial dedication
of particular property operates equally with reference to public and private
endowments, and must be established from a construction of the document of
A
dedication read as a whole.” The issues whether a dedication is absolute 
or partial or whether or not it is public or private are really two 
separate issues and they should not be confused.^
Now, in Maharaja Jagadindra v. Rani Hemanta Kumari,^  though the main 
question to be determined was whether the right to sue in ejectment which
1. Bhupati v. Ram Lai (1909-10) 1*+ OWN 18 (FB) = ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 (FB)*,
Asita Mohan v. Nirode Mohan AIR 1917 Cal 292; Purna Chandra v. Kalipada 
Roy AIR 19^2 Cal 386; Brojobala v. Sri Saradiya Durgamata, AIR 1933
Cal 285.
2. AIR 19^2 Cal 386. 3- Ibid., p. 387.
k. Derrett, IMHL, 509; Dasaratharami Reddy v. Subba Rao, AIR 1957 SC 797*
5. R. Dhavan, ’’The Supreme Court and the Hindu Religious Endowments” (1978)
20 JILI,52-102, 76.
6. (1903-0*0 31 IA 203.
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accrued to the plaintiff as shebait during his minority and suits as 
were brought within three years of the majority were barred by limitation 
under Sec. 7 of the Limitation Act (Act 15 of 1&77), the Privy Council 
pronounced on the character of both absolute or complete and partial, or 
less complete, debutter property. Sir Arthur Wilson who delivered the 
judgement of the Judicial Committee, observed that:
"There is no doubt that an idol may be regarded as a juridical 
person capable as such of holding property, though it is only 
in an ideal sense that property is so held. And probably this 
is the true legal view when the dedication is of the completest 
character, ^he cases of Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty Juggutsoon- 
daree Dossee and Ashutosh Putt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee  ^are 
instances of less complete dedications, in which, notwithstanding 
a religious dedication, property descends (and descends beneficially) 
to heirs, subject to a trust or charge for the purposes of religion."
k
In Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty Juggutsoondaree Dossee, one Kamdoss Bysack 
of Dacca made a will leaving all his self-acquired movable and immovable 
property in favour of the family idol. In that case, one of the points to 
be considered by the Judicial Committee was whether the idol to whom the 
property was dedicated was intended to take it absolutely. In construction 
of the wrill the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the settlor 
did not intend to give his property absolutely to the deity. Lord Justice 
Turner who delivered the judgement for the Privy Council, held that
"he did not intend to give this property to the idol seems to 
their Lordships to be clear from the directions which are 
contained in the third clause, that after the expenses of the 
idol are paid, the surplus shall be accumulated; and still more 
so from the fifth clause, by which the testator has provided 
from whatever surplus should remain out of the interest of the 
property, the expenses of the idol being first deducted. It is 
plain that the testator, looking at the expenses of the idol, 
was not contemplating an absolute and entire gift in favour of 
the idol.
It is obvious from Hindu practice in some quarters a century or so ago
1. (1859-61) 8 MIA 66.
5. (1903-^) 31 IA 203, 209. 
5. Ibid.,pp. 85-86.
2. (1879) 6 IA 182. 
b. (1859-61) 8 MIA 66.
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that the idea of relatives retaining beneficially the remainder of an
income when the deity's worship had been performed was familiar and
acceptable, though the possibility of income tax being levied-on that
remainder had not yet arisen.
in Ashutosh v. Doorga Churn, the respondents as shebaits of a family
idol, instituted the suit to prevent an order for execution of a money
decree against Durga Churn which was carried out because of his sale of
his interest in a certain property which was alleged to be debutter property.
The main question of the case was whether the interest in the property in
question was liable to be attached and sold in execution of the said decree.
The Judicial Committee answered the question in the affirmative on the basis
of some terms in the will of the testator. The will contained a clause
saying that "after all these acts have been observed from the proceeds of
the said property, if there be a surplus in the profits then the family
2
will be supported therefrom." Sir Barnes Peacock who delivered the judgement
of the Judicial Committee held that:
"Their Lordships, not without some doubt and hesitation, have come 
to the conclusion that these words amount to a bequest of the 
surplus to the members of the joint family for their own use and 
benefit... In these circumstances, their Lordships are of opinion 
that the attachment should be allowed to stand.
The significance of this for our study is obvious. The principles as
enunciated in those two cases have never been questioned in any Court-, they
have been discussed and applied in different cases in the Privy Council, the
Supreme Court and the High Courts in India. Thus in Jadunath Singh v. Thakur
Sitaramji though the main issue to be decided was related to the construction
5
of the will, the Judicial Committee discussed both Sonatun Bysack's and 
Ashutosh Putt's case.^ Thus, Viscount Haldane observed that:
1. (1879) 6 IA 182.
3. Ibid., p. 188.
5. (1859-61) 8 MIA 66.
2. (1879) 6 MIA 182, 186.
k . AIB 1917 PC 177.
6. (1879) 6 IA 182.
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"On looking at those cases, the first was a case in which 
Sir George Turner held that, although nominally there was 
a gift at the beginning to the idol, that gift was so cut 
down by subsequent disposition as to leave it clear that 
the subsequent disposition ought to prevail rather than 
the earlier one, and that consequently there was no gift 
to the idol such as to make the property pass an absolute 
and entire interest in its favour. The second case is also 
a decision of this Board, and came to very much the same 
thing. It was a question of the construction of a will, 
taken as a whole, and it was said there was not a complete 
gift to the idol; it was cut down by the subsequent disposition 
to the family. Here there is no such cutting down.’'*!
Therefore, it was held in that case that there was a clear intention of 
the settlor to dedicate ’’the whole estate for the benefit of the idol and 
the temple, and then the rest is only a gift to the idol sub modo by a
direction that of the whole, which had already been given part is to be
applied for the upkeep of the idol itself and the repair of the temple, and
2
the other is to go for the upkeep of the managers."
In order to find out whether a property is partial or complete debutter,
the Courts have to find out the intention of the settlor, as expressed in
3 4the terms of the instrument of dedication. In Gopal Lai v. Purna Chandra
there was a direction in the will that the grandson of the testatrix should
perform the worship of the family idols out of the income of a specific
property. The Judicial Committee found that "the will is most obscure, but
their Lordships think that there is certainly no direct gift of the whole
property...."^ As a result, they had to rule that the will created only
a partial debutter. Thus, in Amanda Charan v. Kamala Sundari,^  the High
Court of Calcutta held the dedication in the property as not complete, on
the basis of a clear provision in the will that the surplus profits would
be shared by the testator's wife and son.
1. AIR 1917 PC 177, 179. 2. Ibid.
3. A settlor’s intention to dedicate the property absolutely may be inferred 
if he or she puts a self-imposed ban under a settlement deed on alienation 
lifetime16 ^ee(^  property. The reservation of certain rights during his or her 
/ over the property will not change the character of the property from the 
absolute to the partial. See Kothandaraja Pillai v. Swamy Viswa Vinayakar 
(I98I) 1 H U  344, an interesting case where a widow dedicated her property 
in a settlement but reserved certain rights of enjoyment for herself during 
her lifetime.
4. AIR 1922 PC 253* 5* Fer Lord Buckmaster, ibid., p.254. 6. AIR .1936 Cal
405
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Now so far as a particular document of dedication is concerned, the 
cardinal point to be remembered is that in deciding the nature of a 
dedication, whether complete or partial, the Court should not be influenced 
by the use of particular words in the will. This question is to be 
determined in each case, taking into consideration the material terms used 
in the document. In short, to ascertain the intention of the settlor and 
to decide the nature of the dedication, whether partial or absolute, the
document, as a whole, has to be considered.
2
In Bar Narayan v. Sur.ja Kunwari, the will of the testator provided
that the property in the will should be taken as the property of the idol
and in addition to that, there was a provision that after meeting the 
expenses of the temple, the residue should be used by legal heirs to meet 
their own expenses. In that case, the Privy Council had to.settle a dispute 
between the heirs and the shebaits. The main issue to be decided was 
related to the construction of the will, which purported to give the whole 
property to the family idol called Sri Thakurji. Lord Shaw who delivered 
the judgement of the Privy Council, ruled that:
"In such cases, no fixed and absolute rule can be set up, derived
alone from the use of particular terms in one portion of the will.
The question, whether the idol itself shall be considered the 
true beneficiary, subject to a charge in favour of the heirs or 
specified relations of the testator for their upkeep, or that, on 
the other hand, these heirs shall be considered the true 
beneficiaries of the property,.subject to. a charge' for the 
upkeep, worship and expenses of the idol, is a question which, 
can only be settled by a conspectus of the entire provisions of 
the will.n5
The principles as propounded in that case, have been accepted by the 
Courts as the guidelines in dealing with the cases where the issues are 
related to the construction of wills.
In Iswari Bhubaneshwari v. Brojo Nath, the Judicial Committee applied
• Har Narayan v. Surja Kunwari, AIK 1921 PC 20; Sree Sree Ishwar Sri dhar v. 
Sushia Bala, AIK 195^ SC 69; M. Dasaratharami Reddi v. D. Subba Kao AIK 
1957 sc 797; Nirmala Bala v. Balai Chand, AIK 1965 SC l874;~S.S. Fillai v. 
K.S.Fillai, AIR 1972 SC~2069; C.I.T.,W.B. v. Jagannath Jew AIK 1977 SC 1525; 
Durai Kami, v. Natesa Fillai (197&) 1 MLJ 296.
2. AIR 1921 PC 20. 3. Ibid. , p.20. if. AIR 1957 PC 185.
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the decision in Har Narayan's case to settle the issue whether under the
deed of settlement there was an absolute dedication to the deity. The
Privy Council concurred with the decision of the High Court and quoted from
the judgement of the High Court that "there is a charge for the upkeep,
worship and expenses of the idol, and that the idol cannot claim to have
2
an absolute interest in any portion of the property...."
3
In Sree Sreee Ishwar Shridhar Jew v. Sunshila Bala, the will provided 
that the shebait could use the premises dedicated to the idol as residence 
for the purposes of worship and. the holding of festivals. That provision 
itself could not move the Supreme Court from ruling that the dedication of 
the property in the will was of an absolute character. The rules as laid 
down m  Har Narayan’s case were applied and Bhagabati, J. who delivered 
the judgement of the Court, held that "It is quite true that a dedication 
may be either absolute or partial. The property may be either absolute or 
partial. The property may be given out and out to the idol, or it may. be 
subjected to a charge in favour of the idol. "The question whether the 
idol itself shall be considered the true beneficiary, subject to a charge 
in favour of the heirs... is a question which can only be settled, by a 
conspectus of the entire provisions of the will":- ’Har Narayan v. Surja 
Kunwari’ AIR 1921 PC 20...
6 7In K. D&saratharami Reddi v. D. Subba Rao, where Har Narayan*s case
was referred to, the main issue was whether the properties in the suit
are merely charged in favour of particular charities. Gajendragadkar, J.
who delivered the judgement of the Supreme Court, held that "whether or
not dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be
1. AIR 1921 PC 20. 2. AIR 1937 PC 185, 188.
3. AIR 195^ SC 69- AIR 1921 PC 20.
5. AIR 195^ SC 69, 72. 6. AIR 1957 SC 797.
7. AIR 1921 PC 20.
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determined in each case in the light of the material terms used in the
document. In such cases, it is always a matter of ascertaining the true
intention of the parties; it is obvious that such intention must be gathered
1
on a fair and reasonable construction of the document as a whole.”
2
Har Narayan1s case was not referred to but its principles have been
followed in Ram Kishorelal v. Kamal Narayan.^  In that case, the main issue
to be decided was whether a dedication of a village to a temple by an instrument
of dedication was made absolutely or not. The Supreme Court, to determine
the character of the dedication, construed the document of dedication and
strangely, without following or mentioning the leading case of Har Narayan
on the subject, followed a case^ which did not have any connection with Hindu
religious endowments and held that:
"The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain 
the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering 
all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain 
this intention, the Court has to consider the relevant portion of 
the document as a whole and also to take into account the cir­
cumstances under which the particular words were used."6
The decision in the aforesaid case was applied by the Calcutta High Court
7
in Pran Krishna v. Controller of Estate Duty, and was referred to m  S .K.
g
Mohideen v. R.V.S. Pillai where the Supreme Court had to determine the 
character of an endowment as made to the temple in opjestion. In the latter 
case, Goswami, J. pronounced for the Supreme Court that "Whether the endowment 
is absolute or partial, primarily depends on the terms of the grant. If there 
is an express endowment, there is no difficulty. If there is only an implied 
endowment, the intention has to be gathered on the construction of the 
document as a whole. If the words of the document are clear and unambiguous
1. AIR 1957 SC797, 8oo. 2. AIR 1921 PC 20.
3. AIR 1963 SC 890. k. AIR 1921 PC 20.
5. Md. Kamgarh Shah v.Jagdish Chandra, AIR I960 SC 953* The subject-matter 
of the case was related to the mining rights as implied in the terms of 
a certain lease.
6. Per Das Gupta, J, Ibid., p. 89 .^ 7* AIR 1968 Cal. ^96, Supra p.15^-
8. AIR 197^ SC 7^0.
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the question of interpretation would not arise. If there be ambiguity,
the intention of the founders has to be carefully gathered from the scheme
and the language of the grant. Even surrounding circumstances, subsequent
dealing with the property, the conduct of the parties to the document and
long usage of the property and other relevant factors may have to be
1
considered in an appropriate case."
2
In Nirrnala Bala v. Balai Chand, the plaintiff contended that the deed 
of dedication did not give the interest in the properties in the suit to 
the idols absolutely. It was held by the Supreme Court that the question 
whether a deed of dedication was of an absolute character or not must be 
settled by a conspectus of all the provisions of the will. The principles
in Har Narayan's case were applied in that case.
In S.S. Pillai v. K.S. Pillai^ as the High Court was unable to give its
firm verdict on the controversy between the parties centering on the issue
whether the dedication made under exhibit "A.2" was partial or complete,
A
the Supreme Court followed Dasaratharami Reddi v. Subba Kao, and came to 
the now platitudinous conclusion by ruling that:
"dedication of a property to religious or charitable purposes 
may be either complete or partial. If the dedication is complete, 
a trust in favour of a public charity is created. If the 
dedication is partial, a trust in favour of a charity is not 
created but a charge in favour of the charity is attached to and 
follows the property which retains its original and secular 
character. Whether or not a dedication is complete would 
naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case on 
the terms of the relevant document if the dedication in question 
was made under a document. In such a case, it is always a matter 
of ascertaining the true intention of the parties; it is obvious 
that such an intention must be gathered on a fair and reasonable 
construction of the document considered as a whole."5
■^n W.3. v. Jagannath Jew,^  one Raja Rajendra Mullick having
enormous estates, dedicated certain properties to the family idol called Sri 
Jagannathji. The subject-matter of the case was the taxability of the deity,
1. Ibid., p. 7hS. 2. AIR 1965 SC l8?4.
5. AIR 1972 SC 2069. *+. AIR 1957 SC 797-
5. Per Hegde, J., AIR 1972 SC 2069, 2076.
6. AIR 1977 SC 1523.
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The Supreme Court had to go through the instrument of dedication in order 
to find out the intention of the donor and to adjudge the issue whether 
the settlor intended to dedicate his properties absolutely in favour of 
the said idol. The principles as formulated in Har Narayan's case were 
again applied. K. Iyer, J. who delivered the judgement, opined that:
"If on a consideration of the totality of terms, on sifting 
the more essential from less purposes, on sounding the depth 
of the donor’s wishes to find whether his family or his deity 
were the primary beneficiaries, and on taking note of the 
language used, if the vesting is in the idol an absolute debutter 
can be spelt out. So considered, if the grant is to the heirs 
with a charge on the income for the performance of pujas, the 
opposite inference is inevitable."
But Jadu Gopal v. Pannalal^ (not many months later) seems to fail to 
apply the principles as formulated in the above cases and the issue was 
the interpretation of the terms of a will, for finding out the 
intention of a donor^ to settle the question whether a particular dedication 
was of an absolute character or not. In this case, the Supreme Court in coming 
to the conclusion that the property in the "Deed of Trust" was not absolute 
debutter, gave paramount importance to the clauses k and 15 of the deed 
of dedication. The said two clauses are reproduced below for our reference.
"b . I shall remain as the sole trustee and shebait of these
properties and debutter mentioned above so long as I shall 
remain alive, and shall be able to sell or settle temporarily 
or permanently or be able to distribute to the tenants the 
Trust property or any part thereof. No trustee excepting me 
shall be able to encumber the Trust and debutter property or 
the part thereof excepting letting the property or any part 
thereof not more than three years. No trustee of debutter 
shall be able to encumber the property in any manner of trans­
fer or shall not be able to do any thing wliich shall in any 
way diminish the value or glory of the deity or do anything 
w?hich should decrease the income or loss of the debutter 
property."
"15• That I shall be able to change the terms of this deed but 
no other trustee excepting myself shall be able to change 
the terms and conditions of the deed."5
1. AIR 1921 PC 20.
3. AIR 1978 SC 1329.
5. Ibid., p. 1331.
2. AIR 1977 SC 1523, 153*+. 
h. Ibid. , 'p. 1330.
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But the Court has failed to give importance to the terms of two other
clauses, namely 1 and 2, which should have convinced it to give its verdict -
the other way round. The said two clauses run thus:
"1. All that properties in Schedule is vested in to the
Debutter and Trust Property completely and permanently 
from today.
"2. That from the income of the above-mentioned property according 
to the account and estimate mentioned in Schedule (Kha) the 
expenditure of Durga puja, Kali puja, and Saraswati puja will 
be made permanently and these properties are hereby encumbered 
permanently for the purpose of meeting these expenditures, 
and under these circumstances, all these properties completely 
and with all the rights I dedicate to the deity Lakshmi 
Janardan.
In the present case, the Supreme Court has applied the principles laid
2
down m  Iswari Bhubaneswari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath, and held that the deed
of dedication "prescribed no destination of the growing income which will
become surplus after meeting the expenses prescribed by the settlor for the
worship of the deities, the performance of the specified religious festivals
and the building of the Thakurbari temple."^ But it has been admitted by
the Court that the facts of the present case and those of Iswari Bhubaneswari's
case are not the same, when it observes that "the instant case is not on
all fours with the above cited case".^ This is why the principles in Iswari
Bhubaneswari's case should not have applied in the present case. The facts
7
of Iswari Bhubaneswari*s case revealed that the testators had prescribed 
the destination of possible growing income when it was said in the instrument 
of dedication that:
"The shebaits are directed 'to build with the said money additional 
masonry building, house, etc. on the debuttar Lands and give them 
for the convenience of residence and habitation of our heirs. If
in the course of time the number of heirs becomes large, the nearer 
heirs shall reside in this house as far as practicable
1. AIR 1978 SC 1329, 1330.
3. AIR 1978 SC 1329, 1339.
3. AIR 1978 SC 1329, 1339.
7. Ibid.
2. AIR 1937 PC 185.
AIR 1937 PC 183.
6. AIR 1937 PC I85.
8. Ibid., p. 187.
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These words point to the fact that the grantors did not want to give
the properties in the deed out and out to the idol. They were more
concerned with the welfare and interest of their heirs. But nowhere in
the present case can we find that the testator intended to give the property
to the idol subject to a charge only. It might be true that the settlor
was aware of the fact that in future the income of the property would grow
and exceed the expenditure prescribed for religious ceremonies. But absence
of direction regarding what to do with the surplus income, does not in any
way suggest that the said income could be treated as income of a secular
1
property. In Dasaratharmi Reddy v. Subba Rao, it was held that "If the
income of the property is substantially intended to be used for the purpose
of the charity ... it may be possible to take the view that dedication is 
2
complete.'1 This rule could well be applied in the present case where the
whole interest in the properties in the deed was intended for religious
purposes, but unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to do so.
In the present case, the Supreme Court observed that:
"here, the Deed of Trust (Ex 1) prescribes no destination of 
the grovdng income which will become surplus after meeting the 
expenses prescribed by the Settlor for the worship of the 
deities, the performance of the specified religious festivals 
and the building of the Thakurbari temple.
Read in the light of the principles enunciated above, the Deed 
of Trust, Ex. 1, was capable of two possible constructions:
(i) It created only a partial dedication and not an absolute 
debutter, the properties being charged for seva puja or 
other religious purposes to the extent specified therein.
(ii) It created an absolute'debutter in favour of the deity.
The former construction was expressly adopted in the
previous suit by the trial C o u r t . . . "2
Then the Court jumped to the conclusion that the property in the suit was
partial debutter. In Iswari Bhubaneswari1s case, the ruling v;as made only
after a careful examination of all the terms of the will. The Judicial
Committee held that: "The purposes of the dedication may be directed
1. AIR 1957 sc 797*
2. Per Gajendragadkar, J., Ibid., p. 800. The same view was held by the
Sup»reme Court in S.S. Pillai v. K.S. Pillai, AIR 1972 SC 2069*
5. AIR 1978 SC 1529, 1559* *+* AIR 1937 PC 185.
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to expand as the income increases or the purpose may be prescribed in 
limiting terms so that if the income increases beyond what is required
for the fulfilment of these purposes, it may not be protected by the
1 — "
dedication,” only when they "have read the deed of dedication with |_cer tain]]
consideration in mind and they have been much assisted by the careful 
analysis to which its provisions have been subjected by the learned Chief 
Justice... But different considerations apply with regard to the remaining 
properties comprised in the deed of dedication and deed of sale. In the 
first place, throughout the deed of dedication the observances prescribed 
are repeatedly referred to as those originally in use to be performed and 
their Lordships agree with the learned Chief Justice that on a fair reading 
of the deed as a whole, it was not intended that the ceremonies and expenditure
2should increase indefinitely with the growing income yielded by the properties.,r
Thus the circumstances of Bhubaneswari's case^ are in no way comparable
to those in the present case. In this case, apart from the fear of the
settlor that the properties in the deed might be misappropriated as secular
properties by his heirs, no other interpretation could be attached to the
terms of the will. The fact that it was in the clause that he could be the
only person to change the terms of the deed, simply indicates that he had
a fear that his heirs might use the deities' properties as secular ones.
Again, the Supreme Court, in support of its ruling that when the dedicated
property being large leaves surplus after meeting the religious expenses
some portion could be construed as undisposed vesting in heirs of the
settlor as secular property, has cited the view as expressed in B.K. Kukherjea's
k
book - The Hindu Lav/ of Keligious and Charitable Trusts. But it missed the 
other view as cited by the same author in the same book that:
1. Per Lord Macmillan, ibid., p. 188.
2. Per Lord Macmillan, ibid., p. 188 ; Surendrokeshub v. Doorgasundari 
(1892) 19 IA 108, was referred to.
3. AIP 1937 PC. 185.
4. 1st ea., Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1932, pp. 176-177.
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"A mere direction to accumulate the surplus income of the 
debutter estate for the purpose of augmenting the corpus 
would not make the dedication partial if the entire interest 
is given for religious purposes and no portion of the income 
is meant for the heirs."
This rather (it is submitted) obvious rule, as laid down in Sarojini v.
Gnanendra, as cited by Mukherjea could have been applied appropriately to 
the facts of the present case.
In Sarojini v. Gnanendra,^  the settlor, Srinath Das, intended to dedicate
most of his properties to the family idols. There was a direction in the
will that after meeting expenses, the residue money should accumulate as 
debutter fund. The plaintiff’s case was that the said expenses might form 
■ only a charge cn the properties in favour of the idols and there would be 
intestacy as to any money surplus over the expenditure. In his judgement, 
Sanderson, C.J. observed that:
"The clause relating to accumulation is merely incidental to the
provisions relating to the dedication and management of the
property, and in any judgment the intention of the testator can 
clearly be gathered from the terms of the clause, viz. that a 
power, and it may be said a necessary and reasonable power, is 
given to the shebait from time to time in the course of the 
management of the properties to make safe investment of the 
surplus income and thus increase the debutter fund, and a
direction is necessarily implied that the income not required
for the specified expenses, shall be used within a reasonable
time and in a reasonable way for other religious ceremonies
and other charitable work. It is left to the discretion of
the shebait to decide the exact form and the exact time when
the income should be so used."1*
In the present case, in so far as the law is concerned, the application
of the rule as cited above would have been the most appropriate one. In the
same case, Sir Asutosh Kookerjee, J. held that:
"It is well-settled that 'where there is an unconditional gift
to charity, a direction for accumulation is invalid, but the only
result is that the income is immediately distributable in charity; 
the heirs or next of kin are not let in', "b
In direct contravention of the rule as cited and underlined in the present
1. Ibid., p. 181.
3. (1916) 23 CLJ 241.
5. Ibid., p. 234. My emphasis.
2. (1916) 23 CLJ 241.
4. Ibid.,'pp.250-251•, My.emphasis.
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case, the Supreme Court has made the law allowing the heirs to inherit
the properties which should have been absolutely owned by the deity.
1
Though Har Narayan's case was referred to in the case, its spirit has
not been accepted by the Court. In the present case, Iswari Bhubaneswari’s
2 3
case has been misapplied, and to Har Narayan's case lip service has been
given by the Supreme Court. Har Narayan itself could have guided the
Court if it had been ready to find out the inner meaning of what
the Privy Council had ruled in that case on the question of the construction
of a will taken as a whole.
k
But Jadu Gopal also has its merits. It has shown us that the highest
Court taking into consideration the present needs of the country can, if it
intends, sidestep the precedents. The Supreme Court could have ruled the
suit properties as absolute debutter but instead it has held them as partial
debutter, thus it has ruled in such a way as to release the properties from
the bondage of perpetuity. The decision has its novelty in the sense that
without adhering strictly to the law on the subject it has hinted that socit1
and economic needs of the country come first. In so far as Hindu law is
5
concerned Jadu Gopal seems to be a step towards judicial reform of the law.
In my opinion, in construction of wills, the Courts should indeed incline 
against holding endowed properties as absolute debutter as opposed to partial 
debutter. Jadu Gopal^ has shown us a new direction and the High Courts can 
rely on its authority. With its vast population India can no longer afford 
to allow areas of the land mass to be locked as debutter (free from rules 
against perpetuity). The social needs of the nation are to be given urgent 
consideration. Lands are needed to fulfil social purposes. Even where, as 
is usually the case, laws exist for the compulsory acquisition of lands for
1. AIR 1921 PC 20. 
3. AIR 1921 PC 20. 
5. Ibid.
2. AIR 1937 PC 183. 
k. AIR 1978 SC 1329.
6. Ibid.
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public purposes (debutter is not exempt) the compensation arising could 
be similarly locked up. It is also suggested that whenever there is no 
proper direction in a private religious endowment for the destination of 
a surplus amount, income tax must be applied without deduction on that 
amount.
A tendency to lean towards construing a grant as 'partial debutter' where
2
possible can be discerned, as in Phanibhusan v. Kenaram. Where only part 
of the income is in fact spent on worship the court may hold that the 
debutter was partial with two important effects: (i) all the remainder is
subject to the revenue laws as property of individuals, and (ii) the shebait 
may alienate subject to a mere charge for purposes of worship, which greatly 
facilitates the transfer of property.
c * Private and public debutter
In so far as Hindu law is concerned, a distinction exists between
private and public aebutter.^ But this distinction is of comparatively
krecent origin. Thus in Monohar v. Bhupendra Nath Mukerji, J. observed
that "the distinction between public and private debutter is a thing of
5
comparatively modern growth." The distinction cannot be traced in ancient
g
texts on Hindu law. Moreover, in modern Hindu law in any endowment whether
it is private or public debutter, the ownership of the property and
its income vest in the deity who "represents alwrays a public purpose par
7
excellence and the epitome thereof." In both kinds of endowment the
1. See K.W. Estate v. State of Madras AIR 1971 SC 161, 16*+; Narendra Prasadji 
v. State of Gujarat AIR 197*+ SC 2098, 2103; Mahant Ram Kishan Pass v.
State of Funjab AIR 1981 SC 1376, 1576-1377*
2. AIR 1980 Cal 555.
3. R.R. Raghavachariar, op.cit. , vol. 1, 7th ed. , • 625; B'.Kh Kukherjea, 
op.cit. , *+th ed.', .18*+.. ■ ■ ■
*+. AIR 1932 Cal 791 (FB).
5. Fer Mukerji, J., Ibid., p. 806. See also on this point Rupa Jagshet v.
Krisknaji Govind ILR (l88*+) 9 Bora 1691 1?1*
6. V.K. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 19-20.
7. I-T Comrnr. v. Jogendra Rath, AIR 1965 Cal 570, 582*
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1
rights and liabilities of the deity are always the same.
2
In this context it may be pointed out again that unlike English law 
a religious trust in Hindu law maybe of a private character, benefit of 
which is confined to a particular family. In Radhakanta Deb v. Commr.,
3
Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa,. where the main point for determination 
was whether or not the temple in question was a private one, Fazal Ali, J. 
referring to B.K. Mukherjea and his book, The Hindu Law of Religious and 
Charitable Trusts (1932 ed.) observed for the Supreme Court that "The 
learned author has ... pointed out that one fundamental distinction between
k
English and Indian law lies in the fact that there can be religious trust 
of a private character under Hindu law which is not possible in English 
law. It is well settled that under Hindu law, however, it is not only 
permissible but also very common to have private endowments....
Now, there is no hard and fast rule which will determine whether a
particular debutter is private or public; in each case it is a question
6 n
of fact. Sometimes the issue involves investigation of complicated facts'
and it must be solved on the consideration of all circumstances and all the
g
evidence produced in a particular case. "The question as to w'hether the 
religious endowment is of a private nature or of a public nature has to 
be decided with reference to the facts proved in each case and it is 
difficult to lay down any test or tests which may be of universal
1. Srinivasan, op.cit., ^th ed., Vol. 3* 2353*
2. The question has been discussed in sec. 2 of the 2nd chapter.
3. AIR 1981 SC 798.
b. With due respect it may be pointed out that the starting sentence in the 
paragraph (para 6, 799), AIR 1981 SC 798, that "the concept of a private 
endowment or a private trust is unknown to English law where all trusts 
are public trusts of a purely charitable and religious nature" is very 
confusing and not true. The observation of his Lordship is a slip of the pen
3. Ibid., p.799- On this point see also Shri Govindlslji v. State of
Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC I638, 16A8.
6. S.V. Gupte, Hindu Law in British India, 2nd ed., N.M.Tripathi, Bombay,
19^7, 8^2.
7. Moti Das v. S.P.Shahi AIR 1959 SC 9^2, 951.
8. Sarjoo v. Ayodhya Prasad AIR 1979 A. I. 7^, 79-
18*+
1
application."
In a public debutter the dedication is for the use or the benefit of 
the public at large or a section thereof. But a private religious 
endowment is meant for the private use of a founder and his family although 
members of the community may be admitted into the temple for worship or for 
making offerings."^ The distinction is of the greatest significance.
In Deoki Nandan v. Hurlidhar  ^where the only issue to be decided by the 
Supreme Court was v/hether or not the temple of Sri Radhakrishnaji was a 
private or a public one, Venkatcrama Ayyar, J. pronounced that "the distinction 
between a private and public trust is that wherea.s in the former the bene­
ficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general public 
or a class thereof, while in the former, the beneficiaries are persons v/ho
sre ascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute
5
a body which is incapable of ascertainment." The same view was expressed
in different language in Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P.Shahi^ and State of Bihar
7
v. Sm. Charusila Dasi in which the Supreme Court relied on Decki Nandan's 
8case.
9
in Deoki Nandan* s case it was held in tie determination of the character
of a temple whether it was private or public "The cardinal point to be
decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified 
individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general
1. Per Fazal Aid,, J. Radha Kanta Deb v. Commr. , Hindu Religious Endov/ments,
Orissa, AIR 1981 SC ”798 , BOO, On this point see also Dhaneswarbuwa
v. Charity Commr. Bombay, AIR 1976 SC 871 , 877* Infra p.l86.
Profulla Chorone v. Satya Choron AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1687. Infra p. 213.
3. Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Sarcop AIR 19*+0 PC 7, 11; Bihar State Board of 
Religious Trust v. Mahant Biseshwr Das AIR 1971 SC 2057, 2061; G.G . v. 
Karashima Prabhu v. Asst. Oomrnr. H . R . C . E . AIR 1977 SC 1192, 119*+ ’> Kadha 
Kanta Deb v. Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, AIR 1981 SC 798,799'
*+. AIR 1957 SC 133* Supra, p. 1*+0.
5. AIR 1957 SC 133? 136. On this .point see also B.3.K.R. Trusts v. Kadan
Lai AIR 1977 Pat 23, 25.
6. AIR 1959 SC 951, 956. 7. AIR 1959 SC 1002, 100S.
8. AIR 1957 SC 133. . 9. Ibid.
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puhlic or any specified portion thereof.” This statement has been quoted,
with approval,with emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court in Radhakanta’s 
2
case.
Again, the mere fact of the use of a temple by the public cannot mean that
3
the temple is dedicated to the public. But if the use of the temple by
the public is made not as a matter of concession but as a matter of right,
then such a public user will be reckoned as good evidence of dedication
k
for the benefit of the public. It is on this factor of public user, that
sec. 20 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Acts, 1959, has given
5
stress in defining a temple.
In this context it may be pointed out that the benefit of a private
endowment is not necessarily limited to a single family. Individual members
of different families may choose to make a valid private endowment. In
£
Sarjoo Prasad v. Ayodhya Prasad., the temple in question was founded by a
group of pandas for their families and successors. The High Court of
Allahabad ruled that "It is possible for a few persons drawn from different
families of pandas inter-related to each other, as in the present case,
7
to get together and choose to make a private endowment." A temple is after 
all an income-producing agency, since strangers may make gifts to the idol.
Again a temple which was originally founded as a private one might become
8 9puolic in course of time. In Lakshmana v. Subramania the temple in
1. Ibid., p. 137. 2. AIR 1981 SC 798, 800.
3. Ibid. ; Bhagwan- v. Har Sar'oop AIR 19^ +0 PC 7, 11 ; Bihar State Board of
Religious Trust v. Bisheswar Das AIR 1971 SC 2057,2061;G.G.V. Narashlraa
Prabhu v. Asst. Commr., H.R. & C.5. Air 1977 1192, 119^•
Narayan v. Gopal AIR i960 SC 100, 110; G.S. Kahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhodas 
AIR 1970 SC 2025, 2031; Dhaneshvar.- buv/a v. Charity Commr. State of Bombay 
AIR 197b SC 871, 878; Radhakanea Deb v. Commr. Hindu Religious Bndcvments, 
Orissa AIR 1981 SC 798, 800. The same view was also expressed in the
Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-62), Govt, of
India, Delhi, 1962, 32^
5. See below, sec. k of this chapter. 6. AIR 1979 All 7^*
7* Per Shukla, J. Ibid., p. 78.
8. G.S. Kahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhoddas AIR 1970 SC 2025, 2031.
9. AIR 192k PC M+.
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question was initially founded as a private temple but the founder
"allowed Brahmins and other Hindus of various castes to worship the idol
2
as if it was a public idol." But though the character of a temple may 
change from private to public, the reverse does not seem to be true.^
Moreover, "If a temple is proved to have originated as a public temple,
k
nothing more is necessary to be proved to show that it is a public temple."
But if the temple is shown, with strong evidence, to originate as a private
one, the court is reluctant to hold the temple as a public one, only on
the basis of the admission of the public later on. In Mundacheri v. Achutan
where the question for determination was whether or not the devaswom and its
endowments in question were private, Sir John Willis observed for the Judicial
Committee that "Had there been any sufficient reason for holding that these
temples and their endowment were originally dedicated for the tarwad, and
so were private trusts, their Lordships would have been slow to hold that
the admission of the public in later times possibly owing to altered
£
conditions, would affect the private character of the trusts."
n
In Dhaneshwarbuwa v. Charity Commissioner Bombay, an old document (sanad) 
which was produced and accepted by the Court, showed that the endowed land 
was the grant of Mthe British Government during the reign of Queen Victoria
1. G.S. Mahala>:mi v. Shah Ranchhoddas AIR 1970 SC 2029, 2031*
2. Per Sir John Edge, Laksmana v. Subramania AIR 192^ + PC T6.
3. The statement in 3.K. Kukherjea's book, *+th ed., 187, that "once an 
absolute dedication was made in favour of a public temple ... the 
former owners of the property lose all their legal rights to go beyond 
the dedication" refers to Ramkishorelal v. Kamalnarayan AIR 1963 SC 890, 
for its authority but the Supreme Court did not rule at all on the 
private/public issue. In fact the Court ruled that once a dedication 
was absolute it could not be changed into a partial one. See d. 89?•
Moreover, the main issue of the case was the nature of dedication 
whether it v/as absolute or partial but not the character of the temple 
whether it was private or public. See p. 892.
k. Per Kegde,J.on G.S. Mahala^i v. Shah Ranchhodas AIR 1970 SC 2023, 2031.
5. AIR 193^ PC 230. • 6. AIR 193^ PC 230, 23^.
7. AIR 1976 SC 871.
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in favour of Devasthan Shri Vithal Rukhamai”. The question to be decided 
was whether the Sansthan was private or public. Goswami, J. summarising 
all the important principles as laid down by the Supreme Court over the 
years in different decisions, observed that
’’when the origin of an endowment is obscure and no direct evidence 
is available, the Court will have to resolve the controversy 
about the character of the trust on documentary evidence, if any, 
the object and purpose for which the trust was created, the con­
sistent manner in which the property has been dealt with or 
managed by those in charge, the manner in which the property has 
long been used by the public, the contribution of the public, to 
all intents and purposes, as a matter of right -without the least 
interference or restriction from the temple authorities, to foster 
maintenance of the worship, the accretion to the trust proper by 
way of grants from the State or gifts from outsiders inconsistent 
with the private nature of the trust, the nature of devolution 
of the property are all important elements in determination of 
the question whether a property is a private or a p»uhlic 
religious endowment.”^
In my opinion this is the most comprehensive statement ever made in a decision
covering the principles or tests for determination of the character of a
temple whether it is private or public.
Now, we may revert to the point which was in effect laid down in Bhsgwan
3
Din v. Har Saroop that the mere fact of the use of a temple by the public
will not characterise a particular temple as a public one. This particular
factor was given much importance in G.G.V. Narashima Prabhu v. Asst. Commr., 
k
H.R. & C.3. The facts of the case revealed that though the trustees belonged 
to the particular section of the community (Goud Saraswat Brahmin community), 
members of the general Hindu community offered sevas and there was some 
income out of these sevas. Rejecting the verdict of the High Court that
the temple in question was a public one, Gupta, J. pronounced for the Supreme 
Court that "The law is now well settled that 'the mere fact of the public 
having been freely admitted to the temple cannot mean that courts should
1. Ibid., p. 873-
2. AIR 1976 SC 871, 878.
3. AIR 19^0 FC 7, 11.
k. AIR 1977 SC 1192 = (1977) 3 SCC 17.
"1
readily infer therefrom dedications to the public...' (...Bihar State 
Board of Religious Trusts, Patna v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, AIR 1971
2
SC 2057, at p. 2062)." It may be pointed out that the temple to which
members of the community at large contributed by way of sevas should 
not be designated by the Supreme Court as a private temple. Moreover, 
however small might be the amount of income of the temple out of those 
sevas, the very fact of earning income from sevas of the public, suggested 
that it was a public institution. It is of no use for the Court to fortify 
its judgement on the authority of previous decisions of the highest.Court 
on other temples unless it goes deep into the circumstances o f every case. 
One wonders whether the essential factor of burden of proof could have been 
influenced by the possible incidence of taxation? The Supreme Court is 
well known to lean in Hindu family matters against the Rev=>r'ii°
It is submitted that as long as a private temple does not set up a 
business i.e. it is not founded only to earn income out of the offerings 
of the public in kind and money, it is in accordance with Hindu religious 
sentiments. No doubt the law does protect temples by enjoining competitors, 
on the analogy of infringement of trademarks, from diverting pilgrims who
might make offerings, but that is incidental of the factum of public
worship. Subject to this no one will deny that temples can be sources of
profit to families who perform minimal services - indeed a very valuable
source of transferable, heritable unearned income as was discovered in
if
BadriJNath v. Mst. Punna, a case concerning baridars (proprietary managers
1. This observation of Shelat, J. in Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts 
v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, AIR 1971 SC 2G5~7\ 20c2~was based on the 
decision in Bhagwan Din v. Har Saroop, AIR 19^0 PC 7 which was discussed 
by the Supreme Court at ppu2o6l-o2.
2. AIR 1977 SC 1192, 119^.
3. Patel Purshottamdas v. Bai Dahi ILR (19^0) Bom 359*
3
k. AIR 1979 SC 1314.
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- neither trustees nor shebaits) in Kashmir. The objection against the 
present law is that it does not make any distinction between a Hindu 
private temple in which members of the public are admitted for worship 
which is established for the spiritual welfare of the founder and his 
family and a private temple which is functioning under the management 
of an individual or a family mainly to receive the income out of the 
offerings of the public who go there or are allowed to enter into it.
This distinction has not yet surfaced in so many words in Indian law' - 
yet from the point of view' of the substance of the matter it is relevant, 
to say the least.
The law must emerge to the effect that the mere fact that members of 
the public enter a Hindu temple will not change the character of the temple 
from private to public but the fact of the public entering will characterise 
the temple as a public one if the temple is used by a family or other 
limited proprietors or impropriators in such a way as to earn income out
of public offerings, and it is on the latter point that the ruling in
1 2 
Bh&gwan Din's case does not seem to be sound. In that case, the temple
was used by the members of the public and offerings were made by the
community at large, so the temple should have been ruled as public. The
case should not have been adjudged on the technical ground that the temple
was established on a private land which was not an endowed property. To
allow members of the public in a private Hindu temple is of course in
accordance with Hindu sentiments as held in the privy Council case^ but
to allow them in a private temple for the purpose of earning money is not
and cannot be in accordance with Hindu or any other religious sentiments
4 -5and it is on this aspect that Bhagwan Din was wrong. Bhagwan D m
1. AIK 19^0 PC 7.
2. The Frivy Council admitted (at p.10) that "it is certain that the temple
and its Goshains profited from the increased resort to the temple during
the mela".
3. AIR 19^0 PC 7> where Sir George Rankin observed that "it would not be 
consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that w’orshippers should be 
turned away".
k. Ibid. 5* ’ Ibid.
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must not be taken as an authority in a future decision involving the 
private/public issue. In G.G.V. Narashima's case the Supreme Court 
should not have accepted the principle laid down in the Privy Council 
case.
Yet we are in a dilemma. Without diminishing my submission that Bhagvan
2
Din was wrongly decided, I'contend that the purpose of the Supreme Court 
is transparent. Once an apparently public temple is declared, virtually, 
the private enterprise of the shebaits, under the income-tax law as it 
stands, the state will have some proportion (some considerable proportion) 
of the public's offerings in the shebaits' hands. There are therefore 
two inconsistent tendencies at work in the Supreme Court simultaneously:
(i) to protect Hindu families from taxation until the Revenue law discharged 
the appropriate burden of proof of incidence of tax and (ii) to free 
property from the dead hand and make it available to public uses by way 
of revenue. Irrespective of the technical questions arising out of 
conscious or unconscious breach with stare decisis, this dilemma, and 
this inconsistency call for resolution.
Section A. THE PUBLIC TEMPLE AND ITS FUNCTIONS,
a. The Nature of a Public Temple
All this naturally brings us to the nature of that ambiguous entity, 
the public temple.
Section 6(20) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments 
Act, 1959 (Act 22 of 1959)> defines a temple as "a place by whatever 
designation known and used as a place of public religious worship and 
dedicated to or for the benefit of.or used as of right by the Hindu 
community or any section thereof as a place of public religious worship...". 
The definition of a temple as given by the Madras Act is in effect a
1. AIR 1977 SC 1192.
2. AIR 19^0 PC 7.
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definition of a public temple. For, the phrase "public temple" refers
to a place used as a place of religious worship by the community or a
section thereof and dedicated to, or for the benefit of the community
1
or a section thereof. It is a sociological factor of some notoriety
that temples are founded or developed to enhance the prestige or legitimate
the claims of castes or communities or sections thereof. Moreover, sec. 6(5)
of the Madras Act corroborates this view when it reads that ""Charitable
endowment" means all property given or endowed for the benefit of, or as of
right by the Hindu or the Jain community..." In the state of Madras the
2initial presumption is that a temple is a public temple.
Mahalinga Iyer v. The State of Madras, the question for deter­
mination was whether a temple in Madras was private or public. Krishna 
Iyer, J. pronounced for the Supreme Court that "It is undisputed law that
so far as Tamil Kadu is concerned, there is an initial presumption that a
4
temple is a public one." Unlike West Bengal, Bihar and U.F. there are
very few cases of private debutter in Madras, but they are no by means 
5
unknown.
All members of the Hindu public or any section thereof is entitled to 
enter into a public temple for offering their worship but it must be 
stressed that the position of the present law is that a temple will not 
be designated as a public one only because members of the public are 
admitted for offering their worship.^ If it would have been so, the test
1. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 22. •
2. Mundacheri Koman v. Achutan Nair (1933-34) 6lA ^05=AIR 1934 PC 230; 
Lakshmana Goudan v. Subramania Ayyar AIR 1924 F'C 44; Subramania v. 
Laksmana AIR 1920 Mad 54 (F3).
3. (1981) 1 SCJ 208. 4. Ibid.
5. T. Mudaliar v. Commr. H.R. & C.S (1975) 2 M U  310 where the High Court 
held the temple in question as a private one. See also T.D. Corn  Ian
v. Commr. H.R. & C.E. AIR 1972 SC 1716 where the Supreme Court rejecting
the decision of the High Court held the temple as a private religious 
institution.
6. Bhagwan Din v. Har Saroop AIR 1940 PC 7» H*- Supra p. 187.
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to determine whether or not a particular temple was public would have
been much easier. "If a temple is proved to have originated as a public
temple nothing more is necessary to be proved to show that it is being
used as a public temple but if a temple is proved to have originated as a
private temple or its origin is unknown or lost in antiquity then there
1
must be proof to show that it is being used as a public temple."
2But in Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P.Shahi, Das, J. pointing out in a subtle 
way the most distinctive feature distinguishing a public temple from a 
private one, observed for the Supreme Court that "in a public trust the 
beneficial interest is vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of 
persons, either the public at large or some considerable portion of it 
answerable to a particular description."^ It is submitted that Das, J.'s 
careful observation reveals the most important feature of a public religious 
institution which distinguishes it from a private one where the management 
and the possession of the endowed properties are in a definite individual 
or individuals.^
At this juncture it may be pointed out that the determination of the 
question, whether or not a particular temple is a public one, does not 
depend on any single factor - the question is to be dealt with in each case 
on the evidence produced. It cannot be said,'as we have seen earlier, that
1. Per Hegde, J., G.S. Kahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhodas, AIR 1970 SC 2025,
2031.
2. AIR 1939 SC 951• 3* Ibid., p. 936.
k. It may be pointed out that the observation of Das, J. does not seem 
to be original. Patna High Court had already ruled in Ram Prasad v. 
Rarnkishun, AIR 1932 Pat 177, that- one test to determine whether
an endowment was private or public was to find out whether the founder 
or his nominees could divert the income of the endowment for their own 
use. Thus Sahay, J. pronounced for the High Court that "One of the tests 
to determine whether an endowment is a private family endowment or a 
public endowment is to consider whether the founder or all the members of 
the family could divert the income of the endowed property to their own 
private use or to any purpose ether than that expressed in the deed of 
endowment." AIR 1932 Pat 177, ^79* It must be held as an original 
pronouncement which in effect was given expression in adifferent language 
by Das, J. in Ram Saroop's case, AIR 1939, SC 95'’', 936.
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the use by the public will dispose of the problem but the use of the
temple by the public is an important factor to decide the character of
2
the temple whether or not it is public. Existence of the factors such
as daily worship, special worship and the participation of members of the
public at large in temple festivals, religious processions etc. points to
3
a positive indication of the public character of the temple. Again even
k
the nature of the land on which a particular temple is constructed and
5 6 7the evidence that construction, repairs, extension or maintenance of a
particular temple have been carried out with public subscriptions also give the
g
positive impression that the temple is a public one. In Narayan v. Gopal 
one factor relied on by the Supreme Court in coming to its conclusion that 
the temple in question was a public one was that the temple was constructed
on a site given by the Peshwa for the benefit of the public. In both Deoki
9 10Nandan v. Murlidhar and State of Bihar v. Charusial Dasi the decisions
of the Supreme Court were influenced by the presence of strangers in the
Bhagwan Din v. Har Saroop AIR 19*+0 PC 7* Supra p. 18?.Even earlier in 
Mundacheri Koman v. Achuthan Nair, AIR 193*+ PC 230, it was held in 
effect that the private character of a Hindu temple would not be changed
by the only factor of the admission of the public in it. Thus it was
observed there that "Had there been any sufficient reason for holding 
that these temples and their endowment were originally dedicated for the 
tarwad, and so were private trusts, their Lordships would have been slow 
to hold that the admission of the public in later times...would affect 
the private character of the trusts." - Per Sir John Wallis at p. 23^ f.
2. G.S. Mahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhoddas AIR 1970 SC 2025, 203*1.
3. Ramaswami Naidu v. Commr., H.R. , C.E. (197*0 2 KLJ J 33» *136.
*+. Bhagwanv. Namdeo AIR 1957 Bom 163 * The temple in question was held
public mainly on the ground that the land on which the temple was 
constructed did not belong to the founder, a certain widow.
5. Gulab Chand v. Shri Balaji, AIR 1959 Bora 252.
6. Sarat Chandra v. Rabindra Nath, AIR 1957 Call 11.
7. Chintaman Bajaji v. Phando Ganesh ILR (1891) 15 Bom 612. In that case 
the local raja conferred on the descendants of the founder some grants of
land for the maintenance of the shrine.
8. AIR I960 SC 100, 11a
9. AIR 1957 SC 133.
10. AIR 1959 SC 1002.
}
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management of the temple. Moreover, the structure of a temple might
sometimes be taken into consideration but it is by no means a decisive
1
factor. In Ratnavelu Mudaliar v. Commr. H.R. & C.E., considerable
importance was attached to the outward features of the building to determine
2
its public character but in H.R.E. Board v. Devianai Amrr.al it was held 
that though the temple had all the features of the structure of a public 
temple, the temple in question was a private temple.
In so far as a public temple and its determining tests are concerned 
Hegde, J.'s observation is most revealing. His Lordship observed in G.S. 
Mahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhoddas^ that
"the circumstances that the public or a section thereof have been 
regularly worshipping in the temple as a matter of course and 
they can take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in 
that temple apparently as a matter of right is a strong piece of 
evidence to establish the public character of the temple. If 
votive offerings are being made by the public in the usual course 
and if the expenses of the temple are met by public contribution, 
it is safe to presume that the temple in question is a public 
temple."
b. Functions of a Public Temple
There is no doubt that a public temple is meant for providing opportunities
5
for the members of the public for prayer and worship. But the sole function
of the institution is not offering facilities for the spiritual benefit of
its worshippers. It is now known to us that long ago a public temple was
used as a cultural and social centre^ and sometimes it was even used as a
7
Court where disputes between the parties were settled.
1. ILR (1955) Mad 241. 2. AIR 195*+ Mad 482.
5- AIR 1970 SC 2025. 4. Ibid., p. 2051.
5. M.N. Srinivasan, Principles of Hindu Law, Vol. 5/ 4th ed., Law Publishers,
Allahabad, 1970, 25^2^24^3.
6. Even now Sikh temples in ,the United Kingdom are also- used as educational 
institutions for"the teaching of Punjabi. See Karbhajan Singh Janjua, Sikh 
Temples in the U.K. and the People Behind Their Management, Jan Publications, 
London, 197o, passim.
7. Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-62), Ministry
of Law, Delhi, 1962, 14.
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In South India managers of different public temples used to take an
active part in administration of local affairs but the powers enjoyed
by the local organisations of Brahmins were subject to the ultimate
1
sanction of the ruling authority. During the reign of the Vijaynagar
kings the temples used to control not only the endowed lands but also the
2
regulation of tenancies and leases. A large measure of devolution of
royal power was in evidence but this devolution of power seemed to be
concessionary on the part of the sovereign.
But the powers and privileges as enjoyed by some devaswoms (i.e. temples
along with endowments attached to them) in medieval Malabar (Kerala) and
the functions as performed by them were by no means the functions of public
temples as generally we understand them. All important devaswoms had their
own independent jurisdictions called sanketams. "These sanketams were well-
defined and in some cases they were of large extent. Since most of the
temples and the lands attached to them were originally the creation of the
Brahmin lords and communities these sanketams were places- in which they
possessed independent jurisdiction. Within these limits the temple
corporations exercised sovereign authority."^ Moreover, it is interesting
to note that the Brahmins who founded the temples vested the superintendence
but not management of the temple properties in the sovereign authority. The
k
sovereign and the local chieftains were only the protectors of sanketams. 
Sanketams seemed to be small states within a State but their power was not 
subject to the control even of the sovereigi. "Some...may have been reminded of the 
Reformation in England. Had the church in England remained indifferent to wealth
i.e. had it refused to accept offerings beyond a fixed minimum, it could quite
1. M.G.S. Narayan, Re-interpretation of Indian History, College Book House, 
Trivandrum, 1977* 5^-5^*
2. K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, Development of Religion in South India, Orient 
Longmans, Bombay, 1963, 130.
3. F.K.S. Raja, Mediaeval Kerala, Annamalai Univ., Annamalainagar, 1953,
238.
h. Ibid.
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1
possibly have retained the affections of the state.” It seems that it 
was the emergence of an independent power by way of the institution of 
public temple threatening and influencing the course of policy at all 
levels which laid them open to control and ultimately to a break with the 
past. It is this factor which influences the State to proceed with 
conscious determination to transform the political foundation of the temples 
under the guise of reform and this determination continues even to the 
present day.
Apparently temples and other religious institutions "are businesses,
2 3
operated for the profit of their managers.” In Hahadeva v. H.R.E. Board,
temples are discussed as business concerns. As the spiritual purpose of a
donor is fulfilled at the moment of divesting the property or making offering
in favour of a deity, Hindus are not concerned with the dedicated assets and
income thereoi. To a Hindu worshipper "the dedication is what counts” but
the same cannot be said generally of Hindu shebaits. Countless cases in
which we find disputes between the parties relating to shebaiti rights
testify to the fact that shebaits in general are more interested in the
property (shebaiti being property) of the debutter than in its religious
aspects. In this context it may be pointed out that the members of the
public have deeper regard for religious endowments than the shebaits have.
Their expectations are different. Nominally, "The managers and the archakas
have far less at stake than the worshippers. Their interest is that of
servants or agents. The worshippers have a deeper interest in the integrity
1. Derrett, "The Reform of the Hindu Religious Endowments", cited above
311-336, 336.
2. Derrett, Critique, 373*
3. ILR (1956) Mad 62^, 633* The case was concerned with the question whether 
or not the character of the temple was private or public. ,
k. Derrett, Critique, 376-377.
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1
and the well-being of the institution."
Worshippers go to a temple for worship and they make their offerings
to the deity for their spiritual satisfaction. They are not at all concerned
with the destination of their offerings. "The actual enjoyment of the object
given can be left to the trustees, the priests, and the touts and hangers-on
2
who attach themselves to the temple as a business." This impression 
about the temple managers and their servants becomes deeper when someone 
goes through the law reports. Urns in Rama-fteo v, Board of Cbmmrs.vKih^'the archakas 
claimed half of all offerings. In Shahzad Kunwar v. Ram Karan priests 
claimed to be the shebaits of the temple. In other words, priests wanted 
more material benefits from the debutter than what they were receiving as 
servants of the shebaits of the temple in question. In seems that for 
those who go there for worship and making offerings, temples are religious 
institutions, but for those who work there or are supposed to look after the 
temples they are business places, money-earning sources, to be exploited 
for their material gratification. The attitude of Hindu shebaits and priests 
towards debutter property is in striking contrast with the world at large. 
Priests in other religions treated votive offerings, for example, with 
scrupulous care - maintaining, it seems, inventories, and eschewing 
peculation.^
In this context, it may be added that worshippers do not always go to 
the temples for their spiritual benefit. They use the temples and make 
their offerings to the deity so that some unfulfilled wishes materialise.
1. Per Seshagiri Ayyar, J., Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturi Pmga Ayyangar 
ILR (1917) ^0 Mad 212 (FB) 225. In that case two worshippers filed the 
suit against the archakas of a ternple, praying for a declaration that the 
perpetual lease cf the temple-income in favour of the archakas was void. The 
view of the case was approved by the Supreme Court in Bishwanath v. Paaha 
Ballabhji? AIR 1967 SC 10^, 10^ +7, in which the suit was filed by an idol 
for a declaration cf the title and possession of its property from a person in 
illegal possession. This case will be dealt with in detail in the 3 th 
chapter. On the point in question, see Derrett's PBS I, +^86.
2. Derrett, RLSI, 487. 3. AIR 1965 SC 231. 4. AIR 1963 SC 234.
3. B.A.Litvinskiy and I.R. Pichikiyan, "The Temple of the Gxus", J.R.A.S.,1981, 
no. 2, 133-167, 136.
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It is painful to point out that a large number of worshippers go to
temples with their gifts not to satisfy their spiritual needs but
1
"primarily for the propitiating of God." Vows are made for material
2
gains e.g. "to obtain a son or to recover from a disease." Businessmen 
make lavish donations so that their interests are protected."^ So, we 
find that gifts are given to God by the worshippers not for spiritual 
satisfaction but for receiving some kind of favour from the deity. Gifts 
are made to temples as if God is bribed to get material benefit for the 
worshippers. But there are cases when devotees make offerings simply to 
get merit.^
Again, as worshippers do not bother the way their offerings are spent,
temples and charities flourish so that systematic exploitation of the endowed
property and the offerings poured into it could be made by the temple-trustees
and their helpers. We have already seen that the temple and its income are
not the monopoly of its trustees, hereditary priests also have vested
interests in their temples. Hereditary priesthood, where it exists by
5custom, is recognised as a property. Thus m  Raj Kali v. Ram Rattan v'here
the main question for determination was whether a female is entitled to
succeed to the office of a hereditary priest, the Supreme Court recognised 
the right to office of a hereditary priest as a property where emoluments 
were attached to such a priestly office. Disputes resulting in ligitations 
involving shebaits, priests and even pandas over their shares of offerings
 ^* Parr,a Rao v. Board of Commrs.,HRB, AIR 1969 SC 231; the same view was
expressed by G-D. Sontheimer, op.cit., 71*
2. Derrett, RLSI, ^81.
3. Ibid. .
*+. Derrett, RLSI, A88. See also Ramaswami v. Commr. H.R. 8c C.E. AIR 196^
Mad 317, 319. The only question for determination was'whether
the shrine in question was a temple within the definition of the Madras Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951•
5. AIR 1955 SC A93.
6. Pandas are pilgrim guides attached to temples. For a litigation involving 
pandas1 right see Nar Hari v. Badrinath AIR 1952 SC 2^5. • .
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are common. "Again and again shebaits claimed that the idol was God
Almighty who would reward the generosity of the pilgrim a thousand-fold
(centuplum accipies), and when the coins were once within their grasp
asserted that these were personal presents belonging entirely to them."
2
In Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturi Eanga Ayyangar, Seshagiri Ayyar, J. 
in his judgement gave us the idea of the apparent functions of a public 
temple when his lordship observed that "In all the important temples in South 
India, devotees are called to pay a fixed sum for the archana that has to 
be performed. This includes the wages of the person who performs the 
archana, the cost of the flowers, the remuneration of the person who recites 
the archana etc. and swarnapushpam offered to the deity. A practice which 
distributes a portion of the levy to the persons who bring the flowers, who 
recite the holy names and who actually do the puja, will not be illegal..."^
So for devotees temples are places of worship but for others who are actively 
associated with these institutions as managers, pu.jaris and persons working 
for the secular side of the temples, they (temples) are centres primarily 
for their living. No wonder that so many decided cases in the Courts are 
related to temples where vested interests of so many persons are involved.
Public temples in most of the Indian states are controlled by statutes 
made by different states' Assemblies and at least it is gratifying to see
kthat they are susceptible to Governmental controls. It is shocking to
note that no statute for controlling Hindu public religious endowments has
5
yet been introduced by the State Assembly of V/est Bengal. The new methods
1. Derrett, ELSI, 489-^90. See Manohar v. Lakhmiram ILK (1887) 12 Born 2^7 
supra,p.137,where the sevaks were held accountable for the right 
disposal of the offerings which they claimed to belong to them. We 
have seen earlier a case where the plaintiff claimed a public temple
to be his personal property. See Eaja Bira Kishore v. State of Crissa 
AIE 196^ SC 1501.
2. ILK (1917) ^0 Had 212 (FB).
3. Ibid., p. 220.
E. Dhavan, "Tine Supreme Court and the Hindu Eeligious Endowments, 1930-73" 1 
(1978) 20 JILI 32-102, 78.
5. Derrett, Critique, 37^*
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of controlling and administering public temples through statutory
provisions as adopted by many states in India, recognising the interest
of the public, place the responsibility of looking after the endowed
properties in the hands of a public body. The overall aim of this public
body is to eliminate malpractices of the temple managers and to make
1
proper use of temple funds.
In this context it may be pointed out that legislations controlling
Hindu public religious endowments exist piecemeal - different statutes
2for different states and even separate statutes for a particular public 
3
temple. Legislation should not be different for different states and there
should be a single statute covering all public religious and charitable
endowments. Moreover, it should not be limited to Hindu religious and
charitable endowments. Reform is needed in this field whereby a legislation
like the present Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, niay be introduced by the
Indian Parliament so that all public religious and charitable endowments
of different communities become susceptible to a single statute. If the
b
Bombay Act could work in the State of Bombay for all communities then a
would-be central Government Act could well apply to public religious or
charitable endowments of all communities in India. Then at least we could
5
see the beginnings of the uniform Code to which our Constitution aspired
1. Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments", D.E.Smith (ed.),
South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1966,
311-356, 329* See also Mudaliar, Secular State and Religious Institutions 
in India, op.cit, specially p.2b2 in her concluding chapter where she points 
out that the State of Madras was concerned primarily "with the mismanagement 
of funds by trustees rather than with questions of faith, dogma or ritual...."
2. E.g. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Bombay Act 29 of 1950); the Madras 
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Madras Act 22 of 1959)•
3. E.g. the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959*
b. See Chapt. VIIA. Sec 56C of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 provides
that the provisions of the chapt VIIA are applicable to all temples, mosques 
or endowments created for a public religious or charitable purpose.
5. Art. bb of the Constitution of India reads; "The State shall endeavour
to secure for the citizen a uniform civil code throughout the territory 
of India."
201
from the moment of its birth. But there should preferably be a uniform 
statute dealxng with both private and public religious endowments.
Section 5 (a) PRIVATE ENDOWMENT AS A FUNCTION OF FAMILY MANAGEMENT;
(b) TERMINATION OF AN ENDOWMENT
a. private endowment as a function of family management
So far as public religious endowments are concerned, they are controlled
2in most of the Indian states by the state statutes but private religious 
endowments are not subject to those statutes. Even the voluminous’’Report 
of the Hindu Religious Endowments CornmissiorP^has not dealt with private
4
endowments; it was mainly concerned with the working of the Indian Consti-
5 6tution in relation to temples and other public endowments. It is extra­
ordinary that no investigating body has yet been set up to see the way 
private trusts are being administered. Perhaps it is supposed that Courts 
are able to detect nominal debutters (above, R.163)i but this presupposes 
litigation, which inevitably brings with it delay and chicanery.
Private endowments among Hindus are quite as common as public endowments
7
and they can usually be found in Northern India, especially in West Bengal. 
The family shrine is extremely common in the South but it is uncommon for 
landed property to belong to its deity or deities. In this connection it 
may be pointed out that Hindu text-writers did not make any distinction 
between a religious endowment having as its object the worship of a family 
idol and a religious endowment, which is meant for the benefit of the
1. See below, sec. 6 of the 6th chapter.
2. Above, sec. 4. Derrett, Critique, 37^*
3- Op.cit., Ministry of Law, Delhi, 1962.
4. The Supreme Court generally approved the Report in K.A. Samajam v.
Commr., AIR 1971 SC,891 where it dealt with the rights of hereditary 
trustees.
5. On this point see a comment on the report by S.C. Bhat, "A Note on the 
Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, AIR 1964 J'nl. ,
98-99-
6. Derrett, Critique, 37^-
7. P.R. Ganapathi Iyer, op.cit., CX III.
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public. "This distinction which obtains in English law with respect to
1
charities, is not to be found in the Hindu text-writers," This distinction
2
is of much later import. In all Hindu religious endowments, dedications
3
involve renunciation of property in favour of God and as we have seen
*+
they are meant for the good of the universe.
5
But the idea of the shebait and that of the trustee is a modern one.
The oft-quoted observation of West, J., that "Property dedicated to a pious
g
purpose is, by the Hindu as by the Homan law, placed extra commercium..." 
and the principle involved in it seem to have been known to Hindus long 
ago who, though not in all cases, taking advantage of the principle made 
dedications not so much to satisfy their spiritual needs as to fulfil their 
secular purpose by defrauding creditors or by evading various legal 
provisions.
"Hindu family religious trusts were invented as a development 
of the original religious endowment much on the pattern of 
Islamic wakf, so that property might remain in the family immune 
from creditors and rapacious tax-gatherers, and free for enjoy­
ment among descendants and others irrespective of a, once 
customarily harsh law of succession."7
It often happens, as we have seen, that religious endowments are created
only "for the purpose of defrauding creditors or for the purposes of defeating
g
the provision of the laws about descent and for preventing alienation."
Even through a valid endowment one can fulfil both the purposes of acquiring
religious merit and making secular investment perpetually for oneself and
one’s nominees. In case of a rich foundation
"the possession of large funds by the idol gives the shebaits 
for the time being a disposition over funds which the personal 
law and the fiscal law also would not have allowed them had it
1. Per Charles Sergeant, J. , Pupa Jagshet v. Krishnaji Govind ILR (188*0
9~Bom 169, 172.
2. G. Sarkar Sastri, op. cit. , 7th ed.,862. 3» Derrett, IMKL, *+93*
*+. Above, p.133;I-T. Commr. v.' Jogendra Nath AIR 1963 Cal 370, 583*
3. J.C. Ghose, op.cit., 2?8.
6. Manohar Ganesh v. Lakhmiram ILR (1887) 12 Bom 2*+7, 26*+.
7. Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments"?. or.cit,, 33*+.
8. J.C. Ghose, op.cit., 28*+.
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passed by succession. It is a perpetuity which grows in 
value, if wisely administered, and is affine example of 
religion and expediency joining hands."
The shebait of an idol is empowered to spend as much as he thinks fit for
carrying out the worship of the idol and to that effect he can spend at
his discretion the bare minimum on the idol's needs. In Kumaraswamy Asari
2
v. Lakshmana - Goundan a priest founded a temple and bought some lands in
the name of the deity and in his name out of the income from offerings
made by various devotees. He spent some of the income for the purpose of
the temple and the rest for himself. The same mode of expenditure was made
by his son and grandson. The Madras High Court ruled that the surplus income
as was used for the benefit of the Pu.jari was not illegal.
A founder of a public temple might allow, with some restrictions, members
of the public to enter a temple and might not end his and his family’s rights
altogether. The expenditure in a public temple largely depends on income
expected from the offerings of devotees. A rich foundation attracts gifts
and offerings, and even fees may be charged for worship in the sanctum.
Technically it is a public foundation but for all practical purposes it is
a device to earn income for the family to be enjoyed generation after
generation. The income is sometimes solely pecuniary in nature. "The
right to be a manager of such a temple is a valuable right. Small wonder
that attempts are made to sell it."^
Again, some temples are technically private but as a matter of fact
they are hardly distinguishable from public temples. For members of the
public are freely admitted in those temples so that shebaits may make profit
k
from offerings of the devotees. In Bhagwan Din v. Har Saroop members of 
the public were allowed to visit the temple freely, they made their offerings
1. Derrett, RLSI, +^91. 2. ILR (1930) 33 Mad 6o8.
3. Derrett, 1MHL, ^97- 
k. AIR 19^0 PC 7.
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of worship which in reality were enjoyed by the members of the family 
in whom the management of the temple was vested, yet the Privy Council, 
as we have seen, ruled that the suit property was private property which 
was not even debutter because of the technical reason that the suit property 
was a private grant made to one Darya Gir to be enjoyed for generations.
But it must be pointed out that though the land in question was not dedicated 
it was used as such to attract the members of the public so that money 
could be made through their offerings. In my opinion, the decision in 
Bhagwan Din's case (criticised above at p.189) must not be applied to the 
facts of the cases of similar kind. For future examples may be set by 
unscrupulous Hindus by establishing temples in their private lands, without 
being dedicated, thus allowing members of the public who, in fulfilling 
their religious needs, may make offerings of worship only to be enjoyed 
subsequently by the founders and their families. The anomaly, it must be 
stressed, lies not in the discrepancy between the dedication to the deity 
and the founder’s absorption of the gift, but in the law’s failing to 
protect eo nomine the institution, the legal person, namely, the deity.
As we have seen - and perhaps should be stressed - Hindu law admits that 
the shebaits, priests, etc., may feed on the remnants of offerings to the 
deity.
At this juncture it must be stressed that nobody has been in a position 
to pinpoint the date when the institution of private endowment first came 
into being; and the question as to why Hindus went in for private 
endowments has been neither explained nor dealt with in detail by any 
Indian text writer or in any judicial decision. But Derrett’s account of 
the background and motives behind private endowments seems to be not only 
plausible but also exhaustive. Thus the learned author observed that
1. AIR 19^ 0 PC 7.
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"long ago it was discovered that neither a grasping king, nor 
selfish relatives or co-villagers would readily seize property 
which, while under the control of a man's descendants and 
representatives, was legally the property of a religious endow­
ment. The concept of trust was not absent from the then Hindu 
law. While the law of succession passed the residue of the 
property to a particular relation who might maintain females 
and other dependants inadequately, and the same difficulty might 
arise when the local ruler escheated the estate for want of 
male issue, a fund dedicated to the family idol was safe for 
purposes of which the manager approved. In the case of family 
idols the cost of their worship in clothes and ornaments, and 
daily Puja by a Brahmin, could be (and still is) very small.
The idol's food consists in the savour of food cooked for the 
family and placed before it. Its bath requires hardly any 
expenditure, yet a fund of several thousands of rupees might 
be dedicated to it. The manager was entitled to spend as much 
in worship as he thought fit. If he chose he could attend to 
the idol's "needs" at the meanest possible level, spending the 
remainder of the income on himself and the members of the 
founder's family at his discretion. The motives of dedication 
to an idol were confirmed by the revenue laws and to this day 
religious trusts are exempt from income tax. Thus such 
foundations serve the same purpose as an investment, permanent
as to caoital, and flexible as to employment of the income.
Small wonder that religious endowments, particularly private
endowments, figure largely in the law-reports and give rise .
to dubious transactions amounting in some cases^ to fraud.""
Derrett is not claiming at all that his remarks constitute the whole 
philosophy behind all Hindu private religious endowments. What the learned 
author is suggesting is that in a large number of cases of private endowment 
unscrupulous Hindus make bogus dedications so that they and their families 
can enjoy extra material advantages attached to religious endowments, as 
opposed to secular investments, generation after generation. It is
therefore a sub-department of tax-planning and the legislation of 1961 has 
by no means ended its raison d'etre.
Some temples in West Bengal are legally private but they are in practice 
as good as public religious foundations. We have remarked on this above 
(p.203). For example, the Kalighat Temple of Calcutta is still designated 
as a private religious establishment in spite of the fact that the temple
1. For a case of fraud see Iswar v. Gopinath Das AIR i960 Cal 7k'\ . For a case
of forgery see Durgap-rosad "v. Sri Sri Rameswar Jew Siba Thakur AIR 19Sl Cal
92. In that case the Court at first instance accepted the plaintiff's 
version that the document in question was fictitious.
2. IMHL, ^96. Emphasis provided. The author's remarks regarding revenue
are of course only partially untrue since 1961.
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attracts visitors from all over India. The expenditure of the temple
may well be met with surpluses from gifts to the goddess Kali. Yet a
part (pala) of the hereditary shebaiti was once mortgaged for a financial
2
consideration and the transaction was held valid on the basis of long 
established custom to that effect. Though the name of the Kalighat temple
3
was not mentioned, the Ramaswami Aiyar Report aptly points out that
"It is relevant to observe in this connection that courts 
and tribunals have refrained in most cases from investigating 
and taking into account the basic idea underlying the dedi­
cation of temples and mutts. They have too often taken for 
granted that there can be private temples to which the public 
contribute by way of offerings and donations.... The trustees 
of Tarakeswar Temple in West Bengal claim that institution is 
entirely their private property and, though the trustees 
receive donations and gifts from the public and public 
resort to the worship of the image, thqyclaim that the image 
is their private property and that they can withhold admission 
to the public into the institution."^
The Report also mentions the Dakshineswar temple which claims to be a
private temple in spite of the fact that it receives offerings and donations
from the public. One point the Report omits to mention is that the trustees
of the aforesaid temples, or temples of the kind will invariably incline to
claim that their temples are private ones, because they fear that if it
is a public religious endowment, "it will be susceptible to governmental
control".^
From different law reports and journals we can see that the Supreme 
Court and the different High Courts deal with as many private religious 
endowments as with public religious trusts. In the vast majority of the 
cases concerning private endowments, the dispute between the parties is 
not so much regarding the way worship should be done as with the right to
1. The writer has personal experience about this.
2. Kahmaya v. Haridas, AIR 1915 Cal 16*1.
3. Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-1962),op.cit. 
h. Ibid., p. ^0.
5. R. Dhavan, "The Supreme Court and Hindu Religious Endowments", 19?S, 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 52-102, 78.
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manage the properties of idols. Shebaits are supposed to do seva to
the deities but they are in most cases found to fight for their rights
in the properties of the deities. "If the shebait is a man of unimpeachable
integrity, things would proceed quite alright, else under the mask of
1 2 juristic personality of the idol any kind of fraud may be committed."
It is suggested that urgent reform is needed in the sphere of private
endowment. Shebaits must not be allowed to maladminister religious
endowments to their material advantage and they must be compelled to use
them for religious purposes. This may have the effect of putting a stop
to the growth of new private endowments of secularising or enfranchising
existing endowments, but the state need not be concerned since the belief
that the deities control the weather, etc. is fading and there are enough
public temples. The state has made no difficulty about secularising funds
dedicated for the support of dancing girls attached to public temples.
If therefore the manager of a Hindu family decides to devote a legally- 
acceptable proportion of the family surplus to a deity under family control 
he will know that the income will not be available for ordinary family 
purposes. To achieve this obviously a change in the law will be required 
as well as some new form of implementing such a change. The present tendency
to submit such income to income-tax only touches the fringe of the problem,
while the eboHtion of the joint family as has occurred in Kerala cracks many 
small nuts with a hammer/
• Terrm.nation of an. Endowment
The question whether an endowment of a family idol can be put an end to, 
ie, enfranchised, is a controversial one and to that effect no uniform rule
1. See iswar v. Gopinath Das AIR I960 Cal 7 ^  In that case the shebait
granted a lease of the endowed property in fraud of the deity.
2. S.R. Baj, "Juristic personality of an Idol in Hindu Legal Philosophy",
(1963) 3 Jaipur Law Journal, 229-236, 233.
1  -
>-e.€ Kerala Joint Hindu Fapiily System(Abolition) Act,1975 
(Kerala Act 30 of 1976),
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covering the whole of India has yet been laid down in any decision of
1
the Supreme Court. It has been held in some decisions of different High 
Courts that the consensus of the whole family might convert a private 
debutter into a secular property. Such a conclusion would be wholly 
consistent with the outlook of the average shebait. To fortify their 
decisions supporting the view that a private endowment of an idol might 
be terminated, the High Courts used an observation made by Sir Montague
2
E. Smith in the Privy Council in Konwur Doorganath Hoy v. Ram Chunder Sen.
In that case the main issue was whether or not the alienations by the 
shebait for raising money for the benefit of the endowed property were 
justified. Ruling in the affirmative on the said issue Sir Montague made 
also an obiter remark that "Where the temple is a public temple, the 
dedication may be such that the family itself could not put an end to it, 
but in the case of a family idol the consensus of the whole family might
3 ^give the estate another direction." This piece of guesswork appears to
have been based on a false analogy between members of the family and the
beneficiaries of a trust other than a trust for a class. Of course, as
with the case of an infant, the Court's permission would be ret|wrejl to
effect such a termination of the idol's interests or indeed the best friend
of the idol must be heard - a person not holding an interest adverse to
the idol.
The obiter dictum of Sir Montague was accepted and given effect to by
5
the Calcutta High Court in Govinda Kumar v. Debendra Kumar. In that case
1. Govinda Kumar v. Debendra Kumar (1908) 12 CWN 93; Tulsidas v. Siddhinath
(191^) 20 “ CLJ 315; Narayan v. Narasing AIR 1951 Cri 60; Senthi vel
v. Kulandaivel ILR (1970) 2 Mad 95*
2. (1876-7) ^ IA 52.
3. Ibid., p. 58.
4. I am told by prof. Derrett that the late Prof. S.E. Vesey FitzGerald, QC,
strongly objected to this obiter dictum from his knowledge 01 Hindu law 
acquired in India.
5. (1908) 12 CWN 93.
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a major point for determination was whether the suit properties were
originally debutter and had ceased to be so. The finding of the Court
was that the properties in question were at one time debutter but later
on they were converted into secular properties by the consensus of all
the members of the family. Relying on the said obiter remark of Sir Montague
E. Smith and referring to G.C. Sarkar Shastri’s and Mayne's books on Hindu
law, Eampini, C.J. and Sharfuddin, J. of the Calcutta High Court held that
the debutter "properties can become secular by consensus of the whole
family, if the dedication was to the worship of the family idol." The
2
same view was held by the same High Court in Tulsidas v. Siddhi Nath wnen
it accepted the findings of its lower Courts that the land in question was
originally debutter "but the shebaits put an end to its debutter character 
3
by consent."
k
But the aforesaid view as expressed in Govinda Kumar's case, based on
the obiter dictum of the Privy Council case, was not followed in any decision
of the Calcutta High Court ever since it was rejected in the decision in
5
Chandi Charan Das v. Dulal paik. In that case the appeal in the High
Court arose^ out of a suit for partition and other reliefs. The main issue
to be decided was whether the endowment in question was absolute debutter
or a mere device for the benefit of the family. Chatterjea, J. referring
7
to an observation an Sri Sri Gopal Jew Thakur v. Radha Binode Kondal
1. (1908) 12 CM/AM01.'
2. (191*0 20 C U  315.
Ibid.> P« 315*
k. (1908) 12 CWN 98.
5. AIR 1926 Cal 1083 = (1926) kk C U  479.
6. Earlier in Sripati v. Krishna (192-5) *+1 C U  22, it was held that once 
the property was dedicated to an idol* the dedication was irrevocable.
It was also ruled that the shebaits jointly could change rules for the 
benefit of the endowment but without affecting the rules of the founder 
in any vital matter.
7. (1925) **1 C U  396 *= AIR 1925 Cal 996.
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pointed out that the issue whether the consensus of all members of the
1
family might put an end to a family endowment was not decided by the
2
Judicial Committee in Konwur Doorganath's case. However, in the decision
of the same case Page, J. refusing to accept the principle as laid down
in the obiter dictum of the Privy Council, held in his separate judgement
that "it must not be taken that I should be prepared to hold that if all
persons interested in the worship of the deity are agreeable they can
validly convert debutter into secular property, or that such a doctrine
3
can be sustained as being in accordance with Hindu law."
The same view (apparently highly consistent with English notions of a 
trust) as held by Page, J. on the issue was expressed by Rankin, C.J. 
forcefully in Surendra Krishna Ray v. Shree Shree Iswar Bhubaneswari
k
Thakurani which dealt with the interpretation of the terms of a deed. In 
that case, a question was also raised whether the debutter character of 
the suit properties was validly terminated by the nominees of the founder. 
His Lordship observed that
"I am not prepared to hold on the strength of the well-known 
passage in the case of Konwur Doorganath Roy v. Ram Chunder 
Sen that there is in Hindu law any warrant for the proposition 
that at any particular time by consent of all the parties then 
interested in the endowment, a dedication can be set aside.
The passage so much relied upon, does not appear to me to be 
intended as a considered opinion to that effect, and before 
importing any such doctrine into Hindu law there is much to 
be considered."5
In so far as the termination of a private Hindu religious endowment is 
concerned the Calcutta case of Sukumar Bose v. Abani Kumar^ is by far the
1. (1926) H  C U  A79, ^85.
2. (1876-7) **IA 52.
3. (1926) V+ C U  ^79, ^89. AIR 1933 Cal 293 = ILR (1933) 60 Cal 3A.
5. ILR (1933) 60 Cal 71. 'In Ehabataxini Debi v. Ashmantara Debi, AIR 
1938 Cal A9O, k99, where the main issue was related to the devolution of 
shebaiti Khundkar, J. ruled to the effect that once the property is 
absolutely dedicated to an idol, the consensus of the whole family could
not convert a debutter property into a secular one.
6. AIR 1936 Cal 308.
211
most important one. The facts of that case were directly concerned with
the efficacy of the application of the principle as evolved from the
obiter remark of Sir Montague Smith. The dispute between the parties
was whether the suit property, once declared by the Court as absolute
debutter, continued to be so, in spite of the fact that the descendants
of the founder had partitioned the property as a secular one. Accepting
1
the view on the suoject as expressed m  Chandi Charan's and Surendra Krishna 
2
Kav's cases and relying on the principle as evolved in Kanhaya Lai v.
3 AHamid Ali and Prs.matha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar that when members of a
family would like to usurp the property of a family idol, the deity's 
interest should be watched, when necessary, by the appointment of a dis­
interested person, Das Gupta, J. pronounced that
"the principles of the necessity of protecting the deity's 
interest by some disinterested person as laid down by the 
Privy Council in 1925 PC 139^ (AIR) and 1933 PC 19&6 (I)
(AIR) and followed in numerous cases, cannot be disregarded 
when the question is of the members of the family divesting 
a deity of its property. In view of these later authorities, 
the observation in 4 Ind App 52(PC) (A), cannot be taken any 
longer to be good law."
It may be observed in passing that it is well known that where the deity
is fairly and properly represented the sale of the image and of the temple
9
may not be sanctioned by the Court in the deity's interest.
5. Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar AIR 1925 PC 139* Supra p. 138.
o. Kanhaiya Lai v. Hamid Ali AIR 1933 PC 198.
7. Konvar Dooganath's case (1876-77) A IA 52.
8. AIR 1956 Cal .308, 311.
9- 'Properties of an idol are normally inalienable, the alienation of a 
temple is commonly regarded as. sacrilege, and procedure exists (for 
example by the appointment in an appropriate case of a receiver to 
receive rents and profits such as offerings) whereby the claims of the 
decree-hoider can be met over a period of time. Since worship need not 
be costly, necessity can never justify transactions which imperil the very 
endowment itsdf" - Derrett, 1KHL, 502. See below pp..280~28l.
1. AIR 1926 Cal IO83.
3. AIR 1933 PC 198
2. AIR 1933 Cal 295. 
A. AIR 1925 PC 139.
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In so far as the Calcutta High Court is concerned it seems that the contro­
versy regarding ■ the obiter dictum of Sir Montague Smith is over, because
of the convincing arguments put forward against it by Das Gupta, J. in
1 2 his cecision m  Sukumar Bose’s case. In panna Bannerjee v. Kalikinkor
where the subject-matter was alienation of debutter property Deb, J. held
that "with all respect I am against this obiter dictum of Sir Montague
Smith." But the view of the Calcutta High Court has strangely not been
accepted as settled law by other Indian High Courts.^
kIn Naraysn v. Karasing where the issue to be decided by the Orissa
High Court was whether a perpetual lease of a family endowment could be
created , legal necessity, it was observed that in case of a
family endowment the members of the family "could even withdraw the
endowment from the trust by their consensus^ as held in Konwur Doorganath
v. Pam Chunaer....
But in this context the most interesting case is the Madras case of
7Senthivel v. Kulandaivel. In that case, the Madras High Court has shown 
us the extent to which a Court can go on building premises on its owrn 
from which it could deduce the conclusion to suit its own judgement. It 
referred inter alia to certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court and 
the obiter dictum of Sir Montague Smith. To support the view that the 
consensus of all the members of a family interested in the worship of the 
deity could turn a debutter into a secular property the Court referred to
g
Chandi Charan Das v. Dulal Chandra Paik. Thus it was observed that "In
1. AIP 195o Cal 308. 2. AIP 197^ Cal 126.
3. Radha Krishna Das v. Radharamana Swami AIR 19^9 Ori 1 *, Narayan v. ha ran ing 
Charan AIR 1151 Ori 60; Bairagi Das v. Uday Chandra AIR 1965 Ori 2C1; 
Senthivel v. Kulandaivel ILR (1970) 2 Mad 95*
k. AIR 1951 Ori 60.
5. To that effect the same view was expressed in Bairagi Das v. Uday Chandra 
AIR 1965 Cri 201, 20h. 27-28. The case was concerned with the alienation 
of deities with their properties under a deed of gift.
6. AIR 1951 Cri 60, 62. 7- ILR (1970) 2 Mad 95-
8. AIR 1926 Cal 1083 = ILR (1927) 5^ Cal 30.
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Chandi Charan Das v. Dulal Chandra Paik...the principle that debutter
property can be converted into secular property by the consensus of
the whole family and that consensus should be by all members, both male
and female, who are interested in the worship of the deity, was laid 
1
down." With due respect, no principle as such was laid down in Chandi 
2
Charan's case. The observation of Chatterjea, J. that
"even if the consensus of the whole family can convert an 
absolute debutter property into secular property such consensus 
must be of all the members, male and female, who are interested 
in the worship of the deity...In the present case defendant N. A did not 
join in the compromise...."^
is not the law that was laid down there but the principle of the case was
in the observation of Page, J. already quoted earlier, to the effect that
the consensus of all members interested in the worship of a family deity
could not convert a debutter into secular property. Again, in the present
case, a trust was created but the purposes for which it was created at its
inception were not known. The Court accepted it as a private trust. It
made a distinction betv'een the private religious trust in question where
there was no dedication in favour of an idol and the private family
endowment made in favour of a family deity. It may be pointed out that
k
Sir Montague Smith's dieturn in Konwur Doorganath's case was essentially
related to a private religious endowment made in favour of an idol but
strangely enough the Madras High Court held that "the case of a private
trust of the kind we are concerned which falls into different category to
which the observation of the Privy Council in Konwur Doorganath Roy v,
5
Ram Chunder Sen can still apply". It is the extension of a principle 
which was net accepted by great judges of the Calcutta High Court. The 
judgement in the present case referred to a principle as alleged to be 
laid down in a Calcutta case (i.e. Chandi Charan Das v. Dulal Chancra Faik)^
1. ILR (1970) 2 Mad 95, 104. 2. AIR 1926 Cal 1083 = ILR (192?) 5^ Cal 30
3. AIR 1926 Cal 1083, 1086. ^  (1876-77)  ^XA 52. Supra p.208.
5* Per Srinivasan, J., ILR (1970) 2 Mad 95, 111.
6. ILR (1927) 5^ Cal 30.
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which as a matter of fact, was not done in that case.
It should be remembered that the principle referred to in the obiter
remark of Sir Montague Smith was not really laid down in Sir Montague’s
1
dictum. It was pointed out by Chatterjea, J. in Chandi Charan*s case
2
when his Lordship pronounced m  Konwur Doorganath*s case that "their
Lordships did not decide the question. There was in fact no question of 
consensus of the whole family in that case, for their Lordships observed 
in the next sentence "No question, however, of that kind arises in the 
present case"."^
Now, when an endowment becomes impracticable as long as the general
charitable intention of the donor can be sifted out of the terms of an
endowment the Court can frame a scheme and apply the funds cy-pres. Eut
a problem may arise if the persons interested in the endowment no longer
follow the founder’s beliefs and if they want to apply the funds for
*+
purposes different from the original purposes of the endowment. If a
single person follows the faith of the founder and if he has an interest
in the endowment, then the original purposes must be taken as the guide.
For the endowment is a juridical person, not swallowed up in the character
of the family. The consensus of the whole community could however redirect
the endowment to different purposes of a different belief or different
objects of charity but as Derrett argues convincingly "Apart from statute,
however, there can be no question of even unanimous redirection which
5
amount to a breach of trust."
Again, if an endowed property is converted into a secular property by 
the unanimous approval of all the members of a family, here the real question 
is not the conversion of the debutter, but its usurpation, because the ownership
1. (1926) ^  CLJ 479- 2. (1876-7) IA 52.
3. (1926) ^  C U  *+79, **85.
*+. Derrett, IKKL, 5^9*
5. Derrett, ibid., p. 3^9*
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is vested in the deity. As is notorious, adverse possession will never 
give title to the usurped trust funds. It is only the State which by 
an Act of the legislature can take away individual ownership for social 
needs, and the deity is not excepted.
It may be argued that though the principle involved in the well-known 
obiter dictum of Sir Montague Smith cannot be supported, because it is 
not in accordance with the present Hindu law, it might have served or may 
be used to serve some social purposes. In cases where the principle was 
accepted, the endowed properties involved therein, which could have been 
free from the rules against perpetuity, became available on the market to 
change hands and being secular properties became sources of revenue (e.g. 
estate duty) for the State. However, in cases where the Courts gave a 
verdict in favour of the families who converted the debutter properties 
by their unanimous consent, they should not have ruled in favour of the 
families, because the members of the families being disloyal to the wishes 
of the founders made a clear breach of trust which should not have been 
condoned by any legal system. If families are not interested in carrying 
out the pu. poses of endowments then it is the State, not the families which 
should own those endowed properties for the good of the community at large 
and reform may be made to that effect.
In conclusion of this study it may be pointed out that if the Court 
approves the view that a debutter property can become secular by consensus 
of the whole family, a day may come when the shebait as an institution in
the field of private religious endowment may come to an end. The institution
of shebait can be conceived of only in relation to endowment. In other 
words, the existence of the institution depends upon the existence of the
institution of tie Hindu religious endowment. A founder may not want the
termination of an endowment but his-heirs being less interested in the 
object than the founder himself might agree to terminate the endowment.
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It could be argued that founders actually relied on their remoter 
descendants being held entitled to convert the foundations' assets by 
unanimous consent! We must preserve two principles: (i) on the one
hand breach of trust must be repressed and the culprits made personally 
liable; and to this end procedure should be devised even in the case of 
private endowment for the deity to be protected notwithstanding negligence, 
fraud, collusion, or misappropriation of the shebaits; while on the other 
hand (ii) income surplus to actual expenditure on the idol's worship etc. 
should be amenable to assessment to tax. The possibility that if these 
principles were upheld private endowments would cease to be created is not 
a matter which need concern the State.
217
CHAPTER IV 
SHEBAITI (MANAGEMENT) OF DEBUTTER
Section 1. WHAT IS SHEBAITI?
When a property is dedicated absolutely to a deity the property vests
1
in the deity as a juristic person but the management of.the debutter is
entrusted to a person called a manager or a shebait. The "possession
2and management of the property belong to the shebait". A shebait as the 
human ministrant of the deity^ is empowered to do whatever is necessary 
for its service and the preservation of its endowed property. For all 
purposes he represents the deity.
In so far as debutter property is concerned the shebait is in a position
of a trustee but "as regards the service of the temple and the duties apper­
taining to it, he is rather in the position of the holder of an office of 
5
dignity". But it may be pointed out that a shebait is not a trustee in 
the English sense of the term. The legal position of a shebait in contrast 
to a trustee in the technical sense was pointed out in the decision in the 
leading Privy Council case of Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami^ when Mr. Ameer Ali
1. B.K. Kukherjea, op.cit., Ath ed., 157*
2. Per Sir Arthur.Wilson, Jagadindra Nath v. Rani Hercanta Kumari (1903-0*0 
IA~203, 210. '
3* Ram Rattan v. Bajrang La I AIR 1978 SC 1393, 1396. Infra, p. 2*0. 
Kukherjea, op.cit., 4-th ed., 201.
A. Prosunno Kumari Debva v. Golab Chand Baboo (187*+-75) 2 IA 1*+5, 151-152.
This is the most important case for our topic on "alienation of 
debutter"' in the .5th chapter of this thesis.
5. Per Lord Macnaghten, Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti (1905-06)
33~ IA 139, 1*0.
6. (1920-21) A8 IA 302. Supra, p; .139.
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pronounced for the Judicial Committee that
"when the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin 
to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency.
Called by whatever name, he is only the manager and custodian 
of the idol or the institution. In almost every case he is 
given the right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoy­
ment and the amount of the usufruct depending again on the usage 
and custom. In no case was the property conveyed to or vested 
in him, nor is he a "trustee" in the English sense of the term, 
although in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, 
he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for malad­
ministration. "
2Shebait is not a mere office, it is an amalgam of office and property.
3In Gnanasambandha pandara Sannadi v. Velu Pandaram where the suit was brought 
by the respondent Velu to establish his right to the possession and management 
of the endowed property connected with a temple in Madras, Sir Richard Couch 
pronounced for the Privy Council that "there is no distinction between the
office and the property of the endowment. The one is attached to the other..."
5
It may be interjected that the Calcutta High Court in Sripati v. Khudiram 
a somewhat old case in which the dispute centred on the right of shebaiti 
of a deity, held that shebaiti was a mere office. Thus Chakravarti, J. 
observed that "the shebait has no right to the property but was merely an 
officer with the rights and limitations as are applicable to the guardian 
of a minor.
But in so far as the legal meaning of shebaiti is concerned, unquestionably
7 8Angurbala v. Debabrata is the leading case. It has the especial merit
of being decided by Indian judges of long experience of India. The dispute
1. (1920-21) ^8 IA 302, 311.
2. Profulla Chorone v. Satya Choron AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1686; Badri Nath 
v. Mst. Punna AIR 1979 SC 131**.
3- (1899-1900) 27 IA 69. **. Ibid., p. 77.
3. AIR 1923 Cal kb2.
6. Ibid., p. 4^ 5.
7. AIR 1951 SC 293 = (1951) SCR 1125.
8. "The leading case is now Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick (1951) 
SCR 1125” - J.D.M. Derrett, Critique, 383~*
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between the parties centred on the issues whether the plaintiff widow 
was entitled, after her husband’s death, to shebaiti of the idol in question 
either solely or jointly with her stepson, the defendant of the case. B.K. 
Mukherjea, J. as he then was, pronounced for the Supreme Court that
"though a Shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the. 
technical sense, it would not be correct to describe the 
Shebaitship as mere office. The Shebait has not only duties 
to discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a 
beneficial interest in the debutter property. As the judicial 
Committee observed in the above case,^ in almost all such 
endowments the hebait has a share in the usufruct of the 
debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant 
or upon custom or usage. Even where no emoluments are attached 
to the office of Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or 
interest in the endowed property which partially at least has 
the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception 
of Shebaiti both the elements of office and property, of duties 
and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together, and 
one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is 
the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the 
endowed property which invests Shebaitship with the character 
of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents 
of property."3
The proprietary element in the shebaiti was emphasized long before 
i+
Angurbala*s case and clearly shown in the Full Bench decision of the 
Calcutta High Court in Monohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath  ^where the suit 
was brought mainly to establish the title of shebaiti. Mukherji, J. pro­
nounced for the Court that the right of a shebait "is none the less a kind
of property, which Hindu law, as far as may be gathered, has never refused
6 7to recognise." The decision in Monohar Mukherjifs case was approved by
g
the Privy Council in both Ganesh Chunder v. Lai Behary and Bhabatarini v.
9
Ashalata; while the former was concerned with the validity of certain 
provision relating to the succession of shebaits, the latter was connected
1. AIR 1951 sc 295, 29**.
2. Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami AIR 1922 PC 123. Supra, p. 217.
3. AIR 1951 SC 293, 296. **. Ibid.
5. ILR (1933) 60 Cal **52 (FB). 6. Ibid., p. **83.
7. ILR (1933) 60 Cal **52 (FB). 8. (1935-36) 63 IA, W
9. (19**2-**3) 70 IA 57, 63.
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with the devolution of shebaiti. In this regard it must be stressed
that the decision in Angurbala v. Debabrata was based on the decisions
in the aforesaid three cases of the Privy Council and the Calcutta High
2Court and the Supreme Court,apart from Vidya Varuthi's case, specifically
referred to the said three cases.^
Again the same learned judge emphasized the proprietary element of
kshebait in Kalipada v. Palani Bala in which ’’the controversy between
the parties practically centres round one short point, namely, whether or
5
not the plaintiff’s suit is barred by limitation.” His Lordship held
that ’’Whatever might be said about the office of a trustee, which carries
no beneficial interest with it, shebaitship,as is now well-settled, combines
in it both the elements of office and property.”^
In Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha 
7
Swamiar, Shirur, the view that shebaiti was a property was reiterated
and extended to the office of mahantship. Again in Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram
8 9Rattan applying the principle in Angurbalafs case Jaganadhadas, J. observed
for the Supreme Court that ”0n the same analogy as that of a ’shebaiti'
right, the right of a hereditary priest or pujari in a temple must also
amount to property where emoluments are attached to such an office.”
The importance of Angurbala's case lies in the fact that it not only
12spelt out categorically that shebaiti was a property but it also laid
down the law on the facts of the case that it was a property within the
13meaning of the Hindu law of succession. It may be recalled that in
1. AIR 1931 SC 293. 2. AIR 1922 PC 123.
3. AIR 1951 SC 293, 296. k. AIR 1953 SC 125.
5. Ibid., p. 126. 6. Ibid., p. 130.
7. AIR 195^ SC 282. Supra, p. 16. 8. AIR 1955 SC 9^3.
9. AIR 1951 SC 293. 10. AIR 1955 SC 9^3, 9^6.
11. AIR 1951 SC 293. 12. Ibid., p. 296.
13. Ibid., p. 298.
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that case the main question to be decided by the Supreme Court was the
question regarding the applicability of the Hindu Women's Right to Property
Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937)• The rule that shebaiti is a property,^ it is
2 3a heritable property, and partible as laid down in the case is a firmly 
established rule. Because of this view of shebaiti, because Of the 
restriction of testamentary disposition of shebaiti and because of the 
effect on the Hindu Succession Act, 1936 (Act 30 of 1956) (allowing unlimited
heirs to succeed to shebaiti) the issue of shebaiti has posed a great problem
5
which we will be discussing at the end of this chapter.
Section 2. CREATION OF SHEBAITI
In the conception of debutter the ideal personality of the deity as a
juristic owner is linked - with the natural personality of its manager or
6 7shebait who is in possession and the management of the debutter. As soon
g
as the deity is installed shebaiti remains in the founder and if he does 
not appoint a manager to look after the services of the deity he is himself
responsible for performing those services. It is his duty to see that the
9
worship of the deity is performed.
After the deity is installed, if a founder chooses himself as - 
the shebait of the deity, he can appoint a shebait any time before his
1. Anath Bandhu v. KristeaLal AIR 1979 Cal 168, 171.
2. Profulla Chorone v. Satya Choron AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1686, Badri Nath,
AIR 1979 SC 13^ (above), Kalyan v. Rambir AIR 1980 NOC 123 (All).
3. It is obvious that shebaiti cannot be physically partitioned like a plot
of land. But it is legally partible in the sense that heirs of equal 
degree can enjoy shebaiti by turn. See on this point Ram Rattan v. 
Bajrang Lai AIR 1978 SC 1393, 1396.
4. We will be discussing this issue under the topic of "Alienation of 
shebait" in sec. 4 of this chapter.
5. On this point see Derrett's Critique, 386" 387 •
6. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 159*
7. Mayne's Hindu Law, op.cit., 11th ed., .929*
8. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 205*
9. Derrett, IMHL, 498.
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death. If he does not exercise his power of appointing a manager before
2his death, the power cam be exercised by his successors in whom shebaiti
3 4becomes vested. In Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar referring to the
5
decision in Ratnbrahfiia. Chatterjee v. Kedar Nath Chatterjee where the
ou
details about worship of Hindu family deity were given, Lord Shaw in his
A
observation showed us precisely the way a shebaiti was created when his
Lordship observed that
"The person founding a deity and becoming responsible for 
these deities is de facto and in common parlance called 
shebait. This responsibility is, of course, maintained by 
a pious Hindu, either by the personal performance of the 
religious rites or as in the case of Sudras, to which caste 
the parties belonged - by the appointment of a Brahmin priest 
to do so on his behalf. Or the founder any time before his 
death, or his successor likewise, may confer the office of 
shebait on another."6
The duty of a shebait is not that he himself should carry out the worship
of the installed deity but his. paramount duty is to see that worship is done.
7
So if he does not want to do it himself he can delegate his duty to a pujari,
g
a paid servant of the shebait, who has specialised in religious matters.
In so far as shebait is concerned there is no legal bar for a female to
Q 10be a shebait and she is also entitled to a priestly office. In Raj Kali
1. The same law was in force at least three centuries ago. See T. Mukherjee 
and J.C. Wright, "An Early Testamentary Document in.Sanskrit" (1979) 42
(2) B.S.O.A.S. 297-320 where the authors discussed an old testamentary docu­
ment made by the founder of a temple relating to succession to shebaiti.
2. Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna (1924-25) 52 IA 245, 251.
3 . Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee (1888-89) 16 IA 
137, 144. See below, p.^A\
4. (1924-25) 52 IA 245. ■ 5. (1922) 36 CU 478, 483.
6. (1924-25) 52 IA 245, 251. 7. Derrett, IMHL, 498.
8. Kalimata Thakurani v. Jibandhan AIR 1962 SC 1329» ^333 where the suit
was filed for the purpose of framing a scheme.
9. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293; Kalipada v. Palani Bala AIR
1953 SC 125, 130; Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram Rattan AIR 1955 SC 493, **96.
10. Annaya Tantri v. Ammaka Hengsu AIR 1919 Had 598 (FB). The majority of 
the judges (Sadasiva Aiyar J.dissenting) of the Full Bench held that a 
female was entitled to inherit a priestly office. The office in question 
in that case was that of an archaka, a hereditary priest - see on this 
point B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 223.
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1
Kuer v. Ram Rattan the question to be determined was whether the office
of a pujari involving religious duties could not be performed by a female
in person, and could then be discharged by a deputy. Jagannadhadas, J.
spoke for the Supreme Court that "the usage of a female succeeding to a
priestly office and getting the same performed through a competent deputy
2
is one that has been fairly well recognised." But it may be pointed out 
that in West Bengal in every Hindu family, Brahmin or not, daily worship 
of a deity or deities,^ whether or not formally installed through an 
endowment, is performed by both males and females and moreover, it is 
noticeable that it is the females who outnumber the males in such kind 
of worship.^
Even if a shebait might hold different beliefs from the founder, he 
cannot be removed from his shebaiti. In Iswar Radhakanta v Kshetra Ghosh^
1. AIR 1955 SC 9^3- 2. Ibid., p. 503-
3. "Hindu homes in Bengal are usually the homes of several deities as
well. A prosperous, high-caste family may maintain a separate building
within the house as a temple for its clan deity (Kuladevata), normally 
a form of Vishnu, in which images of Siva, Lakshmi, and perhaps other 
gods and goddesses also receive the daily ministrations of a Brahman 
domestic priest (purohita). In a less elaborate arrangement, a room
in the highest part of the house is set aside as 'gods' room' (thakur 
ghar), where members of the family as well as the domestic priest 
may worship the deities. An ordinary household of agriculturalists 
might have only a deep niche in the thick mud wall of the house where 
pottery vessels of Lakshmi, Ganesha, and, perhaps, a small brass Siva 
in the form of a linga receive offerings of water, vermilion and 
flowers, and an evening honorific display of light from the mistress 
of the house. A less well-to-do home may contain one or two polychrome 
pictures of deities hung on the wall - but these too are gods and receive
some kind of regular service; only the very poorest have none of these
representations of the gods in them, even those have one shrine in common 
with those of the wealthiest and highest castes: this is the tulasl
manca, or 'pedestal of the sacred basil plant'" - R.W. Nicholas, 
"Understanding a Hindu Temple in Begal" in A.C. Mayer (ed.) Culture and 
Morality, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1981, 17^-190, 17^ -175• 
Though Nicholas has omitted to point out the fact that the homes of the 
very poor Hindus have at least one or two old or new Bengali calendars 
having in them the pictures of the deity or deities hung on the wall, 
it must be admitted that he has given a good account of the worship of 
deities in Bengali Hindu homes in general.
4. Personal experience of the writer suggests so.
5. AIR 19^9 Cal 233-
22k
the shebait was a convert to Arya Samaj which does not believe in idol
worship. The Calcutta High Court had to deal with the issue whether
personal performance of rituals connected with idol worship was essential
to the succession of shebaiti. K.C. Chunder, J. delivering the judgement
for the Court held that "the defendant respondant has the right to remain
the shebait, though he must have the duties connected with the preparation
of the worship and actual worship performed by a competent Brahmin...’*
Sometimes a founder may (very sensibly) appoint trustees for the
endowment in whom the endowed property vests for purposes of management
and investment and also a shebait for the purpose of carrying out the purpose
2of the debutter. In Raikishori Dassi v. Official Trustee the endowed
properties vested in the trustees for their management and investment only
and they were directed by the testator's will to pay over a fraction of
the income to the shebait for the purpose of carrying out the worship of
the deity. Though the High Court refused to accept the said direction as
valid, it ruled that the endowment was the absolute debutter property of
the deity in question and it "is entitled to the entire income thereof".^
Moreover, in so far as the management and the income of the endowed property
are concerned, the trustees are accountable to shebaits but the latter not
the former were responsible for the worship of the deity.
The
/ creation of shebaiti is related to the conception of debutter, but it 
is not necessary to the worship of an idol. The worship of an idol may be 
performed and is performed by many Hindus without creating any endowments, 
so without appointing shebaits.
1. AIR 19^9 Cal 253* 25k. By statute in Kerala the managers of a particular
public temple must take an oath that they believe in idol worship. See
sec. 4, especially the implication of sec. 4(2)(1) of the Guruvayoor 
Devaswom Act, 1978 (Kerala Act 14 of 1978). Below, Appendix II C.
2. AIR I960 Cal 235.
3. Per G.K. Mitter,J., ibid., p. 2k 1.
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Section J>. ABSOLUTE AND LIMITED SHEBAITI
1
Shebaitship being property it can be disposed of by the founder
2 „whether absolutely or for a limited period. if the founder disposes
of it absolutely it will be a case of hereditary shebaiti^ and a shebaiti
if
cannot be heritable unless the shebait has a personal interest in it.
If it is heritable then the ruling in Tagore v. Tagore  ^that a Hindu 
cannot create a line of succession which is not known to Hindu law, will 
apply.^ In such a case if the grantee dies the heirs of the grantee, not
7
those of the founder, will be entitled to shebaiti.
g
In Tripurari pal v. Jagat Tarini Dasi the dispute centred on the claims 
over the shebaiti of an endowed property. In that case the testator laid 
down in his will that after his death his son, Mukunda, would be the shebait 
but if Mukunda remained a minor when he died, his wife, Brajamati would be
1. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIK 1951 SC 293» 296. Supra, p. 218; Ram 
Rattan v. Bajrang Lai AIR 1978 SC 1393» 1397* Infra, p.2Vt; Prafulla 
Chorone v. Satya Choron AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1686. Infra, pi252.
2. Panchanan v. Surendra (1929) 50 CLJ 382. In that case the testator 
laid down in the will that his sons would be shebaits for their life­
time, i.e. for a limited period. Bhabatarini v. Ashalata (19^ 2-43)
IA 57i In that case the settlor provided in the deed that after his 
and his wife’s death his son would be shebait for his lifetime.
3. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., +^th ed., 209-
k. Padmabati v. Biswanath AIR 1976 Cal 3^» 3^ 6. In that case, after 
judging the background of the case and reading the scheme in question 
the High Court of Calcutta held that the settlor did not intend that 
shebaits should have pecuniary interest in the debutter.
5. (1872-73) IA Sup. vol. 47.
6. Gnanasambanda v. Velu (1899-1900) 27 IA 69» 78. Infra, p. 230.
In that case (at p. 78) Sir Richard Couch pronounced for the Privy 
Council that ’’the ruling in Tagore v Tagore is applicable to the hereditary 
office and endowment as well as to other immovable property”. The view 
was relied on in Mcsnohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji ILR (1933)
60 Cal ^52 the decision of which was approved by the Privy Council in 
Ganesh Chunder v. Lai Behary (1935-36) 63 IA kk&. On the issue in 
question see below, sec. 5 of this chapter.
7* Tripurari Pal v. Jagat Tarini Dasi (1912-13) *K) IA 37; Kunjamani v.
Nikunja (1915) 22 CLJ 404.
8. (1912-13) *K) IA 37.
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the shebait until Mukunda attained majority. The settlor also made 
provision that if Mukunda too died after his death Brajamati, mother 
of Mukunda, would again take over shebaiti and after her death, her two 
daughters would be shebaits. Now, after the death of the testator,
Brajamati acted as a shebait, because Mukunda was still a minor. Mukunda
took over shebaiti after he attained majority. But he died a premature 
death. Brajamati reassumed shebaiti. The minor son of Mukunda through 
his mother sued Brajamati and her two daughters for a declaration that he 
was the sole shebait of the debutter in question. Overruling the decision 
of the High Court, the Privy Council held that "There is, in their Lordships 
view, an absolute gift of the shebaiti to the son Mukunda Murari on his
attaining majority and it is not cut down, as far as they can see, by
anything that follows."
But if the shebaiti of an endowment is given to a grantee for a limited
period, e.g. for his lifetime, the heirs of the founder but not those of
the grantee will be shebaits after the death of the grantee. In Bhabatarini 
2
v. Ashalata the Judicial Committee laid down the rule that if the founder 
grants shebaiti to a person for a limited period, the grant does not ter­
minate the founder’s or his heirs' interest in the shebaiti. On the expiry 
of the limited period the shebaiti will revert to the founder or to his heirs 
The relevant facts of the case are that the founder, one Sital, made 
provision in the deed of dedication that "Sital and his wife Rajlakshmi 
should be the first shebaits, and that on the death of Sital (who survived 
his wife) Panchanan should be shebait in his stead...Upon the death of 
Panchanan in 1932 the specific provisions validly made by Sital as founder
3
with respect to the succession to the office of shebait became exhausted."
1. Per Lord Macnaughten, (1912-13) *K) IA 37» *+0.
2. (19^ 2-43) 70 IA 57.
3. Ibid., p. 59.
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Sital died leaving a daughter, Bhabatarini and Panchanan died leaving 
his wife, Ashraantara and three daughters. Thus Sir George Rankin 
pronounced for the Privy Council that
"It must now be taken that shebaiti is property, that it is
not a catena of successive life estates (Gnanasambanda's case) 
but is heritable - heritable^w&LcSi yin the first instance is 
vested in the founder. It must further be accepted that the 
founder may direct that a designated person should hold the
office during that person's life, either immediately or on the
death of a previous holder, and that such directions subject 
to the relevant conditions as to perpetuity, whatever these 
may be - will be good although it carries no right to the heirs 
of the grantee and does not amount to a complete disposal of 
the shebaiti.
"If then, on the death of the grantee the shebaiti goes to the 
founder or his heirs, this is because the right of the founder 
is heritable and he has not completely disposed of the interest 
which he has therein. It is impossible to represent this as 
spes successionis. It is a right in the founder and his heirs.
It is the same estate of inheritance as the founder held at the 
date of the grant. The grant did not exhaust it or terminate 
the founder's interest. On the death of the grantee .the shebaiti 
"reverts" because the heritable interest of the founder has 
ceased to be qualified by the grant.
In this connection it may be pointed out that' the question as to "who
should be the first takers after those specifically nominated to the office
by the founder"^ was not fully settled until it was finally confirmed by
the decision of the present case. In the original side of the High Court
when the case came up the trial judge (Khundkar, J.), accepting the view of
k
Kunjamani v. Nikunja, held that after the death of Panchanan, Bhabatarini,
daughter of the founder, being the nearest surviving relative of the founder
5
would be entitled to shebaiti. In Kunjamani v. Nikunja the founder died 
leaving a widow and six sons. His nominees to be shebaits after his death 
were his widow and two sons successively and he did not give any other 
direction. When all the nominated shebaits died it was held that "the 
office vests in persons who at the time constitute the heirs of the founder,
1. The present case first came up to the Calcutta High Court in the original 
side in Bhabatarini v. Ashmantara AIR 1938 Cal 490.
2. (1942-43) 70 IA 57, 66-67. 3. Ibid., p. 60.
4. (1915) 22 CLJ 404. 5. Ibid.
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1
provided the last shebait has not taken it absolutely..." So the then 
four surviving sons of the founder were the heirs of the founder. But
p
on appeal the view of Khundkar, J. as expressed in Bhabatarini v Ashmantara
was not accepted by Derbyshire, C.J. and B.K. Mukherjea, J. as he then was,
of the Calcutta High Court. In the judgement of the Appellate Bench, B.K.
Mukherjea, J. argued that as shebaiti was not granted to Panchanan absolutely,
the residuary right was still in the founder, Sital and his heirs. But
Panchanan being the sole heir of the founder both the residuary and the
limited rights merged in him. "His position therefore was that of an absolute
shebaiti, his heirs and not the heirs of the founder would be entitled to
succeed as shebaits."^ The decision of the Appellate Bench was affirmed
by the Privy Council but the Judicial Committee added that as there was no
direction regarding devolution of shebaiti in the event of the death of the
last nominee, the residuary right remained in the founder from the beginning
and it devolved as a species of heritable property following "the line of
U
inheritance from the founder”.
The two issues of absolute and limited shebaiti are really the issues 
concerning the subject of devolution which will be dealt with in detail in 
section 5 of this chapter.
Section 4. ALIENATION OF SHEBAITI
5
Though shebaiti is heritable, it cannot be transferred like other
properties freely.^ Shebaiti being an amalgam of elements of both office
7and property, the concept of property, in its application, is not to be
1. Per Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J., (1915) 22 CU, 4o4, 408.
2. AIB 1938 Cal 490. 3* Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 211.
Per Sir George Rankin, Bhabatarini v. Ashalata (1942-43) 70 IA 57» 60.
See also Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 212.
5. MPnohar v. Bfrupendra Nath AIR 1932 Cal 791 (PB): Bhabatarini v. Ashalata 
AIR 19^ -3 PC 89; Angurbala v. Debabarata AIR 1951 SC 293.
6. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 3rd ed., 1970, 178 » 4th ed. 205-
7. Gnanasambanda v. Velu (1899-1900) 27 IA 69• In that case,
(continued on next page)
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1
understood in its unqualified sense. It is a special kind of property,
alienability of which is very restricted and is not permitted except under
special circumstances. In the vast majority of cases the Court prevents
2
alienation for value. This is of great interest since it proves the State's 
interest in the regularity and authenticity of the endowment and its 
traditional function - while the Hindu notion that secular interests are 
to be preserved behind a screen of religion is given less weight.
In Rajah Vurmah v. Ravi Vurmah,^  some important pronouncements on the 
subject of alienation of shebaiti were made by the Judicial Committee. In that 
case, the appellant Rajah paid a certain amount to the four managers 
( urallers ) of a religious foundation, a pagoda and its dependent institutions, 
for satisfaction of their debts and also an extra sum personally to them.
So far as the pagoda and its dependent institutions are concerned, the 
managers transferred all their rights to the Rajah under an assignment.
Though the Rajah gained possession of landed properties, he could not take 
possession of certain jewellery belonging to the pagoda, and as a result, he 
instituted this suit. The main issue to be decided by the Priyy Council was 
whether the managers were entitled to assign the conduct of worship and to 
transfer their right to manage property of the endowment to the Rajah of 
Cherakel Kovilagom. The Judicial Committee held that the suit must fail 
as the assignment was void in law. Such assignment of religious office for 
pecuniary benefit was held to go against public policy and could not be 
countenanced even on the score of custom. Sir James Colvile who delivered 
the judgement of the Board observed that
(continued from previous page)
the Judicial Committee held (at p. 77) 'that "there is no distinction 
between the office and property of the endowment. The one is attached 
to the other."
1. Sovabati Dassi v. Kashinath, AIR 1972 Cal 95* 100.
2. But the right to recover shebaiti from adverse possession can be barred by 
limitation. On this point see Lakshmana v. Vaidyanatha ILR (1956) Mad 1144.
3. (1876-77) 4 IA 76.
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’’The first question is, whether independently of custom, 
persons holding such a trust are capable of transferring it 
at their own will. No authority has been laid before their 
Lordships to establish this proposition; principle and reason 
seem to be strongly opposed to such a power, and particularly 
to such an exercise of it as has taken place in this instance.
The unknown founder may be supposed to have established this 
species of corporation with the distinct object of securing 
the due performance of the worship and the due administration 
of the property by the instrumentality and at the discretion of 
four persons capable of deliberating and bound to deliberate 
together; he may also have considered it essential that those 
four persons should be the heads of particular families, in a 
particular district, open to the public opinion of that district; 
and having that sort of family interest in the maintenance of 
this religious worship would increase its due performance. It 
seems very unreasonable to suppose that the founder of such a 
corporation ever intended to empower the four trustees of his 
creation at their mere will to transfer their office and its 
duties, with all the property of the trust to a single individual, 
who might act according to his sole discretion, and might have no 
connection with the families from which the trustees were to be 
taken.
The main objection was thus to the alienee and the terms of the alienation.
2The rule as laid down in Rajah Vurmah's case, was reasserted in Gnanasam-
banda v. Velu? In that case, the hereditary trustees sold their right of management
of a religious endowment and transferred the endowed property. It was held
by the Judicial Committee that in the absence of a custom, the sale of the
right of management and that of the endowed property are not merely voidable
1*.
but strictly null and void.
The Judicial Committee have never questioned the principles enunciated 
in the aforesaid two cases. Any alienation by a shebait in contravention 
of the law, as laid down in those cases, is void,^ and may be declared void 
at the instance even of the alienor.^ The post-Independence Courts in India 
have loyally persisted in this view of Indian law.
7
The Supreme Court has not deviated. In Kali Kinkor v. Panna Banerjee,
1. (1876-77) ** IA 76, 81. 2. ibid.
3. (1899-1900) 27 IA 69. *f. Ibid., p. 76.
5. Narayanan v. Lakshmanan AIR 1915 Mad 1196; Nagendra v. Rabindra, AIR
1926 Cal 490.
6. Jugget Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Dossee (1871) 17 WR 4l (PC).
7. AIR 197^ SC 1932.
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a co-shebait purported to transfer her share in shebaiti to a stranger
by a deed of sale. The Supreme Court confirming the decision of the
Calcutta High Court held that the transfer of shebaiti by sale in such
2circumstances Mis void in its inception”.
3
In Shrimati Mallika Dasi v. Ratanmani, the main point for consideration
was whether pala or turn of worship was transferable by way of mortgage.
if
Banerjee, J. referring to the cases of both the Privy Council and the 
different High Courts observed: "It has been held in a uniform current
of decisions, both in this Court and in the High Courts of Bombay and Madras,
5
that a priestly office with emoluments attached to it is inalienable.”
In Mahamaya v. Haridas,^  the main issue to be decided was whether palas
or turns of worship of the Kalighat temple were transferable by way of
mortgage on the footing of custom in the limited market of hereditary shebaits
by blood and marriage, and the High Court of Calcutta held that according to
custom a pala of the Kalighat temple was transferable for value in the
limited circle of shebaits by blood or marriage. In that case, the main
issue was transferability of palas and Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. made
important observations on the issue of alienability of shebaiti. His Lordship, 
7
citing many cases on the subject, observed that ”in the absence of a custom
1. Panna Bannerjee v. Kali Kinkor, AIR 1974 Cal 126, see below, this section.
2. Per Ray, C.J., AIR 1974 SC 1932, 1936. 3- (1897) 1 CWN 493.
4. Juggernath v. Kishen Pershad (1867) 7 WR 226; Drobo Misser v. Srineebash 
Misser (1870) 14 WR 409; Kalee. Churn v. Bunghsi Mohan (1571) 15 WR 339;
Rajah Vurmah v. Ravi Vurmah (187&-77) ^ IA 76; Mancharam v. Pranshankar
(1882) 6 Bom 298; Kuppa v. Dorasami TTR (1882) 6 Mad 76.
5. (1896-97) 1 C.WN 493, 496.
6. AIR 1915 Cal 161. In Hemanta Kumar v. Prafulla Kumar AIR 1957 Cal 685, the
principle in the Mahamaya case was extended and it was held in that case that
poojaris or hereditary priests of the Kalighat temple would also be within
the competent class of transferees of palas under a custom.
7. For example, Drobo Misser v. Srineebash Misser (1870) 14 WR 409; Ukoor Doss 
v. Chunder Sekur Doss (l865) 3 WR 152; Kalee Churn v. Bungshi Mohun (1871)
15 WR 339; Rajah Vurmah v. Ravi Vurmah (1876-77) 4 IA 76; Rama Varma v.
Raman Nayar ILR (1882) 3 Mad 89; Durga Bibi v. Chanchal Ram ILR (l8fl£)5 All 
81 ; Kuppa v. Dorassami ILR (1882) 6 Mad 76; Kannan v. Nilakandan ILR
(1884) 7 Mad 337; Narayana v. Ranga ILR (1892) 13 Mad 183; Subbarayadu v.
(continued on next page)
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or usage to the contrary or any term to that effect in the deed of the
endowment, a religious trust or the right of management of a religious
or charitable endowment or a religious office attached to a temple or any
1
other endowment, cannot be alienated by the holder.” This view of Sir 
Asutosh Mookerjee, J. was the reassertion of the law as laid down by the 
Judicial Committee in Raja Vurmah’s case, and the observation has often 
since been quoted with approval in different decisions^ of the Calcutta 
High Court.
But even apart from the consideration of custom, the High Courts in India
k
have recognised some exceptions to the rule that shebaiti is inalienable.
One view is that a transfer of shebaiti is valid if it is made in favour of
a person standing in the line of succession. Again there is authority for
the proposition that an alienation of shebaiti is valid only when it is
made in favour of a sole and immediate heir.^ Another view is that shebaiti
is alienable to an immediate or sole heir where the alienation is made by way
7
of renunciation or abdication. On the question of transfer of shebaiti,
(continued from previous page)
Kotayya ILR (1892) 13 Mad 389; Rangasami v. Ranga ILR (1893) 16 Mad 146; 
Trimbak v. Lakshman ILR (1895) 20 Bom 495; Alagappa v. Sivaramasundara 
ILR (1896) 19 Mad 211; Shrimati Mallika v. Ratanmani (l897) 1 CWN 493; 
Rajaram v. Ganesh ILR (1898) 23 Bom 131; Ghaiasambandhav. Velu (1899*1900) 
2? IA 89; Lakshmanaswami Naidu v. Rangamma ILR (1903) 26 Mad y \; Ramanathan 
v. Murugappa ILR (1904) 27 Mad 192; Rajeshwar v. Gopeshwar ILR (1907) 34 
Cal 8287
1. AIR 1915 Cal 161, 164. 2. (1876-77) 4 IA 76.
3. Nagendra v. Rabindra, AIR 1926 Cal 490, 497; Manohar v. Bhupendra, AIR 
1932 Cal 791 (FB) 807; Bameswar v. Anath AIR 1951 Cal 490, 495-
4. Prafulla Chorone v. Satya Chorone AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1687.
5. Si tar am Bhat v. Sitaram Ganesh (1869) 6 BHCR 250, 253; Mancharam v. Pran-
shankar ILR (ld82) 6 Bom 298, 300; Annasami v. Ramakrishna ILR(1901) 24 Mad. 
219 , 225; Nirad Mohini v. Shibadas ILR (1909) 3& Cal 975* 977; Prayag v. 
Govindacharlu AIR 1935 Mad 220, 226; Official Receiver v. Jogamaya (1946)
50 CWN 272, 279; Nandlal v. Kesarlal AIR 1975 Raj 226.
6. Narayana v. Ranga ILR (1892) 15 Mad 183, 186; Muthukumaraswamia v.
Subbaraya AIR 1931 Mad 505* 508.
7. Nagendra v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Cal 490, 499; Bameswar v. Anath AIR 1951 
Cal 490, 495.
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there is a controversial view according to which an alienation of shebaiti
can be held valid on the basis of the doctrine of necessity or benefit of 
1
the deity.
The rule that the office of a shebait is transferable or alienable in
favour of a person standing in the line of succession to the office has
2
been laid down in Mancharam v. Pranshankar. In that case, the appellant's 
(Mancharam's) predeceased brother's son bequeathed his right of worship 
and that of receiving a share of offerings to his sister's son, the plaintiff 
Pranshankar. Melville, J. who delivered the judgement of the case, observed 
that
"if the alienation of priestly office is open to objection only 
on the grounds that it would be contrary to the founder's 
intention that the office should pass out of his family, and 
that it would be incompatible with the due performance of the 
duties of the office that it should be held by a person of a 
different religion or caste, then (in the absence of any res­
triction to a particular class of heirs, imposed either by the 
founder or by usage) there would appear to be no reason why an 
alienation should not be upheld, which is made in favour of any 
person standing in the line of succession, and not'disqualified 
by any personal unfitness."-^
The view that shebaiti is alienable only to a sole and immediate heir is
generally associated with the view of the Madras High Court, as expressed
i+
in Narayana v. Ranga. In that case, the right to the office of the hereditary 
pujari was transferred to the plaintiff's father by his uncle. On the 
finding that the plaintiff's father was not the sole heir, the Court held 
that the transfer of the office of the pujari was invalid. So Mukherjea 
observed that "opinion of the Madras High Court definitely is that in the 
absence of a special usage, the alienation of a religious office would not 
be valid, if made in favour of any person other than the sole and immediate
1. Khetter Chunder v. Hari Das ILR (1890) 17 Cal 537; Nirad v.' Shibadas ILR 
(1909)36 Cal 973; Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prasad AIR 19^1 Cal 5&2; Sova- 
bati v. Kashinath AIR 1972 Cal 93; Jagannath v. Byomkesh AIR 1973 Cal 397.
2. ILR (1882) 6 Bom 298.
3* Ibid., p. 301.
k. ILR (1892) 15 Mad 183.
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1
hear of the transferor.” But the view of the Madras High Court is by
2
no means settled because of the decisions in Prayag v. Govindacharulu,
and Annas ami v. Rarnakrishna,^  which held that an alienation of shebaiti
could be held valid if made in favour of a person standing in the line
of succession. Referring to earlier decisions of the same High Court
If
including the decision in Narayana v. Ranga the Madras High Court in
5
Prayag*s case pointed out that the High Court in those cases refused
only to apply the principle in Mancharam v. Pranshankar^ to transfers for
consideration or value or to transfers to strangers.
Again, B.K. Mukherjea places on the same footing the view of alienation
of shebaiti in the form of renunciation, to a sole and immediate heir, as
7
expressed by Page, J. in Nagendra Nath v. Rabindra, where his Lordship
made an elaborate treatment on the subject of alienation of shebaiti, and
the opinion of the Madras High Court on the question of transfer or
alienation of shebaiti when he said that
”A shebait like a trustee cannot delegate his duties to another 
person, but he is not bound to accept his office, and if he 
renounces his duties which he always can, then even if the 
renunciation be in the form of a transfer in favour of the 
next heir, it can be held valid in law. This is the view of 
the Madras High Court, and exactly the view taken by Mr. Justice 
Page in Nagendra Nath v. Rabindra.
9
It is submitted that there is a difference in views as expressed in cases
10 11 cited by B.K. Mukherjea and as expressed by Page, J. in Nagendra*s case.
The Madras High Court would hold a transfer of religious office as valid
if the transferee was the sole and immediate heir, even if that transfer
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 3rd ed., 182.
2. AIR 1935 Mad 220. 3- ILR (1901) 2k Mad 219.
II£ (1892) 15 Mad 183. 5. AIR 1935 Mad 220.
6. ILR (1882) 6 Bom 298. 7. AIR 1926 Cal ^90.
8. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 3rd ed., 183-I8*f * kth ed., 235-236.
9. Narayana v. Ranga ILR (1892) 15 Mad 183; Muthukumaraswaraia v. Subbaraya 
AIR 1931 Mad 505.
10. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 3rd ed., 182.
11. AIR 1926 Cal **90.
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was made under an assignment. Thus, in Narayana v. Ranga, the religious 
office was transferred to the plaintiff’s father under an assignment, 
and the transfer "was evidenced by a muktiarnama filed as an exhibit A".
The High Court of Madras would have held the transfer as being valid but 
for the reason that he was not the sole and immediate heir to the 
alienor] But Page, J. shared the view that the office of a shebait 
could not pass under an assignment even to a sole and immediate heir.
Thus his Lordship observed that
"if it be assumed that a shebait is competent to abdicate from 
his office, in my opinion, such an act would operate to trans­
fer the office to the persons entitled thereto as reversioners 
under the foundation or in default of any directions by the 
founder or of custom, according to the principles of the Common 
Law of India. The office would not pass to the assignee under 
or by virtue of any assignment of his office by the abdicating 
shebait, whether it purported to be in favour of the sole 
immediate heir or any other person, for every such assignment, 
in my opinion, is wholly void and inoperative."^
The view of Page, J. sounds more plausible on the subject of alienability
of shebaiti than the opinion of the Madras High Court, as expressed in
3 4Narayana v. Ranga and Muthukumaraswamia v. Subbaraya.
Next, it seems that the authority for the proposition that an alienation
of shebaiti is valid if it is made on the basis of doctrine of necessity
or benefit to the deity, found its expression first in the important and
5
original decision in Khetter Chunder v. Hari Das. In that case, shebaits 
of a family endowment being unable to carry on the worship of the idol with 
the profits of the debutter, made over the idol together with the endowed 
property to the plaintiff's predecessors. Since then the plaintiff's 
predecessors and after them, the plaintiff had been holding the endowed 
land and performing the worship of the deity. Though the Courts below
1. ILR (1892) 15 Mad 183.
2. AIR 1926 Cal ^90, ^ 99- My emphasis.
3. ILR (1892) 15 Mad 183.
k. AIR 1931 Mad 305. 5. ILR (1890) 17 Cal.357.
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ruled that the plaintiff's predecessors acquired the valid right as 
shebaits of the endowment, the High Court,without giving any importance 
to the finding of the lower Courts, held the transfer of shebaiti to the 
plaintiff's forefathers as valid mainly for the reason that it was for 
the benefit of the deity. The High Court purported to rely for its decision
on the two pronouncements of the Privy Council in Prosunno Kumari v. Golab
1 2 Chand and Konwur Doorga Nath v. Ram Chunder.
It should be noted that the Privy Council cases were concerned with the
question of the alienation of debutter. In Prosunno Kumari's case ,^ the
respondent obtained two decrees against the shebait of an idol for the bonds
made for repayment of money which was alleged to have been borrowed to be
spent for the expenses of the temple and the service of the idol. The
appellants as succeeding shebaits to the judgement debtor instituted the
suit to set aside the said decrees. The Judicial Committee held that the
decrees were binding on the succeeding shebaits. In Konwur Doorga Nath's 
4
case the appellant instituted the suit to set aside certain alienations of 
a "mehal" (estate) made by his grandmother, on the ground that the "mehal" 
was debutter. The Judicial Committee held that the estate was not debutter 
and also held that according to the admissions in the deeds, the sales were 
justifiable, even if the property were dedicated to the worship of the idol.
It is to be observed that the aforesaid two cases had nothing to do with 
the alienation of shebaiti. They were concerned with the question of alien­
ation of debutter and no rule enunciated in those cases would be immediately
5
applicable to Khetter Chunder's case, because of its different subject- 
matter. The rule of necessity as developed and applied in the Privy Council
1. (1875) 2 IA 1^5* See above, sec. la of the 5th Chapter.
2. (1876) 4 IA 52.
3. (1875) 2 IA 1^5.
4. (1876) k IA 52.
5. ILR (1890) 17 Cal 557.
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cases on the basis of the famous Hunoomanpersaud1s case, is to apply
to the corpus of debutter or to the estate or property of the deity.
2
The observation in Prosunno Kumari1s case, as made by the Judicial
3
Committee and relied on by Khetter Chunder's case is to the effect that 
a shebait is entitled to alienate debutter lands only for the service of 
the deity, e.g. for the benefit and preservation of the endowed properties.
It is submitted that this observation is related to and meant for the 
preservation of debutter and for the service of the idol, and the rule of 
necessity or of benefit of the deity had been laid down by the Judicial 
Committee to be applied to the cases where the subject-matter is the alien­
ation of debutter for the benefit of the idol, though (admittedly) transfers 
of debutter lands are thereby authorised. Any attempt to apply the rule 
in cases of differing subject matter will amount to a misapplication of the
law laid down by the Judicial Committee. In this case (Khetter Chunder*s
if.
case ) the rule was wrongly applied, because the issue there was the 
alienation of the shebaiti, not the debutter.
Again, the statement of the Judicial Committee as quoted in Khetter
5
Chunder's case judgement is that ’’the consensus of the whole family might 
give the estate another direction”.^  It is regretted that the sentence does
1. (1856) 6 MIA 393* ’’The shebait, or all the shebaits together where
there are more than one, have the power...to charge mortgage, or sell 
the property of the idol, or to dispose of its income, for the necessity 
of the idol, for example for its worship and for the repairs of the 
temple, or for the benefit of the idol's estate. The rule in Hunooman­
persaud 1s case...applies here also, and a third party dealing in good 
faith with the shebait after due inquiry into the necessity pressing upon 
the idol, is protected against suits on behalf of the idol” - Derrett,
IMHL, 501. Again, B.K. Mukherjea observes(at pp. 277-278)on the appli­
cation of the rule in Hunoomanpersaud * s case, (1856 6 MIA 393i on Hindu
religious endowments that "The transaction in Hunoomanpersaud’s case was
one by way of mortgage or charge for money received as loan, but the same
principle applies to other forms of alienation like sale or permament lease. 
No sale or mortgage of the debutter property by the shebait would be binding 
on the deity unless it is supported by legal necessity or benefit to the 
idol" - op.cit., 4th ed.t
2. (1875) 2 IA 145. 3. ILR (1890) 17 Cal 557.
4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.
6. (1876) 4 IA 52, 58. The issue has been dealt with in detail in sec. 5(b)
of the 3rd chapter of this thesis.
238
not reveal the whole truth, and it must be read along with the next
sentence of the judgement of the Privy Council case (Konwur Doorga Nath's
case) when it says that "No question however, of that kind arises in the
present case", which operates as an admission by the Judicial Committee
2
that this observation obiter, as quoted in Khetter Chunderfs case, was
not called for to decide any issue of the Privy Council case. Moreover,
it was a case involving the issue of alienation of endowed property. The
High Court, in this case, not only misapplied a rule but also did not pay
attention to the correct ruling of the lower Appellate Court which rightly
decided that "even if the deed of gift was invalid, the plaintiffs had
acquired a title by twelve years' possession."^ On this finding of the
lower Court alone, the High Court could have dismissed the appeal, and the
obiter ruling was embarrassing as well as unsound.
k
In Ra.jeshwar v. Goneshwar the main point for consideration was whether 
hereditary shebaiti could be transferred by will. The decision of the High 
Court was in the negative. Though no necessity or benefit of the deity was 
made out by the evidence in that case, Mitra, J. one of the Bench of three 
judges, without citing any authority, had made a very short observation 
that a shebait "had no power to alienate except for necessity or clear
5
benefit to the Thakur". B.K. Mukherjea rightly pointed out that much 
importance could not be attached to an incidental observation^ of Mitra, J. 
As the observation of Mitra, J. is irrelevant to the facts of the case, it 
cannot be cited as authority for the proposition of law that an alienation 
of shebaiti as distinct from alienation of debutter lands is justified on 
the ground of necessity or benefit to the deity.
1. (1876) k IA 32, 58.
2. ILR (1890) 17 Cal 557- 3. Ibid., p. 559-
4. ILR (1908) 33 Cal 226. 5. Ibid., p. 321.
6. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 3rd ed., 186.
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The recent decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the subject are
1
conflicting. Observations in some cases suggest that shebaiti can be
alienated on the basis of necessity or benefit of the deity. But in Nemai 
2
v. Banshidhar, the High Court of Calcutta relying on the decisions in
Iswar Lakshi Durga v. Surendra,^ and Nagendra v. R a b i n d r a , 4 refused to
allow transfer of pala to the defendant by a deed of gift in spite of the
finding of the Courts below ’’that there was absolute necessity for such
a transfer as the plaintiff under the circumstances was not in a position
to go on with seva puja and the transfer was in favour of a person who was
in the line of shebaiti."^
In Panna Banerjee v. Kali Kinkor,^ the main issues were whether a part
of a temple and a share of a shebaiti right as alienated for a financial
consideration were valid. The Calcutta High Court held that
"on an analysis of judicial opinion, there can harcUy be any 
doubt that a shebaiti, even assuming that his temporal and 
spiritual rights, duties and obligations can be separated, 
cannot be sold even for legal necessity."?
The controversy regarding the question whether shebaiti can be alienated
on the ground of necessity or benefit of the deity is not yet settled. A
Supreme Court decision or at least a Full Bench decision is called for to
resolve the dispute and the decision should take into consideration the
view of Page, J. to the effect that the doctrine of necessity or benefit to
the deity is applicable to the case of a transfer of the debutter lands only
1. Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prasad, AIR 1938 Cal 709; Sovabati v. Kashinath, 
AIR 1972 Cal 193; Jagannath v. Byomkesh, AIR 1973 Cal 397.
2. AIR 1974 Cal 333.
3. (19^0-41) ^5 CWN 665.
4. AIR 1926 Cal 490.
5. AIK 1971* Cal 333, 33^.
6 . AIK 197^ Cal 126.
7. Ibid., p. 135-
2*4-0
and it does not extend to the case of"a transfer of an alienation of an 
office of a shebait, as expressed in Nagendra v. Rabindra, The merit 
of Page, J.'s view.is that if the doctrine is allowed to extend to 
alienation of shebaiti as well then the shebait for the time being may, 
with some excuse, invoke the doctrine to bargain his office with any heir 
whether sole immediate heir or not for some pecuniary consideration. But 
if he finny tnJy his office, there will not be any scope for him to
bargain with his office. In that case, his Lordship observed that
’’the rule of necessity extends only to an alienation of the 
temporalities of the idol. It does not, and in my opinion, it 
cannot be made to apply to any alienation of spiritual rights 
and duties, the fulfilment of which is the primary function of 
a shebait. To apply such a rule to the spiritual duties of a 
shebait would be to contravene a fundamental principle of the 
Hindu law, and to violate the religious instincts of all orthodox 
Hindus. Indeed, in the nature of things there can be no necessity 
for a voluntary transfer of the spiritual duties of a shebait, 
Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v.Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami, and the doctrine 
that a shebait at his own will and pleasure is at liberty to alter 
the line of shebaits on the ground that to do so will be 'for the 
benefit of the deity', in my opinion, offends against the Common
Law of India, and is in conflict with the uniform rulings of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.”^
Pala or Qsra
Next, where there is more than one shebait, the shebaits jointly are 
entitled to shebaiti. The reasons which are applicable to the entitlement 
of one of the several owners to the partition of a joint property are also 
to be applied in the case of a joint right of performing the worship of an 
idol. The joint owners are entitled (where they cannot agree) to a decree 
for the performance of worship by turn. As the partition of shebaiti
’’cannot be effected by metes and bounds, the only way of effecting it is by
5fixing turns.” Hereditary religious offices were indivisible according to
1. AIR 1926 Cal 490. 2. ILR (1903) 27 Mad 435.
3. AIR 1926 Cal 490, 501-502.
4. Mitta Kunth v. Neeranjan (1875) 14 BLR 166.
5. Per Deoki Nandan, J., Nagarwali Devi v. Girjapati Tiwari AIR 1982
All 80, 82.  “ --------
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old Hindu law, but modern Hindu law sanctions partition of such an office 
by means of performing the duties of the office by different shebaits by 
turns.
"Hereditary offices, whether religious or secular, are no 
doubt treated by the Hindu text writers as naturally indiv­
isible; but modern custom, whether or not it be strictly in 
accordance with ancient law, has sanctioned such partition 
as can be had of such property by means of a performance of
the duties of the office and the^enjoyment of the emoluments
by the co-partners in rotation."
Moreover, shebaits are entitled to make their own arrangements without
the help of the Court, for performing their religious duties in such a way
2
as is "conducive to the due and orderly execution of the office." But in
the eyes of the law, shebaits remain one body and the deity is represented
by all of them collectively. None of them can be said to represent the deity 
in part or to have any interest in a fractional share of the debutter. The
performing of religious duties by several shebaits in rotation is known as
4 5pala in West Bengal. Shebaiti is partible. "There is also no question
that though probably religious offices were originally indivisible, they are
6 7now deemed partible.’1 Pala is a divided or partitioned right of shebaiti
of one shebait where shebaiti of a religious foundation is vested in several
g
shebaits. It is called osra in North India.'
However, in this context it may be pointed out that a serious controversy
centred round the question whether a pala or osra was an interest in immovable
9
property.
1. Per Melville, J., Mancharam v. Pranshankar ILR (1822) 6 Bom 298, 299.
2. Per Lord Macnaghten, Ramanathan v. Murugappa (1906) 33 IA 139* 1^4. See 
also Alasinga v. Venkatasudarsana (1936; 70 M U  424.
3. Iswar LakshiDurga v. Surendra (1940-41) 45-CWN 665.
4. Jagannath v. Byomkesh AIR 1973 Cal 397, 398.
5. Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lai AIR 1978 SC 1393» 1396, see below , this section.
6. Per Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J., Mahamaya v. Haridas AIR 1915 Cal 161, 167-
7. Jagannath v. Byomkesh AIR 1973 397 * 398.
8. Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lai AIR 1978, 1393* ^ 396.
9. See M.L. Jain*s discussion on the point in "Is an Osra an Interest in 
Immovable Property?" AIR ,1969 Jnl.., 80H-101.
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In Jagdeo v. Ram Saran where the plaintiff brought the suit inter alia
for the partition of the right to do worship the Patna High Court held that
2
a pala or a turn of worship was not an interest in immovable property. The
High Court did not give any reasons for its decision; it simply relied on
two Calcutta cases of Jati Kar v. Mukunda Deb^ and Eshan Chunder Roy v. Momnohini
4 5Dassi. In Jati Kar*s case the suit was instituted by the plaintiff for 
the recovery of possession of a turn of worship in a certain temple for
eight days in a month. The High Court of Calcutta relied on Eshan Chunder*s
6 7case for its ruling that a pala was not an interest in immovable property.
g
The case of Eshan Chunder was involved with the main issue of the right of 
the plaintiff worshipping two idols. As regards one of them the plaintiff 
claimed her right of worship only during one-sixth of the year. The High
Court of Calcutta ruled that the right of worshipping an idol was not in the
9
nature of an interest in an immovable property. The High Court did not 
advance any reason for its decision. Again in Narasingha v. Prolhodman Tevari 
where the suit was brought to enforce a mortgage of a pala or turn of worship
.10
the High Court of Calcutta without any discussion simply relied on Eshan
12 i
13
11 1  Chunder Roy v. Monmohini Dassi and Jati Kar v. Mukunda Deb and held that
a turn of worship was not an interest in immovable property,
But the Bombay High Court held the reverse view on the question whether
a pala or turn of worship was an interest in the nature of an immovable
14
property. In Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat where the plaintiff, a hereditary
I. AIR 1927 Pat 7.
3. ILR (1912) 39 Cal 227.
5. ILR (1912) 39 Cal 227.
7. ILR (1912) 39 Cal 227, 230.
9. Ibid., p. 685.
II. ILR (1879)> Cal 683.
13. AIR 1919 Cal 671, 671.
14. (1869) 6 BHCR * 137.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
4. ILR (1879) ^ Cal 683.
6. ILR (1879) ^ Cal 683.
8. ILR (1879) ^ Cal 683.
10. AIR 1919 Cal 671.
12. ILR (1912) 39 Cal 227-
* "Nibandha" means cor rody, pens ion. or allowance, for a 
discussion see Kane-.op.cit., ’ ' ’ # vol.3,575;
Derrett has fully explained the term : in ZVR 64
(1982),15-130.74-75 Nibandha has striking resemblance with 
nivi, see Perrett .wHiviM.Vishehvarancl Iddological Jou^rnal.
,12(197^,x-2,89-95. A
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priest, brought the suit to establish his right to officiate and to take
a share of the proceeds of the ceremonies, the main question to be decided
by the Bombay High Court was whether the office of hereditary priest should
be held to be immovable property within the meaning of the Limitation Act
1839 (Act 14 of l859)* It was held that the office of hereditary priest
\cu
of a temple being by Hindu law classed as nibandha should be held as immovable
1 2 property. In Balvant Kay v. Purshotam Westropp, C.J. in his judgement of
3 4the Full Bench agreed with the view^ held in Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat but
5
earlier in the same case in a Division Court West, J. expressed doubt as
to the correctness of the decision in Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat.^  After an
exhaustive survey of Hindu law Westropp, C.J. pointed out in effect that
Hindu law was the proper source of information on the question whether the
right to an office of hereditary priest was an interest in immovable property.
The Privy Council approved both the Bombay High Court cases in Maharana
7
Futtehsangji v. Dessai Kullianraiji where the main issue to be decided was
8 iwhether a right to a toda giras hak, was an interest in immovable property.
10Toda giras hak was held by the Privy Council as immovable. The Calcutta
11
High Court held in Raghoo Pandey v. Kassy Parey, a case where the suit 
was brought for redemption of a share of Brit Jugmanka, that a right to
officiate as priest at funeral ceremonies "ranks amongst immovable property
12 13 according to Hindu law." The High Court referred with approval to the
aforesaid two Bombay cases and the Privy Council case.
lap-------------------------------------------------------
I. (1869) 6 BHCR . 137, 139. 2. (1872) 9 BHCR 99 (FB).
3. Ibid., p. .113. 4. (1869) 6 BHCR 137-
. 5. (1872) 9 BHCR 99 (FB), 101-103. 6. (1869) 6 BHCR . 137.
7. (1874) 21 WR 178(PC)
8. "Toda Giras" means "an annual fixed money payment in the nature of blackmail 
..." See Sumbhoolal v. Collector of Surat (1869-61) 8 MIA 1.
9.- Ibid., note 'a* of p.2.
10. (1874) 21WR 178(PC} 182.
II. (1884) 10 Cal 73.
12. Ibid., p. 73. 13. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
*/ a species of hereditary tenure in Bombay/Gujarat area,^*
2kk
In this context the difficulty is that the distinction between movables
and immovables is applicable not only to material objects but also to
rights, the law recognises certain attributes which pertain to material
things only * "Every right over an immovable thing is itself immovable ...
1
The rights are situated where they are exercised and enjoyed.11 The right 
to worship and to receive offerings is exercised and enjoyed in a temple and 
since the temple is an immovable property the right itself is an immovable 
property also.^
The controversy over the issue whether a pala or a turn in rotation for
worship in a Hindu temple is an interest in an immovable property has been
finally resolved by the judgement of the Supreme Court in Ram Rattan v.
3
Bajrang Lai in which the Court discussed the question at issue elaborately.
5
It referred inter alia to the decisions in Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat, Balvant
6 7 8Rav v. Purshotam, Raghoo Pandey v. Kassy Parey and Angurbala v Debarata
and ruled that the right to worship by turn or pala or osra was immovable
property. Thus, Desai, J. pronounced that
"The hereditary office of shebait which would be enjoyed by the 
person by turn would be immovable p r o p e r t y . " 9
Can Shebaiti be Transferred to a Stranger?
In Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lai one Mst. Acharaj purported to transfer 
her shebaiti right (pala) by gift to Ram Rattan, .the appellant. The facts 
of the case reveal that Ram Rattan to whom shebaiti or pala was transferred 
by Mst. Acharaj, was an outsider or a stranger to the religious office and 
the dedicated property. Now, the most important question was whether
1. M.L. Jain, op.cit., 101.
3. AIR 1978 SC 1393.
3. (1869) 6 BHCR 137.
7. ILR (188*0 10 Cal 73.
9. AIR 1978 SC 1393, 1397.
2. M.L.Jain, ibid. , p.101. 
k. Ibid., pp. 1395-1397.
6. (1872) 9 BHCR 99 (FB).
8. AIR 1951 SC 293. See above, p.218.
10. Ibid.
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shebaiti of a private or family endowment was transferable to a stranger 
who had no relationship with the members of the family.
Though the Supreme Court did not hold the alienation of pala to the 
appellant, Ram Rattan, as valid, on the technical ground that the instrument 
of alienation by gift was not duly stamped, it pronounced that the hereditary 
office of a shebait "appears to be heritable and partible in the strict sense 
and it is enjoyed by heirs of equal degree by turn and transferable by gift 
subject to the limitation that it may4not pass to a non-Hindu." The obiter 
dicta of the Supreme Court are binding on all Courts except the Supreme Court 
and this extraordinary statement of law can have unforeseen consequences. So 
the law has been propounded by the Supreme Court that an alienation of 
shebaiti by gift can be held valid if it is made to a stranger who is neither 
the next heir, nor a possible hdr, or even a person related to the family, 
and whose only qualification is that he is a Hindu! Then, the Supreme Court 
would not have hesitated to hold the transfer of shebaiti by Acharaj to Ram 
Rattan as valid but for the document not being duly stamped. No doubt the 
Court may have been glad (as so often happens) to take advantage of a 
technicality to avoid an embarrassing decision on the merits: but it is
far from clear that/plaintiff had merit and the obiter dicta are now 
permanently in our books. It is submitted that the highest Court in India 
has laid down as law something which has never found support in the uniform 
rulings of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee and the different High
1. Per Desai, J. AIR 1978 SC 1393* 3^96. Emphasis provided.
A quite inadequate statement for its background. One might wonder 
whether, in the present case, the learned Judge of the Supreme 
Court, ignoring the law on the subject, had at the back of his mind 
the decision of the Madras High Court in T.V. Pillai Charities v.
Thavasiah (1976) 1 MU 185. In that case the Subordinate Judge, 
on an application made by a descendant of the author of the trust 
in question, modified the scheme in a way not even asked for by the 
applicant. The learned Subordinate Judge "altered the scheme by intro­
ducing the expression ’trustees professing Hindu religion* instead of 
'trustees of whom one shall be a Brahmin and the other two caste Hindus'u-Seep. 
188. Upholding the ruling of the lower Court, Bao J. (at pp.187488) observed’ 
for the High Court that "Our country being secular and the Constitution not 
providing for Such differentiation, on the basis of caste, the venture of 
the. learned Subordinate Judge in having enterprisingly cast an amendment to 
Clause 5 of the scheme decree, is beyond reproach and condemnations"*
2k6
Courts on the question of alienability of shebait to a stranger.
2
In Rajah Vurmah's case Sir James Colvile’s observation that
"It seems very unreasonable to suppose that the founder of 
such a corporation ever intended to empower the four trustees 
of his creation at their mere will to transfer their office 
and its duties, with all the property of the trust, to a single 
individual who might act according to its sole direction and 
might have no connection with the families from which the 
trustees were to be taken,
had laid down as law that shebaiti could not be transferred to a stranger,
for a reason which is immediately intelligible and has never been contra­
il-
dieted in India. The decision in Rajah Vurmah1s case, "has been followed 
in numerous cases, the propriety of it on the actual facts of the case has 
never been questioned in any subsequent decision."^ But the Supreme Court 
has failed to apply the decision to the facts of the present case.
In Kuppa v. Dorasami^ a priest sold his right of performing worship in 
certain temples to a stranger. The main point for decision was whether the 
priest could make a valid alienation of his right to worship to an outsider. 
Innes and Kindersley, JJ., observed that
"It is argued that in the present case the alienee is of the 
same caste and sect as the alienor, and that no objection to 
fitness to perform the worship exists in this case. But we
1. Ukoor Doss v. Chunder Sekur Doss (1865) 3 WR 152; Keyake-Ilata y. Yaddatil
(l888) 3 Mad HCR Rajah Vurmah v. Ravi Vurmah1576-77) *+ IA 76;
Narasimma v. Anantha HR (1881)4 Mad 391; Kuppa v. Dorasami ILR (1882) 6 Mad 
78; Rama Varma v. Raman Nayar (Ayancheri v. Acholathil) ILR (1882) 5 Mad
89; Durga Bibiv. Chanchal Ram ILR (l8&2) 4 All 81; Mancharam y. Pran-
shankar ILR (1882) 6 Bom 298; Rajaram . v. Ganesh ILR (I898) 23 Bom 131» 
Narayanan v.Lakshinanan AIR ,1913 Mad 1196, Rajram Bhattar v. Singarammal 
AIR 1919 Mad 570; Panchanan v. Surendra Nath AIR 1930 Cal 180; Jogesh 
Chandra v. Dhakeswari Mata AIR 1942 Cal 26;Bhagaban v. Narayana AIR 19^6 
Pat 27. In that case, though the main issue to be considered was whether
the defendant Narayana acquired shebaiti for himself alone or for the
joint family of which he was a member, the High Court (p*29‘) in the context of 
alienation of shebaiti, held that ’’the Courts should refuse to recognise 
it as being against public policy, specially where the sale is made to a 
stranger for the pecuniary benefit of the vendor.” The correct position 
was therefore known in Patna as late as 19^ -6.
2. (1876-77) ** IA 76.
3. Ibid., p. 81. Emphasis provided. 4. (1876-77) ^ IA 76.
5. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 3rd ed., 179. 6. ILR (1882) 6 Mad 76.
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are not disposed to hold that this of itself will validate 
such an alienation. To hold so would tend to public mischief 
in inducing needy incumbents of hereditary religious offices 
who desired to sell them to give a dishonest recognition to 
qualifications which, in fact, were not the qualifications 
demanded by the nature of the office.1’1
Moreover, if alienation is permitted to be made to a stranger having
no relationship with the family and the endowment, then the religious
office will be the subject of bargain and this will defeat the intention
2
of the founder. In Narayana v. Ranga, as the plaintiff's father was not 
the sole and immediate heir, the High Court of Madras held that the transfer 
of the office of the pujari (priest) to the plaintiff's father was not valid. 
The Court arrived at the decision on the ground that "unless the aihsnee is 
the sole heir, the alienor might be under temptation to make the office the 
subject of bargain and thereby defeat the intention of the founder."^ The 
reasoning is more applicable to the case of the alienation of religious 
office to an outsider. For, a needy or greedy incumbent of a hereditary 
office will transfer his office to the highest bidder, defeating the intention 
of the founder.
if
In Rajairam v. Ganesh, the original owner of the property in dispute 
transferred the property, including his right of worship, to the plaintiff 
who was a stranger to the family. In the context of hereditary service in
temples, Ranade, J. observed that "Alienations to strangers are indeed not
5
favoured."
In Ukoor Doss v. Chunder Sekur Doss,^  one of the shebaits transferred 
his shebaiti (turn of worship) without any consideration to the defendant, 
a Brahmin, who was otherwise qualified to carry on the purposes of the 
endowment. The transfer of shebaiti was held to be invalid beyond the life­
time of the alienor and the Court held that "It is the essence of a family
1. ILR (1882) 6 Mad 76, 79.
3. Ibid., p. 186.
5. Ibid., p. 135*
2. ILR (1892) 15 Mad 183. 
k. ILR (1899) 23 Bom 131.
6. (1865) 3 WR 152.
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endowment amongst Hindoos, that no stranger shall be permitted to
1
intrude himself into the management of the endowment.” The dictum
2
in the Ram Rattan . case that shebaiti can be transferred by gift to
any Hindu is directly against the rule laid down in Ukoor Doss’s case^
that shebaiti is not transferable even without any consideration to any
outsider, whether he is a Hindu, a Brahmin or non-Brahmin.
4
In Ram Rattan's case, Ram Rattan was a stranger to the management of
the endowment and on that ground alone the suit could have been dismissed.
Then the Supreme Court would not have to waste time considering a relatively
unimportant issue whether the document of transfer of shebaiti should have
5
been received in evidence unstamped. In Panchanan v. Surendra Nath, the
plaintiff claimed to succeed exclusively to the office of the shebait after
an arrangement by which Mayabati, the widow of the previous shebait, Ramsevak,
gave up her claim to shebaiti in his favour. Rankin, C.J. dismissing the
plaintiff's claim, held that "In my judgement, the plaintiff is not entitled
to stand in the shoes of Ramsevak for this purpose. He is a mere stranger
to this religious office and dedicated property, and on that ground alone
his suit cannot succeed."^ In his judgement of the same case, C.C. Ghose, J.,
observed that "In my view, Mayabati still remains a shebait, then, so far
as the plaintiff is concerned, he is a mere stranger and he cannot step in
the shoes of Ramsevak and claim as shebait. This conclusion would be
sufficient to enable the Court to dispose of the plaintiff's suit by saying
7
that it is incompetent."
g
In Panna Banerjee v. Kali Kinkor it was held by the Calcutta High Court 
that a transfer of shebaiti to a stranger had not got "the sanction of law
9
behind it." Again, it was observed in the same case that shebaiti could
1. (1865) 3 WR 152. 2. AIR 1978 SC 1593.
3. (1865) 3 WR 152. 4. AIR 1978 SC 1393.
5- AIR 1930 Cal 180. 6. Ibid., p. 185.
7. Ibid., p. 187. 8. AIR 1974 Cal 126. Supra, p.239.
9. Ibid., p. 136.
2*+9
never be transferred by sale, because it was against public policy.
2The Supreme Court in Kali Kinkor v. Panna Banerjee also shared the
same view with the High Court and ruled that the transfer of shebaiti
by sale was illegal and the sale was void in its inception.^
Again, shebaiti cannot be alienated to a stranger, even on the footing
of a custom. In Jogesh Chandra v. Dhakeswari Mata, a custom was established
according to which palas or turns of worship could be privately alienated
either to persons professing the Hiirb faith belonging to any of the three higher
castes or to sanyasis (fakirs). Mukherjea, J. who delivered the judgement
of the case, observed that
”In my opinion, the custom that is set up here is not only 
prejudicial to the interests of the deity, but is also against 
the presumed intentions of the founder. In the case of a 
private debutter, the intention of the founder undoubtedly is 
that the shebaitship should ever remain in his family, or it 
would pass to such person or persons as he himself had indicated.
It cannot be his intention that it should pass to a total 
stranger."!?
So the rule has been made clear in that case that shebaiti cannot be
alienated to a stranger, even on the footing of a custom, in spite of the
fact that he is a Hindu. The rule was again reiterated by the same learned
judge as a judge of the Supreme Court in Kalipada v. palani Bala^ in which
an alienation of shebaiti was made by sale in favour of a stranger. His
Lordship pronounced for the Highest Court that "The proposition is well
established that the alienation of the shebaiti right by a shebait in favour
of a stranger is absolutely void in Hindu law and cannot be validated even
7
on the footing of a custom".
It is regretted that the highest Court in India, without citing any case,
8has laid down a law in Ram Rattan*s case which is directly opposed to the 
firmly established view held by the Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee,
1. AIR 197^ Cal 126, 1^ 5. 2. AIR 19?k SC 1932. Supra, p.231.
3. Ibid., p. 1936. k. AIR 19^2 Cal 26.
5. Ibid., p. 31* Emphasis provided. 6. AIR 1933 SC 125.
7. Ibid.. p. 127. Emphasis provided. 8. AIR 1978 SC 1393.
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the Bombay, the Calcutta, the Madras and the Patna High Courts that 
an alienation of shebaiti to a stranger is not valid. It is also contrary 
to the extremely careful Kali Kinkor v. Panna Banerjee case.
Section 5. DEVOLUTION OF SHEBAITI
The founder of an endowment has (as we have seen in sec. 2 of this
2
chapter) the right to appoint a shebait. It is open to the founder in 
whom shebaiti is vested in the first instance^ to dispose of the shebaiti
if
right, a heritable property like any other species of heritable property. 
"Shebaitship being property it devolves like any other species of heritable 
property.”^
Before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of
1956), if the instruction of a founder could not be traced, the custom of
6 7the endowment ruled. Thus in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata it was held that
the mode of devolution prescribed by the ordinary law should give way to
let in the nominees of the founder. But now most customs are
abrogated by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and customary succession to
g
shebaiti ceased after the commencement of the 1956 Act.
1. AIR 1974 SC 1932.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 499.
3. N.R. Raghavachariar, op.cit., Vol. 1, 7th ed. ? 664.
4. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293, 296; Kalipada v. Palani Bala 
AIR 1953 SC 125, 130; Profulla Chorone v. Satya Choron AIK 1979 SC 
1682, 1686; Kalyan Das v. Rambir Das AIR 19&Q NPC 123 (All). Shebaiti 
is not a property when a shebait has not any personal interest in the 
endowed property - see on this point Sri Raman Lalji v. Gopal Lalji ILR 
(1897) 19 All 428, 433; Padmabati v. Biswanath AIR 1976 Cal 344, 346.
For the (exploded) view that shebaiti is not a property at all see
Sripati v. Khudiram AIR 1925 Cal 442, 445.
5. Per Sarkaria, J., Profulla Chorone v. Satya Charon, AIR 1979 SC
1652, 1686. --------------------£-------
6. Derrett, IMHL, 499.
7. (1942-43) 70 IA 57, 65.
8. Derrett, IMHL, 499* Parameswaran Pillai v. Sivathanu Pillai (1976)
2 M U  19 (hereditary trustees entitled to material benefits).
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Section 4(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956) 
provides that
’’Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, - (a) any text 
rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as 
part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of 
this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter 
for which provision is made in this Act; (b) any other law in 
force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall 
cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with 
any of the provisions contained in this Act...”
If a founder has not disposed of the shebaitship the devolution of the
office will take place in accordance with the line of inheritance from the
2
founder to his heirs. Again, undisposed shebaiti devolves on the heirs 
of the founder and to this effect the principle had been enunciated in the 
leading Privy Council case of Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee
3
Gossamee that
’’According to Hindu law, when the worship of a thakoor has been
founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of
the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it
otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or
some circumstance to show a different mode of devolution.”
But it must be remembered that at present in an endowment a founder can
do very little ”to provide for the devolution of the shebaiti otherwise than
according to the scheme of succession set out in the Hindu Succession Act,
1956.” ^  "It is the general law of succession that governs succession to
shebaitship as well.”^ A founder must lay down (if at all) the line of
7
succession to shebaits consistent with the general law of succession. The
mode of devolution of shebaiti must not be contrary to the provisions of
g
Hindu law. The law is directly derived from the traditional abhorrence of
1. See Derrett, IMHL, 578.
2. Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lai AIR 1978 SC 1593* 1395*
3. (1888-89) 16 IA 137. 4. Per Lord Hobhouse, ibid., p. 144.
5. Derrett, IMHL, 500.
6. Per Mukherjea, J., Augurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293i 299* See
above , sec. 1 of this chapter.
7. Hiranbala v. Bishnupada AIR 1976 Cal 4o4, 405.
8. Raikishori Dassi v. Official Trustee AIR i960 Cal 235» 243; Anath Bandhu De 
v. Krisha Lai Das AIR 1979 Cal 168; Sitesh Kishore v. Rnamesh Kishore AIR 
198l^|at ^39» 3^3; Durga Prosad v. Sri Rameswar Jew Siba Thakur AIR 1981
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'i
unrecognised perpetuities.
Now, the general law of succession is not what it was at the time of
the decisions in so many cases of both the Supreme Court and the Privy
Council on the question of devolution of shebaiti before 17th June, 1956.
At present, the general law of succession must comprise the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956). To quote a relatively recent conjecture.: nPrima
facie all cases in which a shebait dies after 17th June 1956 must be governed
by the Hindu Succession Act and shebaiti will pass by survivorship or succession
2as the case demands. 11
If there is no disposition shebaiti will devolve according to the ordinary
3 4Hindu law of succession. In Profulla Chorone v. Satya Choron the Supreme
Court very recently reaffirmed the famous rule in Gossamee Sree Greedhareejee’s 
5
case and held that undisposed ’’shebaiti rights remained with the heirs of
the founder”  ^and ordinary rules of succession would be applicable in case
7of devolution of shebaiti.
Again, shebaiti being a property within the meaning of the Hindu law of 
8
succession, in so far as succession to shebaiti is concerned the rules of 
the Hindu Succession Act unquestionably, as we have seen, have an overriding
1. Ibid. Reliance is placed upon Tagore v. Tagore (1872-73) IA Sup. vol. 47. 
See below p. 253*
2. Derrett, IMHL, 499- Illustrated at Parameswaran Pillai v. Sivathanu 
Pillai (1978) 2 MU  19 (below) and Kalinath Mukherji v. Santilata Devi 
AIR 1978 Cal 371.
3. Jagannath v. Byomkesh AIR 1973 Cal 397» 398. The case followed both 
Monohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath AIR 1932 Cal 791 (FB) and Ganesh 
Chunder v. Lai Behary AIR 1936 PC 318, which held that succession to 
shebaiti would be according to ordinary Hindu law of succession.
4. AIR 1979 SC 1682.
5. (1889) 16 IA 137.
6. Per Sarkaria, J., AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1689. Illustrated at Anath Bandhu
De v. Krishna Lai Das AIR 1979 Cal. 168.
7. AIR 1979 SC 1682, 1689.
8. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293.
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effect upon customs. There is nothing, therefore, to restrain the
frequent partitioning of shebaiti amongst distantly related heirs of
equal degree, or the featuring of debutter in family arrangements between
a whole concourse of heirs on an intestacy or deemed intestacy. In Parames-
1
waran Pillai v. Sivathanu Pillai, a case concerning the succession of
2
hereditary trusteeship, Ramaprasad Rao, J., referring to sec. 4 of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, held that
"undoubtedly section 4 has an overriding effect. The statute law 
having made marked inroads upon the personal law of the parties, 
has provided that any custom or usage immediately before the 
commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect 
to any matter for which provision is made under this Act."3
Now a founder of a Hindu religious endowment is still competent to lay
down rules to govern the succession to shebaiti right but his powers to
dispose of shebaiti right are subject to the same restrictions which exist
in relation to disposal of any other property according to Hindu law. In
if
Monohar v. Bhupendra Nath where an issue to be decided by the Full Bench 
of the Calcutta High Court was whether a Hindu founder of a religious 
endowment was competent to lay down rules to govern the succession to 
shebaiti, Mitter, J. observed that the founder could lay down rules "but
subject to the restriction that he cannot create any estate unknown to
5 6Hindu law." The High Court rejected the view voiced in Sripati v. Khudiram
7
that the rule laid down in the famous case of Tagore v. Tagore prohibiting 
a Hindu to create a line of succession inconsistent with Hindu law did not
apply to the appointment of a shebait. The Judicial Committee approving the
8 9decision in Monoharfs case ruled in Ganesh Chunder v. Lai Behary , a case
1. (1978) 2 MU 19.
2. Hereditary trusteeship is property - on this point see S. Mudaliar v. 
State of Madras (1970) 2 SCJ 1311 132.
3. (1978) 2 M U  19, 26. 4. AIR 1932 Cal 791 (FB).
5. Ibid., p. 796. 6. AIR 1925 Cal kk2.
7. (1872-73) IA Sup. vol. k?. 8. AIR 1932 Cal 791 (FB).
9. AIR 1938 PC 318.
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relating to the question of validity of certain provisions of shebaitship,
1 2 that Tagore v. Tagore was applicable to the appointment of a shebait.
But the said rule in Tagore v. Tagore^ is not applicable to offices which
are not property. The office of a dharmakarta (manager) which has no
emoluments attached to it apparently does not come within the purview of
if
the rule. In Manathunainatha v. Sundaralingam the Madras High Court dealing
5
with the correctness of the decision of an earlier case of the same Court
held that the founder of a religious endowment has "the right to dispose of
the dharmakartaship in any particular way."^
In this context it may be pointed out that the issue as to whether a founder
can change the line of succession after it has been laid down in the instrument
of dedication is still a controversial one. The principle that unless the
right of revocation of the line of succession to shebait is reserved in the
endowment the founder cannot subsequently change, revoke or alter the line
of succession as laid down in the endowment, was enunciated in Gouri Kumari 
7v. Ramanimoyi. In that case the founder became the first shebait of an 
endowed property and in the endowment it was provided that after his death 
shebaitship would devolve on his first wife. But later on he changed his 
mind and appointed his second wife sis shebait. Woodroffe, J. ruled that 
the founder "could not make any change in the order of succession of shebaits
g
unless he had made reservation to that effect in the deed..."
9
This decision was followed in many cases but it must be pointed out that
1. (1872-73) IA Sup. vol. 47. 2. AIR 1938 PC 318, 320.
3. (1872-73) IA Sup. vol. 47. 4. AIR 1971 Mad 1 (FB).
3. Manathunainatha Desikar v. Gopala (19*0) 1 MLJ *+34.
6. Per Natesan, J., AIR 1971 Mad 1 (FB), 14. Followed in V.R. Santhanam 
Iyer v. V.S. Sundarathammal AIR 1981 Mad 244, 246.
7. AIR 1923 Cal 30. 8. Ibid.t. p. -31. .
9» Lalit Mohhan v. Brojendra Nath-AIR 1926 Cal 561, 563; Manorama Dasi v.
Dhirendra Nath AIR 1931 Cal 329» 331; Narayan Chandra v. Bhuban Mohini 
AIR 1934 Cal 244, 246; Brindaban v. Sri Godamji Maharaj AIR 1937 All 394, 
394; Radhika v. Amrita AIR 1947 Cal 301, 303» In Brindaban v. Ram Lakhan,
(continued on next page)
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Woodroffe, J.'s observation was not an original one on the subject. The
principle as involved in his Lordship's observation had been laid down
long before in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee and
a clear exposition of the law in question was made later on in Narayan Chandra 
2
v. Bhuban Mohini. Mukherjee, J. observed that
"The Judicial Committee in the case of Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee 
v. Rumanlolljee^ has very clearly pointed out that when the founder 
of an endowment dedicates properties to a deity and appoints a 
shebait or lays down the order of succession to shebaitship, he 
makes a gift with a condition attached and that the deity or those 
who speak for him on earth need not take advantage of the gift but 
that if the gift is taken and the condition insisted on, it must 
be observed....
"When the gift to the deity has taken effect, the donor or founder, 
in the absence of reservation to the contrary, ceases to have any 
proprietary right in the properties, -the subject-matter of the 
gift and such right thereupon vests in the deity.,,Zf
5
In Sripati v. Khudiram the issue in question did not arise directly but
Chakravarti, J. discussed the law in question at considerable length. Although
c
his Lordship did not refuse to accept the rule in Gourikumari's case, he
remarked that as the appointment of a shebait is an appointment to an office
of a peculiar nature the power of a founder to appoint a shebait "should be
7
presumed to exist unless expressly given up."
Again, even if the right of the founder is not reserved at the time of 
laying down the mode of devolution in the endowment it was held that the 
succession to shebaiti could be relaxed both in the interests of the deity
g
and justice. In Radheshyam v. M.K. Narain where the dispute was related
(continued from previous page)
AIR 1975 All 255i 258, though the Allahabad High Court did not refer to
Gouri JKumari1s case, AIR 1923 Cal 30, it followed Brindaban v. Godamji
Maharaj, AIR 1957 All 39*+♦ which applied the decision in Gouri Kumari's 
case on the point in question.
1. (1888-89) 16 IA 137* 1^ 7. 2. AIR 1934 Cal 244.
3. (1888-89) 16 IA 137. 4. AIR 193*+ Cal 244, 249.
5. AIR 1925 Cal 442. 6. AIR 1923 Cal 30.
7. AIR 1925 Cal 442, 446. 8. (1971) 69 A U  563.
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to the management of a temple and its properties in terms of an arbitration 
award, Shukla, J. pronounced for the High Court of Allahabad that
"although the alienation in the line of succession to shebait­
ship is generally irrevocable unless a contrary right has 
been reserved by the testator, yet in certain circumstances 
the rule permits of relaxation in the interests of justice... 
notwithstanding the original line of succession of shebaitship 
contained in the will, there is no rule of law which precludes 
a shebait from not shouldering the responsibility himself and 
allowing the other heirs to manage the temple properties and if 
such management is entrusted, it neitheramounts to ouster of the 
other heirs so as to extinguish their rights nor can such entrust- 
ment be rendered legally void on account of being inconsistent 
with the direction of the original will creating an endowment and 
binding the shebaits."
So his Lordship’s observation is applicable only in exceptional circumstances,
and is suspect as introducing an element of unpredictability and uncertainty
into the law.
To conclude this study it. may be pointed out that so far as the devolution 
of shebaiti is concerned, it must be consistent with the provisions of the 
Hindu law of succession. If any provision in the instrument of dedication 
regarding the succession to shebaiti is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), the provision of the 
instrument must be held invalid. We have alluded to problems this situation 
creates and to these we now turn.
Section 6. MANIFEST PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Virtually all the problems relating to shebaiti centred upon the two 
accepted but incompatible theories that the idol as a juristic person^ is
3
the owner of any debutter and the shebait as a manager of an idol has not
J
only right in his office but also has a beneficial interest in the debutter.*
1. (1961) 69 A U  563, 568.
2. Monohar Ganesh v. Lakhrairam ILR (1887) 12 Bom 2^7; Pramatha v. Pradhyunma 
AIR 1925 PC 139.
3. Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami (1921) ^8 IA 302; Kalanka Devi v. M.I.T.,
Nagpur AIR 1970 SC 439.
*+. Bhabatarini v. Ashalata (19^ 2-43) 70 IA 57, 65; An^urbala v Debabrata 
AIR 1951 SC 295.
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Shebaiti being a property within the meaning of the Hindu succession
|<aw, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956) has posed the biggest
problem relating to the proper administration of any endowed property because
of its indirect effect of causing shebaiti to be divided almost every time 
2a shebait dies. Now, when shebaiti as property passes, on intestacy, to 
a large number of heirs both agnates and cognates, males and females, obviously 
it will pass being fragmented among heirs some of whom may not be interested 
in the worship of the idols.^ This effect of the succession law may easily 
raise the question of the validity of the rule that all shebaits must concur 
in the management of the debutter including any alienation of debutter 
property for the benefit of the idol. This rule may possibly be abandoned 
in favour of a rule to the effect that the decision of those shebaits who 
are directly concerned with an endowment relating to a scheme of management 
of the debutter should be binding on the idol in the same way as a family 
arrangement and later on no other shebaits will be allowed to object to the 
decision. The potential of the family arrangement to cope with such problems 
is known,^ and the institution as such has been the subject of frequent 
notice in the Supreme Court.^
Again, the problem relating to so many heirs of shebaiti may be solved 
if the present provision regarding succession to shebaiti only should be 
changed. It is not suggested that the property aspect of shebaiti should 
be scrapped altogether as suggested in the Raraaswami Aiyar Report on Hindu
1. Angurbala v. Debarata AIR 1951 SC 293i above p. 218; Kalipada v.
Palani Bala AIR 1953 SC 125; Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lai AIR 197& SC 
1393; Prafulla Chorone v. Satya Choron AIR 1979 SC 1682; Kalyan Das 
v. Rambir Das AIR 1980 NOC 123 (All).
2. Derrett, Critique, 386.
3. Radha Charan v. Iswar AIR 19^2 Cal 295* In that case, it was held that 
the ejectment notice served on the defendant tenant was not valid, because 
all the shebaits did not join in serving the notice in question.
4. Derrett, Critique, 3&7*
5. Derrett, "Family arrangements..." ECMHL, Vol. 4, 258 ff.
6. Derrett, ibid., p. 284.
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endowments. The rule of succession to shebaitship could be changed by
statute from the existing provision to a new provision of law to the
effect that shebaiti will always be vested in one person, say, the oldest
issue of the family of a particular endowment willing and fit to undertake
it. Then the problem concerning the rule that all co-shebaits must act 
2together relating to the management of a debutter could be avoided.
Shebaiti being a special kind of property? it is not by nature physically 
divisible like immovable properties. If "property, which in its nature is 
impartible, as a Raj or ancient Zemindary can...only descend to one of the 
issues" why cannot a.shebaiti in its nature being impartible, be vested 
in one person only? Yet the partibility as well as hereditability of 
shebaiti is taken for granted in all our books.
In so far as a religious endowment is concerned the paramount consideration
is the fulfilment of the purpose of the endowment. So in the idol's interest
and for the administration of a debutter at least the heirs who are directly
concerned with the endowment may be allowed to eliminate from managing the
debutter distant heirs or the heirs who are not interested in the worship
of the idol. Such a device will have the effect of reducing the number of
5
disputes over the right of management of the endowment property. The
distribution of the income after payment of tax may be a second consideration.
The problem regarding succession to shebaiti, especially relating to so
1. The Report of the Hindu Religious Endowment Commission (1960-62), 173“"*9^ i 
see specially page 19^ where it was specific about the proprietary 
element of shebaiti; the same view was held by J.M. Jain, Right of 
Property, 1968, 69-70, 307-308, cited in Derrett's Critique, 386, footnote 6; 
See also R.N. Sarkar, "Has a Shebait or a Mahant Proprietary Right in. 
Endowment", AIR 1954 Jnl., 93-9^ • The writer is of tie opinion that a shebait 
might be appointed with a fixed remuneration.
2. Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad (19^-^3) ^9 OWN 193 (PC). In that case the 
Judicial Committee pointed out in effect that in so far as the administration 
of a debutter or that of a trust was concerned the office of co-shebaits and
that of co-trustees were on the same footing. To that effect the Privy
Council quoted Lewin's Law of Trusts: see pp. 201-202.
3. Sovabati Dassi v. Kashinath AIR 1972 Cal 93-
4. Mayne's Hindu Law, op.cit., 6th ed., 713* 3* Derrett, Critique, 387* 388.
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many heirs of a particular shebait, would not have been so acute but for
the reason that ’’transfer of shebaiti by will is almost unknown”. The
restriction on transfer of shebaiti may be lifted to the extent that the
distant heirs, who have not much beneficial interest in the endowment, may
be allowed to dispose of their shebaiti under assignments or by way of
family arrangement in favour of other heirs who have more interest in the
idol and its property. But the heirs who have a priority interest in the
endowment will not be permitted to dispose of their shebaiti right by
testament. Otherwise, shebaiti will be a marketable commodity of very
uncertain value and co-shebaits with some amount of interest may induce
each other to dispose of it for a consideration which may not be disclosed
to any third party. If, however, testamentary disposition is to be allowed,
it must be allowed within the family only. The difficulties that have
arisen are almost self-evident and more than a quarter of a century has
passed without an attempt to mitigate them.
The rule that the founder cannot change the line of succession after it
2has been laid down in the instrument of dedication may be abandoned in
favour of the view that the power of a founder-shebait to appoint a shebait by
a testament should be presumed to exist unless he has expressly given it up.^
4In Zabu Khima v. Amardas the Gujarat High Court dealt with a will where the 
founder-testator laid down the line of succession to shebaiti. Bhagwati, J. 
held that ’’the shebaitship of the temple in the present case was property
and the deceased himself being the founder of the temple was entitled to
5
dispose of the shebaitship by making a will.” The view of the Gujarat 
High Court seems to be plausible. It can be assumed that a founder-shebait
1. Derrett, Critique, 387•
2. Gouri Kumari v. Ramanimoyi AIR 1923 Cal 30.
3. Sripati v. Khudiram AIR 1925 Cal 2kk.
4. AIR 1967 Guj 214.
5. Ibid., p. 217.
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being a founder of the religious endowment will always wish the object
of the endowment to be fulfilled. Moreover, it has been pointed out that
testamentary disposition of shebaiti by a founder was in vogue even three
hundred and seventy-five years ago in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The
founder of the Radhadamodara Temple in Vrindaban made a testament envisaging
posthumous implementation of its provisions relating to succession to
2shebaiti of the temple. The "provisions of the will were in fact admitted 
and carried out to the letter.... The subject-matter leaves no room for 
suspicion of malpractice, and the codicil merely confirms that the testator, 
now near death, has not changed his mind about the succession to his 6hebait- 
ship." Now, the view that the power of a founder to appoint a shebait 
should be presumed to exist has the practical merit that if after the line 
of succession to shebaiti has been laid down, a founder thinks that the 
immediate would-be shebait, as laid down in the line of succession, is not 
competent to manage the affairs of the deity and the debutter, the founder 
will have a chance to appoint a suitable shebait instead who can manage the 
debutter after he dies. It is suggested that it is in the idol's interest 
that a founder should have the power to dispose of the shebaiti any time 
before he dies.
Nivi
At this juncture it may be interjected that it is surprising to see 
that a trust concept called nivi , which is of Indian origin and was used 
in ancient India, is apparently no longer in use in the field of Hindu 
religious endowments. According to this concept, a fund for an endowment 
was used to be deposited with a banker permanently on condition that a part
1. T. Mukherjee and J.C. Wright, "An Early Testamentary Document....", 
op.cit., 297-320.
2. Ibid., p. 297. 3« Ibid., p. 301.
k. . Derrett, "The Development of the Concept of Property..." ECMHL,vol.2,
6^ - 63*
of the income of the deposited fund would be paid to the beneficiary of
the nivi. MThis was an excellent method of providing for periodical
worship of a deity, or the maintenance of some long-lasting object of 
1
charity.” A shebait or a mahant could not interfere with the fund placed
upon a permanent deposit with the banker and he could not have any proprietary
2interest in the fund. The title of the depositary to the capital fund ’’was
nearly that of full owner, except that he could not alienate it so as to
3
impair its capacity to provide the income stipulated.” But the present
concept of shebaiti implying property is a well developed concept evolved
out of so many judicial decisions that it seems impossible to change the
concept overnight from its present position.
Again, the present position of the law is that the idol owns the endowment
kand all the offerings made to it. But it is the shebait who normally sees
to the idol's interests and manages all its properties. Now, the first
charge which can be made on its property and its income is its meals. "These
are prepared, one will suppose, to the taste of those who will eventually eat
5
them, namely those entitled to eat the idol's "leavings”, his attendants."
A shebait is not a legal owner and he is also not merely a manager like a 
bare trustee because of the fact that he enjoys almost the same advantages 
as he would do if he had the full ownership of the debutter. "If the manager 
were treated as merely a bare trustee for the idol the purpose of many 
endowments would be frustrated and the whole transaction might become 
unworkable."^ A religious endowment serves as a mask under which a shebait 
enjoys personally almost everything that he does for the idol and for the 
maintenance of the debutter. Hindus make donations and offerings to the
1. Derrett, ECMHL, vol. 2, 63* ■ ■
2. Dhavan,.op.cit., 60. 3» Derrett, ECMHL, Vol. 2, 63*
J*. Manohar Ganesh v. Lakhmiram Govindram ILR (1887) 12 Bom 2^ 7, 238; Brijendra 
Singhji v. Kishan Ballabh AIR 1981 NOC 131 (All).
5. Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments", op.cit., 321.
6. Derrett, IMHL, +^97.
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deities for religious merit but their desire to earn religious merit
1
is not affected by the dishonesty of shebaits. The remedy is not to
abolish the institution or to utilise the endowment for secular purposes
>k £
t.3
2as suggested by a social thinker but is ”to bring in the account-boo and
the ledger, and to call the refractory to heel by due process of law.'
If a new definition of shebaiti excluding its property aspect is formulated 
and the position of a shebait is transformed in line with the position of a
bare trustee then the institution of shebait might wither as we have seen
earlier in Derrett's remark and in future there will remain very few private 
endowments in North India especially in West Bengal where a private endowment 
is generally made as a function of family management. But we diould 
find a remedy to prevent a shebait from misusing the income of a debutter.
Now, in so far as property of shebaiti is concerned a unique and realistic 
suggestion has been made by Derrett. He observes that
’•In the context of the shebait's ownership the answer must be, 
not that he owns nothing and the idol owns everything (which 
is fantasy), but that the shebait or shebaits collectively own 
the assets and that the assets are subject to a trust which
the court must supervise when called upon to do so by a com­
petent person suing in the idol’s name and for its welfare, 
or by the Advocate-General at the relation of interested 
parties. The same solution would work well if applied to the 
mahant or a manager of any endowment.”^
I t M t f j t h a t  in relation to the proprietary interest of a shebait,
in a certain endowment, Derrett*s suggestion is at first sight plausible.
If all debutter lands were enfranchised and subjected to a statutory charge
for the worship of the deity or deities, the shebait or shebaits could
dispose of the lands subject to the charge. But the objection to this is
that by repeated transfers of fractions of the lands, through many hands,
with no control over alienations for the idol(s)' benefit or necessity as
1. Derrett, ’’The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments”, op.cit., 321-322,
2. M.P. Chatterjee, Temples and Religious Endowments, B.N.Neogi, Calcutta, 
1951i as cited in Derrett*s RLSI, 507-50fe, footnote 2 of 307.
3. Derrett, RLSI, 507-308. k. Critique, 383.
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exists at present, the identity of the trust would be lost, the idol,
(whose manager would have little or no funds at his disposal to finance 
litigation) would find it impossible to enforce its rights, thus hopelessly 
fragmented, and the State's present duty to protect endowments would become 
a fiction and needless to say further endowments of this type would be 
seriously prejudiced or totally discouraged.
However, considering all the circumstances in this
stion, just quoted is the only pragmatic solution at this juncture
kir
See post p. of this thesis
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CHAPTER V
ADMINISTRATION OF DEBUTTER
SECTION 1
ALIENATION OF DEBUTTER PROPERTY 
a, Alienation by lease, mortgage and sale
When a dedication to a deity is of an absolute character, the
1 2 property comprised in it belongs to the deity as a juristic person
but the management and the possession of the dedicated property vest
3
in its shebait whose duties are not only to see that the worship of
kthe deity is performed but also to manage and preserve debutter pro-
5
perty. Although a dedication to a deity may make no mention of a 
particular person as shebait (as a wakif in Islamic law is not bound 
to nominate a mutawalli [[managerJ for his new wakf ), the existence of 
a debutter is wholly inconceivable without a shebait, because the ideal 
personality of the deity is connected with the human personality of the
1. Mayne*s Hindu Law, op.cit,, 11th ed., 926.. See also
on this point Brijendra Singhji v. Kishan Ballabh AIR 1981 NOC 131 (All)
2. Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar AIR 1957 SC 133, 136« See above, Section 1 
of the.3rd chapter.
3. Maharaja Jagadindra Nath v. Rani Hemanta Kumari (1903-^ 0 31 IA 203,
210* See above, section'1 of the M;h chapter.
k. Derrett, IMHL, ^98. In the case of a family endowment the members of 
the family have the right to see that the deity being the object of 
worship is properly maintained and preserved. See Bhimasena v. Ramesh 
Chandra AIR 1978 Ori 139, 161.
5. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., *fth ed., 201-2 , where the'
author observes that the shebait "is the person entitled to speak on 
behalf of the deity on earth and is endowed with authority to deal 
with all its temporal affairs".
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shebait. Practically speaking, there "cannot be property dedicated to
2
an idol without a shebait to manage it". In other words, all the 
interests of the deity and the debutter are attended to by the shebait 
"who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all
the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to
3
the manager of the estate of the infant heirs". It is not in truly
practical terms but only in an ideal sense that the dedicated property
can be said to belong to the deity and
"the possession and management of it must in the nature of 
things be entrusted to some person as shebait, or manager. It 
would seem to follow that the person so entrusted must of 
necessity be empowered to do whatever may be required for the 
service of the idol, and for the benefit and preservation of 
its property, at least to as great a degree as the manager of 
an infant heir. If this were not so, the estate of the idol 
might be destroyed, or wasted, and its worship discontinued, for 
want of the necessary funds to preserve and maintain them".
As a general rule properties given for religious purposes are inalien­
able.^ This general rule was laid down by the Judicial Committee in 
Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo  ^where the main issue 
to be decided was whether or not the grant of a mauroosee (hereditary) 
tenure of debutter lands at a fixed rent was valid. In that case, it had 
been held expressly that lands devoted to religious purposes could not
1. B.K. Mukherjea, ibid., p.276. See also Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami
Ayyar (1920-21) 48 IA 302, 311» where Mr. Ameer Ali
commented that "When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the 
seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency".
2. Per Page, J. Nagendra v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Cal 490, 496. .
3* Per Lord Shaw, Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar, AIR 1925 PC 139*
140, supra, p. 13b.
4. Per Sir Montague Smith, Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo, 
ri5?4-75) 2 IA 145, 152. Infra, p.269.
5. Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1874-75) 2 IA 145, 150 
where it was observed that "There is no doubt that, as a general rule 
of Hindu law, property given for the maintenance of religious worship 
and of charities connected with it is inalienable". See also Nagendra
v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Cal 490, 496 and B.K. Mukherjea op.cit. 4th ed. 276.
6. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270.
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be alienated by a shebait but he was empowered to create derivative 
tenures and estates conformable to usage. Lord Chelmsford, in delivering
the judgement, pronounced that
1 2 "The talook itself, with which these jummas connected by
tenure, was dedicated to the religious services of the idol.
The rents constituted, therefore, in legal contemplation, its
property. The shebait had not the legal property, but only
the title of manager of a religious endowment... In the
exercise of that office she could not alienate the property,
though she might create proper derivative tenures and estates
conformable to usage.
The Privy Council's ruling that the shebait was not entitled to alienate
the debutter by fixing an invariable rent of the lands in question was
based on a sound reasoning advanced by it that "To create a new and fixed
rent for all time, though adequate at the time, in lieu of giving the
endowment the benefit of an augmentation of a variable rent, from time
k
to time, would be a breach of duty in a shebait..." This observation of 
Lord Chelmsford which made the general law that property dedicated to an 
idol was inalienable has been reiterated by the Privy Council in a large 
number of cases and the Supreme Court has not deviated from those decisions.^ 
In the recent case of Sridhar v. Shri Jagan Nath Temple,^  the original
1. It means tract of proprietary land in India. See The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 5th ed., 1964, 1321.
2. The expression "jummas" means rents, see (1869-70) 13 MIA 270, 273*
3. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270, 273.
4. Ibid.p. 273-
5. Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1874-75) 2 IA 145, 130; 
Seena Pena Mayendi v. Chokkalingam Pillai (1903-4) 31 IA 83, 88, a 
case where the ex-manager granted the cultivation right of the temple 
lands permanently. Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi (1908-9) 
36 IA 148, 163 supra, p. 164; Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony 
Pandara (1916-17) 44 IA 147, 13^1 Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyair 
(1920-21) 48 IA 302, 325» supra, p.217; Niladri Sahu v. Mahant 
Chaturbhuj (1923-26) 33 IA 233» 267, a case where the mahant mort­
gaged debutter properties to get money to repay earlier loans. 
Sridhar v. Shri Jagan Nath Temple AIR 1976 SC i860, 1866,
6. AIR 1976 SC i860.
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plaintiff submitted that the site on which the two suit rooms stood was
granted to his ancestor on a permanent lease by the superintendent of
the temple concerned. Though the finding of the Court was that it was
a licence, not a lease as claimed by the plaintiff, Singh, J. delivering
the judgement for the Supreme Court pronounced that
"The present case is, in our opinion, fully covered by the 
decision in Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo, (1869)
13 Moo. Ind. App 270 (PC) where it was laid down as a general 
rule that apart from unavoidable necessity to create a new and 
fixed rent for all time, though adequate at the time, in lieu 
of giving the endowment the benefit of an augmentation of a 
variable renj^  from time to time would be a breach of duty in 
the mahant".
The principle as laid down in the above observation of his Lordship is
equally applicable to a case of shebait in management of a debutter of a
family deity as to that of a mahant in charge of a math property. In
2Srimath Daivasikhamani Ponnambala Desikar v. Perjyannan Chetti where the
main question was related to adverse possession and limitation Sir George
Rankin observed for the Privy Council that
"It is clear that permanent lease or absolute alienation of 
debutter property is beyond ordinary powers of management, 
whether in the case of the head of a math, the shebait of a 
family idol, or the dharmakarta of a temple: such alienations
can be justified only by proof of necessity for the preservation 
of the endowment or institution."3
It may be pointed out that the expression "unavoidable necessity" made
in the said observation of Singh, J. or any term giving similar meaning
k
was not used in the judgement in Maharanee Shibessouree*s case. The
expressions "benefit of the deity","unavoidable necessity" or "legal
5
necessity" often made in the judgements in relation to alienation of
1. AIR 1976 SC i860, 1866.
2. (1933-36) 63 IA 261 = AIR 1936 PC 183.
3. (1933-36) 63 IA 261, 27b. k. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270.
5. For example, see G.V. Kalmath v. Vishnu Dev AIR 1973 Mys. 207, a case
where the manager gave some debutter lands on a permanent lease at a
fixed rent, the Mysore High Court in holding the rule that "unless it
is shown that the permanent lease evidenced by exhibit 85 was entered
into for legal necessity or benefit of the deity, the said lease
cannot be binding on the deity" referred (at p.211) inter alia to Maharanee 
Shibessouree1 s case.: ', —
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debutter property originate not from the judgement in Maharanee Shibes- 
1
souree’s case but from the decision in the celebrated case of Prosunno
2
Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo.
The genesis of the expressions like ’’benefit of the deity” or ’’legal 
necessity” may be found in the interpretation of an observation of Lord
3
Chelmsford in Maharanee Shibessouree*s case made by the Privy Council
if
in Prosunno Kumari Debya's case. Before coming to lay down the original
5
rule that a shebait must of necessity be empowered to do the necessary 
for the service of the idol and for the benefit and preservation of the 
debutter, the Privy Council, in the latter case, seems to have built the
premises out of the meanings ascribed by it to the observation of Lord
£
Chelmsford in question. Thus in Prosunno Kumari’s case where the she­
bait borrowed a certain amount of money by pledging the debutter for the
repayment of that amount, the Judicial Committee referring to Maharanee
7
Shibessourree’s case held that
’’this Committee, whilst considering that the grant of such 
a pottah by a shebait would be prima facie a breach of trust, 
expressed an opinion that if the grant had been affirmed by a 
judgement, the succeeding shebaits would have been bound by 
it, probably for the reason that after a judgement it must be 
assumed either that such a pottah was warranted by the terms 
of the original endowment, or by usage, orgwas in some way 
beneficial to the interests of the trust”.
9
And then the Judicial Committee quoted the observation of Lord Chelms­
ford that "If the decree appealed against stood unreversed, the title 
to hold at a fixed invariable rent would on the pleadings, and especially
on the judgements, be viewed as res judicata, binding on the parties and
10
those claiming under them”.
1. (1869-70) 13 M IA 270 2. (1874-75) 2 IA 145, 150.
3. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270 4. (1874-75) 2 IA 145
3. See above for the rule in the observation quoted.
6. (1874-73) 2 IA 145. 7. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270.
8. (1874-75) 2 IA 145, 151
9. For the observation of Lord Chelmsford see (1869-70) 13 MIA 270, 275
10. (1874-5) 2 IA 145, 151.
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So expressions like ’’legal necessity” cannot be traced to the
1
decision in Maharanee Shibessouree*6 case but it can be ascribed to
2
the judgement in Prosunno Kumari Debya’s case (see below)
whose actual decision is based on the judgement of the Privy Council in
Hunoomanpersaud’s case,^  ’’the most celebrated of all the cases in Anglo- 
i+
Hindu law”, which did not in fact concern a shebait or a mahant, but a 
minor whose affairs were in the hands of a manager.
A shebait being a manager of the deity and being in possession of 
the debutter is expected to do the necessary for the maintenance of the 
purposes of the endowment. But if he is given the absolute right to 
manage the deity’s property in whatever way he likes, an unscrupulous 
shebait may misappropriate either the income of the debutter or the de­
butter itself. Then not only the purpose of the endowment will be unful­
filled but also the endowment itself will be in danger. But in the course 
of the administration of a shebait a situation may arise when the existing 
income or the funds of the endowment may not be sufficient to meet that 
situation, and to preserve the endowment itself the only recourse open to 
the shebait may be to get extra funds by pledging or selling the deity’s 
assets. The question whether a shebait is empowered to pledge the 
deity’s property to meet exigencies for the preservation of the endowment
1. (1869-70) 13 MIA 270.
2. (1874-75) 2 IA 145.
3. Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1854-
57) 6 MIA 393- The suit was brought to recover certain lands and 
to set aside a mortgage bond and to cancel the appellant’s name as
mortgagee in the records of the Collector.
4. Derrett, Critique, 425. See his excellent critique on Hunoomanper­
saud ’s case at 425-432 of that book. In Bhabatarini v. Ashalata 
AIB 1943 PC 89, 931 ' referring to Hunoomanpersaud*s case,
Sir George Rankin commented that ’’perhaps the most often cited of 
all the cases in the Indian reports...”.
270
itself has been settled by the decision in Prosunno Kumari Debya v,
Golab Chand Baboo. Sir Montague Smith delivering the judgement for
the Privy Council held that
"notwithstanding that property devoted to religious purposes 
is, as a rule, inalienable it is, in their Lordships' opinion, 
competent for the shebait of - property dedicated to the 
worship of an idol, in the capacity as shebait and manager of 
the estate, to incur debts and borrow money for the proper 
expenses of keeping up the religious worship, repairing the 
temples or other possessions of the idol, defending hostile 
litigious attacks, and other like objects. The power, however, 
to incur such debts must be measured by the existing necessity 
for incurring them".^
He made an analogy between the administrative power of a shebait to pledge
debutter and the authority cf the aaaager of an infant heir to charge the infant's
estate when Sir Montague continued that "The authority of the shebait of
an idol's estate would appear to be in this respect analogous to that of
the manager for an infant heir, which was thus defined in a judgement of
3 kthis Committee..." He quoted the famous observation of Knight Bruce,
L.J., and applied the principles involved in the observation of the Lord 
Justice in Hunoomanpersaud's case^ defining the authority of a manager of 
an infant heir to charge the infant's estate. Thus Knight Bruce, L.J., 
observed in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Baboee Munraj Koonweree
that
"The power of the manager for an infant heir to charge an estate 
not his own is, under Hindoo law, a limited and qualified power.7
1. (197^-75) 2 IA 2. (187^-75) 2 IA 1 5^, 151-
3. Ibid. p.'131. 4. Ibid.pp.151-152.
5. (185^-57) 6 MIA 393. 6. Ibid. ■
7. It must be pointed out that this is not correct Hindu law but it has 
been accepted as such. Thus Derrett comments in his Critique that 
"The case was concerned with mortgages to pay debts incurred at an 
earlier period, some of them to reduce the rate of interest payable.
This is not the English law regarding the powers of a guardian. It 
was very much more limited... It is not the Hindu law, which emphatically 
said that minors were liable for no debts until they reached majority, 
and that guardians had no powers of alienation (without the consent, 
we must understand, of the court). The Mitakshara text which suggests
(continued on next page)
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It can only be exercised rightly, in a case of need, or the 
benefit of the estate. But where, in the particular instance, 
the charge is one that a prudent owner would make, in order 
to benefit the estate, the bona fide lender is not affected 
by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual 
pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, or the bene­
fit to be conferred upon it, in the particular instance, is 
the thing to be regarded. But of course, if that danger 
arises or has arisen from any misconduct to which the lender 
is or has been a party, he cannot take any advantage of his 
own wrong, to support a charge in his own favour against the 
heir, grounded on a necessity which his own wrong has helped 
to cause. Therefore the lender in this case, unless he is 
shewn to have acted mala fide, will not be affected, though 
it is shewn that with better management the estate might have 
been kept free from debt.”1
2
Prosunno Kumari Debya laid down the guide lines about when and under 
what circumstances a shebait is permitted to pledge the deity’s property. 
In so far as the administration of a debutter, especially the authority 
of a shebait to alienate the endowed property is concerned, the decision 
in the Privy Council case is unquestionably a pioneer one. It must be 
asserted, before we go further, that no one can mortgage an estate unless 
the latter is capable of being permanently alienated.
Again the ruling that the power of a shebait to borrow money or ”to
incur debts must be measured by an existing necessity...” ,^ was explained
if
by the Privy Council in Niladri Sahu v. Mahant Chaturbhuj Das where the
(continued from previous page)
that a manager may alienate the family property for minors as well as 
major members (subject to the consent of the latter) speaks of the 
necessities arising from distress, the benefit of the family, and 
religious purposesI This is a wider power, not ultimately directed 
to the interests of minors, but concerned to enable a joint-family 
to be a viable social and economic unit. It is a wider power than 
that stated by Knight Bruce, L.J., and it is clear he, and his fellow 
Privy Councillors, did not have that passage in mind... No one can 
suggest that the rule has been calamitous, or misconceived. It has 
worked very well. It was not a direct importation from London. Whence 
did it come then?
’’...Some of my readers will be astonished at my reply. This is 
Roman law”. See pp. ^28-^29.
1. (185^57) 6 MIA 3931 ^23-^. • 2. (187^-73) 2 IA 1^ 5.
3- Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (187^ -75) 2 IA 2^ 5, 151*
k. (1923-26) 53 IA 253.
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raahant mortgaged debutter properties to raise the money for paying the
debts already incurred by him for the construction of a lodging house.
In that case it was held that ”it was the immediate cause not the remote
cause, the causa causans, of the borrowing which was to be considered.
The immediate cause of the borrowing was the math’s need of money to
1
carry on and pay for its services”.
It is now a well settled law that in the course of his administration of
a debutter a shebait is entitled to alienate property for the benefit and
2
the preservation of the endowment itself. Innumerable decisions have 
been made to that effect.
3
In Prasanna Kumar v. Sri Jagannath, the Full Bench of the Orissa High
Court, dealing with the interpretations of different phrases of the Orissa
L
Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1952 (Act 2 of 1952), held that ”It is 
well settled that a permanent lease of temple land at a fixed rent or rent- 
free for a premium whether the lands are agricultural or building site is
5
valid only if made for the necessity of the institution”. Referring to
1. Per Lord Atkinson (1925-26) 53 IA 253, 267.
2. For example , Prasanna Kumar v. Sri Jagannath AIR 1971 Ori 246, (FB),
254, G.V. Kalmath v. Vishnu Dev AIR 1973 Mys 207, 210-211, Sridhar v.
Shri Jagan Nath Temple AIR 1976 SC i860, 1886. But see Phani Bhusan 
v. Kenaram Bhuniya AIR 1980 Cal 255♦ 258 where the High Court referred 
to Hunoomanpersaud's case (1854-57) 6 M IA 393» to justify its ruling 
that legal necessity was not required in case of alienation of partial 
debutter. It is surprising to note that it has not mentioned Prosunno 
Kumari’s case (1874-75) 2 IA 145. Earlier the same Court in Offl.
Receiver v. Iswar Baldev Jiu, AIR 1963 Cal 647, 662, referred to the 
same Privy Council case only to hold that alienation of debutter was
not permissible in absence of unavoidable necessity. In that case (at p.662), 
Mallick J. observed that ’’Ever since Hunoomanpersand's case reported 
in 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC), the courts have held that a manager of an 
infant's or debutter estate has no power to alienate minor's property 
or debutter property ’except in the need or the benefit of the estate'.” - 
the least informed ruling I have come across in my research. A judge
sitting in a Bench of the High Court dealing with a case of Hindu religious
endowment is assumed to know that in the circumstances concerned it is 
the reference to the decision in Prosunno Kumari's case (1874-75) 2 IA 
145, but not to that in Humoomanpersaud's case, 1(1854-57) 6 MIA 393 
which is indispensable.
3. AIR 1971 Ori 246 (FB).
k. Now superseded by the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1969
(Orissa Act 2 of 1970).
5. AIR 1971 Ori 246 (FB), 254.
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1
Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara the Full Bench also pointed 
2out that in the absence of necessity permanent alienation of debutter 
property is not permitted even if it is sanctioned by custom or the 
practice of the institution]
It is interesting to note that in case of necessity the shebait is 
held to be entitled to alienate debutter property even if there is a 
condition in a deed of dedication that he shall not alienate or encumber 
the debutter property. Thus in Ramchandraji Maharaj v. Lalji Singh^ 
where the deed in question imposed a limitation on the power of
the shebait (mahant) to dispose of the debutter properties and where some 
debutter properties were disposed of by the shebait on a perpetual lease 
for meeting pressing necessity, holding the alienation of the suit proper­
ties as valid Kanhaiya Singiy J^* pronounced for the Patna High Court that 
"It is well settled law that a mahant or shebait has power to incur debts 
and alienate the dedicated property either by sale or mortgage" in case 
of need or for the benefit of the estate. "It is therefore, recognised 
that for unavoidable necessity the mahant or the shebait in charge of
the property for the time being can create even a permanent lease of the
5debutter property."
But it may be pointed out that a shebait’s alienation of debutter 
property without any legal necessity is not void but it holds good as 
long as he is alive or holds the shebaiti.^ In Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama
7
Charan Nandi where the mahant claiming the debutter to be his own 
property granted permanent leases of substantial portion of the debutter
1. AIR 1917 PC 33 = (1916-17) ^  IA 1^ ?.
2. AIR 1971 Ori 246' (FB), 254. 3- AIR 1939 Pat 305-
4. Ibid., p. 309. 3. Ibid., p. 309.
6. Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21) 48 IA 304, 327; Ponnambala
v. Periyanan AIR 1936 PC 183, 186, Derrett, IMHL 301, B.K. Mukherjea,
op.cit., 4th ed. 279*
7. (1908-9) 36 IA 148 supra, p.
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without any legal necessity, the Privy Council held that "the leases
... were valid only during the lifetime of the mahant by whom they 
1
were granted..." The same principle was reiterated and laid down
2
in Ram Charan v. Naurangilal where the question for determination
was whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. Lord Russell
pronounced for the Privy Council that "a mahant las power (apart from any
question of necessity) to create an interest in property appertaining
to the mutt which will continue during his own life, or to put it perhaps
more accurately, which will continue during the tenure of office of
mahant of the mutt".^
Unless a grant of permanent lease of a debutter property by a shebait
is made for unavoidable necessity, the act of the shebait will be held
as a breach of duty on his part. Thus in Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony 
4Pandara, Atkinson, J. held that "it is a breach of duty on the part of 
a shebait, unless constrained thereto by unavoidable necessity, to grant
5
a lease in perpetuity of debutter lands at a fixed rent...." For grant­
ing a lease of debutter lands in perpetuity at a fixed rent by a shebait, 
"however adequate that rent may be at the time of granting", will deprive 
the endowment "of the chance it would have, if the rent were variable, 
of deriving benefit from the enhancement in value in the future of the 
lands leased."^ An alienation of a debutter will not be valid beyond the
1. (1908-9) 36 IA 148, 167.
2. AIR 1933 PC 75 = (1932-33) 60 IA 124.
3. AIR 1933 PC 75* 77. The same view was held by the Privy Council in 
Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti (1934-35) 62 IA 47, 52-53* which 
was related to a village forming a part of a debutter estate.
4. (1916-17) 44 IA 147. 5. Ibid., pp. 155-156.
6. (1916-17) 44 IA 147, 156. This ruling was based on the observation
of Lord Chelmsford (quoted above p. 266) in Maharanee Shibessouree's 
case (1869-70) 13 MIA, 270, 275.
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1
life of the shebait unless it is made of unavoidable necessity.
However, if the validity of an alienation is called into question
after a long period from the alienation, the Court will assume that
the alienation was made for legal necessity. In Iswar Gopal v. Pratapmal 
2
Bagaria where the suit was concerned with the estate of a deity installed 
at Chinsurah in West Bengal, Fazl Ali, J. observed for the Supreme 
Court that
"It is now well settled that where the validity of a permanent 
lease is called in question a long time after the grant, 
although it is not possible to ascertain fully what the cir­
cumstances were in which it was made, the Court should assume 
that the grant was made for necessity so as to be valid beyond 
the life of the grantor".^
An alienation of debutter property on a permanent basis is not valid beyond
if
the tenure of the office of a shebait unless it is of legal necessity.
Yet alienations by a permanent lease made without legal necessity or
benefit of the deity or foundation itself may give valid title to the
5 
lessee by adverse possession.
An alienation of a debutter property by a sale or by a permanent lease 
is governed by the same rule^ in the sense that to make it binding on
1. Chocklingham Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar ILR (1896) 19 Mad 485; Bawa
Magniram v. Kasturbai' AIR 1922 PC 163, 165; Iswar Gopal v Pratapmal
Bagaria AIR 1951 SC 214, 216.
2. AIR 1951 SC 214. 3. Ibid., p. 216.
4. Ram Charan v. Naurangilal (1932-33) 60 IA 124, 130 = AIR-1933-PC 75,-77.
5« Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti (1934-35) 62 IA 47, 53; Ponnambala 
v. Periyanan AIR 1936 PC 183, 1b6-1b8; Derrett, IMHL 501-502.
6. In Ram Charan v. Naurangi Lai, AIR 1933 PC 75, Lord Russell (at p.78), 
referring to his own observation that "a mahant is at liberty to dispose 
of the property of a mutt during the period of his life and that a 
grant purporting to be for a longer period is good to the extent of 
the mahantfs life interest..." held that "the statement is in no way 
confined to the grant of a lease, but covers the case of a purported 
out and out grant of the property"
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the endowment, unavoidable necessity must be proved and the onus of 
proving such necessity or justifying such alienation lies with the 
alienee.^
Now any decree of judgement passed against a shebait binds not only
the shebait for the time being but also his successors.^ In Prosunno 
4
Kumarifs case the Judicial Committee laid down the law that ’’judgements
obtained against a former shebait in respect of debts so incurred should
be binding upon successive shebaits, who, in fact, form a continuing
5
representation of the idol's property."
Moreover, a shebait has power to compromise inherent in his right as
a manager^ of the deity and he "may validly enter into a compromise which
7
will bind the deity without the prior consent of the Court", but that
\
compromise must be beneficial not prejudicial to the interests of the
8 9deity. A decree based on a compromise is binding on the endowment
10and the succeeding shebaits are also bound by the same decree.
Though a shebait is entitled to do whatever is necessary for the benefit
or the preservation of the debutter, he "may not undertake anything with
11regard to the endowment which is speculative." In Manohar Das v. Tarini
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op. cit., 4th ed. 292.
2. G.V. Kalmath v. Vishnu Dev AIR 1973, Mys 207, 211; Vijay Chand v.
Thakurji Radha Krishna AIR 1979 NOC 154 (All).
3* Derrett, IMHL, 501; B.K. Mukherjea, 4th ed., 273*
4. (1874-75) 2 IA 145. 5* Per Sir Montague Smith, ibid.,p.152.
6. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 274.
7* Derrett, IMHL, 501.
8. Sri Ram v. Chandeswar Prasad AIR 1952 Pat 438, 444.
9. Sudhindra v. Budan ILR (1885) 9 Mad 80, 83; Chintaman Vithoba v.
Chintaman Bajaji ILR (1898) 22 Bom 475, 481; Manikka Vasaka v. Bal- 
agopalakrishna ILR (1906) 29 Mad 553, 555.
10. Hossein Ali v. Mahanta Bhagaban ILR (1907) 34 Cal 249, 256.
11. Derrett, IMHL 501. On this point see also B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 
280.
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Charan, a case where the mahant alienated the debutter property by way
of lease which, though it was done without necessity, resulted in profit
to the debutter as a whole, Graham, J. pronounced for the Calcutta High
Court that the expression "benefit to the deity” "must be interpreted
in its special meaning and cannot be construed in such a way as to cover
any and every contract or lease which may bring some sort of financial
2benefit to the estate”.
At this juncture, it might be interjected that there is a judicial 
divergence in opinion regarding the issue whether unproductive or unmanage­
able debutter properties could be disposed of by the shebait without any
3
legal necessity. In Baidyanath Prasad v. Kunja Kumar, where the shebait
sold a debutter land situated at a distant place which could not be looked
after properly and did not yield any reasonable profit, Narayan, J. refer-
Zf
ring inter alia to two Allahabad cases held that the phrase 'benefit to 
the deity' "may be held to apply to such a transaction as the sale of 
inconveniently situated, encumbered and unprofitable property, and the 
purchase in its stead of other property was undeniably a sound investment."^ 
But Derrett comments on the decision of the Patna High Court that "The 
Court has, in any case, no jurisdiction to enlarge the shebait's powers 
at Hindu law - there is no analogy with the manager of a minor's estate 
in this instance..."^
But the view of Page, J. that "the shebait's power's of alienation 
must be exercised for purposes of defence and not of aggrandisement; as
1. (1929-30) 3^ CWN 135.
2. Ibid., p. 137*
3. AIR 19^ 9 Pat 75.
Jado Singh v. Nathu Singh AIR 1926 All 1 and Jagat Narain v. Mathura 
Das AIR 1928 All (FB). The analogy was the power of a manager of 
a joint Hindu family.
5. AIR 1949 Pat 731 76. 6. IMHL, 302.
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a shield not as a sword" seems to have been accepted in Laxmidas
2Mathuradas v. Jitendra Mullick where the shebaits purporting to sell 
a certain debutter property entered into an agreement with the would- 
be buyer. Harris, C.J., discussing different cases where the phrase
"for the benefit of the estate” was dealt with, did not accept the wider
3 *+meaning given to the phrase in Hossein Ali Khan1s and Krishna Chandra’s
cases. Accepting the restricted meaning of the phrase and referring
5
inter alia to Raghumani Roy v. Bibhuti Bhusan Roy and the Privy Council 
case of Raja Kandukuri v. Gade Subbaya  ^where the phrase, "for the benefit 
of the estate" has been given meaning synonymously with the meaning of 
the phrase "legal necessity" and as alternative to legal necessity 
respectively, held that "It is not enough to show that as a result of the
7
transaction the vendors might receive a somewhat larger income". The 
same principle was reiterated by the Bombay High Court in Chintaman v.
g
Narayan Maharaj where the founder of a religious institution borrowed 
a large amount of money with the intention of establishing a permanert source of 
income of the institution in question. It was held that the power of a 
shebait to render liable the estate for the institution "can only be 
exercised for protective purposes and not for enhancing the estate of
9
the institution". There is thus a clear distinction between the powers
of a shebait and those of a manager of a joint Hindu family, who has a
10greater power of initiative.
1. Nagendra v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Cal 9^0, 501.
2. ILR (1952) 2 Cal 352. 3- ILR (1907) 3>k Cal 2^ 9-
k. (1915-16) 20 CWN 6 5^. 5. AIR 1936 Cal 256 = (1936) 6k CU 65.
6. (1936-37) V  CWN 18 (PC).
7. ILR (1952) 2 Cal 352, 357.
8. AIR 1956 Bom 553. 9. Ibid., p. 555.
10. For a detailed discussion on the subject see below, section 2 of 
the next chapter.
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It is submitted that the expression "benefit of the estate" should 
be given a restricted meaning, in the sense that unless there is 
unavoidable or imperative necessity for disposing of debutter property 
the Court should not allow an alienation as a valid transaction. For 
there will not be any want of showing so-called grounds of necessity 
to justify an alienation of a debutter property for the material benefits 
of the manager. It is suggested that strict adherence to restricted 
meanings to the phrases of "the benefit of the deity" and "unavoidable 
necessity" must be maintained. If the Court becomes too liberal in this 
respect then the shebait in collusion with a third party may dispose of 
the debutter property with the pretext of legal necessity or benefit of 
the deity at a price much lower than the market price of the property.
In Behari Lai v, Radha Ballabhji the contention of the defendant was 
that the suit property (a house) was in a dilapidated condition and it 
was sold for the benefit of the deity of the estate. But in fact the 
property was not in a delapidated condition; it needed only repairs.
The disputed property was sold by the shebait at far below its market 
price. The Allahabad High Court did not hold the transaction as valid.
It might be pointed out that there was a strong possibility that in the 
aforesaid case the shebait might have colluded with the buyer to see the 
transaction go through on a so-called ground of benefit of the deity.
1. AIR 1961 All 73* Similar rules are well understood in reference to 
the manager's power of alienation of joint family property. See 
Ram Charan Lonia v. Bhagwan Das Maheshri (1925-26) 53 IA 1^2 where 
the Privy Council remarked obiter that in the case of joint family 
property the manager could alienate the entire immovable property 
for necessity "provided (that) the property was not sacrificed 
for an inadequate price..." p. 1^ 6. Therefore adequacy of consider­
ation is an important element in respect of a manager's alienation 
of joint family property. See also Kailash Nath v. Tulshi Ram 
ILR (19^6) All 457, *f60; Dudh Nath v. Sat Narain Ram AIR 19&6 All 
315 (FB), 316; Durga Prasad Bhagat v. Marchia Bewa (1967) 33 
CLT628, 633-636; Gopalakrishnan v. Balasubramania Chettiar (1969)
1 M U  537, 5^0.
280
It may be noted that we have seen cases of illusory endowments but 
the Allahabad case is not a case of illusory endowment but it was an 
illusory transaction in respect of a valid endowment representing 
possibly a large number of cases which do not come to the Courts and 
find their way into law reports, and so escape our notice.
Alienation of the whole of an endowment
In this context it must be added that though a shebait is entitled to
sell debutter property or to alienate it by a permanent lease, his power
to sell or dispose of such property is limited in the sense that he is
never entitled to dispose of the whole of the endowed property. He can
1
only alienate certain items of an endowment. An alienation of the whole
2 3of an endowed property is void. In Ram Charan v. Naurangilal where the
issue to be determined was whether the suit was barred by limit at ion, Lord
Russell of Killowen pronounced for the Privy Council on the point at issue
unambiguously that
’’Their Lordships.. .must point out that the cases in foanasambanda 
Pandara v. Velu Pandaram... and Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das... were 
both of them cases in which the assignment or the disposition 
consisted of an assignment or disposition of the mutt and its 
properties. Such an assignment was void and would in law pass 
no title, with the result that the possession of the assignee was 
perforce adverse from the moment of the attempted assignment...”
5
In Ram Charan’s case the subject-matter was related not to the whole of
6 7the endowment as in Gnanasambanda1 s and Damodar’s ' cases but the Privy 
Council has been clear in its exposition of the law at issue.
Though some items of a debutter may be disposed of on the grounds of
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit. *fth ed., 279*
2. Gnanasambanda Pandara v. Velu Pandaram (1899-1900) 27 IA 69i 76; 
Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (1909-10) 57 IA 2V?, 151; Ram Charan v. 
Naurangi Lai AIR 19551 PC 75* 77; Bairagi Das v. Udai Chandra AIR 
1965 Ori 201, 203-
3. AIR 1935 PC 75-
5. AIR 1955 PC 75-
7. (1909-10) 37 IA 2^ 7.
k. Ibid., p. 77.
6. (1899-1900) 27 IA 69.
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1
necessity and benefit of the deity, items like idols and a temple
can never be transferred for pecuniary considerations even on the grounds
legal necessity.^
3
In Panna Banerjee v. Kali Kinkor it was observed that
"An idol can never be the subject-matter of commerce. The 
sale of an idol is prohibited by Hindu law... A deity is not 
a chattel but a juridic:,al person. No custom can ever vali­
date a sale of any deity. The legal necessity of the deity
cannot destroy the very existence of the deity by selling it
in the open market... It is against public policy... It is 
so repulsive to the judicial mind that ©rery Court is bound 
to strike it down in limine.
5
In Mukundji Mahraj v. Persotam Lalji the property in dispute was 
half of the temple with the installed deity in it, which was bought at 
auction by one Goswami Purushottam Lalji. Agarwala, J. of the Allahabad
High Court observed that "a temple cannot be sold in execution of a decree
obtained by a creditor on the basis of a loan taken by a mahant even if 
it be for legal necessity".^ The credit of the deity is obviously vitally 
affected by the law thus stated.
Now, the decision in the above Calcutta case was affirmed on appeal
7
by the Supreme Court in Kali Kinkor v.Panna Banerjee. where Ray, C.J. 
delivering the judgement of the Supreme Court pronounced inter alia that 
the transfer of either a temple or the deity TTby sale is void in its 
inception".^
1. Khetter Chunder v. Haridas ILR (1890) 17 Cal 557, where it was held 
that "the Hindu law prohibits the sale of an idol" - 559 Bairagi v. 
Uday AIR 1965 Ori 201, 205; Panna Banerjee v. Kali Kinkor AIR 1974 
Cal 126, 159.
2. Mukundji Mahraj v. Persotam Lalji AIR 1957 All 77, 80.
3. AIR 1974 Cal 126.
4. Per Deb,J. Ibid p.139**Selling the deity'1' is a picturesque expression 
not of course to be taken literally.
5. AIR 1957 All 77 = ILR (1956) 1 All 421.
6. AIR 1957 All 771 80 (my emphasis). Referring to the decision in the 
Allahabad case Derrett comments that "it was urged with great plausi­
bility that even for legal necessity, for example to pay debts binding 
upon the idol it was legally impossible for the temple itself to be 
sold" - IMHL, 502.
7. AIR 1974 SC 1932.Supra, p. 249. 8. Ibid.,p. 1936.
282
It is true that the law prohibits alienation of idols or a temple
by any means and the idol cannot be sold as a chattel.. But can such
a law stop an idol being sold as a chattel? As long as the present
1
Indian law of limitation is applicable to the case of a debutter
specially to all cases of private debutter; my answer is no. An
acquirer of an idol by adverse possession may gain a valid title of
ownership of a consecrated idol by a lapse of certain period as provided
in the Limitation Law; the idol becoming a secular property of the
possessor may be treated as a chattel. It is urged that in case of a
debutter the Law of Limitation should not be applied and a new law
incorporating the ancient rule that ’’the property of gods could never
2be acquired by lapse of time” should be introduced and applied. Hiere 
is, of course, no perfect precedent for this in the personal laws of 
modern South Asia.
b. Alienation as a Result of Shebait*s Execution of Promissory Notes
The law is unquestionably settled that a shebait or all co-shebaits
together have the power to charge, mortgage, even sell the property of
the idol or to dispose of any income of the debutter for the benefit or
the necessity of the deity,^ but the law is not at all clear whether the
shebait is empowered to borrow money for the necessity of the idol by
executing promissory notes and in this respect if we are to go by the 
4
latest decision on the subject then the law is that he is not entitled 
to do so.
In V.K. Kombi Achan v. C.K. Chidambara Iyer  ^a trustee of a temple
1. The present law is provided by the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 
1963)* Relevant sections for our purpose are Secs. 92-96. See 
below, Appendix IIA.
2. Derrett, Critique, 378.
3* Derrett, IMHL, 501.
4. V.K. Kombi Achan v. C.K. Chidambara Iyer, 1966 KLT 597-
5. Ibid.
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1
the Viswanathaswami Temple, executed a promissory note for its purpose.
2
Following the decisions in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Shanmugam Chettiar 
a case where a trustee executed a promissory note purporting to bind 
a fund of a charitable character, Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar^ 
in which a trustee executed a promissory note on his personal credit 
for debts for the purposes of a trust and Rama Variar v. Ananthanarayana 
Pattar, a case where urallers (managers) of a devaswom borrowed money 
executing promissory notes for a proper and necessary purpose of the 
foundation the Kfcrala High Court ruled that a trustee of a temple could 
not bind the idol by executing a promissory note incurring a debt for
5
the necessity of the idol. The Kerala High Court also accepted the view
that an idol was a permanent minor. Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair delivering
the judgement of the Court ruled on the issue in question that
"The law appears well settled that in a suit on a promissory 
note executed by the guardian of a minor the latter's estate 
cannot be made liable, and that the consecrated idol in a 
temple being for legal purposes, a permanent minor (vide 4 IA 
32) the same principle applies to a promissory note executed 
by its trustee".^
It is rightly pointed out by Derrett that the cited case of Konwur Door- 
ganath Roy v. Ram Chunder Sen (1876) 4 IA 52, in the said observation of 
Nair, J.,
1. See the illuminating critique of Derrett on the case in "Promissory Notes
executed by Shebaits" in 1966 KLT Jnl 101-104. In that article Derrett
enquires why the textbook writers like Mayne, Mulla, Mukherjea, Gupte, 
Gour and Raghavachariar did not deal with the topic at issue and the 
cases dealing with a shebait's power of borrowing money by executing
promissory notes. The learned author himself finds out the answer
for all of us when he points out that "The answer is simple. People 
tend to divide up the topics of law with mental scissors. These cases 
fall under the law of negotiable instruments and will be found mentioned 
in treatises on that subject. Since they fall on that side of the line 
and headnotes and indexes index them under that heading it does not 
occur to any writer on Hindu law to use them". See p. 103.
2. ILR (1918) 41 Mad 815. 3. (1916) 32 M U  259.
4. (1950) 2 M U  636.
5. See on this point Derrett, "Promissory Notes.op.cit., 101-102.
6. 1966 KLT 597, 597.
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’’Laid down nothing of the kind and was not concerned with 
a promissory note. What was observed in that case (at p.6*0 
as has been in many another case dealing with religious 
endowments, namely that as regards the powers of the shebait
to bind the idol by his alienations he may be regarded as
limited . analogously with the manager for an infant heir,
so that the rule in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussamut
Babooee 6 MIA 423 is applicable to alienations by a trustee 
of a temple (Prosunno Kumari v. Golab Chand 2 IA 151)*
This rule, which is notorious, does not amount to a propo­
sition that the idol is a minor”.^
2Similarly Mukherjea also expresses categorically that a Hindu idol
is not a perpetual minor. In support of the view that an idol is not
a permanent minor the learned author cited^ Surendrakrishna v. Shree
4
Shree Bhubaneswari ILR (1933) 60 Cal 54, where it was observed refer­
ring to the doctrine that an idol was a perpetual minor, that it was an
extravagant theory contrary to the judgement of the Privy Council in
5
cases like Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das.
Again Ameer Ali, J. dealt specifically with the point of analogy
between the deity and a minor in Ananta Krishna Shastri v. Prayag Das.^
His Lordship pronounced that
"To my way of thinking, their nature is essentially different.
Their practical incidents differ, for instance, in the case 
of a minor he is being protected and his properties saved so 
that he can enjoy it to the full upon attaining majority. In 
the case of a deity no such thing can happen: he is a major,
he is born major, there is no future time at which he becomes 
major and then enjoys the property. He is not incapable. He 
is under no inherent disability... On the other hand he is 
all powerful. He owns property but for quasi-physical 
reasons cannot make his own contracts. Therefore, he has torj 7
make contracts through a human agency".'
So it is obvious tbat in the presence of so many authorities cited above
1. Derrett, "Promissory Notes...", op.cit., .101-102, Emphasis provided.
2. Ibid., 102 where he quoted B.K. Mukherjea on the point extensively.
3. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 236.
4. ILR (1933) 60 Cal 54, 73*
5. (1909-10) 37 IA 147.
6. ILR (1937) 1 Cal 84.
7. Ibid., p. 97.
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*1
the rule laid down by the Kerala High Court in V.K. Kombi Achan*s case 
that a Hindu idol was a minor, is wrong. But the actual decision in 
the case that a trustee could not bind the idol by executing a promis­
sory note incurring debts for the purpose of the idol seems to be correct 
in the sense that they are supported by previous decisions. Whether the
rule itself is correct may be tested when we examine those decisions
evolving and accepting the rule that a shebait could not bind the debutter
executing a promissory note.
2Let us consider first Swaminatha Aiyar’s case. Rahim and Spencer J.J.
following three cases,^ two of which were English cases which had nothing
to do with Hindu religious endowments, came to the conclusion that a
trustee could not bind the debutter if he borrowed money executing a
promissory note for the purpose of the endowment itself. Their Lordships
4
referred to a Calcutta case which was ironically related to a hotel 
under a trust and in the Calcutta case the judgement debtor was a trustee 
of a hotel called the Adelphi Hotel. They did not accept the authority 
of the Hindu law specially related to the point at issue based on a 
decision in a case of Hindu religious endowment in spite of the fact 
that they discussed the case.^ The case was Shrimat Daivasikamani v.
Noor Mahamad Rowtham.^  It was not related to any debt of a shebait of 
a Hindu religious endowment; it nevertheless laid down the rule that 
debts contracted by the head of a math for the purposes of the math 
would bind the math. A decree regarding such debts might be passed 
against the succeeding head charging the income of the debutter in spite 
of the fact that such debts were not charged on the income of the math.
1. 1966 KLT 597. 2. (1917) 32 M U  259-
3. Strictland v. Symons (1884) 26 Ch.D 245, In the matter of Johnson, 
Shearman v. Robertson (1880) 15 Ch.D. 548 and In the matter of M.A. 
Shard ILR (1901) 28 Cal 574.
4. In the matter of M.A. Shard ILR (1901) 28 Cal 574.
5. See (1917) 32 M U  259, 261-262. 6. ILR (1908) 3*1 Mad 47.
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In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Shamnugam Chettiar, in laying down
the rule that a trustee of a temple or a charity drawing a hundi or
a promissory note or a bill of exchange could not bind the religious
or charitable institution even in respect of debts incurred for the
purposes of an institution, the Madras High Court applied the rule of
English law about bills made by churchwardens, overseers and others, in
2their official capacities. Wallis C.J. came to his conclusion only
when in the facts of the case nothing was found to justify that the
trustee "intended to draw the hundi on behalf of any body e l s e . S o  
If
Palaniappa cannot be the authority for the proposition that the act 
of a trustee borrowing money by executing a promissory note for the 
purposes of the religious foundation could not bind the foundation. In 
that case it was not proved that the borrowed money in question was 
actually spent for the purposes of the endowment.
5
Now, the decision;in Rama Variar v. Ananthanarayana Pattar was not 
correct because it was based on the decisionsin Palaniappa  ^and Swamin-
7
atha'sr cases and neither of those cases, as we have seen, can be relied 
on for the proposition that a trustee could not bind the deity by execut­
ing a promissory note borrowing money for the purposes of the deity.
But many cases dealing with a shebait’s power to borrow money by 
executing a promissory note or bills for the purposes of the deity in 
effect laid down the rule, which, it may be submitted, is a correct one - 
that a shebait could bind the idol for the debts incurred for the idol's 
purposes by executing a promissory note.
1. ILR (1918) 4'1 Mad 815.
2. Ibid, pp.820-821 where Wallis, C.J. referred to and quoted from Byles 
on Bills, 16th ed., p. 86.
3. ILR (1918) Mad 815, 821. V  Ibid.
5. (1950) 2 M U  636. 6. ILR (1918) **1 Mad 815.
7. (1916) 32 M U  239.
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In Laksmindratheertha v. Raghavendra Row, the head of a math 
incurred debt borrowing money for the necessary purposes of the math. 
Sadasiva Ayyar, and Spencer, J.J. held that the head of a math incur­
ring debts for the purposes of the math bound the math property. A 
suit to recover money could be brought during the lifetime of the 
incumbent or against his successor. Sadasiva Ayyar J also pointed out 
a distinction between a sannyasi head of a math and a lay trustee of a 
charitable or religious foundation. In his opinion an analogy could
not be drawn between a head of a mutt and an administrator or a lay
2
trustee of a religious or charitable institution. Referring inter 
alia to Shankar Bharati Svami v. Venkapa Naik^ where it was observed 
that a head of a math might presumably have no private property and must 
be presumed to pledge the credit of the math when incurring debts he 
incurred for the purposes of the math, Sadasiva Ayyar, J. pronounced 
that
"I am clear that a Hindu Sanyasi has no personal credit whatever 
of a monetary or proprietary character, and that it is a contra­
diction in terms to state that any loan was made to a sanyasi 
on his personal credit. I would therefore hold that Swaminatha 
Aiyar... and the other cases referred to, do not apply when the 
question of the liability of the mutt or other institution for 
the debt incurred by a Sanyasi as head of the institution comes 
into question."
In his judgement in the same Madras case, Spencer J. referred inter 
alia to Daivasikamani v. Noor Mahamad^ and approved it and ruled that in 
all the cases "in which the head of a math, either directly or by impli­
cation, pledged the credit of the math in incurring debts for purposes 
necessary for the maintenance of the institution ... (*) there is 
no presumption that the head of the mutt... intended to make himself
1. ILR (1920) 43 Mad 795- 2. ILR CL920) 43 Mad 795, 798.
3. ILR (1885) 9 Bom 422. 4. ILR (1920) 43 Mad 795, 799-
3. ILR (1908 ) 31 Mad 47. See above, this section.
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1
personally liable”.
But Sadasiva Ayyar, J.*s comments on the decisions in Swaminatha
2 3Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar, Chidambaran Pillai v. Veerappa Chettiar
if
and Parvathi Ammal v. Namagiri Ammal are the most revealing ones on
the issue in question. His Lordship observed that
’’The principle underlying these decisions is that such a 
trustee, or other person in the position of a trustee, has 
got his personal credit to pledge and the presumption should 
be that when he incurred a debt without charging the trust 
properties, the creditor lent the money on such personal 
credit and could look to that credit alone and to the prin­
ciple of subrogation for recovery of his l o a n ” .5
It may be interjected here that there must be a distinction drawn between 
a lay trustee and a shebait - between a trustee of a hotel as we have 
seen in the Calcutta case and a trustee of a religious endowment dedi­
cated to a deity.
Moreover, in Niladri Sahu v. Mahant Chaturbhuj Das  ^where the mahant 
borrowed money from moneylenders on notes of hand not for the necessary
7
purpose of the math and Vibhuda Priya v. Laksmindra where the mahant 
borrowed money for the benefit of the math, the Privy Council laid down 
the rule that a decree could be passed to realize in discharge of debts, 
incurred for the purposes of the math, the beneficial interest of the 
mahant in the endowed property, and the decree would bind the succeeding 
mahant as well. Relying on the said Privy Council decisions the Madras
g
High Court held in Venkatabalagurumurthi Chettiar v. Balakrisha Odayar 
that the creditor was entitled to recover the value of goods from the 
assets of the temple when goods were bought by the trustee for the purposes 
of the temple.
1. ILR (1920) Mad 795, 799.
2. (1917) 52 M U  259,cited above in this section.
3. (1917) 6 LW 6^0 as cited at 798 of ILR (1920) Mad 795.
k. (1917) 6 LW 722 as cited at 798 of ILR (1920) Mad 795*
3. ILR (1920) 43 Mad 795, 798. 6. (1925-26) 53 IA 253.
7. (1926-27) 5  ^IA 228. 8. (1931) 60 M U  90, 96.
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In Sudaresan Chetty v. Viswanatha Pandarasamadhi, Krishnan, J. on the
finding that the trustees of the temple in question had agreed to repay
the loan out of the temple funds which was borrowed for temple purposes,
2granted a decree charging the funds of the temple. In that case, the 
trustee of a temple borrowed money on a bond for the purposes of the 
temple in question. In this context it may be pointed out that his 
Lordship not only granted a decree charging the funds of the temple but 
also laid down the general rule that where a trustee borrowed money for 
the purposes of a temple without charging the funds of the institution 
expressly, a decree could be granted to the creditor charging the funds 
of the institution. Thus His Lordship ruled that "Turning now to the 
main question argued, whether in the absence of an express charge on the 
temple properties a decree could be given against!’ temple properties or 
the like,"it seems to me the learned District Judge’s view that it
could not be given is not correct on the facts of the case".^
kBut in this context Manikka Vasaka Desikar v. Balagopalakrishna Chetty 
is in point. In that case the head of a math purchased goods for the
necessary purposes of the math by executing a promissory note. Following
5
the decision in Sudindra v. Budan which was based on the decision in
Prosunno Kumari Debya*s case  ^ the Madras High Court, in spite of the fact
that the head of the math against whom the decree was passed for the
recovery of the money gave up his position of the head, held that
"a decree passed against the trustee of a mutt is binding on 
his successor upon whom lies the onus of coming forward and 
taking steps to set aside a decree, which as it stands is bind­
ing upon the mutt as represented by him, and that in execution
proceedings he cannot be allowed to dispute the correctness of 
the decree".?
1. (1922) MU 1^ 7. 2. Ibid., p. 152.
3. Ibid., p. 1^ 9. * ILR (1906) 29 Mad 553.
5. ILR (1885) 9 Mad 80. 6. (187^ -75) 2 IA 1*»5. Supra, p. 2?0.
7. ILR (1906) 29 Mad 553, 555-
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It is submitted that the above ruling of the Madras High Court should
be the law relating to the cases where shebaits borrow money by
executing promissory notes for the purposes or the benefit of the deity.
Moreover, it must be pointed out that in the presence of a ruling, as
laid down in Manikka Vasaka1s case the later decisions of the Madras
or any other High Court should not have departed from the law on the
2
subject at issue. V.K. Kombi Achan v. Chidambaran Iyer or Palaniappa 
Chettiar v. Shamnugam Chettiar  ^must not be taken as authorities on the 
point at issue because of their wrong basis, as shown above.
On the merits of the matter, if a debutter can be alienated for the 
necessity of the deity by way of sale, mortgage or permanent lease, then 
there should not be any bar for a shebait to borrow money by executing 
a promissory note for the benefit of the deity. Again, it may be pointed 
out that dealings of secular properties of minors by their managers or 
guardians cannot be compared to the dealings of shebaits and debutter 
properties. A shebait like a manager of an infant estate is empowered to 
do whatever is necessary for the preservation of the endowment but his 
power to deal with the debutter is not the same as that of a manager of 
an infant estate and the Privy Council in formulating the rule in Prosunno 
Kumari*s case never held like that. It drew a broad analogy between a 
shebait and a guardian of a minor and this is the only interpretation which 
may be made from Sir Montague's observation that "It would seem to follow 
that the person so entrusted must of necessity be empowered to do whatever 
may be required of the idol, and for the benefit and preservation of its
5
property, at least to as great a degree as the manager of an infant heir".
1. ILR (1906) 29 Mad 553, 555*
3. ILR (1918) 41 Mad 815.
2. 1966 KLT 597.
k. (187^ -75) 2 IA 1^ 5.
5. (l8'7^ -75) 2 IA 1^ 5, 152, emphasis provided.
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The underlined phrases, "at least to as great a degree as the manager 
of an infant heir", obviously mean that he has at least the power of 
a guardian of a minor but in no way do they mean that he has powers 
equal with those of a guardian of a minor. So, whatever law is applic­
able to limit the power of guardian of an infant is not necessarily 
applicable to a shebait of an idol. The representative capacity of a 
guardian of a minor is contingent and does not pass to his heirs but
the case of a shebait is different because "succeeding shebaits ...
2
form a continuing representation of the idol's property". And the 
holder of a promissory note will know that he can sue any of the shebaits 
either the incumbent or the future one, who form a continuing represen­
tation of the debutter and the idol's property will be bound if it is proved 
that money was borrowed for the purposes of the idol.
In my opinion the restriction which is imposed by law on a manager of 
an infant estate in relation to his execution of promissory notes for 
borrowing money for minor's purposes must not be there in case of a 
shebait of an idol who intends to borrow money by executing promissory 
notes to save the deity's interests and the money so borrowed by a she­
bait should be realised from the debutter and if necessary a portion of 
debutter may be transferred or alienated either by sale or mortgage or 
lease whichever suits the deity's interests.
It may be argued that it is extremely inconvenient that a promissory 
note's validity should depend on the contingency of the borrowing having 
been, at its inception, supported by, e.g. legal necessity. India is, 
however, familiar with defeasible titles and the proposition is not so 
wildly anomalous as it appears. Acceptors of such notes must acquaint 
themselves with the facts or lose their remedy.
1. Derrett, "Promissory Notes...", 2. (187^ -75) 2 IA 1^ 5, 152.
op.cit., 101.
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SECTION 2
SHEBAIT fS DUTY AND RIGHT OF SUIT : MANDAMUS
a. Duties of a shebait 
The ownership of a dedicated property belongs to the deity but the
1
deity owns the property only in an ideal sense. The deity by its
nature cannot manage its own affairs and its ideal nature is connected
2with the natural personality of its shebait who is in charge of the
management and in possession of the deity's property.^ But "the duties
and privileges of a shebait primarily are those of one who fills a sacred
office... The main concern of shebait, therefore, is to duly carry out
4the sacred duties of his office."
In relation to debutter property a shebait is empowered to discharge
5
his duties in such a way as he thinks proper. But he "by virtue of his
office can never possess adversely to the idol, whatever steps he takes
in a.manner hostile, it might appear, to the idol's interests". This
disability of a shebait is assumed to exist in any person who stands in
7
a fiduciary relation to others.
g
In Venkatanarasimha v. Gangamma where the scheme for the management 
of a public temple was challenged by the archakas of the temple, Ramaswami, 
J. held for the Madras High Court that the "principle that a trustee
1. Prosumro Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1874-75) 2 IA 145, 152.
2. "An idol can hold property and obviously it can sue and be sued in 
respect of it. But the idol is the owner of the debutter property 
only in an ideal sense, its ideal personality is always linked with 
the natural personality of the shebait." B.K. Mukherjea op.cit.,
4 th ed., 256.
3. Jagandindra Nath v. Rani Hemanta Kumari (1903-4) 31 IA 203, 210.
A very important case for the purpose of this section.
4. Per Page, J. Nagendra v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Cal 490, 495. Supra p. 240.
5. Jagannath v. Byomkesh AIR 1973 Cal 397, 398.
6. Derrett, IMHL 503*
7. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 3^ 3*
8. AIR 1934 Mad 258.
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cannot acquire title by adverse possession of the trust property,
applies equally to 'quasi’ or constructive trustees, the managers
of religious endowments and in fact to all persons who stand in a
1
fiduciary relation to others." Again in Sree Sree IshwariSridhar Jew 
2v. Sushila Bala affirming the view held by Rankin, C.J. in Surendra-
3
krishna Roy v. Shree Shree Iswar Bhubaneswari Thakurani that there
could not be adverse possession of the debutter by any Shebait, Bhagwati,
J. held for the Supreme Court that "no shebait can, so long as he con-
4
tinues to be the shebait ever claim adverse possession." But a 
stranger, or even the donor, can hold both the idol and the debutter
adversely to the deity or the shebait and prevent the shebait from the
management and possession of both the deity^ and its property.^ Under 
the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) he can acquire title to the 
idol's property, for 'he can prescribe for the estate against the idol 
itself.'^
At present the period of limitation for perfecting title to an endowed
property by adverse possession or to recover possession of that property
• o
is governed by Articles 92-96 of the Limitation Act. Whether to perfect
1. AIR 1934 Mad 238, 261.
2. (195*0 5 SCR 407, 417.
3. ILR (1933) 60 Cal 34, 78.
4. (1934) 5 SCR 407, 417.
5. "Adverse possession against the idol in respect of property dedicated 
can be acquired either by a total stranger or by the donor himself" 
Varadachari, op.cit>, 2nd ed., 303»
6. Derrett, IMHL, . 303•
7. Derrett, IMHL, 503* See also Gossamee Sree Greedhareejee
Rumanlolljee Gossamee (1889) 16 IA 137 as cited by the author, see 
especially p. 146 of the cited case.
8. See below, Appendix IIA. An elaborate discussion on the 
subject has been dealt with in Mukherjea's book, 4th edition, pp.298- 
313* But there are some printing mistakes at p. 312 relating to the 
limitation period of movable properties. It should be three years, 
not twelve years as inserted on that page.
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title to a debutter in adverse possession or its shebaiti, the 
limitation period is twelve years. "The idol may lose the whole or 
a portion of its properties in case its shebait through laches suffers 
a trespass for more than 12 years." and in these circumstances even the 
idol itself might get lost.
2In Iswari Bhubaneswari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Roy the deity lost
title to half cf its property due to adverse possession for more than
3
twelve years. But in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das the junior chela 
(disciple) perfected his title by adverse possession not only to the 
debutter but also to the deity itself.
Even the founder can acquire a good title of a debutter by adverse 
possession. In Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameswar, the founder appointed 
his mother as the shebait of the endowment. Two years after the dedi­
cation the founder and his mother revoked the dedication and then the 
founder treated the property as his own for more than twelve years. 
Holding that the founder acquired title by adverse possession, the 
Allahabad High Court held that "the same principle applies whether the 
adverse possession is exercised by a total stranger or by the donor 
himself.
It is suggested that a property dedicated in the name of God or in
favour of any religious foundation should not be subject to the Law of
Limitation. Public sentiments never acquiesce that the ownership of a
1. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd edn., 303-
2. (1937-38) 6  ^IA 203, 213-21^ . The judgement of the Privy Council 
affirmed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Krishna 
Roy v. Shree Shree Ishwar Bhubaneswari Thakurani, ILR (1933) 60 Cal
W-
3. (1909-10) 37 IA 1^ 7, 151.
4. AIR 1929 A11 313* The case is cited and discussed at pp.
303-30^ of Varadachari*s book, 2nd edn., but no critique of the
case has been made there.
5. AIR 1929 All 315, 318.
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religious property may be taken away because of its adverse possession
for a certain period. The deity’s property is more vulnerable to adverse
possession than a secular property, because it is by its nature incapable
of preventing a trespasser, and the law does not protect the deity even
if adverse possession is maintained with the collusion of the shebait, as
we have seen in the Allahabad case. The present position of law cannot
be acceptable by any religious or moral standard and gods' properties must
be saved by introducing the ancient rule, as we have already suggested
in the previous section, that the title to a debutter could never be
1
acquired by lapse of time. Moreover, the general rule that a debutter 
property is inalienable sounds ludicrous when we find the effect of limit­
ation on an endowed property in adverse possession. It seems that on one 
hand we are giving protection to the deity by the rule of inalienability 
of its property, but on the other hand we are withdrawing that protection 
by making debutter subject to the law of limitation. The limitation law 
and the rule of inalienability relating to debutter are a contradiction 
in terms. This contradiction must be removed by making an exception to 
the limitation law that a debutter must not be in the purview of the 
Limitation Act.
Now the duties of a shebait in respect of the idol had been succinctly
2
pointed out by Lord Shaw in Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar when his
Lordship observed for the Judicial Committee that
"It must be remembered in regard to this branch of the law that 
the duties of piety from the time of the consecration of the 
idol are duties to something existing which, though symbolising 
the Divinity, as in the eyes of law a status as a separate 
persona. The position and rights of the deity must in order to
1. Derrett, Critique, 378. Above, p. 282.
2. AIR 1923 PC 139 = (1924-23) 52 IA 245. Supra p. 138.
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work this out both in regard to its preservation, its main­
tenance and the services to be performed, be in the charge 
of a human being. Accordingly, he is ti^ e shebait custodian 
of the idol and manager of its estate.”
The duties of a shebait are implied in the rights of the deity as mentioned
by Lord Shaw in his observation. So his duties are to get the services
of the deity performed, to manage and preserve its property.
b. Shebait*s Right of Suit
In the conception of shebaiti two ideas are involved, the shebait is
2not only the ministrant of the deity, but also the manager of its property.
All the interests of the deity are attended to by the shebait.^ In
4
Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar Lord Shaw ruled for the Privy Council
that a Hindu idol
"has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued.
Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity 
in his charge and who in law is its manager with all the powers 
which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the 
manager of the estate of an infant heir."^
The same view in different language was expressed by Mr. Ameer Ali in Vidya
Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar^ when he observed for the Judicial Committee that
"When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to complete
7
the gift is necessarily effected by human agency". Shebait, being the 
human agent of the deity, is empowered to defend the deity's right on its 
behalf. Litigations involving a debutter are naturally attended to or 
dealt with by the shebait whose paramount duty is to see that the deity's 
interest is not injured.
'1. AIR 1925 PC 139, 1^ 1.
2. Maynes' Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, op.cit., 11th ed., 928*
3. \feradacbari., op.cit. , 297. AIR 1923 PC 139* 3- Ibid., p. 140.
6. AIR 1922 PC 123 = (1920-21) kS IA 302.
7. AIR 1922 PC 123, 126.
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Now the point that a shebait as a manager of the deity and its
property is vested with the right of maintaining suits on behalf of
an idol, was nowhere dealt with or spelled out as clearly as in Jaga-
dindra Nath Roy v, Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi. In that case Sir Arthur
Wilson delivering the Advice of the Judicial Committee pronounced that
"assuming the religious dedication is of strictest character, 
it still remains that the possession and the management of 
the dedicated property belong to the shebait. And this carries 
with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for 
the protection of the property."^
Though an idol is legally capable of holding property, by its very
nature it is incapable of protecting its property from the hostile attacks
of the litigants. In order to protect the debutter from hostile attacks
the law has provided that the shebait is empowered to defend the deity's
right to property on its behalf. In Sri Iswar v. Gopinath Das, ^ Mallick J.
pronounced on the point at issue very clearly that "According to the Hindu
law, shebait represents the deity and he alone is competent to institute
k
a suit in the name of the deity."
Now, when there are more than one shebait, all the shebaits form one
5 ftbody in the eye of the law^ and they should act together as plaintiffs0
in relation to the debutter property when they want to bring a suit to
recover possession of the debutter property or to recover money payable
7to the estate of the deity.
1. (1903-10 31 IA 203. 2. Ibid., p. 210.
3- AIR I960 Cal 7^ 1. k. Ibid., 741, 7^ 8.
5. Iswar Lakshi Durga v. Surenda (19^0-Vi) *t5 OWN 665* 670; Nemai v.
Banshidhar AIR 197*+ Cal 333 * 33*+ supra p. 239; Nandlal v. Kesarlal
AIR 1975 Raj 226, 229.
6. Nirmal Chandrav. Jyoti Prasad (19^ 0-41) CWN 709» 715; Sree Sree
Sreedhar Jew v. Kant a Mohan (l9^ 5-V>) 50 CWN 1*f, 22, Laxman Prosad v. 
Shrideo 1973 MP LJ 642. cited in Raghavachariar, op.cit., 7th ed. 671*
7. Raghavachariar has made the exposition of the law at issue very clearly
when the learned author observes in his book, 7th edition, vol. I,
pp. 670-671, that "A plurality of shebaits form one body in the eye of 
the law. Hence where the plaintiffs, the defendants and the person 
who made a gift were all co-shebaits of the deities, the right of the 
plaintiffs to bring a suit challenging the validity of the alienation
(continued on next page)
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’’The management may be for practical purposes in the hands 
of one of the shebaits who is called the managing shebait, 
or the shebaits themselves may exercise their right of manage­
ment by turns; but in neither case is it competent for one of 
the shebaits to do anything in relation to the debutter 
estate without the concurrence either express or implied of 
his co-shebaits. This is, of course, subject to any express 
direction given by the grantor."1
The rule that a majority of the shebaits cannot by their act bind the
deity or the dissenting minority, was laid down in Man Mohan Das v Janki 
2
Prasad. In that case the deity’s property was mortgaged to different 
persons and the mortgagor was one of the trustees acting as a sole de 
facto manager. The Privy Council held that even in emergency the 
execution of the mortgage deed by the acting manager alone "would be 
ineffective as a valid claim to the suit property.’’^  In other words, it 
ruled that the idol was not bound by the mortgage even if the manager 
acted as sole de facto manager and acted in good faith for the benefit of 
the deity and its estate. It is suggested that the law should be changed 
to the effect that in the case of several shebaits of an endowment, the 
shebait in charge of the administration must be entitled to act for the 
deity’s benefit on the deity's behalf even without any express approval 
of other co-shebaits. Otherwise, by the time he gets the consent of 
other shebaits to act for the deity even in a case of emergency, the 
interests of the idol may have suffered irreparably.
Reverting to the question of a shebait's right of suit, it may be pointed
If
out that Maharaja Jagadindra Nath’s case laid down only the general rule
that right to sue on behalf of the debutter is vested in the shebait and
the rule is meant only for normal circumstances where the shebait administers
(continued from previous page)
cannot be questioned. All the shebaits must join as plaintiffs when 
a suit is brought on behalf of a deity either to recover possession 
held adversely by a stranger, or for recovery of money payable to a 
debutter."
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., kth ed., 231. 2. (19Mf-45) CWN 195 (PC).
3. Ibid., p. 201. k. (1903-^ ) 31 IA 203.
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the debutter, looking after the interests of the deity. But when a 
shebait refuses to bring a suit or precludes himself by his conduct 
from suing,
"it frequently happens that someone other than the shebait 
must bring a suit whether in his own name or in the name of
the deity, to enforce the deity's rights.”2
Jagadindra Nath Roy's case^ is not applicable in such circumstances. In
that case the shebait filed the suit for the protection of the deity's
interests and the ruling of that case was not meant for cases where the
4
shebait acts adversely to the deity's interests. In the case of a
private Hindu religious endowment the members of the family of the founder
5
are entitled to sue on behalf of the deity.
In Monohar Mookerjee v. Peary Mohan^ where the heir of the founder of
a private religious endowment on whom the management could devolve in
future brought the suit against the.existing shebait for his misconduct,
Sir Asutosh Mokerjee and Panton, J.J. held that persons interested in the
protection of debutter could sue to enforce the rights of the deity. Thus
their Lordships pronounced for the Calcutta High Court that
"the founder or his heir may sue for the enforcement of the 
trust, for the removal of the old trustee, for the appointment 
of a new one and may thereby secure the proper administration 
of the trust and its properties.
g
In both Girish Chandra v. Upendra Nath and Tarit Bhusan v. Sridhar
9
Salagram it was held that members of the family of endowment had a right
1. "The principle in Jagadindra's case applies when there is a shebait 
actually in office and ready and willing to do all acts necessary for 
the protection of the deity's interests. In these normal circumstances 
the deity's right of suit can be said to have for practical purposes no 
independent existence apart from the rights of shebait, as it is 
through the shebait alone that the right would be exercised.’’ Mukherjea, 
op.cit., 4 th ed., 258.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 504. 3. (1903-4) 31 IA 203.
4. Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji AIR 1967 SC 1044;: 1046-47. See below,
Section 4, for the detailed discussion of the case.
5. Derrett IMHL, 504; Mukherjea op.cit., 4th ed. 239*
6. AIR 1920 Cal 210. 7. Ibid., p.215-
8. (1930-31) 35 CWN 768, 770. 9. AIR 1942 Cal 99,115-116.
300
to maintain suit on behalf of the deity to protect the deity's interests.
1
But in Sri Iswar v. Gopinath Das it was held that even a stranger with
the permission of the court could bring a suit in the name of the deity.
This was a significant step forward.
2In Ramchand v. Janki Ballabhji where a pujari-cura-shebait misappro­
priated temple properties, the Supreme Court ruled that a person con­
tributing a large amount towards the maintenance of a temple had a 
substantial interest to bring a suit on behalf of the deity for possession
of the debutter from mismanagement and misappropriation.^ In Thenappa
4
Chettiar v. Karuppan Chettiar where the suit was concerned with the
settlement of a scheme of a private math, Ramaswami, J. delivering the
judgement for the Supreme Court held inter alia that
MIf there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the part of 
the trustee, a suit can be brought in a civil court by any 
person interested, for the removal of the trustee and for the 
proper administration of the endowment..."5
1. AIR I960 Cal 7^ 1, 7^8. In coming to this decision for the High Court 
of Calcutta, Mallick, J. put forward several arguments (at p. .7^ 8) 
that "In exceptional circumstances ... where the shebait ... does not,
or by his own act deprives himself of the power of representing the deity, 
a third party is competent to institute a suit in the name of the deity 
to protect the debutter property." The right of a member of his family 
or that of a worshipper to institute a suit to protect his right to 
worship and for that purpose debutter, was his personal right and that 
such suit was not the suit by the deity to protect its interests. His
Lordship reasoned and came to the conclusion that "The deity has also
a right of its own to have a suit instituted by a next friend” and
such "a next friend is not limited to the members of the family or
worshippers. Anybody can act as (such) a next friend, but ... anybody 
other than the shebait instituting a suit in the name of the deity 
must be appointed as such by an order of the Court."
2. AIR 1970 SC 532.
3. Ibid., p. 53^1 para. 8. For its judgement the Supreme Court relied on 
the decision in Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar AIR 1925 PC 139i
see above, p. 295; Mahadeo Jew v. Balkrishna AIR 1952 Cal 763 and 
Asha Bibi v. Nabissa Sahib AIR 1957 Mad 583»
if. AIR 1968 SC 915.
5. Ibid., pp. 918-919* The court approved both Pramatha Nath v. Prad­
hyumna Kumar AIR 1925 PC 139 and Monohar Mookerjee v. Peary Mohan 
(1919-20) 24 CWN if78 = AIR 1920 Cal 210, on the point at issue.
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The phrase ’’any person interested” must be interpreted to cover persons
who have got either material or spiritual interests in the endowment.
For a worshipper who does not have material interest in an endowment,
was held in Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji, a very important case for
the whole subject of suits relating to debutter, to be entitled to file
suit for the protection of the debutter.
The law as it stands now is that any person materially or spiritually
interested in a private religious endowment is entitled to bring suit for
the protection of the endowment. It may be pointed out that the interest
2of the person in the endowment must be a continued not a contingent one.
c. Mandamus
3
The word "mandamus” meaning ”we command” in Latin is a high prerogative
*t 5writ of a most extensive remedial nature issuing in England from the
Queen's Bench Division^ and in India either from the Supreme Court accord­
ing to Article 32 or from any High Court according to Article 226 of the
7
Constitution of India. The origin of this writ was described by Bowen L.J.
1. AIR 1967 SC 10*+*+, l0*+7-
2. Derrett, IMHL, 50*+. In Vikrama Das v. Daulat Ram AIR 1956 SC 382, 390, 
it was observed as "the ordinary rule that persons without title and 
who are intermeddlers cannot sue as of right is clear”. See also 
Derrett, op.cit., 50*+, note 5 where he cited the case.
3. Jowitt, op.cit., Vol. 2, 1977, 1139.
*+. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, vol. 3* *+th ed., Sweet Y Maxwells, London
1973, 1615.
5. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1*+th ed., Law Publishers, London, 1958, 62*+.
6. The order of mandamus issuing from the Queen's Bench Division was sub­
stituted for the writ of mandamus in England by the Administration of 
Justice (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1938 - Jowitt, op.cit., vol. 2,
2nd ed., 1139* But the charge was only in form, in substance -
H.M. Seervail, Constitutional Law of India, vol. 2, N.M.Tripathi,
Bombay 1976, 752.
7. Seervai,. ' ibid., p. 751i where the learned author comments that
"the part played by prerogative writs in England in securing the liberty 
of the subject and in protecting his rights and property was well known 
to the framers of our Constitution... Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the framers of the Constitution should have decided to arm the
(continued on next page)
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about one hundred years ago in In Re Nathan where an application was
made for a mandamus to the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue to pay
back the amount of duty overpaid to the Commissioners. Bowen L.J. first
questioned the origin of the writ by asking "What is the origin of the
right that any roan has to ask the Court for a writ of mandamus?11 His
Lordship then answered that
”A writ of mandamus. as everybody knows, is a high prerogative 
writ invented for the purpose of supplying defects of justice.
By Magna Charta the Crown is bound neither to deny justice to 
anybody, nor to delay anybody in obtaining justice. If, therefore, 
there is no other means of obtaining justice, the writ of mandamus 
is granted to enable justice to be d o n e . ” ^
Now, Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India refer only to the
prerogative writ of mandamus and they do not mention common law or
3
statutory forms of a writ of mandamus as available under English law.
One great advantage of mandamus is that it can be used for the control
of both judicial or quasi-judicial orders and administrative acts. It
will issue to both a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal and an adminis-
4
trative authority vested with public duties.
’’Mandamus is a command issued by a Court asking a public  ^
authority to perform a public duty belonging to its office.
For example, when it omits to decide a matter which it is bound 
to decide, it can be commanded to determine the questions which 
it has left undecided. Mandamus can be granted only when a 
legal duty is imposed on the authority in question and the r
petitioner has a legal right to compel the performance of the duty.”
(continued from previous page)
Supreme Court with the power to issue famous English writs by habeas 
corpus... mandamus for the enforcement of fundamental rights (Art. 32) 
and to arm all High Courts with power to issue the same writs for the
enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purposes. (Art 226).”
1. (1883-84) 12 QBD 461.
2. (1883-84) 12 QBD 461, 478-479-:
3. D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India,
Vol. 3» 5th ed., S.C. Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta, 19671 474.
4. D.D. Basu, ibid., p. 475*
5. See on this point State of Mysore v. K.N. Chandrasekhara AIR 1975
SC 532, 537.
6. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 
1978, 198-99.
303
Though both Articles 32 and 226 refer only to the prerogative writ
of mandamus. the powers of both the Supreme Court and a High Court
1
are not limited to the prerogative writs. "The powers of the High 
Court under Article 226 are not strictly confined to the limits to
2which proceedings for prerogative writs are subject in English practice".
The powers of the High Court under this Article are of "widest amplitude".^
In Lt.Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, a case concerning the
question of premature retirement of an army officer, Subba Rao, J. as
he then was, in his dissenting judgement ruled that
"The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Consti­
tution is of the widest amplitude and it is not confined only 
to issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, etc. for it 
can also issue directions or orders against any person or  ^
authority, including in appropriate cases any Government...."
Again, in Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.V. Immanuel  ^a case where the workers
applied for a writ of mandamus (instead of an injunction) restraining
inter alia the company in question to implement an agreement, Shelat, J.
pronounced that
"The condition for the issue of mandamus is that there is in 
one claiming it a legal right to the performance of a legal 
duty by one against whom it is sought. An order of mandamus 
is in form a command directed to a person, corporation, or an 
inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular 
thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office 
and is in the nature of a public duty."7
His Lordship added further that
"It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority 
on whom the statutory duty is imposed need be a public official
1. D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, Vol. 2, 7th ed., S.C.Sarker 
and Sons, Calcutta, 197$» 124, 125.
2. Per Beg, J. S.I. Syndicate v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 460, 468.
3. S. Malik, Supreme Court on Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, Eastern Book 
Co., Lucknow, 1974, 1237*
4. AIR 1961 SC 532.
6. AIR 1969 SC 1306.
5. AIR 1961 SC 532, 547.
7. Ibid., p. 1309.
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or an official body. A mandamus can issue, for instance, 
to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the 
terms of the statute under or by which the society is 
constituted or governed, and also to companies or corpor­
ations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes
authorising their undertakings.
As a corollary of the observation of Shelat, J., it can be said that a
mandamus can issue to a public official or a body to restrain them from
implementing a statute alleged to infringe the religious rights of
individuals.
2In Ratilal v. State of Bombay the petitioner, manager of a Jain 
temple, filed his petition to the High Court of Bombay against inter 
alia the state of Bombay and the Charity Commissioner "praying for the 
issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or direction ordering and 
directing the respondents to forbear from enforcing or taking any steps 
for the enforcement of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 or any of its 
Provisions...."^ and the Supreme Court granted the prayer substantially 
when B.M. Mukherjea, J. as he then was, ruled for the Court that "The 
result...is that in our opinion the appeals are allowed only in part and 
a mandamus will issue.-, .restraining the State Government and the Charity 
Commissioner from enforcing against the appellants the following provisions 
of the Act...." It may be pointed out that the Supreme Court ruled in 
favour of the appellant when it held that the provision in the Bombay Act 
regarding the appointment of the Charity Commissioner as a trustee 
"cannot be regarded as valid in regard to religious institutions of the 
type we have first indicated. To allow the Charity Commissioner to function 
as the shebait of a temple or the superior of a math would certainly amount
5
to interference with the religious affairs of the institution."
1. AIR 1969 SC 1306, 1309-10.
3 . Ibid., p. 390.
5. Ibid., p. 393.
2. AIR 195^ SC 388.Supra p. 21. 
k. AIR 195*+ SC 388, 396.
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Now a public officer can be served with a writ of mandamus if he 
interferes with the affairs of a religious trust or if he does not do 
his duty as imposed by a statute in relation to an administration of 
an endowment. But a shebait or a trustee of a religious endowment 
being not a public officer cannot be served with a writ of mandamus.
However, a shebait of a public religious institution is in the same 
position as a public officer in the sense that he is engaged in the 
administration of an institution in which the affairs of the public 
are concerned. A public religious endowment is concerned with the 
affairs of the public and in managing that endowment he in a way serves 
the public as a public officer of a secular institution. So if a shebait 
fails to discharge his duties properly, or if he maladministers the 
endowment, a member of the public interested in the endowment must be 
empowered to ask the Court to serve the shebait with a writ of mandamus 
restraining him from maladministering the endowment. It is suggested 
that the scope of issuing the writ of mandamus should be enlarged to 
include in it persons like the shebait of a debutter or a mahant of a 
math.
Moreover, if a mandamus can issue to an official of a society to
compel him to perform his duties under the provision of a statute by
1
which a society is formed, then it is quite logical to make the proposition 
that a shebait either of a public or a private religious endowment, being 
an official of the endowment, should be served with a writ of mandamus 
if he is unwilling to carry out the purposes of the endowment by which he 
is appointed as such and for the realisation of which the endowment itself 
is made. As the law rests, however, there are no means, as yet, whereby the 
court can be moved by petition to compel a delinquent shebait or shebaits
1. Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.V. Immanuel, AIR 1969 SC 1306*
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.to perform their duty of protecting the debutter against encroachment 
of any kind. This is among the reasons which led to the enactment of 
state statutes controlling public religious endowments. No steps have 
been taken, however, to protect private endowments against inert or 
corrupt shebaits.
SECTION 3.
DEITY*S RIGHT OF SUIT AS A JURISTIC PERSON
It has already been pointed out in the previous section that the ruling
in Jagadindra Nath*s case is a general law regarding the right of a
shebait to sue concerning a debutter if he chooses to do so, and the
principle in the Privy Council case is applicable in normal circumstances
where the shebait carries out his duties for the protection of the deity's 
2interests. But when a shebait or shebaits are negligent in carrying on
their duties or when they disagree or have by their conduct precluded
themselves from instituting any suit, the deity as owner of the debutter
is not entirely without a remedy,^ because it frequently happens that
some one other than the shebait must institute a suit either in his own 
4name or in the name of the deity, who has a theoretical independent
1. (1903-^ ) 31 IA 203.
2. B.K. Mukherjea op.cit., 4th ed. 258.
3- M.N. Srinivasan, Hindu Law, Vol. 3i ^th ed. Law Publishers, Allahabad, 
1970, 2662.
4. "Where...shebait refuses to act for the idol, or where the suit is 
to challenge the act of the shebait himself or prejudicial to the
interests of the idol, then there must be some other agency which
must have the right to act for the idol. In such cases, the law 
accordingly recognises a right in persons interested in the endowment 
to take proceedings on behalf of the idol." B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit.
4th ed. 270, and this observation was quoted with approval in
Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji AIR 1967 SC 1044, 1047.
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right of suit to protect its own interests, to enforce (as it were)
2
its rights. A sceptic might say that the poor deity must offer up
prayers that a human being will come to its rescue.
In Masjid Shahid Ganj Mosque v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parandhak Committee,^
a case relating to a mosque in Lahore, Sir George Rankin pronounced for
the Judicial Committee that "The procedure of our Courts allows for a
suit in the name of an idol or a deity, though the right of suit is
4really in the shebait..."
3
It may be repeated that Jagadindra Nath»s case must be taken as a
law regarding the right of shebait to sue only when he acts for the
protection of the debutter and this was the point which was aptly pointed
out by Subba Rao, C.J. in Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji^ dealing with the
issue relating to the right of a worshipper to file suit for the protection
of the debutter. The question whether under certain circumstances the
7
rights of the idol can be vindicated through persons other than its 
shebait seems to have been settled by the Supreme Court in its celebrated
g
decision in Biswanath's case. Referring to Pramatha Nath v. Pradyumna
1. Tarit Bhusan v. Sridhar Salagram AIR 19^ 2, Cal 99, 104; JanglLal v.
Panna Lai, AIR 1937 All 7^ +3, 7^ +5; Sri Iswar v. Gopinath Das AIR I960
Cal 741, 748. The "true beneficiaries of religious endowments...are the 
worshippers..." See Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar AIR 1957 SC 133i 137.
See above 3rd fchapter, Section 1.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 504. 3. (1939-^ 0) 67 IA 251.
4. Ibid., p. 264. 5. (1903-4) 31 IA 203.
6. AIR 1967 SC 1044, 1046, para. 8.
7. Rights of an idol are not limited to those of idols representing a
deity, but they include the rights of an idol of a living person like
Sai Baba. In M.L. Hanumant Rao v. Sri Sai Baba (1980) 2 M U  507, an 
endowment was made in favour of an idol of Sai Baba which was installed 
in a temple. It was held that the suit concerned on behalf of the 
idol Sri Sai Baba was maintainable. See p. 517*
8. AIR 1967 SC 1044. Regarding the decision in the Supreme Court case, 
Dhavan observes that "In this remarkable judgment" Subba Rao, C.J.
"held that since a private suit for recovery of property was not 
available as one of the remedies under section 92 of the Civil Procedure 
Code of 1908, a representative suit could be filed without invoking 
sec. 92 by a worshipper where the shebait was not acting in the 
idol's interests". Op.cit., 91•
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1 2 Kumar and Kanhaiya Lai v, Hamid Ali the Supreme Court held that in
these two cases
"the Board remanded the cases to the High Court in order that 
the High Court might appoint a disinterested person to 
represent the idol. No doubt in both the cases no question 
of any deity filing a suit for its protection arose, but the 
decisions are authorities for the position that apart from a 
shebait, under certain circumstances, the idol can be repre­
sented by disinterested persons".-'
if
In Ramraghava Reddy v. Seshu Reddy where the suit was brought by
the plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree to which the
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, was a party and
by which temple properties of the deity were declared to be secular
properties of the defendant trustees, was not binding on the deity,
Ramaswami, J. ruled for the Supreme Court that
"The possession and management of the property with the right 
to sue in respect thereof are, in the normal course, vested 
in the shebait, but where, however, the shebait is negligent 
or where the shebait himself is the guilty party against whom 
the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other 
persons interested in the religious endowments to file suits 
for the protection of the trust property. It is open in such 
a case to the deity to file a suit5 through some person as 
next friend for recovery of possession of the property improperly 
alienated, or for other relief. Such a next friend may be a 
person who is a worshipper of the deity or is a prospective 
shebait or is legally interested in the endowment..
There is a divergence of judicial opinion whether a person other than 
a shebait can maintain a suit on behalf of the deity without prior 
permission of the Court. The majority of the decisions of the Calcutta
1. AIR 1923 PC 139.
2. AIR 1933 PC 198.
3. AIR 1967 SC 1044, 1047.
4. AIR 1967 SC 436.
5. "The deity as a juristic person has undoubtedly the right to institute
a suit for the protection of its interest. So long as there is a
Shebait in office, functioning properly, the rights of the deity ... 
practically lie dormant and it is the Shebait alone who files suits in 
the interest of the deity". B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 263-264.
6. AIR 1967 SC 436, 441.
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High Court support the view that any person who is not a shebait
can file a suit on behalf of the deity only when he has obtained the
2 3permission of the Court. Both the Orissa and the Patna High Courts 
have followed the same view as the Calcutta High Court. But this view 
is no longer correct, because the permission of a Court is not necessary
K kin view of the decision in Biswanath v. Radha Ballatyji and this point 
will be dealt with again in Section k of this chapter. A comparative 
evaluation of the early discordant decisions would therefore be super- 
ogatory.
It seems to be a settled law that in case of a private debutter a
member of the family or a member of the family of the donor or any person
having independent interest in the endowment may bring a suit without
5
prior permission of the Court. In this context the expression ’’interest” 
must be taken to imply both material and spiritual interest.^
1. Administrator-General of Bengal v. Balkissen ILR (195*0 31 Cal 9531 959; 
Sharat Chandra Shee v. Dwarkanath Shee ILR (1931) 58 Cal 619i 622;
Tarit Bhusan v. Sridhar Salagram AIR 19^2 Cal 99, 112; Sree Sree 
Sreedhar Jew v. Kanta Mohan (19^ 5-^ 6) 50 CWN li, 2k; Sushama Roy v.
Atul Krishna AIR 1955 Cal 624, 626; Sri Iswar v. Gopinath Das AIR 
i960 Cal 7^ 1» 7^ 8, on which see below (p. 521). But the contrary
view that no permission should be necessary for a person to institute
a suit on behalf of the deity had been held by the Calcutta High Court 
in Thakur Sri Sri Annapurna v. Shiva Sundari Dasi ILR (19^0 2 Cal 1^ 4,
1*t6 and Gopal Jew v. Baldeo (19^ -6-47) 51 CWN 3831 *+0k.
2. Somanath Dani v. Shri Gopal Jew AIR 1961 Ori, 105, 107.
3. Sri Ram v. Chandeswar Prasad AIR 1952 Pat 3^ 8, kkj.
k, See Biswanth’s case AIR 1967 SC 10Vt, which . ^5 discussed in detail
in the next section.
5. Gopal Jew v. Baldeo (19*+6-V7) 51 CWN 383» kok; Deoki Nandan v. Murli- 
dhar AIR 1957 SC 133 supra p. which was relied on in Behari Lai v. 
Radha Ballabhji AIR 1961 All 73» 78, by the Allahabad High Court to 
hold the view that a worshipper had a beneficial interest in the endow­
ment. Jangi Lai v. Panna Lai AIR 1957 All 7^ 3» 7^ 5; Thakur Govind v. 
Susalli AIR 1967 All 278, 280. See also Derrett, IMHL, 50^ »
6. Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1967 SC 10Mf has laid down the law 
to this effect. Thus, Subba Rao, C.J. observed for the Supreme Court 
that ’’Three legal concepts are- well settled: (1) An idol of a Hindu
temple is a juridical person; (2) when there is a shebait, ordinarily no 
person other than the shebait can represent the idol; and (3) worshippers
(continued on next page)
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Again, it may be clarified that a de facto shebait is also accepted
by the Court as one of the persons competent to file suit on behalf of
the deity for the protection of the debutter and to recover possession
1
of the idol's property. Moreover
"A de facto shebait is not disqualified from conducting suits 
to recover the idol's property merely because in substance he 
seeks to advance or protect his own interests - the blending 
of office and property in the character of the lawful shebait 
is present even in the case of a de facto shebait, and if the 
suit is framed in the deity's interests it will lie..."^
But the right of a de facto shebait to file a suit on the deity's behalf
does not imply recognition of his right to continue in the management of
the debutter.^
k
The proposition as laid down in two decisions of the Calcutta High 
Court that in the absence of a shebait any person, as next friend of the 
deity, may bring a suit on behalf of the idol does not seem to reflect 
the proper position of the law as laid down by other decisions of the same
High Court and the opinions expressed on the point at issue by different
5
textbook writers.
(Continued from previous page)
of an idol are its beneficiaries, though only in a spiritual sense.
It has also been held that persons who go in only for the purpose of 
devotion have according to Hindu law and religion, a greater and deeper 
respect in temple than mere servants who serve there for some pecuniary 
advantage: see Kalyana Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturi Ranga Ayyangar,
ILR 40 Mad 212 at p.223: (AIR 1911? Mad 112 at p.il8)" - p. 10?7.
1. Mahadeo Prasad v. Karia Bharti, AIR 1935 PC 44, 45-46; Jagannath v. Tir- 
thananda AIR 1952 Ori 312, 317-318, Sri Ram v. Chandeswar AIR 1952 Pat 
438, 4^ 6; • Sapta Koteswar v. R.V~. Kittur AIR 1956 Bom 615, 616; Kana- 
kulamala Nadar v Pichakan'rtqAriyar AIR 1954 Tra-rco, 254, 256, Vikrama Das 
v. Daulat Ram AIR 1956 SC 382,390.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 505* 3» Gopal v. Mahomed Jaffar AIR 1954 SC 5, 8.
4. Monmohan Haidar v. Dibbendu Prosad AIR 19^ 9 Cal 199, 203, Sri Iswar v.
Gopinath Das AIR 1980 Cal 7^ -1, 7^ 8.
5. In both Sharat Chandra Shee v. Dwarkanath Shee ILR (1931) 58 Cal 619 and 
Tarit Bhusan v. Sridhar Salagram AIR 1942 Cal 99, the Calcutta High Court 
had laid down in effect the principle as involved in the following obser­
vation of B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit. 4th ed. 266, that "if a suit could be 
instituted on behalf of the idol by any person as its next friend, it
(continued on next page)
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In conclusion of this study it may be pointed out that an idol need
not be a party in all suits relating to its property, because it is
1open to its manager to conduct suits in his own name to recover its
properties from the possession of trespassers. But when he denies the
right of the idol to the debutter it is entitled to be represented by
2a disinterested next friend. In this context it may be added that no 
settlement altering the terms of an instrument of dedication will be 
binding on the deity if the decision is taken in its absence and in such 
a situation the idol has a right to be heard in the matter.^ In a suit 
for the framing of a scheme a deity is not a necessary (additional) party
(continued from previous page)
would really be an invitation to all sorts of persons to come and meddle 
in the affairs of the idol and if the idol is bound by the result of 
such trust or proceeding, it would be disastrous to its interests”.
Derrett also does not support the view in question when he observes 
that "The proposition which has been put forward that in the absence 
of a shebait any person may sue on the idol's behalf as next friend 
seems to go further than the law allows. Certainly a complete stranger 
who has merely a benevolent interest in the endowment, or has a grudge 
against the dishonest shebait, will not be entitled to sue, or to apply 
for permission (according to the practice of the relevant High Courtjf1 - 
IMHL, 305.
1. Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari (1903-4) 31 IA 203; Ramsarup Das v. 
Rameshwar Das AIR 1952 Pat 184, 187.
2. Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar AIR 1925 PC 139i Sri Ram v. Chandeshar 
Prosad AIR 1952 Pat 438, 443.
3. Mahadeo Jew v. Balkrishna AIR 1952 Cal 7631 765-766. Where the 
deity's interests are not affected by litigation and the party's claim 
does not go against the interest of the deity the Court does not feel 
it necessary for the deity to be represented in the suit (see Mukherjea, 
op.cit. 4th ed. 268). But if the deity's interests are likely to be 
affected by the result of a litigation and the shebait's or shebaits' 
interest in the litigation is adverse to that of the deity and the deity 
is not represented in the suit, the Court may appoint a shebait ad litem 
or next friend to represent the deity or to express its will in the matter 
of the litigation. Thus in Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradhyumna Kumar 
Mullick (1924-25) 52 IA 245, see above, 3rd chapter* section 1, where the 
shebaits themselves engaged in litigation regarding one of the shebait's 
right of removal of the deity to his own residence and the deity itself 
was not represented in the litigation, the Privy Council held that the 
will of the deity relating to its location must be respected and the
suit should be remitted to the High Court so that "the idol should appear 
by a disinterested next friend appointed by the Court” - p. 261.
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unless its interests are affected by the framing of the scheme.
SECTION k
RIGHTS OF WORSHIPPERS TO SUE IN DEITY'S NAME
a. Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
2
Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908) as
amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 10*f
of 1976), provides that a suit against the shebait for the reliefs
mentioned therein might be instituted only in the manner provided in the
3
section. A private trust is not within the operation of this section
and a suit under the section will be maintainable if it is related to a 
kpublic trust which, it may be submitted, is not the main contention of 
this thesis. Under this section the Advocate-General or two or more 
worshippers having a substantial interest in the endowment may bring a 
suit^ for any of the reliefs, e.g. either for the removal of a trustee 
or for settling a scheme, provided by section 92 of the Civil Procedure 
Code^ after obtaining the leave of the Court. It may be pointed out 
that before the introduction of the Amendment Act (Act 10*+ of 1976) the 
persons suing under section 92 were to get the consent of the Advocate-
1. Bimal Krishna v. Gunendra (Iswar Radha Ballav), AIR 1937 Cal 33$, 3^ 15 
Upendra Nath v. Nilmony AIR 1937 Cal 3^ 2, 3^«
2. See below, Appendix IIB.
3- Gopal Lai v. Purna Chandra (1921-22) 49 IA 100, 107 supra p.171 - It may 
be pointed out that Section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code as mentioned 
in the Privy Council case was replaced later on by Section 92 of the 
Civil Procedure Code, see B.K. Mukherjea op.cit. 4th ed. 467- See also 
on this point in Abdur Rahim v. Abu Md Barkat Ali AIR 1928 PC 16, 19*
4. Mahant Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai AIR 1952 SC 143, 144; Harendra Nath 
v. Kaliram Das AIR 1972 SC 246, 249; Vidya Sagar v. Ananda Swarup 
AIR 1981 All"106, 109.
5. Derrett, IMHL 506-507.
6 . Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed. 300.
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General and the consent was a condition precedent to any suit under 
section 92. His unwillingness to give consent led to many legal 
disputes involving inter alia the issue regarding the nature of his
decision, which we shall discuss in detail later in this section.
1
Again, to attract Section 92 certain conditions must be fulfilled.
First of all, as mentioned above, the suit to lie under the section 
must be related to a public trust created for public religious or charit­
able purposes. Secondly, it must proceed on an allegation either of a
breach of trust or on the ground of the necessity of taking directions
2from the Court for the administration of a trust. Thirdly, the relief
or reliefs claimed must be within the reliefs provided in the section.
Finally, the suit must be brought in a representative capacity either in
the interests of the trust or of the public and it must not be brought
3
to vindicate the private rights of the plaintiff.
4In Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai where the main issue was whether there 
existed a public trust of a religious and charitable character in respect 
of the suit properties, and the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit 
under section 92. B.K. Mukherjea, as he then was, observed for the Supreme 
Court that
”A suit under sec . 92 Civil Procedure Code is a suit of 
special nature which presupposes the existence of a public 
trust of a religious or charitable character. Such suit can 
proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such 
trust or that directions from the court are necessary for the 
administration thereof, and it must pray for one or other reliefs 
that are specifically mentioned in that sec. It is only when
these conditions are fulfilled that the suit has got to be brought
in conformity with the provisions of sec. 92, Civil Procedure 
Code.”5
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed.
2. Harendra Nath v. Kaliran Das AIR 1972 SC 246, 250; Vidya Sagar v.
Ananda Swarup AIR 19&1 All 106, 109-
3. Budree Das v. Chooni Lai ILR (1906) 33 Cal 789, 807; Appana v. 
Narasinga ILR (1922) 45 Mad 113 (FB), 133-13^ 5 Paratmanand Saraswati 
v. R. Tripathi AIR 1975 SC 2140, 2144.
k. AIR 1952 SC 143. 5. Ibid., p. 144.
y\h
But section 92 has no application where the state statuses of different
states, e.g. Madras, Bombay, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, have provided
different machinery for the administration of public religious or
2charitable trusts.
Let us now revert to the question of the nature of the decision the 
Advocate-General used to make in the event of being asked permission by 
persons interested in a public endowment to file suits under section 92 
before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. 
Very little knowledge of India is required to verify that irrelevant 
political considerations may affect his decision. A judicial controversy 
which has lasted approximately twenty years centred on the issue whether 
the functions of an Advocate-General in relation to the section were 
judicial or quasi-judicial or purely administrative. And a corollary to 
the said issue was the issue whether in this regard his order to give or 
to decline consent for conducting a suit was amenable to be 
quashed by the issue of the writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the 
Constitution.
1. For example, section 110(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and 
Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 (Andhra Act 17 
of 1966) provides that Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is not 
applicable to charitable and religious institutions in that state.
For the judicial decision on the point see P. Venkateswarlu v. P. 
Venkateswarlu AIR 1973 AP 26k (FB), 271, 273*
2. Derrett, IMHL, 307 •
3. The word ’certiorari1 means ’to be more fully informed of’. It is 
an original writ issued in England out of the Queen's Bench Division 
addressed to judges or officers of inferior Courts commanding them 
to return the record of proceedings in some cause depending before 
them with a view to seeing that justice might be done. Though the 
writ was abolished in England by the administrative of Justice 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 193$, the High Court has the power 
to make an order of certiorari in a case of lack of jurisdiction or 
error of law on the face of the record - Jowitt's Dictionary of 
English Law, Vol. I, 307.
In India the writ of certiorari is still in force but it generally 
means a writ to quash a decision on the ground of some defect in it - 
D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, vol. 3, 5th ed.,
S.C. Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, 1967, 569*
3^5
1
Now in Abu Backer v. A-G of Tra-Co (195*0 , the trust concerned was
a public charitable trust founded by a certain Muslim of the then Cochin
state. In that case the Advocate-General refused to grant permission
to the petitioners to file suit under section 92 inter alia to remove
the managing trustee. Aggrieved by the decision of the Advocate-General,
alleging the decision as unjust, the petitioners instituted the present
suit praying the High Court to use its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 
2227 of the Constitution for calling up the record of proceedings before
the Advocate and to quash his order by the issue of appropriate writs
and directions. As the first defendant of the case, the Advocate-General
contended inter alia that the correctness of his decision was not amenable
to a writ of certiorari and in making his decision he was not acting
either as a judicial or as a quasi-judicial tribunal.^ Though the division
bench of the High Court of Travancore-Cochin refused to grant the prayer
of the petitioners, it ruled against the contention of the Advocate-
General that his order was not amenable to a writ of certiorari under
Article 226. The High Court held that
"When the jurisdiction is...conferred on the High Court to issue 
writs in appropriate cases even as against a Government, there 
is no point in contending that such writs will not lie against 
the Advocate-General who is only an officer under the Government.
His orders are undoubtedly liable to scrutiny by the High Court 
and are amenable to appropriate writs under Article 226, provided 
that there are justifiable grounds calling for such interference 
by the High Court”.
1. AIR 1954 Tra-Co 331.
2. Article 227 of the Constitution of India confers power on a High 
Court to control inferior Courts which is in addition to the power 
given to it by way of the different writs under Article 226. See
D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. 4, 5th ed., S.C, 
Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, 1968, 3*
3. AIR 1954 Tra-Co 331, 333.
4. Per Sankaran, J., ibid., p. 336.
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Against the contention of the Advocate-General that he did not act
1
as a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunalf the High Court held that
though section 92 ’’does not specify the manner and the extent of the
investigation" of any allegation of any party interested in an endowment
"it is obvious that the section contemplates the necessary 
investigation and inquiries being made by the Advocate-General 
before he finally decides whether the sanction or consent 
applied for should be given or not. It is equal^ r obvious that 
he has to make a judicial approach to the question in contro­
versy and then to arrive at a decision after due consideration 
of the facts and...there cannot be any doubt that the decision 
which the Advocate-General arrives at under section 92, Civil 
P.C. is a quasi-judicial decision".^
The view of the Travancore-Cochin High Court was followed by the Pepsu 
High Court in Sadhu Singh v. Mohatmin Dera  ^in which aggrieved by the 
decision of the Advocate-General the petitioners urged the High Court 
inter alia to quash the order of the Advocate-General. The High Court 
did not entertain the petition; nevertheless it observed that "the view 
taken by the learned judges of the Travancore-Cochin High Court is the 
correct view and that the functions of the Advocate-General under section 
92, C.P.C. are judicial in nature and not administrative or executive".
But the majority of the decisions of High Courts held the opposite 
view regarding the nature of the functions of the Advocate-General; the
decision of the Advocate-General in relation to section 92 was neither
5
judicial nor quasi-judicial in nature. In A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate- 
£
General, the Advocate-General did not refuse to give consent to the
1. AIR 1954 Tra-Co. 331, 335- 2. Ibid., 338.
3 . AIR 1936 Pepsu 65.
4. Per Singh, J., ibid., p. 68. .
3* For example , Shrimali Lai v. Advocate General AIR 1935 RaJ 166,
167; Shantanand v. Advocate-General AIR 1955 All 372, 376; A.K. 
Bhaskar v. Advocate-General AIR 1962 Ker. 90 (FB) , 93; Abdul 
Kasim v. Mohd. Dawood AIR 1964 Mad 247, 250; Shavax v. Masood 
Hosain AIR 1965 AP 143, 152. •
6. AIR 1962 Ker. 90 (FB). .
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petitioners for filing suit under section 92 but he granted only two
reliefs out of the many reliefs asked by the petitioners. Aggrieved
by the decision of the Advocate-General the plaintiffs submitted a writ 
under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Overruling the decision 
petition/of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Abu Backer v. A-G of
Tra-Co the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that "notwith­
standing that the Advocate-General has to form an opinion and come to a
conclusion one way or the other when he acts under section 92, C.P.C.,
2that does not make it either a judicial or a quasi-judicial order".
Again, the Full Bench made another ruling opposite to that of the
Travancore-Cochin High Court. The Advocate-General
"does not decide anybody's rights and though it may be proper 
for him to issue notice to the proposed defendants and hear 
their viewpoint also, he is not bound to follow that procedure. 
Anything that he decides, does not become conclusive and it is 
open to the proposed defendants to fight a suit instituted even 
on such sanction on all grounds available to them in law. There­
fore, we have to hold that the action of the Advocate-General 
cannot be judicially reviewed by this Court under Article 226 of 
the Constitution".
The view of the Travancore-Cochin High Court as held in Abubacker v. 
A-G of Tra-Co and the contrary view represented by the decision of the 
Full Bench of the Kerala High Court • consisting of three judges in A.K. 
Bhaskar v. Advocate-General were reconsidered in 197^  by a Full Bench 
of the same Court consisting of five judges in Simon v. Advocate-General.< 
In that case, the petitioner applied to the Advocate-General for his 
permission to institute a suit under section 92 because of the trustee's 
mismanagement of an endowed property of a Jewish synagogue and misapprop­
riating its funds, but the Advocate-General refused to give consent to
1. AIR 193^  Tra-Co. 331.
3. Ibid., p. 93*
5. AIR 1962 Ker 90 (FB).
2. AIR 1962 Ker 90 (FB) 93.
*f. AIR 1932* Tra-Co. 331.
6. 1973 KLT 78 (FB).
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the petitioner. The main question for determination of the Full Bench 
was whether the order of the Advocate-General refusing permission to 
the petitioner for filing a suit under section 92 of the Civil Procedure 
Code was amenable to be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari 
under Article 226.
1
In Simon’s case, the Full Bench rejected the argument of counsel for
2
the petitioner based on Abu Backer’s case that the act of the Advocate- 
General in dealing with a petition under section 92 was either judicial 
or quasi-judicial, and to that effect Nair, C.J., held that ’’Very little 
judicial support... was for the view taken by the Travancore-Cochin
High Court; only the Pepsu High Court in Sadhu Singh v. Mohatmin Dera,
AIR 1956 Pepsu 631 followed the principle of that decision”.^  But it must 
be pointed out that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court did not over­
rule the whole of the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court; it
refused to accept only one of the principles in that case. But the more
k
important principle in Abu Backer’s case that an act of the Advocate-
General in relation to section 92 was amenable to judicial proceedings
under Article 226 was accepted by the Kerala High Court in Simon’s case.
Nair, C.J. pronounced for the Kerala High Court that
”In a welfare State such as ours with a growing emphasis on 
administrative control which could interfere with the life, 
liberty and rights of citizens there should be the insistence 
that those who are invested with wide and varied powers act 
according to justice and fairness, and who can guarantee this 
but the Courts entrusted with the jurisdiction such as that 
in Article 226 of the Constitution? There can be no doubt that 
this jurisdiction will enable Courts to interfere in approp­
riate cases where administrative orders have affected the
1. 1975 KIT 78 (FB).
3. 1975 KLT 78 (FB),*81.
3. 1973 KLT 78 (FB), 8r.
2. AIR 195^ Tra-Co. 331. 
k. AIR 193^ Tra-Co. 331.
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rights of parties or affected interests in a substantial 
manner as to cause real and serious injury, if there has 
been violation of the principles of natural justice, where 
it would apply, when there has been abuse of power, where 
the authority had acted in excess of the power conferred 
by a statute, or when there has been no dispassionate 
application of the mind, or there was nothing to indicate 
that the mind was applied.”
In his judgement Mr. Chief Justice Nair referred to many English and
2Indian decisions including Padfieldfs case where the Minister declined 
to refer the complaint of a committee of the Milk Marketing Board to 
the committee of investigation established under a particular enactment 
and Sahadora Devi v. Government of India^ where the Supreme Court dealt 
with the interpretation of powers of a military officer to grant a lease.
By referring to English decisions and applying the principles involved 
in them his Lordship in effect applied in the facts of the case the rule 
of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience which may be invoked in a 
situation that is not within the scope of any law.
Moreover, the Full Bench rejected the principle in A.K. Bhaskar*s
5
case that in dealing with section 92 the Advocate-General decided nothing.
Thus Nair, C.J. observed that the Advocate-General's
’’conclusion to refuse consent can very adversely affect those 
who had applied for consent, (and can) certainly cause sub­
stantial injury... It is quite true ... that while granting 
consent no one is adversely affected, not even such prejudice 
as to sustain a petition under Art. 226 is caused. But can 
the same be said while refusing consent? The answer must be no 
in the%light of what we have s a i d ” .°
7
In Simon’s case, in his separate judgement Nambiyar, J. came to the
1. 1975 KLT 78 (FB), 83. 2. [71968]] 1 All ER 694.
3. AIR. 1971 SC 1599.
4. J.D.M. Derrett, ’’Justice, Equity and Good Conscience” (1962) 64 Bom 
LR Jnl. 127-132,. passim. ' - ., ...
5. AIR 1962 Ker 90 (FB).’ 6. 1975 KLT 78 (FB), 9CT.
7* Ibid.
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same conclusion as the Chief Justice when his Lordship said that "I think 
that save in extreme cases, such, for instance, as where this Court is 
able to find that there has been no application of mind, no exercise of 
discretion at all by the Advocate-General, there would be no ground for 
interference under Art. 226.”
2The Kerala High Court in Simon v. Advocate-General accepted in part
both the views, opposite to each other, concerning the act of the Advocate-
General in relation to his giving consent to the persons interested in an
endowment for filing suits under section 92. The Court approved the
ruling in A.K. Bhaskar v. Advocate-General  ^that the act of the Advocate-
General was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but it accepted the main
kprinciple of the judgment in Abu Backer v. A-G of Tra-Co that the acts 
of the Advocate-General were amenable to Article 226 of the Constitution.
It seems that the decision in Simon's case  ^precipitated amendment of the 
Civil Procedure Code in 1976 to the effect that the persons suing under 
section 92 do not have to get the consent of the Advocate-General but 
instead they have to get the permission of the Court.^
b. Worshippers* Right to Sue to Protect Debutter
So far as worshippers of public religious trusts are concerned, they
are entitled under Section 92 to bring suits on behalf of the deity. But
no such statutory provision is available in the case of worshippers of 
private endowments, to bring suits for the protection of the debutter
1. 1975 KLT 78 (FB).93.
2. Ibid .
3. AIR 1962 Ker 90 (FB).
k. AIR 195^ Tra-Co 331. 3 . 1975 KLT 78 (FB).
6. In this context it may be said that B.K. Mukherjea's latest edition 
(1979) is not up to date with the present position of the law in 
question; it has only dealt with the old law relating to the Advocate- 
General' s consent for suing under section 92 (see pp. 9^3-^ 95)*
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1properties - their rights are determined by the general law on the 
subject.
Before we go into the details of the question at issue it must be
pointed out that a worshipper as such does not have an unqualified right,
2
as does a shebait, to conduct suits on behalf of a deity, but his right 
to sue arises when a shebait declines to institute suits for the preser­
vation of the deity’s property.^
4In Tarit Bhusan v. Sridhar Salagram where the suit was brought on 
the deity's behalf without the prior permission of the Court, by a mere 
worshipper, the daughter of the then shebait having no beneficial interest 
in the property of the deity in question, Pal, J. ruled inter alia that 
unless "the shebait was controlled or removed by the Court he alone could
5
act for th^idol" but "In exceptional circumstances, a deity can be repre­
sented in a legal proceeding by a person other than a shebait only by the 
special appointment of the Court.His Lordship ruled in effect that it 
was only the shebait who could effectively represent the idol and a mere 
worshipper was not entitled to represent the deity on his or her own, unless
he or she obtained previously the permission of the Court to do so. The
7
view of Pal, J. was accepted in Sri Iswar v. Gopinath Das and Sushama
g
Roy v. A'tul Krishna, where the question to be determined was whether or
not a person interested in the worship of the deity could sue on the
deity's behalf without having prior permission of the Court. But Sushama 
o
Roy went further when it laid down the law by declaring that "if anybody
1. B.K. Mukharjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 511*
2. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 299*
3. Shashi Kumuri v. Dhirendra Kishore ILR (1941) 1 Cal 309» 316-317.
4. AIR 1942 Cal 99.
6. AIR 1942 Cal 99, 116.
8. AIR 1935 Cal 624.
3. Ibid., p. 115.
7. AIR I960 Cal 741, 748.
9. Ibid.
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other than a shebait wishes to institute a suit on behalf of the deity,
he should make an application to the Court, and the suit will be main-
1
tainable only if the Court appoints him as the shebait of the deity.”
It is submitted that the tedious procedure involved in applying to the
Court and the Court appointing a proper person to be the shebait, would
consume so much time that a deity in imminent danger would have a poor
chance of survival.^
In this context the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Behari
Lai v. Radha Ballabhji^ seems to be more plausible and practical than
4that of the Calcutta High Court. It was an original decision in the
sense that it recognised the right of a mere worshipper to sue on the
deity's behalf for the protection of the debutter. In that case the
worshipper filed the suit for the possession of the temple property which
was sold by its shebait without any legal necessity. Gurtu, J. of the
Allahabad High Court, holding the maintainability of the suit by the
worshipper to recover the possession of the debutter, made a pioneer
observation which we will see below, to help the Supreme Court make the
most valuable judgement of the Court in a whole range of suits relating
5
to debutter. His Lordship's pioneer remarks were:
1. Per P.B. Mukharji, J. , ALB 1953 Cal 624, 626V
2. But the Calcutta High Court does not even now look to the interest of
the deity as it cares about the technicalities of law. See:Jogesh
Chandra v. Iswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur, AIR 1981 Cal 259 which held at p.262
the same view as Susham Roy v. Atul Krishna, AIR 1955 Cal 624.
See the case as discussed below in this section.
3. AIR 1961 All 75* '
4. The decision in Behari Lai v. Radha Ballabhji, ibid., was relied on in
Kishore v. Guman, AIR 1978 All 1, 4 where it was held that "it is ... 
well settled that in exceptional circumstances persons other than a 
shebait can institute a suit on behalf of an idol."
5. Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji AIR 1967 SC 1044, is an appeal case of 
Behari Lai v. Radha Ballabhji AIR 1961, All 73• Most of the principles 
laid down in the decision of the Allahabad case have been accepted by 
Subba Rao, C.J in his judgement of the Supreme Court.
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"We are unable to understand why, if a declaration can be sought 
by a deity through a next friend who has a beneficial interest, 
a suit for possession cannot be filed in the same manner. The 
decree would be executed for the benefit of the idol and when the 
next friend took possession he would be taking it for the idol. " 1
Mr. Justice Gurtu's argument is even more convincing when he observed that
2"Once the right of a de facto manager is accepted, then it seems 
to us that it is only one step further and involves no real 
breach of principle to allow one who has a beneficial interest in 
the temple property to take steps to see that the temple property • 
is preserved to the idol and to file a suit for that purpose as 
the next friend of the deity bringing the suit in the name of the 
deity himself.
"Where even a de facto shebait is absent surely a person who 
has a beneficial interest should be permitted to come in. That 
the worshippers have a beneficial interest has been clearly laid 
down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v 
Murlidhar,... AIR 1957 SC 133* It has been laid down there that 
the true beneficiaries of a religious endowment are not the idols, 
but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the 
maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers."
It is submitted that no statement on the law in question,i.e. law regarding 
the right of a worshipper to sue on behalf of the deity for the recovery of 
the debutter property, has ever been so clearly expressed, avoiding tech­
nical jargon, as can be found for example, in the decisions made in Tarit
i+ 5
Bhusan v. Sridhar Salagram and Sushama Roy v. Atul Krishna on one side,
and Gopal Jew v. Baldeo^ on the other, over the application of Order 32 of
the Civil Procedure Code concerning suits on behalf of infants. The view
of the Allahabad High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in Biswanath v.
1. AIR 1961 All 73, 78.
2. For the right ofade facto shebait see above, section 3 of this chapter.
3* AIR 1961 All 73, 78.
4. AIR 1942 Cal 99 where the daughter of the shebait, being a mere wor­
shipper, was not allowed to protect the deity’s interest - see p. 104. 
But in contrast see Radhamohan Dev v. Navakishore Naik AIR 1979 Ori 
181, 186, para. 10, where the daughter of one of the founders was held 
to be entitled to file suit on behalf of the deity for possession of 
the deity's property.
5* AIR 1955 Cal 624.
6. (1946-4?) 51 CWN 383.
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1
Radha Ballabhji which we will be discussing below in this section.
p
Now, though it was held in Ramraghava Reddy v. Seshu Reddy (in 
which the Supreme Court’s judgement was not cited) that ’’worshippers 
do not exercise the deity's power of suing to protect its own interests, 
they are not entitled to recover the possession of the property improperly 
alienated by the shebait, but they can be granted a declaratory decree 
that the alienation is not binding on the deity,it seems that the 
observation of Ramaswami, J. is contradictory to his other observation 
in the same judgement that ’’where ... the shebait is negligent ... against 
whom the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other persons 
interested in the religious endowment to file suits for the protection of 
the trust properties." Out of the two observations it appears from the 
first that a worshipper is entitled only to a declaratory decree relating 
to the deity's property, but it is difficult to make out the same meaning 
from the second, where the general entitlement of the worshipper to sue
5
on the deity's behalf to protect its property appears to be conceded. In 
any case, it may be said that Mr. Justice Ramaswami is not clear on the 
point. Moreover, that case related to a public endowment.
However, the point at issue (the right of a mere worshipper to sue on 
behalf of the deity to recover possession of its property) was directly 
raised in the Supreme Court case of Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji.^  The 
Court approved the famous observation of Seshagiri Aiyar, J. that "The
worshippers have a deeper interest in the integrity and well-being of
1. AIR 1967 SC 1044, above, pp. 2. AIR 196? SC 436.
3. Ibid., p. 440. 4. Ibid.,. p. 441.
3. If the shebait acts adversely to the deity's interest, then a wor­
shipper has the right to institute suite both to protect its interest
and to remove the offending shebait - see Balaji v. Narasingha Kar,
AIR 1978 Ori 199, 102.
6. AIR 1967 SC 1044. ’Above pp. 307, 309-10.
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1
the institutions” than the shebait and the archaka, and applied the
principle involved in it when Subba Rao, J. pronounced for the Court
”that persons who go in only for the purpose of devotion have according
to Hindu law and religion, a greater, and deeper interest in temples
2than mere servants who serve there for some pecuniary advantage.”
Moreover, the judgement of the Supreme Court as a whole has settled
almost every issue relating to suits concerning debutter, and it is
particularly important in solving the very controversial issue of the
right of a mere worshipper to sue on the deity’s behalf. Subba Rao, C.J.
raised the question himself, by asking ?
”The question is, can a mere worshipper also being assistant 
to the shebait represent the idol when the shebait acts adversely 
to its interests and fails to take action to safeguard its 
interest? On principle we do not see any justification for deny­
ing such a right to the worshipper. An idol is in the position 
of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in the 
lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can 
certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to 
protect its interest. It is a pragmatic, yet a legal solution 
to a difficult situation.”^ -
This observation is a solution to a very controversial issue. Yet we find
that even after fourteen years the Calcutta High Court failed to apply the
principle to the facts of the case of Jogesh Chandra v. Sri Iswar Braja Raj
5
Jew Thakur (a case where the wife of the offending shebait wanted to 
protect the interests of the deity by recovering possession of the alien­
ated debutter properties through collusion and fraud) where it held
1. Venkataramana v. Kasturi Ranga AIR 1917 Mad 112 (FB), 118.
2. AIR 1967 SC 1044, 1047. The low status of pu jar is, known to anthro­
pologists, Is outside our scope.
5. See Derrett’s ECMHL, Vol. 3* Leiden, A.J. Brill, 1977» 260-263» where
he has made an excellent critique of the case and comments at p. 263 
that the case of Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji is ”the leading .case on 
this point."
4. AIR 1967 SC 1044, 1047. .
5. AIR 1981 Cal 259.
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1 2  3following inter alia Tarit Buhsan's, Sushama Roy’s, and Sri Iswar's
cases, that a person other than the shebait or a prospective shebait
could not sue on behalf of the deity without the permission of the Court.
The Calcutta decision (it is submitted) is wrong, for it contravenes the
law laid down in the Supreme Court decision that a person other than a
shebait, having only spiritual interest, i.e. even a mere worshipper,
could sue for the protection of the deity’s interests, without the prior
if
permission of the Court. In Biswanath’s case the plaintiff, a mere wor­
shipper, did not have the Court's permission before bringing the suit to
recover possession of the debutter alienated wrongfully by the shebait.
5
Tarit Bhusan and the like are no longer authority on the point at issue.
For the Supreme Court's ruling in Biswanath's case^must prevail.
Again, in the Supreme Court case Subba Rao, C.J. argued plausibly that
if the worshipper could only sue either
"for removal of a shebait and for the appointment of another in 
order to enable him to take steps to recover the property, such 
a procedure will be rather prolonged and a complicated one and 
the interest of the idol may irreplacably suffer,"*'7 but "this 
is what has been held often to be the law."°
In support of his ruling that a worshipper had a right to sue on the deity's
behalf to protect its interests if a shebait acted adversely to an idol's
9
interest the Supreme Court cited with approval many decisions of the
9. Radhabhai v. Chimnaji ILR (L878) 3 Bom 27, a case where the wife as the 
plaintiff brought suit against her husband to recover debutter property; 
Zafaryab Ali v. Bakteswar Singh ILR (1883) 3 All **97, a case where the 
worshippers brought the suit to set aside a mortgage of a mosque property; 
Chidambaranatha v. Nallasiva AIR 1918 Mad 464 which was related to a 
suit by the worshippers to set aside an alienation of a mutt property; 
Dasandhoy v. Muhammad Abu Nasar ILR (1911) 33 All 660 in which two rauslims 
brought the suit to set aside an alienation of the wakf property; 
Venkataramana v. Kasturi Ranga AIR 191^ Mad 112 (FB) of which we have 
already made mention above; Sri Radha Krishnaji v. Rameswar AIR 1934
1. AIR 1942 Cal 99-
3. AIR I960 Cal 741.
3. AIR 1942 Cal 99.
7. Ibid., p. 1047.
2. AIR 1955 Cal 624.
4. AIR 1967 SC 1044.
6. AIR 1967 SC 1044.
8. Derrett, ECMHL, vol. 3, 262.
(continued on next page)
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different High Courts.
0-
The decision of the Supreme Court in Biswanth's case alone cam" ■ h' ■
give the Courts guide lines regarding who, under what circumstances,
can institute suits on the deity's behalf if a shebait acts adversely
to the interests of the idol. It is an authority not only for the cases
where mere worshippers, having only spiritual interest in the endowment,
institute suits on behalf of the deity to recover possession of the
debutter, but also for all those cases where persons having material
interest in the endowment bring suits on the part of the deity. So the
traditional proposition laid down by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in Panchkari v.
2
Amode Lai, a case relating to the recovery of certain endowed lands
belonging to certain idols, that "none but a member of the family can have
a legal right to worship the deity in the case of family endowment and
no such person can sue on behalf of the deity for recovery of property
3
belonging to it unless the founder has expressly given such power," 
does not reflect the position of the present law on the subject. In Bis- 
wanath's case (a case of family endowment) the person who filed the 
suit, as a next friend of the deity, for the recovery of possession of 
the deity's property, was neither a member of the family of the endowment 
in question, nor a person authorised by the founder to institute suits 
on behalf of the deity to protect its interests.
But it must be stressed that our inference from the decision in the
(continued from previous page)
Pa.t where the de facto shebait brought the suit for possession of 
the deity's property; Mnnmohan Haider v. Dibbendu Prosad AIR 19^9 
Cal 199» in which the worshippers of the deity called Badrika Nath 
Shiva Thakur brought the suit to protect its property from sale due 
to arrears in road cess.
1. AIR 1967 SC 1<M
2. (1936-37) CVN 13^9 = AIR 1937 Cal 539*
3. AIR 1937 Cal 559, 561. k. AIR 1967 SC 1(M.
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Supreme Court case that a worshipper having only a spiritual interest 
in an endowment without being a member of the family, is empowered to 
sue on the deity’s behalf to protect the endowment, must not be given 
a broader interpretation to include any case of a casual worshipper whose 
spiritual interest in the endowment is ’’fugitive or intermittent”. In 
this context the spiritual interest of a worshipper must be a continued 
interest in the worship and the property of the deity. So the law as 
it stands today is that any member of the family, other than a shebait, 
whether he is a mere worshipper or not, or any worshipper who is a stranger 
to the family but admitted to the worship of the family deity and has a 
oontinued, not contingent, spiritual interest in the endowment, can 
institute suits on the deity’s behalf for possession of its property from 
a person possessing illegally without prior permission of the Court. 
Technicalities of law concerning the permission of the Court must not be 
emphasised, because of the great principle involved in the Supreme Court 
judgment that
’’Should it be held that a worshipper can file only a suit for the 
removal of a shebait and for the appointment of another in order 
to enable him to take steps to recover the property, such a pro­
cedure will be rather a prolonged and complicated one and the 
interest of the idol may irreparably suffer. That is why 
decisions have permitted a worshipper in such circumstances to 
represent the idol and to recover the property for the idol.”^
In so far as the private debutter is concerned, to sum up the rights of
suit of the deity, the shebait and any other person in relation to debutter:
a) In normal circumstances it is the shebait alone who can sue on behalf 
of the deity.
b) A shebait or any other member of the family, whether a mere wor­
shipper or not, or a person as both a mere worshipper and a stranger having
1. Derrett, IMHL, 504.
2. AIR 1967 SC 1044, 1047.
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a continued interest in the endowment can sue to vindicate his personal 
right.
c) When a shebait acts adversely to the deity's interest, the right 
of the deity as owner of the debutter to sue in its name to protect its 
interests can be exercised through any member of the family or a stranger 
as a mere worshipper having a continued interest in the worship of the 
deity without any permission of the Court.
SECTION 5
SHEBAIT'S'(a) ACCOUNTABILITY, (b) REMOVAL and (c) FRAMING A SCHEME 
FOR PRIVATE DEBUTTER.
As a private religious endowment lies outside the scope of section
92 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other state statute controlling
public religious trusts, as there is no statutory provision controlling
the abuses of private endowments, let us find out what other remediesp
apart from those in relation to suits for the protection of the debutter
which we have already discussed above, are available to plaintiffs to
prevent shebaits' abuses of private endowments. Now, in the case of any
abuse of a private endowment the remedy or remedies which are available
2to a plaintiff are provided by the general Law of the land. Moreover,
the civil Courts have power in providing remedies for abuses either in
private or (unless barred by statute) in public religious trusts.
"Notwithstanding the number of statutes, central and provincial, 
dealing with regulation and control of public religious trusts, 
there is still room for the common jurisdiction of the civil 
courts in remedying abuses in the management of the debutter 
property."3
1. Varadachari, op.cit., 291.
2. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th edition, 5^ 1» where the learned author 
observes that: "The suits relating to such private trusts are not
regulated by any statute as in the case of public trusts, they are 
governed by the general law of the land."
3. Derrett, IMHL, 506.
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(a) Shebait*s Accountability
A shebait or a ’’manager is in the position of a trustee”. In 
other words, he is accountable as a trustee for the management of the 
trust or endowed property. It may be interjected here that it seems 
that it is only in this aspect that there is similarity between a shebait 
of a family endowment and a trustee in the English sense. It seems that 
a shebait can in no other way be compared with a trustee; moreover the
2former is also a beneficial owner of the trust or the endowed property
and it is this characteristic of shebait which greatly differentiates
it from trusteeship at large.
Now, a shebait as a trustee of the debutter must protect the interest
of the deity and must not deal with the debutter in such a way as to
3make his own material or financial gain. In Monohar v. Peary Mohan
where the suit was related to a portion of a debutter property purchased
by the son of the trustee in an execution sale, Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and
Panton, J.J. laid down an important principle in their observation that:
’’The law does not stop to inquire into the fairness of the sale 
or the adequacy of the price, but stamps its disapproval upon 
a transaction which Creates a conflict between the self interest 
and integrity of the trustee.”
This point of honesty or integrity of a shebait in relation to the
1. Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti (1905-6) 33 1A 139i 1 ^  where 
the suit was brought to recover possession inter alia for books of 
of account.
2. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293 * 296 para ii, where it was
held that a shebait ’’has a beneficial interest in the debutter
property”. See above pp.218-219.
3« AIR 1920 Cal 210. The judgement of the Calcutta High Court was
affirmed by the Privy Council in Peary Mohan Mukherji v. Monohar
Mukherjee (1920-21) IA 158.
4. AIR 1920 Cal 210, 217.
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debutter was also stressed in the oft-quoted observation of Lord
2Blanesburgh in Gulzari Lai v. Collector of Etah where a dishonest
shebait alienated, without any legal necessity, the whole of the endowed
property comprising eleven villages. His Lordship pronounced for the
Privy Council that:
"The standard of rectitude and accuracy expected from every 
trustee of charitable funds is of the highest, and that standard 
must in all circumstances be maintained by the Courts if the ,
safety of property held upon such trusts is not to be imperilled..."
A shebait being in the position of a trustee and as a manager of the
deity, is bound to maintain regular accounts of the income and expenses of 
if
the debutter. The obligation to maintain accounts lies in the shebait
because of the fact that no other person other than a shebait is responsible
5
for the application of the debutter funds. He can be made personally 
liable for any defalcation of the debutter funds.^
7
In Bhagwan Pass v. Jairam Pass, a case relating to an institution 
called the Dera, of a public religious and charitable nature, Dua and 
Mahajan, J.J. gave judgement for the Punjab High Court and in their Lord­
ships’ judgement almost all the principles of the subject in question have 
been laid down. Thus their Lordships observed:
"It is indispensable ... that a mahant or a shebait who has 
accepted this office or acknowledged himself as such, is in­
capable of asserting any hostile title against the trust, such 
disability being implicit in any person who holds fiduciary
1. See Derrett, IMHL , ~~ 505-506; Varadachari op.cit. 200; B.K. 
Mukherjea, op.cit. *fth edition, 519 where the observation has been 
quoted.
2. AIR 1931 PC 120.
5. Ibid., p. 123.
4. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., H h  edition, 316.
5. Varadachari, op.cit., 199*
6. Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prosad AIR 19^1 Cal 562, 568. For the facts 
of the case see below, this section.
7. AIR 1965 Punj 260.
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position in relation to another. It is also his duty to 
keep regular accounts of the trust property, for he is 
responsible for the due application of the trust money and^ 
is bound to keep regular accounts of income and expenses.”
But there is no hard and fast rule regarding the way a shebait should
2
keep accounts; it largely depends on the custom of a particular
institution but the obligation to maintain it is implicit in the very
office of a shebait.^ In the case of a family endowment the heirs of the
founder are entitled to conduct a suit for accounts when any allegation
if
of mismanagement is made against the manager. "Clear and distinct accounts 
of the property ought to be kept by all trustees, so that they are ready at
any time, with accurate information as to the disposition of the trust
5
funds”. This is evidently in their own interests and forms a legal 
protection for them in case of their being called to account for their 
administration of the endowment. Should no one be concerned enough to call 
them to account, it is nevertheless their duty as shebaits to keep regular 
accounts of the debutter property.^
Now the founder or his heirs having sufficient interest in a private 
endowment are the persons to be entitled to maintain "suits against the 
shebait for an account of his management of the debutter property, as well
as against alienees from the shebait to recover property improperly
7 8alienated.” In Monchar v. Peary Mohan this point was also stressed when
1. AIR 1965. Punj 260, 262.
2. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit. 4th ed^ , 316.
3. Bhagwan Pass v. Jairam Pass AIR 1965 Punj 260, 262-263.
4. Bhimasena v. Ramesh Chandra AIR 1978 Ori~159» 161.
5. Per Scott J. in Thackersey v. Hurbhum ILR (1884) 8 Bom 4-32, 470 where
the suit was brought inter alia for making the trustees liable for the
money lost to the temple and the caste in question.
6. Bhagwan Pass v. Jairam Pass AIR 1965 Punj 260, 262.
7. Derrett, 1MHL, 506.
8. AIR 1920 Cal 210.
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it was observed that "the founder or his heirs may invoke the assistance 
of a judicial tribunal for the proper administration” of a debutter ”on 
the allegation that the trusts are not properly maintained...." But it 
can be argued that it is not the founder or his heirs only who are able 
to maintain suits in the case of a shebait's improper administration of 
a debutter, but persons who are spiritually interested in the endowment 
are also qualified to sue a shebait for his improper administration of 
the endowed property. If the right to sue on behalf of the deity against 
a dishonest shebait is not limited to the members of the family 
interested in an endowment then it is logical that the persons entitled 
to sue a shebait for his maladministration and invoke the help of a 
Court for the proper administration of the debutter should not be limited 
to the founder and his heirs. A shebait should be accountable for his 
management of a private debutter to all persons interested in the endow­
ment; and this is exactly the principle which can be sifted out of the
2
observation of Sarkar, J. in Upendra Nath v. Nilmony where the co-shebait 
and the managing shebait were brothers and the co-shebait as the plaintiff 
filed the suit against the managing shebait alleging inter alia the mis­
appropriation of the debutter income ani asked ihe Court for a decree for 
accounts. Sarkar, J. pronounced for the Calcutta High Court that
"A shebait who has received the income of the debutter properties 
and misappropriated or misapplied the same without spending it 
for the purposes of the deity and has not kept proper account 
of the income and the expenditure, cannot refuse to render 
accounts when so required by the other shebaits or persons inter­
ested in the endowment. It is well settled that if a shebait is 
negligent or is the guilty party against whom the deity needs 
relief, it is open to a worshipper or any person interested in 
the endowment to bring a suit for the protection of the endowment 
... So under such circumstances there can be no objection to a 
co-shebait suing for the rendition of accounts against the 
managing shebait.”5
1. Biswanath v. Radha Ballabji AIR 1967 SC 10Mf.
2. AIR 1957 Cal 3^2. 3. AIR 1957 Cal 3*t2, 3M*.
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If a suit is brought against a shebait for accounts, the Court may
compel the shebait to be ’’personally accountable for defalcations and
deficiencies which are not adequately explained.” Again, under its
2
inherent jurisdiction a civil Court may ignore an exemption clause
in an instrument of dedication exempting a shebait from the liability
of rendering accounts as repugnant and instead order rendition of 
3
accounts. It is interesting to point out that a shebait is also entitled 
to receive accounts from any of his co-shebaits when his own right is
If
endangered by a breach of trust.
(b) Removal of a Shebait
The ’’standard of rectitude and accuracy expected from” a shebait or 
a trustee of a private debutter or of any religious or charitable endowment
5
is ”of the highest” and the Court is to see that the standard expected 
from a trustee of an endowment is properly maintained. So a shebait who 
is guilty of misconduct or abuses his position as a trustee of the debutter, 
can be removed in a judicial proceeding.^
What constitutes a sufficient reason for the removal of a shebait is
7 8determined by the Court. In Mohohar v. Peary Mohan Sir Asutosh Mookerjee
and Panton, J.J. observed that "no useful purpose would be served by an
examination of decided cases to determine what constitutes a sufficient
reason for removing a trustee. The matter is within what is called the
sound judicial discretion of the Court. The Court is guided by the con-
1.
2.
4.
5.
6. 
8.
Derrett, IMHL, 506. See also Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prosad AIR 1941 
Cal 562, 56b; Ramchand v. Janki Ballabhji AIR 1970 SC 532,53** 1 see below, 
this section; N.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law, vol. 1, 7th ed., MU, 1980, 
658; M.N. Das, Laws Relating to Partition, 2nd ed., Eastern Law House, 
Calcutta, 1981,
Derrett, IMHL, 506. 3» Upendra Nath v. Nilmony AIR 1957
Ibid., p. 3****; Derrett, IMHL, 506. Cal ^ 2*
Gulzari Lai v. Collector of Etah (1930-31) 58 IA 460, 465.
B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit;, 4th ed., 319* 7« Mukherjea, ibid., p. 319*
AIR 1920 Cal 210.
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siderations of the welfare of the beneficiaries and of the trust estate; 
and there must be a clear necessity for interference to save the trust 
property.”"*
Now, a shebait1s assertion of his right to treat the debutter as his 
own and to utilise the income or the funds of the debutter for his
personal purposes will be deemed by the Court as sufficient grounds for
2 3his removal from office. In Bhagwan Das v. Jairam Das it was observed
that ’’failure to keep proper accounts of the dera and assertion of
hostile title of his own by the mahant to the trust property are
sufficient grounds for his removal.”
5
In Thenappa Chettiar v. Karuppan Chettiar where the suit was brought
inter alia for an account of the management of a debutter the Supreme
Court in unambiguous terms laid down that
”If there is a breach of trust or mismanagement on the parfc 
of the trustee, a suit can be brought in a civil court by any 
person interested for the removal^of the trustee and the proper 
administration of the endowment.”
7
In Ramchand v. Janki Ballabhji a case where a donor of a temple 
brought the suit against the dishonest pu.iari-cum-shebait who claimed 
title to the debutter property, the Supreme Court ruled that the shebait
g
was not fit to remain in possession and management of the debutter.
Again, it will be considered a sufficient reason for a Court to order 
the removal of a shebait either for grossly improper conduct amounting to
9
an abuse of his fiduciary position or for ”placing himself in a position 
inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duties; but not for
1. AIR 1920 Cal 210, 222.
2. The ’’assertion of a right to treat the endowed property as his own or
a claim to apply trust funds for his private purposes are adequate
grounds for the removal of a shebait.” - Varadachari, op.cit., 200.
3. AIR I960 Punj. 260 4. Ibid., p. 263
5. AIR 1968 SC 915 6. AIR 1968 SC 915, 918-919
7. AIR 1970 SC 532. 8. Ibid., p. 534.
9* Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prosad AIR 1941 Cal 562, 568.
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1 2laziness or incompetence”. In Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prasad where 
the co-shebait brought the suit for the removal of other shebaits on 
grounds of misappropriation and neglect of duties and where one of the 
shebaits allowed a suit to be dismissed for non-prosecution, B.K. Muk­
herjea, J. as he then was, referring to the conduct of the one of the 
shebaits observed for the Calcutta High Court that "This was conduct 
which fell below the standard of rectitude and accuracy expected from 
a trustee of charitable funds and justified the removal of defendant 1 
from his position of trust".^
k
In Satish Chandra v. Dharanidhar Sinha the case was instituted inter
alia for an order for the removal of a shebait of a shrine of Sri Taraknath 
in Bengal. In spite of the presence of both secular and religious elements 
acd of the blending of office and property and mixing of duties and personal 
rights in the conception of mahantship, the Privy Council held that if 
it was found that the performance of obligations of a mahant's office could 
not be done without danger to the endowment that was a sufficient ground
5
for his removal. But the more important principle was laid down by the
Privy Council when referring to the question of removal of religious heads
of various Hindu religious foundations Mr. M.R. Jayakar observed that
"The Court may sometimes not order their total removal, but 
may associate with them a committee of management. But these 
are matters for the consideration of the Civil Court, which 
must necessarily enjoy a wide discretion to decide what form of 
punitive or ameliorative order will suit the requirements of the 
case. But the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide such 
questions can no longer be doubted. "6
It is obvious that subsequent to an order of the removal of a shebait 
a new shebait will be authorised to take charge of the debutter but even
1. Derrett, IMHL, 507 
3* Ibid., p. 568.
2. AIR 19^1 Cal 562.
4. (1939-40) 67 IA 32.
5. Satish Chandra1 s Case (1939-40) 67 IA 32, 46.
6. (1939-40) 67 IA 32, 46.
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during pendency of a suit instituted for the purpose of removing a
shebait, the Court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to manage 
1
the debutter.
A shebait can be removed by suit by the founder or his heirs or any 
2
person interested in the endowment for his mismanaging or misappropri­
ating the deity*s property. In Monohar v. Peary Mohan^ it was observed
that *’the founder or his heirs may sue for the enforcement of the trust,
for the removal of the trustee' , for the appointment of a new one and may
ii
thereby secure the proper administration of the trust and its property.** 
But it must be stressed again that this right of action against a dishonest 
shebait is not limited to the founder and the members of his family;
5
following Biswanath*s case it can be said that the right is open to 
anybody who is spiritually and materially interested in the endowment.
The question relating to removal of a shebait and the power of a Civil 
Court to deal with the matter has never been a controversial one, but if 
the remedy for a plaintiff in a suit of private endowment had been a 
statutory one, like that of a plaintiff in a suit of a public endowment 
under Section 92, judges would not have to waste time in delivering their 
judgement on the point at issue if it was raised in a case. The rule 
relating to removal of a shebait is settled and it can pose no problem as 
to inclusion in a future code of the rules on debutter.
c) Framing a Scheme for Private Debutter
In spite of the existing statutes dealing with regulations and control 
of Hindu public religious endowments and the absence of any central or
1. Saligram v. Raghavacharia AIR 1969 Pat 118, 124, Varadachari, op.cit. 
200, T. Mahmood, Studies in Hindu Law. Law Book Co.Allahabad,19ol, 738.
2. Thenappa Chettiar v. Karuppan Chettiar AIB 1968 SC 9^ 5» 919*
3. AIR 1920 Cal 210. 4. Ibid., p. 215.
5. AIR 1967 SC 1044.
338
state statute regulating and controlling Hindu private religious
endowments "there is still room for the common jurisdiction of the
civil courts in remedying abuses in the management of debutter property.”
The principle involved in the said observation is equally applicable in
the case of entertaining a suit by a civil Court for framing a scheme
of management for a private debutter. In other words, the civil Courts
have jurisdiction to settle a scheme in the case of a private religious
endowment and this view has been settled by the uniform ruling in a large
2number of decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and different 
High Courts.
3
In Bimal Krishna v. Gunendra Krishna, rejecting the contention of the 
defendants that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to settle a scheme 
of a private debutter, B.K. Mukherjea, J. as he then was, held for the
1. Derrett, IMHL, 506.
2. Pramatha v.Pradhyumna AIR 1925 PC 139 where the Privy Council directed
for framing a scheme. Rabindra Nath v. Chandi Charan AIR 1932 Cal 117* 
a case where the heirs of the founder brought the suit for framing a
scheme. Prasad Das v. Jagannath Das AIR 1933 Cal 519* 522 in which the
Calcutta High Court directed the Master of the Court for framing the 
scheme. Bimal Krishna v. Gunendra AIR 1937 Cal 338, 3^ 1 * a- very 
important case for the purpose of this section which will be discussed 
in this section. Mahadeo Jew v. Balkrishna AIR 1952 Cal 763* 768
where the suit was brought inter alia for a scheme of a private debutter. 
Narayanswami v. Balasundaram AIR 1953 Mad 750* 75^  a case in which the 
property was dedicated for the purpose of conducting mandagapadis at 
Madurai. Chellam Pillai v. Chatham Pillai AIR 1953 Tra-Co 19&, 202 where 
the suit was brought inter alia for framing a scheme. Upendra Nath v. 
Nilmony AIR 1957 Cal 3^2,3^6 where the Calcutta High Court approved
the ruling of the lower Court that in the circumstances of the case 
framing a scheme was necessary. Ramaswami v. Aiyasami AIR I960 Mad *f67, 
^75 where though the suit was concerned with a public trust, the Madras 
High Court held that a civil Court could frame a scheme for a private
debutter. Thenappa Chettiar v. Karuppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915, 917,
the case will be discussed in the section. Ramchand v. Janki Ballabhji 
AIR 1970 SC 532, 53^  this case will also be dealt with below in the 
section. Brindaban v. Ram Lakhan AIR 1975 All 255, 258 which relied 
on the said two Supreme Court cases for its ruling on the point at 
issue. Radhamohan Dev v. Nabakishore Naik AIR 1979 Ori l8l, 185-186 
but the Orissa High Court omitted to refer to Ramchand v. Janki 
Ballabhji AIR 1970 SC 532.
3. (1936-37) OWN 728 = AIR 1937 Cal 338.
339
Calcutta High Court that
”In India, the Crown is the constitutional protector of all 
infants and, as the deity occupies in law the position of 
an infant, the shebaits who represent the deity are entitled 
to seek the assistance of the Court in case of mismanagement 
or maladministration of the deity’s estate and to have a 
proper scheme for management framed which would end the 
disputes amongst the guardians and prevent the debutter 
estate from being wasted and ruined.”^
2
His Lordship referred inter alia to Pramatha Nath v. Pradttyumna Kumar 
in which the Judicial Committee directed the framing of a scheme and 
remanded the case to the trial Court specifically to that end laying 
down an important ruling that a civil Court was competent ”to entertain 
a suit the object of which is to have a scheme established for the admin­
istration of a private debutter.
Now the founder or his heirs retain sufficient interest to file a suit
4 5
for framing a scheme and it is open to the Court to frame such a scheme.
The civil Court has inherent power to deal with the matter concerned and
this point of inherent jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a
suit for s cheme of private debutter is implied in the famous statement
of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and Panton, J.J. which may be repeated that
1. AIR 1937 Cal 338, 341. In coming to this decision the Court relied on
the judgement in Monohar,,v... Peary Mohan, AIR 1920 Cal 21, where Sir
Asutosh Mookerjee, J. ’’invoked the analogy of the rule of English law 
according to which in the case of a charitable corporation where the 
founder was a private person he and his heirs became visitors in law 
and in case such* heirs were extinct or were incompetent the visita­
torial powers devolved on the Crown. It is true that in England such 
trusts are regarded as matters of public concern and the Attorney- 
General who represents the Crown takes proceedings on his behalf for 
protection of these charities....” See AIR 1937 Cal 338, 341. So 
the deity being incompetent and being represented by its shebait
can get assistance from the Court in case of any mismanagement of its 
property.
2. AIR 1925 PC 139.
3. AIR 1937 Cal 338, 341. But it was argued against schemes in private
debutter by the counsel for the appellants, the original defendants, that
the debutter in question being a private one, section 92 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure had no application. The shebaits of a private religious 
endowment could have their rights adjudicated if a dispute arose regard­
ing the same. The civil Court, however, could not frame any scheme as it
could do in the case of a public debutter - see p. 340.
4. Varadachari, op.cit. 294. B.K.Mukherjea, op.cit. 4th ed., 516.
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"in respect of a debutter in this country, the founder or his 
heirs may invoke the assistance of a judicial tribunal for 
proper administration thereof jj>n the allegation that the trusts 
are not properly performed...”
The aforesaid observation of their Lordships is practically the judge-
2ment of the Privy Council in Peary Mohan v. Monohar because the decision 
of the High Court was affirmed by the Judicial Committee.
The Supreme Court in two decisions spelt out unambiguously that even 
in case of a private religious endowment the civil Courts had jurisdiction 
to entertain a suit for framing or settling a scheme for the management 
of the debutter.^ It may be stressed again that it is under its inherent 
jurisdiction that a civil Court can entertain a suit for a scheme of a 
private debutter.
5
Now the Supreme Court case of Thenappa Chettiar v. Karuppan Chettiar
is directly related to the subject at issue. In that case the suit was
brought ”for the settlement of a scheme in respect of a trust”^  founded
for the worship of the deity called God Vinayagar. Though the Supreme
Court did not accept the contention of the plaintiffs that a scheme was
necessary for the proper administration of the debutter it reiterated
the already settled rule in unambiguous terms that "even in the case of
a private trust a suit can be filed for the removal of a trustee or for
settlement of a scheme for the purpose of effectively carrying out the
7
objects of the trust.” The Supreme Court referred to Pramatha Nath v.
8 9 *10Pradhyimna Kumar, Monohar v. Peary Mohan and Bimal Krishna v. Gunendra
1. Manohar v. Peary Mohan AIR 1920 Cal 210, 215. See above, p.337*
2. (1920-21) ^8 IA 258
3- Thenappa Chettiar v. Karuppan Chettiar AIR 1968 SC 915 a^d Ramchand 
v. Janki Ballabhji AIR 1970 SC 332.
4. Derrett, IMHL, 306. 5. AIR 1968 SC 913-
6. Ibid., p. 916. 7* Ibid., p. 918.
8. AIR 1925 PC 139. 9. AIR 1920 Cal 210.
10. AIR 1937 Cal 338. For the summary of arguments put forward in the 
case against schemes in private debutter see above, this section.
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in support of its ruling.
1
In Ramchand v. Janki Ballabhji where the dishonest pujari-cum-
shebait misappropriated the deity’s property and set up his personal
title to it, the Supreme Court did not deviate from its previous ruling
on the subject in question. Shah, Ag. C.J. pronounced for the Supreme
Court by referring to the endowment in question that "This is undoubtedly
a private trust but the civil courts have jurisdiction to frame a scheme
2for the management of the temple which is not a public trust." The 
ruling of the Court is a well settled law but in laying down the principle 
the citation of cases was defective, because he omitted to cite cases 
like Bimal Krishna v. Gunendra, Monohar v. Peary Mohan and even the 
previous Supreme Court case (i.e. Thenappa Chettiar*s case, AIR 1968 SC 
915) on the subject auid these three cases, especially the first two, have 
contributed much in evolving the principle that civil Courts have juris­
diction to entertain suits for framing a scheme for the management of a 
debutter.
5
In Mahadeo Jew v. Balkrishna, where inter alia the relief prayed for 
was a decree for the administration of a trust property and for a scheme 
for managing thereof, Mukharji, J. as he then was, made an interesting 
ruling that the right to institute suit for a scheme and the administration 
of a private debutter was a civil right^ falling within the 6cope of
7
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. Thus His Lordship remarked that
"I am...of the opinion that a suit for a scheme and adminis­
tration of a private trust is a justiciable claim within the 
meaning of .. sec. 9i Civil P.C., and therefore the
Court has all the relevant and necessary powers to determine 
a scheme for the proper administration and due management of 
the trust."°
1. AIR 1970 SC 332. 2. Ibid., p. 53*+.
3. AIR 1937 Cal. 338 k. AIR 1920 CAL 210. 5. AIR 1952 Cal 763.
6. See Varadachari, op.cit., 29^ where the learned author pointed out 
the ruling of the Calcutta High Court.
7. See below, Appendix IIB, for the text. 8. AIR 1952 Cal 763,768,
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In my opinion the ruling of Murkharji, J, was not only sound but also
novel. No suit relating to the management or the administration of a
debutter can have as its principal point for determination a caste or 
religious question which could make it barred under section 9« The 
kind of suit with which we are dealing is of a civil nature and can be 
tried by the civil Courts under section 9*
In conclusion of this study it may be said that in any future codifi­
cation of rules relating to private debutter, the legislators will be
in no difficulty regarding the framing of a scheme, because of the uniform 
ruling of the Courts on the subject at issue.
SECTION 6
DUTY OF THE STATE
The observation of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee in Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lai
that "the king, as the ultimate protector of the State, undertakes the
2
supervision of all endowments” could be more applicable to ancient than
modern India. The ancient Indian religious endowments were under the
guarantee of the protection of the king; embezzlers of endowed properties
were subject to severe punishment, e.g. exile. This point has been made
clear in Vis^usmriti.^  It has also been pointed out in Sukranlti that
4
the king’s prime duty is to protect religious endowments. Thus in
1. ILR (1910) 37 Cal 128 (FB).
2. Ibid., p. 135» See the similarity of this observation with that of
B.K. Mukherjea, J. as he then was, in respect of the content in Bimal Krishna 
v. Gunendra Krishna, AIR 1937 Cal 33$, 3^  ^that "In India, the Crown is 
the constitutional protector of all infants..." etc. which has been 
quoted in detail in the previous section.
3. See Pandit v. Krishnamacharya (ed .), Visnusmrrti With The Commentary 
Kesavaijayanti of Nandapandita, Vol. I, The Adyar Library and Research 
Centre, Madras, )964, P* 3^7 (on Visnu V. 168). Visnu V. 168 says: 
ganadravyapaharta vivasyah which means that any person embezzling "goods 
belonging to a corporation (of Brahmins and which have been sent to them 
by the King or private persons), shall be banished" - see F. Max Mtlller
(ed.) The Sacred Books of the East, vol. 7» Macmillan & Co., publishers
to the University of Oxford, 1880, p.38* The goods or properties as 
referred to above are in effect endowed properties.
4. See Sukraniti, Chapter IV, p.9 as cited by Mukherjea, op.cit. 4th ed. 455*
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Rajah Muttu Ramalinga Setupati v. Periyanayagum the celebrated case 
relating to a rich endowment, a pagoda, of Bamesw aram, the Judicial 
Committee held that "The British Government by virtue of its sovereign
power, asserted, as the former Rulers of the country had done, the right
or'
to visit endowments of this kind and to prevent redress abuses in their
* ■ A ■ 3management .tP_ In Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram a document
dated 1793 (exhibit 210 of the case) showed the visitorial power of the
native governor to prevent waste of the debutter by the shebait or other 
4temple servants. The modern State of India has introduced various state
legislations to control public religious endowments and a powerful Commission,
The Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, was set up in I960 "for the
purpose of making an inquiry into certain matters connected with Hindu
5
public religious endowments.” So the Report of the Hindu Religious 
Endowments Commission which came out in 1962 was about the conditions in, 
and made suggestions relating to, public religious trusts; private Hindu 
religious endowments ’’were immune from their scope of reference and equally 
from their overt scope of recommendations."^
It is surprising to see that the Government of India has not yet come 
up with any proposal of reform which migjht affect the administration
1. (1873-73)1 IA 209.
2. Per Sir Montague Smith at 232-233*
3. ILR (1887) 12 Bom 247- Supra p. 137.
4. Ibid., p. 262. On this point see also B.K., Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th 
edition, 49 where the learned author cites inter alia the Bombay
case and observes that "The authority, therefore, support the conclusion 
that supervision and control of Hindu religious and charitable insti­
tutions is a function of government and that government at all times 
asserted and exercised the power. Although India is today a secular 
state, rthat would not preclude the secular administration of religious 
institution'."
5. Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-62), Govt, 
of India, Ministry of Law, Delhi, 1962, 1.
6. Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments", D.E. Smith (ed.), 
South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1966, 311-336, 336. :
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of private Hindu religious endowments as a whole. The state legislatures
are intermittently occupied introducing statutes covering public religious
endowments; it seems that legislators may have made up their minds not to
attempt any reform in the field of private endowments, because no proposal
has as yet come forward to do substantial reform in that area. nThe
State has not cared to make any positive provision for the preservation of
the private trust, and has on the contrary so acted that its interests are
likely to be endangered.” It will be recollected that the incorporation of
the private or family wakf within the scope of state Wakf Boards has not
proved entirely happy: the state's interference has not rewarded those
who had relied on ancient privileges and traditions. In the case of a
public trust the members of the public may ventilate their suspicions about
the way the management of a foundation is being run, and at least they can
instil fear into the managers. Any statute affecting public trusts usually
provides ways by which the public may draw the attention of Government
2officers to a problem which can be solved by the latter. But in the 
field of private endowments the parties involved are very few, so it can 
be argued that the cry of the few does not or will not cause any fear 
in the managers and the public are not affected by any abuse in a private 
endowment, at least directly. But it must be contended that any abuse 
in either a private or a public endowment will affect the public in another 
way because of the existence of the secular property element in the 
shebait j? in respect of any endowment. Moreover, any abuse by the managers 
in any endowment, public or private, results in acquiring material benefits 
by individuals and it has nothing to do with any religion. These abuses 
or means of the shebaits acquiring material benefits through an endowment
1. Derrett, RIB I 506.
2. Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments”... 313 .
5 Shebaiti is a secular property - Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 
SC 293- Supra pp. 218-219.
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under the cover of a religion must be stopped.
As there is no general public demand for reform in private endowments
Parliament may not set up an investigatory body for reform in this field.
Surely there are trained lawyers amongst the parliamentarians, as among
the officials of the Judicial department, and it can be said without
hesitation that most of them either in course of their academic study for
the law degree or in going through the law reports have come across the
notion of the juristic personality of a Hindu idol and the alleged abuses
of the shebaits of private debutters as reported in the cases of different
High Courts and the Supreme Court. Possibly the parliamentarians
tend to ignore the cases of the shebaits' abuses in the field of private
endowments and the nation's wealth involved in them for the reason that
1
they do not affect the position of their political parties. So far the
Indian Legislatures have not attempted to investigate needs for reform in
the field of private trusts, under the impression (doubtless) that the
existing machinery was adequate.
"It must be a part of such study as this one to inquire into the 
validity of this convenient distinction between public and private 
trusts, and to see whether a comprehensive solution is not needed 
which will take care of the problem fundamentally. The amounts 
of money or extents of land involved have nothing to do with the 
matter. A set of stones may be a public temple within a par­
ticular statute and may have two fields endowed for its upkeep 
and the performance of worship; on the other hand the 'private' 
deity of a wealthy Bengali or Bihari family may 'own' numerous 
large farms. The stones may own no jewellery; the deity might 
own enough ornaments and valuable clothing to set many an ^
impoverished family in the same village on its feet economically."
Now, the IndisiParliament has consistently turned a deaf ear to rumours 
of malpractices and irregularities in the field of private endowments, 
so it should share any blame in not introducing reform in this field where
1. "But the shebait of the family idols wields no political patronage, and 
whatever difficulties can be created in the realm of transfer of land, 
and the like by manipulations with the property of 'devata' (called 
'debutter property'), the influence obtained through managership of a
.family trust is slight" - Derrett, "The Reform of Hindu...Endowments", 33^ •
2. Derrett, ibid., p. 313.
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a substantial portion of the nation's wealth in terms of money and land
is involved. If
"the subject were viewed from the point of view of strict 
religion, of the religious benefit of the worshippers, certain 
reforms would suggest themselves in the family field as readily 
as in the public ones. Family trusts are at least as numerous,
and in sum their properties cannot be less valuable. Land
reforms have not hit debutter properties equally in ^11 states, 
and debutter income is not accessible to income tax. One would 
suppose that shebaits of any religious foundation ought to be 
capable of being rendered accountable whether the foundation were 
public or private. The spiritual objects upon which the Commission 
lay stress apply no less urgently here thanthere - and legislation 
actually to prevent excessive dedication to private deities would 
not be impossible, especially if the bogus ’private* temples were 
redefined as ' public *. ”2
It has already been pointed out that some temples in Bengal e.g. the
Kalighat temple in Calcutta, should be reclassified as public institutions.
The worshipppers who are drawn to these temples are no less numerous than
those who go into the famous public temples in both South and North India.
Again, we are bound to ask ourselves why have not individual Indian
legislators expressed any desire to reform private Hindu religious endowments? 
More than a dozen statutes serve as machinery for controlling and administer­
ing the institution of public Hindu religious trusts in different states 
in India but not a single state statute is there whose purpose is to 
control the malpractices and maladministration of shebaits of private 
Hindu religious endowments. Reasons for reforming public endowments and 
the considerations for not reforming private Hindu religious endowments 
have been suggested by Derrett, who observes that
’’the spirit which works for the development and reform of the 
public institution works also for the decay and neglect of the 
private. How, again, is this? Surely religion is more meaningful 
in the home? Fewer Hindus worship in temples than worship in 
their own home. Yet the cosmopolitan intelligentsia, who desire 
that temples should in some manner become respectable and approxi­
mate unobtrusively to churches or cathedrals, are at the same time
1. This is no longer true. See Income Tax Act, 1961.
Reform of Hindu...Endowments”
2. Derrett, ’’The/ , 33^ -335* The Commission as referred to in the 
author's observation is the Commission of the Hindu Religious Endowments 
as mentioned earlier in the section.
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people who have given up keeping an ancestral shrine and 
no longer perform daily worship of family idols. To them 
the family idol is a charming anachronism, and the fact that 
the institution was kept afloat chiefly by economic motives 
does nothing to endear it to them. If the family trusts 
gradually break up through neglect, if the assets gradually 
become secularized, if no property is dedicated to family 
idols, they will not care. The misuse of power by the trustees 
of public institutions is one thing, the decay of private 
institutions is another. Religion inspired both, but consider­
ations that inspired^the movements for reform in the 1960's are 
not religious ones.”
It could be added that the reasons which led to the reform in the field
of public religious trusts ignoring the much needed reform of private
religious endowments impressed the legislators who introduced statutes
regulating Hindu public religious trusts; they could not be entertained
by Hindus in general to whom the political objects were not immediately
apparent. In other words, they did not reflect the wishes of the common
Hindu. Just as the pious Muslim expects thawab (heavenly reward) for
his gift in wakf, not from the mutawalli*s honesty, so the pious Hindu
acquires pupjya from the dana orjfo«ivar|>ana, not from the functionary's
honesty or competence.
The pre-British king was not so much concerned with the intention of
the founder of an endowment as with its use for worship of a manifestation 
2of God. If temples were out of repair, the dedicated lands were either
re-dedicated to other temples or income of the dedicated property was
used in such a way as to serve a purpose similar to that wanted by the
dedicator.^ Nobody can say that the present day Hinduism is different in
this respect from pre-British Hinduism.
"The law should protect temples so that worshippers make their 
vows and pay them, may offer worship to the idol and present 
it with their gifts; and the law should protect mutts so
1. "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments"... cited above, 335* We 
should prefer to say 'were not primarily religious ones'.
2. Derrett, Critique, 3&0*
3. Derrett, Ibid., p. 3^ 0.
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that the educational purposes for which they were founded 
(subject to valid redirections) should continue to hold 
together the sects concerned in a common doctrine, and common 
form of worship, and a common path to individual salvation.”
It is submitted that the State of India is responsible for the protection 
and maintenance of the existing religious endowments so that the purposes 
for which they have come into being may be fulfilled. It must accept- 
some responsibility to protect endowments, not least Hindu private religious 
endowments which have never been subject to enquiry by any investigatory 
body for finding out whether the existing machinery works well. The Consti­
tution of India does not discourage religion in any of its provisions and 
the institution of the Hindu private religious trust cannot be made an 
exception. In this context, the duty of the State is twofold: (i) to
find out bogus 'private' religious endowments and redefine them as public 
or take them away from the managing shebaits for the benefit of the society 
as a whole; and (ii) to protect the genuine private religious endowments 
thus allowing the family worshippers to satisfy their spiritual needs. The 
considerations for future reform in the field of Hindu private religious 
endowment must be religious not political ones. We are not, in saying 
this, reflecting in any way on the duty of endowments to contribute by way 
of taxation to the country's needs.
SECTION 7 
RECOMMENDATIONS
2
The rule that all the co-shebaits must join together to make any
alienation of debutter property renders the administration of debutter 
3
very difficult in circumstances where money may be needed for the
1. Derrett, Critique, 381.
2. Man Mohan Dais v. Janki Prasad (19^-^5) ^9 CWN 195 (PC), 201 where 
the main point for determination was whether the mortgage deed 
executed by one of the trustees was binding on the deity.
3. Derrett, Critique, 3 8 7 1u «./
cli- cO ct.Ii ,,, T/wri A /A. tj$2- All So
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protection of the endowment itself. When there are several shebaits
of an endowment the management may be in the hands of one of the
shebaits. But even the act of the majority of shebaits including the
managing shebait will bind neither the deity nor the minority of shebaits.
It should be remembered that because of the effect of the Hindu Succession
2Act on shebaiti which is heritable and partible, a time may come when 
there will be innumerable shebaits for a particular endowment. So for the 
effective administration of debutter and to enable the managing shebait 
to alienate a .portion of the debutter for meeting legal necessity speedily 
for the protection of the endowment itself, the new law should incorporate 
provision, in addition to what has already been suggested in this respect 
in section six of this chapter, to the effect that when a managing shebait 
has been able to get the consent of the majority of competent shebaits 
to make an alienation, in case of legal necessity he should be legally
3
entitled to make it, the alienation being in any case voidable. The 
old law relating to a widow's right to adopt in Madras may be cited as
1. B.K. Mukherjea, on.cit.. *tth ed.f 251. See above, p. 218.
2. Angurbala v. Debabrata AIR 1951 SC 293, supra, p. 3^ 8; Laxmidhar v. 
v. Rangabati Bewa AIR 1967 Ori 90, 92, M.N. Das, Laws Relating to 
Partition, 2nd ed. Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1981, 56b. It is 
strange to see that the whole of the fourteenth chapter (called 
Debutter) of the learned writer's book covering about eighty pages 
deals with debutter as a whole where about six pages (pp. 565-567 
and pp. 57^-576) only have been devoted to the laws about partition 
of debutter and shebaiti. The treatment of the question of debutter 
covering so much space in a book on laws of partition seems to be 
very irrelevant. Moreover, it is not at all understandable why the 
authx’has treated the subject of Islamic wakf in the midst of the 
chapter (pp. 530-535)* Moreover, in dealing with wakf he has not 
cited at all the two important cases of Abul Fata (1893-9*0 22
IA 76 and Fazlul Rabbi, AIR 1965 SC 1722. These two cases are as 
important and indispensable for Islamic wakf as Prosunno Kumari's 
case (197^ -75) 2 IA 1^5 and Angurbala's case AIR 1951 S.C. 293, 
for Hindu debutter.
3. "The rule should be that where a majority of shebaits in the line of 
management or interest as it was constituted immediately before the 
enactment of HSA approve a transfer or scheme of management this should 
be binding on the idol (cf. the family arrangement) notwithstanding
(continued on next page)
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an appropriate analogy: the want of consent of some sapindas
1
used to be ignored.
Again the general rule that all the shebaits must be co-plaintiffs
2
in a suit instituted on an idol's behalf to recover possession either
of the idol's property held adversely by a stranger or money payable to
the endowment, should be abandoned for a new approach which should allow
any of the co-shebaits to sue on the idol’s behalf to recover eitha*its
property or any money payable to it. The present procedure delays the
recovery of the possession of the deity's property and the possibility
exists that the deity might iose the property altogether by the operation of
the Law of Limitation. It has been held that where a deity was represented
by some but not by all the shebaits the test was whether the deity's
interests were sufficiently represented by those shebaits. This is
obviously a most fruitful line to develop and it is strange that we have
no recent authorities proceeding in the same direction.
(continued from previous page)
objections later raised by other shebaits belonging to other families 
and less directly concerned with the endowment" - Derrett, Critique. 387* 
Here the expression 'HSA' means the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
1. T. Naidu v. K. Naidu AIR 1970 SC 1673, 1679; C.S.VJSharma v. Ramalak- 
shamma AIR 1972 AP 270, 273-27^; see Mulla's Hindu Law, 14th ed. N.M. 
Tripathi, Bombay, 1978-, p. 532, where the Supreme Court case has been 
referred to and it has been observed that "the consent necessary to 
validate the adoption is not the consent of every sapinda, however 
remote... The starting point relating to the doctrine of consent of 
the sapindas was first enunciated by the Privy Council in the case of 
Collector of Madura popularly known as the Ramnand case... It was 
developed by the decisions of the Privy Council and the Madras High 
Court and culminated in the decision of the Supreme Court in Tahsil 
Naidu v. Kulla Naidu... The consent required is that of a substantial 
majority of the nearest sapindas who are capable of forming an intelligent 
and honest judgement in the matter...."
2. Nirmal Chandra v. Jyoti Prosad AIR 19^1 Cal 562, 567 and Sree Sree 
Sreedhar Jew v. Kanta Mohan AIR 19^7 Cal 213, 219*
3. On this point see Jyoti Prasad v. Jahar Lai AIR 19^ 5 Cal 268, 278 and 
Prabir Chandra v. Panchanan AIR 1957 Cal. 117, 118.
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The problem relating to the question who may sue on behalf of a
private deity and under what circumstances, calls for-an immediate solution.
For time spent on procedural steps may damage the deity's interests. To
-simplify procedure and concentrate on the substance of a case was the
effect of the famous observation quoted above (p. 328) of Subba Rao J.
in Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji which laid down the rule that fla prolonged
2and a complicated" procedure should be abandoned to save the interests 
of the deity.
Again, in so far as a Hindu public religious endowment is concerned, 
the procedure under Section 92 is complicated even after its amendment in 
1976. The procedural aspect of Section 92 that a suit under the section 
cannot be instituted by more than one person interested in an endowment 
without prior permission of the Court, can be abandoned. For it will delay 
the remedy needed for an endowment; whether "the plaintiff, or next friend, 
is entitled to commence proceedings on the idol's behalf would normally be 
raised by the defendant in any event and will be before the court as a 
preliminary issue".^
Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure even as amended in 1976 is 
applicable only when a suit is related to one of the reliefs provided in
if
the section and a declaratory suit relating to the property rights of the
deity is not contemplated in the section and the limitation of the section
1. AIR 1967 SC 1044.
2. Ibid., p. 1047; Abu Backer v. Advocate-General, Madras ILR (195*01 Tra- 
Co,- 369» 387, see above, section 3 of this chapter; S.wami Shantanand 
Saraswati v. Advocate-General ILR (1956) 1 All 609, 610, see above, 
section 5 of this chapter.
3. Derrett, IMHL 503.
4. Pragdasji v. Iswarlal Bhai AIR 1952 SC 143, 144; Harendra Nath v.
Kali Ram Das AIR 1972 SC 246, 250, Vidya Sagar v. Anand Swarup AIR
1981 All 106, 109i infra this section.
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can be avoided in the way shown by the Supreme Court in Biswanath’s 
1case.
In that case the Supreme Court has in effect laid down the rule that
if jfawie of the reliefs claimed in a suit is ' covered by the provision
of the section it must not be taken that the plaintiff has no other
remedy. There the reliefs claimed were both the recovery of a declaration
that the property belonged to the deity and possession of the deity’s
property. Subba Rao, C.J. observed that
’’The present suit is filed by the idol for possession of its 
property from the person who is in illegal possession thereof 
and, therefore, it is a suit by the idol to enforce its private 
right. The suit also is for a declaration of the plaintiff’s 
title and for possession thereof and is, therefore, not a suit for 
one of the reliefs mentioned in S. 92 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and therefore, the said section is not a bar to its 
maintainability. ” 2
Thus the effect of the statement is that what is not within the purview
of any particular section should not be taken to mean that it is barred by
that section. This ruling of the Supreme Court was followed in Vidya Sagar
3
v. Anand Swarup, where the pujaris were claiming the temple to be their 
private institution and contended inter alia that the suit was barred under 
section 92. The Allahabad High Court ruled that the suit in question was 
maintainable in spite of the fact that requirements of section 92 were 
not complied with. Technicalities of law should not delay justice.
In this .context, an important curiosity is that plaintiffs successful 
in suits for possession of the deity’s property improperly alienated are 
not entitled to actual possession of the property during -the tenure of 
the dishonest shebait. ”A contract for a permanent lease of a debutter 
property cannot certainly be enforced in the absence of any legal necessity
1. AIR 1967 SC 10Mf. 2 . AIR 1967 SC 1(M, 10^ 6.
3. AIR 1981 All 106, 109.
k, Ponnambala Desikar v. Periyanan Chetti (1935-36) 63 IA 261, 27^
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but when the grant has already been made by a shebait, the correct
position seems to be that it is operative at least during the tenure
of office of the grantor”, but it can be operative on a permanent basis
"even after his death if the next incumbent privately comes to terms
2
with the occupiers of the property”. It must be pointed out that the
present position of law is intolerable. It encourages malpractices,
especially collusion in the administration of the debutter. The deity
or the endowment must not be dispossessed of 'its property even for a
short time when a plaintiff is successful in a litigation for recovery
of the possession of the debutter. The law^ gives the shebait the right
to possess and manage the deity's property not to encourage him to indulge
in malpractices in his administration of the debutter or to collude with
a third party to let him possess the property adversely to the deity's 
k
interests. The law should be that the deity's property wrongfully alien­
ated by a shebait can be recovered from the occupier immediately after the 
plaintiff is successful in a suit to recover the possession of the debutter. 
The question of the shebait's right of property in the debutter is a 
separate question, but legislation (in our submission) is needed to 
terminate the right of a mala fide purchaser to-retain debutter property 
for the duration of a corrupt or incompetent shebait's tenure of his 
shebaiti. The old analogy with the right of a mala fide purchaser from a 
widow to enjoy the property for the widow's life is most inappropriate, 
since although the shebait represents the deity and has property in his 
shebaiti and in the debutter (until this is abolished) the debutter does 
not exist for his enjoyment as the widow's estate existed for the widow.
1. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 287. 2. Derrett, Critique, 384.
3. Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari (1903-4) 31 IA 203•
4. Bhagabat v. Ajodhya Das AIR 1978 Oril94, 198. In that case, the 
shebait acted adversely to the deity's interest by executing an illegal 
sale deed in respect of the endowed properties.
The present uncertainty regarding the question who can sue on behalf
of the deity should be settled by a statutory provision. A Supreme
Court decision on the question is not enough, because decisions may
differ on the same point. Thus the Court (contrary to the case of
Biswanath v. Radha Ballabh.ji) laid down in Ham Raghava Reddy v. Seshu 
2
Reddy that a bare worshipper had no right to sue on the deity's behalf
3 kto recover possession of the deity's property. Varadachari follows 
this view in the second edition of his book when the learned author 
observes that "The right of the worshipper to sue in the name of the idol 
is limited only to getting a declaration that an alienation is not binding 
on the deity. Since the worshippers do not exercise the deity's power of 
suing, they are not entitled to recover possession of the property." How
5
can such a dichotomy be justified? In Biswanath v. Radha Ballabhji it was
c
held that a bare worshipper could maintain suits on behalf of an idol.
In the latter case the Court in effect ruled that a person either a member 
of the family or a stranger to the family having either spiritual or 
material interest in a family endowment was entitled to conduct suits on 
behalf of the deity for the recovery of the possession of the debutter 
from the hands possessing it adversely. But it is implied that the stranger's 
interest must be a continuing interest as that of the plaintiff in the 
Supreme Court case who took an active part in the worship of the deity and 
also helped the then shebait in the management of the debutter. In these 
circumstances the person may be a stranger but not to the endowment. Anyway, 
whether a person is a complete stranger to the endowment or to the family 
can be judged by the Court from the circumstances of a case.
1. AIR 1967 SC 1(M.
3* Ibid., p. *+*+0, para 10.
5. AIR 1967 SC 10*+*+.
2. AIR 1967 SC *+36. 
*+. At p. 300.
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"It would be better to refashion all the remedies by legis­
lation but while that is pending the courts can themselves 
clarify the rights of persons interested in the endowment.
The latter should sue on behalf of the compendious expression 
of the pious purpose which is symbolised by the idol or the 
mutt, and thus in the idol's or mutt's name, and the court 
should apply its mind not primarily to the locus standi of 
the plaintiffs or applicants, as at present, but rather to 
the merits of the matter."
What Derrett suggests is definitely meant for the institution of the
Hindu private religious endowment and it is where we have seen the State
in India to be apathetic. Again, it may be added that a legislative
reform is needed in this field and any future legislation relating to the
subjects of suits in relation to the idol or debutter must incorporate
2in it the principles laid down in the Biswanath's case. In my opinion 
the Supreme Court's judgement in the case is a gem of a decision.
1. Derrett, Critique, 38^ .
2. AIR 1967 SC 1<M.
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CHAPTER VI '
MATHS
SECTION 1
(a) THE NATURE OF A MATH, (b) MAHANT AND MAHANTSHIP and (c) THE 
APPOINTMENT OF MAHANTS
a. The Nature of a Math
A math (Sanskrit Matham, Anglo-Indian ’mutt' ) in its original and
2
narrow sense signified the abode of an ascetic or a sanyasi. In Swami
Harbansa Chari Ji v. State^ where the plaintiff brought the suit for a
declaration that he was the successor mahant of a so-called math which
was in fact a temple, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that ’’Math in
k
ordinary language signifies an abode and residence of ascetics”.
Sankaracharya founded many Hindu maths in competition with powerful
5
institutions of both the Buddhists and Jainas. In Giyana Sambhanda v.
Kandasami Tambaran^ where the main contention of the plaintiff was related
to a declaration that certain maths of Tiruppanandal and Benares were
subject to his and his successors’ control, the Madras High Court held that
’’when the Buddhists assailed the Brahminical religion and when 
Sankarachariyar,? the founder of the Advaita or non-dualistic 
school of philosophy, ultimately prevailed against them, he 
established some mutts in order to maintain and strengthen the
1. Derrett, IMHL, 510. 2. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 115.
3. AIR 1981 MP 82. k. Ibid., p. 87.
5. Derrett, IMHL,-511. 6. ILR (1887) 10 Mad 375-
7. ’’The origin of these mutts is traceable to the times when Buddhism
had a powerful hold upon the masses in India and Sankaracharya, the 
leader of Brahminical doctrines, led the opposition against the 
Buddhists. With a view to counteracting the activities of the 
Buddhists and to serve at centres of religious instruction and 
philosophy, he started mutts presided over by learned and pious 
ascetics after the model of the Buddhistic order of monks...” - 
Raghavachariar, op.cit., vol. I, 7th ed. 1980, 6^2.
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doctrine and the system of religious philosophy he taught, 
sanyasis being placed at the head of those institutions.”'1
But in its legal parlance a math "connotes a monastic institution presided
over by a superior and established for the use and benefit of ascetics,
belonging to a particular order, who generally are disciples or co-disciples 
2
of the superior". The superior of a math called mahant or mathadikari 
"is the spiritual guide of a sect or sub-sect, and often acts as caste 
head, settling disputes and serving as an authority in matters of conscience."^ 
Like a college, a math is an institution which exists normally for the
if 5
advancement of religious education. In Vidyapurna v. Vidyanidhi where
the main question for determination was whether the lunacy of a mahant
could divest him of his mahantship Sir Subramania Aiyar, O.C.J., observed
for the Madras High Court that the maths "were established as centres of
theological learning, and in order to provide a line of competent teachers
with reference to the established Hindu creeds of the Country".^ But
unlike a college having many fellows it has only one representative, i.e.
the mahant or the head of the math who is normally its manager, but in
many cases persons interested in the math "have a say at critical moments
in the life of the math, as for example when a mahant is to be appointed
7
or recognized or 'deposed".
g
Again, a math like the deity of a debutter is a juridical person.
1. ILR (1887) 10 Mad 3751 386. For the origin of maths see also Sam- 
mantha v. Selappa ILR (1879) 2 Mad 175* 179 and Ganeswara Giri v.
Som Giri AIR 19^9 All 718, 721-722.
2. Mukherjea, op.cit., kth ed. 321. The view was accepted and Mukherjea’s 
observation was quoted by the Supreme Court in Krishna Singh v. Mathura 
Ahir, AIR 1980 SC 707» 713» see below, this section.
8. Babaji Rao v. Laxman Das ILR (190*0 28 Bom 215, 223; Vidya Varuthi
v. Balusami (1920-21) IA 302, 311; Ongole Byragi Mutt v. Kannayya
AIR I960 AP 98 (FB), 99-100, Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1972 
All 273, 279; Lakshmi Narayan v. State AIR 1978 Pat 330 , 333; Pushpa- 
giri Mutt v. Ramalinga Sastri (1979) 1 M U  5**; Krishna Singh v.
Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707, 726.
3. Derrett, IMHL, 511
6. Ibid., p. 107.
k. Derrett, ibid., p. 511. 5. (190*0 1** M U  105
7. Derrett, IMHL, 511*
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"It is a characteristic of Hindu law that property should be owned by
deities (idols) and by maths (religious institutions like colleges).’1
2In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir where the main point for decision was 
whether a Sudra being ordained to a religious order could become a 
sannyasi and thus could become a mahant of a math, the Supreme Court held 
that "According to the Hindu jurisprudence, a religious institution such
as a math is treated as a juristic entity with a legal personality capable
3
of holding and acquiring property.”
4
In Babaji Rao v. Laxmandas the mahant instituted the suit to recover 
the possession of a house belonging to the math in question, Sir Lawrence 
Jenkins, C.J., pronounced for the Bombay High Court that
5
”A math, like an idol in Hindu law is a judicial persona 
capable of acquiring, holding and vindicating legal rights, 
though of necessity it can only act in relation to those rights 
through the medium of some human agency. When the property is 
vested in the math, then litigation in respect of it has 
ordinarily to be conducted by, and in the name of the manager, 
not because the legal property is in the manager but because it 
is the established practice that the suit would be brought in 
that form...”8
7
A math is a religious institution sui generis and unlike a temple where
1. Derrett, "The Concept of Property in Ancient Indian Theory and Practice",
AIR 1968 Jnl. 2-8, 3-
2. AIR 1980 SC 707• The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Allahabad High Court in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1972, All,
273* Derrett appreciates Kirty, J. of the Allahabad High Court for 
Ins excellent judgement in the case. See "Common Sense in Hindu Law 
a Splendid Decision from Allahabad", 1972, KLT Jnl. 89-92: Both the
High Court and the Supreme Court decisions have been praised by W.F. 
Menski in his article "Sudra Sannyasis: A Piece of Realism in Hindu 
Law" (1981) 2 M U  Jnl. 25-26. Menski points out (at p. 25) that the 
Supreme Court has rediscovered "a basis of entitlement to be a sannyasi 
which had been overlooked...during the British period."
3* Per Sen, J., ibid., p. 726.
*t. ILR (190*0 28 Bom 215.
5. Similarly a gurdwara is also a juristic person. See Piara Singh v.
Shri Guru Granth Sahib AIR 1973 P & H *f70, kjl.
6. ILR (190*+) 28 Bom 215 , 223.
7. Derrett, IMHL, 510.
359
the presiding element is the deity, the presiding element of a math
2 3is its mahant. The primary object of a temple is the worship of the
deity but in the case of a math the worship of the deity attached to it
4
is a secondary matter; however, it is the essence of a math that religious
5
instruction is imparted. It must be stressed that the common object of 
both maths and temples is the same,in the sense that both types of insti­
tutions are meant for the spiritual welfare of mankind. In Vidyapurna 
v. Vidyanidhi^ Sir Subrahmania Ayyar, O.C.J. pronounced on the point when 
his Lordship observed that
’’The two classes of institutions, viz, temples and mutts, are
...supplementary in the Hindu Ecclesiastical system, both
conducing to spiritual welfare, the one by affording opportunities 
for prayer and worship, the other by facilitating spiritual 
instruction and the acquisition of religious knowledge - the 
presiding element being the deity or idol in the one, the learned 
and pious ascetic in the other.”
But the aforesaid observation of Sir Subrahmania Ayyar was not accepted 
by G. Sarkar Sastri when the latter commented that ”It is, however, submitted 
with great deference that the deity is the presiding element in both, there
being no math without its deity: the worship is prominent in both, but
g
religious knowledge is added to it in one of them”. With due respect
1. Vidyapurna v. Vidyanidhi ILR (1904) 27 Mad 435, 4-54.
2. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 7071 7^3; Swami Harbansa
Chari Ji v. State AIR 198I MP 82, 87.
3* ’’Mutts...are distinguished from temples in which property is dedicated
for the worship of a god primarily for spiritual purposes, and the 
worshippers are beneficiaries in a spiritual sense...” - G. Sarkar 
Sastri, A Treatise on Hindu Law, 6th ed. Eastern Law House, 1927, 761.
4. Thambu Chetti v. A.T. Arundel ILR (1882) 6 Mad 287, 288; Varadachari,
op.cit., 117*
3. Abhinav Vidyatirth v. Charity Commr. AIR 1967 Bom 194, 198, affirmed
by the Supreme Court in Charity Commr. v. Shringeri Math AIR 1969
SC 366, 569 = (1969) 71 Bom LR 678 SC, 681.
6. ILR (1904) 27 Mad 435 = 14 MLJ 105.
7. ILR (1904) 27 Mad 435, 454.
8. Op.cit., 6th ed., 762.
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to the learned author it may be pointed out that the essential difference
between a math and a temple is that the former is essentially an educational 
1
centre for imparting religious or spiritual learning and the worship of
2
a deity is not its primary purpose.
Again a math even without a deity may be found to exist. In Swami
Harbansa Chari Ji v. State^ where the main issue was related to the
succession of mahantship, Varma J. observed for the Madhya Pradesh High
Court on the point that
”The presiding element in a math is an ascetic or a religious 
teacher. With his disciples and co-disciples, he forms a 
spiritual family... The primary purpose of the math is to en­
courage and foster spiritual learning. Competent teacher 
imparts religious instructions to the disciples who are followers 
of the particular school or order... The worship of God was 
not excluded if it was essential as a part of the religious 
teachings of a particular math. It cannot, however, be said that 
there cannot be a math without an idol”.
In general, maths are of three types,^ namely, maurusi, panchayati and
hakimi. In maurusi or appointable maths the existing mahant usually makes
6 7the choice of his successor. In the case of a panchayati or elective
math the new mahant is elected either by the committee of mahants or other
g
maths or by the effective leadership of a sect or a caste. In hakimi or
9
nominative maths the mahants are appointed by the ruler or a descendant
1. See the Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, op.cit.,
20, where it was observed that "A close study of the origin and develop­
ment of mutts in the country would show that they were started mainly 
for the purpose of imparting instruction in various forms of Hindu 
religion and philosophy and conducting religious propaganda”.
2. See Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. yy\ where the author has expressed the
same view and disagreed with Sarkar Sastri on the point at issue.
3. AIR 1981 MP 82. 4. Ibid., p. 87.
5. See Mohunt Rama Nooj Doss v. Mohunt Debraj Doss (1839) 6 SDA 328, 336;
Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das AIR 19l6 PC 236, 237 see below, p. 364.
6. See Tulasiram v. Ramprasanna AIR 1956 Ori 41 where the dispute was related 
to the nomination of the successor of a mahant of a Vaishnab maurusi math, 
the Orissa Court held if there were more chelas or disciples than one, a 
mahant had a right to appoint one of them as his successor. See p.47.
7. Sital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR 195^.SC 607, a case relating to an institution 
belonging to the Ram Kabir sect of Hindu Bairagis and Sarju Pass v. Bhag 
Pass AIR 1961 Punj 364 where the mahant committed an offence under the 
Indian Penal Code, are the cases of panchayati or elective maths.
8. Derrett, IMHL 5*13« 9. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 357*
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1
of the ruling house or by the party who made the endowment. Maurusi
2maths are the mere common type but the least common are hakimi.
b . Mahant and Mahantship
3 kThe head of a math is called the mahant or mathadikari who is
5 6generally its manager or custodian. In Sarangadeva v. Ramaswami
where the plaintiff instituted the suit to recover the possession of
lands belonging to a math which were granted to his predecessors on a
perpetual lease and where upon the verdict of the Supreme Court he acquired
title to the suit lands by adverse possession, the Supreme Court following
7
Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar pronounced that "A mathadipathi is the 
manager and custodian of the institution... The office carries with it 
the right to manage and possess the endowed properties on behalf of the
math and the right to sue on its behalf for the protection of those
8 9properties." A mahant may of course have private properties of his own.
As the manager of a math the mahant represents the math either as a 
10
plaintiff or as a defendant in all suits brought on b.ehalf of or against
11
the math. In Guranditta v. Amar Pass , where the main point for determi-
1. Sarkar Sastri, op.cit., 6th ed. 761.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 513*
3- "The word 'mahant' means 'respected' and 'one whose desires for earthly
belongings have been put to an end to'" (sic) R.P. Arora, "Rights and
Duties of Mahants", (1950) k Indian Law Review, 235-2^ +8, 235-
4. Varadachari, op.cit., 2nd ed., 511*
5. Derrett, IMHL, 511.
6. AIR 1966 SC 1603.
7. (1920-21) *f8 IA 302.Supra, p. 217.
8. Per Bachawat, J., AIR 1966 SC 1603, 1606.
9. Math Sauna v. Kedar Nath AIR 1981 SC 1878, 1880 = (1982) 19 GLT SC 6. 
See below, section 2.
10. Derrett, IMHL, 515*
11. AIR 1965 SC 1966.
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nation was related to the question of the starting point of adverse
possession of land belonging to an Akhara of Amritsar which was
alienated by the deposed mahant without any legal necessity, Mudholkar,
J. held that ”a Mahant of an Akhara represents the Akhara and has both
the right to institute a suit on its behalf as also the duty to defend
2
one brought against it”.
As long as he manages the endowed property, a mahant seems to be on 
the same footing as the shebait of an idolfs property. But the main 
difference between them is the position of a mahant which implies the 
office of a religious preceptor as well. In Krisha Singh v. Mathura Ahir^ 
Sen, J. pronounced for the Supreme Court that ” a math is an institutional 
sanctum presided over by a superior who combines in himself the dual office 
of being the religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious 
fraternity, and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution
if
of the math.”
Again, there can be more than one shebait for a temple but in the case
5
of a math there is only one mahant. The shebait of a deity is not
entitled to the offerings^ made to the deity whereas the mahant has not
only an absolute right to the income of the offerings made to him personally
7
but also has complete control over all the offerings made to the math. 
Mahantship, like shebaiti, is an amalgam of office and property, but
1• In deciding this point the Supreme .Court relied on Subbaiya v. Mahamad
Mustapha (1922-23) 50 IA 295 which was related to the recovery of the 
possession of endowed lands belonging to an endowment of food chattaram 
and other objects and Mahant Sudarsan Das v. Mahant Ham Kirpal (1949-50)
77 IA 42 where the mahant claimed title to a share of the endowed 
property belonging to another math (asthal).
2. AIR 1965 SC 1966, 1969. 3. AIR 1980 SC 707 4. Ibid., p. 713-
5. Gobinda Ramanuj v. Mohanta Ramcharan ILR (1936) 63 Cal 326, 343*
6. Manohar Ganesh v. Lakhmiram Govindram ILR (1887) 12 Bom 247, 265» supra p.
7. See Lakshmi Narayan v. State AIR 1978 Pat 330, Below, p. 363;
Varadachari, op.cit., 119.
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1
unlike shebaits it is neither partible nor (in the ordinary sense)
2 3heritable. Thus in Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swaniar B.K. Mukherjea, J.
as he then was, observed for the Supreme Court that
nin the conception of mahantship, as in shebaitship, both the 
elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest 
are blended together and neither can be detached from the other.
The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endow­
ments attached to an institution is manifested in his large 
powers of disposal and administration and his right to create 
derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties; and these 
and other rights of a similar character invest the office of 
the Mahant with the character of proprietary right, which, 
though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right.
It is true that the mahantship is not heritable like ordinary 
property...”1*
A mahant being a spiritual teacher of a sect or a caste has ”ample 
discretion in the application of the funds of the institution, but always
5
subject to certain obligations and duties, governed by custom and usage”.
The point that he has ample powers of disposition of trust funds has been
reiterated by the Patna High Court in Lakshmi Narayan v. State^ where
Agarwal, J. observed that
”the position of the Mahant...is that the property of a math 
is held by him as the spiritual head of the institution. In
the conception of Mahantship, as in shebaitship, both the elements
of office and property are blended together and neither can be 
detached from the other, but a Mahant, in addition to his duties, 
has a personal interest of a beneficial character larger than 
that of a shebait in a debutter property”.?
The position of the head of a math or a mahant was explained long ago
1. Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar (1917-18) 45 IA 1, 9* Ramcharan
Ramanuj v. Gobinda Ramanuj (1928-29) 56 IA 104, 110.
2. On maurusi maths see above, p. 360; Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T.
Swamiar AIR 1954 SC 282, 288. Supra, pp. 16-21.
3. AIR 1951* SC 282.
4. Ibid., p. 288.
3. Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21) 48.IA 302, 313•
6. AIR 1978 Pat 330, a case relating to four deities of two temples in
the district of Rothas, Bihar.
7. Ibid., p. 333* But unlike the interest of a shebait in a debutter the 
interest of a mahant in a math property completely ceases after his death 
and does not pass to any heir. See Controller of Estate Duty, Bihar v. 
Mahant Umesh Narain Puri (1982) 2 SCC 3031 309*
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in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das where the main issue to be decided by
the Privy Council related to the office and rights of a mahant.
Lord Shaw pronounced that,
"The mahant is the head of the institution. He sits upon the 
gaddi; he initiates candidates into the mysteries of the cult; 
he superintends the worship of the idol and the accustomed 
spiritual rites; he manages the property of the institution; 
he administers its affairs; and the whole assets are vested i ^  
him as the owner thereof in trust for the institution itself."
But the point that the property of the math is held in'trust' by its 
mahant was clarified in the decision in Vidya Varuthi's case^ where Mr. 
Ameer Ali pointed out that the property of a math did not vest in a 
mahant; he was not a trustee in the English sense but "he is answerable 
as a trustee in the general sense for maladministration".
In the conclusion of this study it may be pointed out that like the 
institution of math, mahantship is an institution sui generis. He is 
neither a trustee in the English sense nor an owner of the trust property 
but is accountable as a trustee in respect of obligations and duties 
imposed on hira.^  Though he is not the owner of the 'trust' property, 
in view of his office, like an ordinary owner of a property, he is himself 
a beneficiary of the 'trust' property.
cf The Appointment of Mahants
If the founder of a math lays down any particular rule of succession
7
to mahantship then that rule is to be adhered to. Otherwise, the
1. AIR 1916 PC 256.
2. Ibid., p. 257« The word 'trust' is commonly recognised to be used here 
in a loose sense. See below# ;
3# (1920-21) 48 IA 302.
4. Ibid., p.3H» On this point see Commr# H.R.E.v.L.T. Swamiar AIR 1954
SC 282, 288 and S.T. Swamiar v. H.R. & C.E. AIR 1963 SC 9&6, 971.
5# Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21) 48 IA 203, 11#
6. Commr. H.R.E.v.L.T. Swamiar AIR 1954 SC 282, 288.
7# Sital Das v. Sant Ram AIR 1954 SC 607, 609, a case when the suit was 
brought for the recovery of alienated lands on lease belonging to a 
Thakurdwara of the Ram Kabir sect of Hindu Bairagis, see Mahant Bhagwan 
v. Girija Nandan AIR 1972 SC 814, 817 where B.K. Mukherjea's observation
in his book on the point was quoted. On this point see also Mukherjea,
op.cit., 4th ed., 347.
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appointment or the succession to the office of a mahant is determined 
1
by custom. This is a settled law supported by uniform ruling of the 
Courts of all levels.
2
In Greedharee Doss v. Nundokissore Doss the question to be determined
was the succession of a mahant "of the Akara of an endowed religious
monastic institution of professed ascetics at Rajgunge in the district
of Burdwan".^ Lord Romilly pronounced for the Judicial Committee that
"It is to be observed that the only law as to these Mohunts 
and their offices, functions, and duties, is to be found in 
custom and practice which is to be proved by testimony..."
In Mahalinga Thambiran v. Arulnandi Thambiran^ where the main issue
was related to the question of the validity of an appointment of a junior
mahantship of the Kashi Math, Mathew, J. held for the Supreme Court that,
"Succession to the office of a Mahant or Head of a Mutt is to 
be regulated by the custom of the particular Mutt and one who 
claims office by right of succession is bound to allege and prove 
what the custom of the particular institution is, for the only 
law regulating succession to such institutions is to be found 
in the custom and practice of that institution..."®
7
Again in Krishna Singh v. Mathura Singh Sen, J. reiterated the law 
at issue when his Lordship pronounced for the Supreme Court that,
1. Greedharee Doss v. Nundokissore Doss (1866-67) 11 MIA 405, 428,
Genda Puri v. Chhatar Pari (1885-861 13 IA 100, 105, Ramalingam Pillai 
v. Vythilingam Pillai (1&92-93) ^0 IA 150, 154; Lahar Puri v. Pur an 
Nath (1914-15) 42 IA 115, 118; Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das AIR 19l6 
PC 256, 257* Nataraja Thambiran v. Kailasami Pillai (1920-21) 48 IA
1, 8 though it wan not mentioned there that custom determined the 
succession of mahantship of the math, it could be read that the head 
was entitled to nominate his successor according to the custom of the 
math; Satnam Singh v. Bhagwan Singh AIR 1938 PC 216, 217; Sital Das 
v. Sant Ram AIR 195^ SC 606, 609; Mahanth Bhagwan v. Girija Nandan 
AIR 1972 SC 814, 817; Rajendra Ram v. Devendra Doss AIR 1973 SC 268,
271-272; Mahalinga Thambiran v. Arulnandi Thambiran AIR 1974 SC 199, 
202; N.P.V. Hiremath v. V.S.M.K. Hiremath AIR 1976 Knt. 103, 107; Ramji 
Jankiji v. Mauni Baba AIR 1978 Pat 49 , 53, Mahant Amar Parkash v. 
Parkashanand (1979) 1 S C J  516, 518 = AIR 1979 SC 845, 84?; Krishna 
Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707, 716; Swami Harbansa Chari J. v. 
State AIR 1981 MP 82, 88.
2. (1866-67) 11 MIA 405 . 3- Ibid., p. 405^  ' ’
4. (1866-67) II MIA 405, 428. 5. AIR 1974 SC 199-
6. AIR 1974 SC 199, 202. 7. AIR I98O SC 707-
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"The law is well-settled that succession to mahantship of a 
math or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage 
of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession 
is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment.
The question of the succession of mahantship cannot be determined by
an appeal to the general customary law; it must be regulated by the custom
2 3and usage of a particular institution. In Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das
Lord Shaw held that
"The question as to who has the right to the office of mahant 
is one, in their Lordships* opinion, which, according to the 
well-known rule in India, must depend upon the custom and usage 
of the particular math or asthal. Such questions in India are 
not settled by an appeal to general customary law; the usage of 
the particular math stands as the law t h e r e f o r " . 5
Now the right to nominate or appoint the successor is usually appurtenant
to the office of a mahant.^ Where the mahant of a math is bound to celibacy,
it is often the usage that he nominates the succeeding mahant either by
7 8appointment during his lifetime or by will. Thus in Mahalinga Thambiran
9
v. Arulnandi Thambiran the Supreme Court held that "where the head of a
religious institution is bound by celibacy, it is frequently the usage that
he nominates his successor by appointment during his own lifetime, or by 
10will." In that case the mahant nominated his chela by a will but by a
1. AIR 1980 SC 707, 716.
2. Ramji Jankiji v. Mauni Baba AIR 1978 Pat *+9i 53* 3« AIR 1916 PC 256.
k, "Asthal" means math - see AIR 1916 PC 256, 237*
5. AIR 1916 PC 256, 257.
6. "The right of nomination of a successor is an incident of the office
of a mahant. Maintenance of a competent line of teachers being the
principal purpose in establishing a mutt, the mahant knows best how 
to perpetuate the line and has the inherent power of nominating the 
successor. He has to see who is the Sat-sishya" - Varadachari, op. 
cit, 127.
7. Mavne*s Hindu Law, op.cit., ,10th ed., 939*-
8. Mahalinga Thambiran v. Arulnandi Thambiran AIR 197^ SC 199» 202.
9. Ibid.
10. AIR 197^  SC 199, 202, see also Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai 
(1893) 20 IA 150 where the custom as accepted by the Privy Council was 
that the dharmakarta in office nominated his successor shortly before 
his death (see p. 13*0 .
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subsequent will he cancelled the nomination. The main point for decision
was whether the mahant could cancel the nomination without a good cause.
The Supreme Court found that the cancellation of the nomination by the
mahant was bad and the plaintiff was held entitled to succeed to the
mahantship on the death of the existing mahant. Now reverting to the
question of the power of a mahant to appoint his successor it may be
pointed out that the Supreme Court, following the decision in Giyana 
1
Sambandhafs case, held that,
"it is clear that the custom in the Kasi Mutt is for the head 
of the mutt for the time being to nominate a successor to succeed 
him from among the Thambirans of Thirukkuttam of the Dharmapuram 
Adhinam; that the nomination is made by will and it is attended 
by certain religious ceremonies..."2
The appointment of a successor must be made by the mahant,taking into
consideration the interests of the math. If the power of the mahant to
nominate his successor is exercised corruptly or for ulterior reasons the
3
appointment will be held invalid. In Nataraja Thambiran v. Kailasami
ij.
Pillai where the appointment of the succeeding mahant was made to avoid 
the risk of a criminal prosecution for forgery of a will and was not made
5
in the interests of the math, the Privy Council held the appointment of
the appellant (Nataraja) as mahant invalid.^ So the law as it stands now
is that the power of a mahant to choose his successor must be exercised in
the interests of the institution and must not be used for an ulterior
motive, otherwise the appointment will not be a valid one.
7
The right to nominate a successor is a personal right of a mahant
1. ILR (1887) 10 Mad 375. 2. AIR 1974 SC 199, 202.
3. Nataraja Thambiran v. Kailasami Pillai (1920-21) 48 IA 1, 11-12;
Mahalinga Thambiran v. Arulnandi Thambiran AIR 1974 SC 199, 202.
4. (1920-21) 48 IA 1.
5. See also V.aidyanatha Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar AIR 1924 PC 221, 225-226 
where the appointer of a trustee of an endowed property (chatram or
choultry) appointed the manager of the endowed property and
claimed it to be has personal property, the Privy Council held the appointment 
invalid and the property concerned was a public trust (see p.224). The 
ruling of the Privy Council indicates that had the appointment been in the 
interests of the endowment the Judicial Committee would have held it valid.
6. (1920-21) 48 IA 1, 11-12. 7. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 353.
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and his right to do so cannot be delegated. In Mahanth Ramji Pass v.
2Lachhu Das the main question for determination was related to the
validity of an appointment of the mahant. In that case the sitting
mahant of an asthal called Alak Dass delegated his power of appointing
his successor to another mahant of Mirzapur asthal by an arrangement
(ekrarnama). The Calcutta High Court held that
,TMahant Alak Dass had no power to ignore... custom and practice 
of election and give to the Mahanth of Mirzapur the right of 
naming or appointing his own successor.”3
Though a mahant cannot delegate his power of choosing his successor
which is his personal right, he has the right to delegate his ministerial
duties for the sake of convenience. In Gobinda Ramanuj v. Mohanta Ramcharan
5
Ramanuj which was concerned with the famous math of the Ramanuj sect 
situated in the district of Midnapore and where the validity of a will 
of the mahant of the main math creating mahantship of a subordinate asthal, 
situated at a distance of fourteen miles, was challenged, the Calcutta High 
Court held that ”a delegation of the ministerial duties of a shebait” by 
an arrangement ”would be sufficiently justified on the ground of convenience, 
the asthals being situated 14 miles apart.
Now in the case of a math of recent origin it may be possible to find
out the intention of the founder who may have laid down the rules of de-
7
volution of mahantship. The development of a clear common law has not 
been possible in case of devolution of mahantship because of the existence 
of various customs obtaining in different maths regarding the succession
g
of mahantship. In so far as the devolution of mahantship is concerned,
1. Mahant Ramji Dass v. Lacchu Dass (1902-3) 7 OWN 1**5, 1^ 8; Mayne’s 
Hindu Law, op.cit^ lOth ed:', 9^ 1.
2. (1920-3) 7 OWN 1^ 5. 3- (1902-3) 7 OWN 1^ 5, 1**8.
*f. Mukherjea, op.cit., *tth ed. 353* 5- ILR (1936) 63 Cal 326.
6. Ibid., p. Jfbk.
7. Derrett, IMHL, 513*
8. Derrett,. ibid., p. 313.
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in circumstances where there is a failure of proving custom the rules
-j
of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience (J.E.G.C.) will apply. In this
context it may be remembered that though custom is the dominant rule
relating to the succession of mahantship, it must not repeal the terms
2
of the original foundation. Moreover, the Courts need not resort to 
the doctrine of J.E.G.C. if in states, where the maths as public religious 
trusts are regulated by the state statutes and are required by law to be 
registered with State religious boards, and if in those states a new 
provision of law is introduced that each manager when registering his 
institution is to give information about the custom of appointing the 
mahant of his institution, because in that case it will be easier for 
the Court to verify the custom of appointing a mahant of each math 
controlled by a state statute and does not need the application of the 
doctrine.
SECTION 2
ADMINISTRATION OF MATHS
a. Introduction
Normally the mahant like the shebait of an idol is in possession and 
management of the math property,"^  because he is not only the spiritual
if
head but also the administrator of temporal affairs of the institution.
In other words, he "combines in himself the dual office of being the 
religious or spiritual head of the particular cult or religious fraternity,
1. Derrett, IMHL, See also Kali Pennamma v. St. Paul's Convent 1972
KLT 12, 1FI
2. Derrett, ibid., p»513»
3. Sarangadeva v. Ramaswami AIR 1966 SC 1603» 1606, see below, p.37(j 
Varadachari, op.cit., 13^ *
Mukherjea, op.cit., *tth ed., 365*
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and of the manager of the secular properties of the institution of the
math.” But the position may not be the same in circumstances where
the endowment is made by a trust deed in which the mahant is neither
a sole trustee nor a trustee even. In Arunachallam v. Ventakata- 
2
chalapati where the head of the math brought the suit for the
possession of a village forming part of the property of a math against
the trustees who were in possession of the village, the Privy Council
laid down that
"In the first place, the nature of the ownership is an 
ownership in trust for the institution itself. Secondly, 
while it may no doubt be true that the ownership in the 
general case is with the spiritual head of the institution, 
still, to use the language_of Sir Charles Turner in Sammantha 
Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti ...
'We do not, of course, mean to lay it dawn that ... the 
property may not in some cases be held bn different conditions 
and subject to different incidents.
The aforementioned observation of Sir Charles Turner was quoted
5
with approval in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das and referring to the 
management of a math property the Privy Council held that "It may ... 
rank as one of the varieties of circumstances and tenure whose adoption 
or rejection will fall to be determined by the usage and custom of the 
math."6
But in most of the cases the right of management of a math property 
belongs to the mahant only.
1. Per Sen, J. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIRI98O SC 707, 7^ 3*
2. AIR 1919 PC 62 = 46 IA 204.
3. ILR (1879) 2 Mad 173, 179-
4. AIR 1919 PC 62, 68.
5. AIR 1916 PC 256.
6. Ibid., p. 258.
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"The mahant is entitled to be installed and to be put 
into possession of all the math's property, which will 
remain distinct from the raahant's private property, though 
it is open to him^at any time to merge his private assets 
with the former."
2It is a settled law that a mahant can possess private property. When
a mahant acquires property by his exertions or with his own money it
does not lose "its secular character and partake^  of a religious
character"^ as was held by the Privy Council in Parma Nand v. Nihal 
kChand, a case where though the head of the religious institution was 
called mahant the institution as such was not a math; it was called the 
Bagichi or the gurdwara. The main issue was whether the endowment was
private or public and the Judicial Committee did "not think that any user
or treatment of the property has been proved, such as would justify the
5
conclusion that it was a public, and not a private trust."
Now the law concerning the position of a mahant relating to his adminis­
tration of the debutter or the math property seems nowhere to have been
formulated so clearly and precisely as in Sarangadeva v. Ramaswami,^  a 
case where it was held by the Supreme Court that the title of the math
to the suit lands was extinguished by adverse possession. Referring to
7 8Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar and Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar
Bachwat, J. pronounced for the Supreme Court that
"A mathadhipathi is the manager and custodian of the institution 
... The office carries with the right to manage and possess the 
endowed properties on behalf of the math and the right to sue on 
its behalf for the protection of these properties. During the 
tenure of his office, the mathadhipathi has also large beneficial 
interests in the math properties..."9
1. Derrett, IMHL, 515- % '
2. Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 7071 719; Thakur ji Maharaj Ram 
v. Kashi AIR 1980 NCC(A1]) 153; Math Sauna v. Kedar Nath AIR 1981 SC 
1878, 1S80, see above, p.361.
3. Parma Nand v. Nihal Chand AIR 1938 PC 193, 196. 4. Ibid.
3. Per Sir Shadi Lai AIR 1938 PC 195, 198. 6. AIR 1966 SC 1603.
7. (1920-21) 48 IA 302. 8. AIR 1954 SC 282.
9. AIR 1966 SC 1603, 1606.
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Again, though a math as a juristic entity is the owner of the
2endowment and is capable of suing and being sued, it, being an ideal 
person but physically incapable of doing anything, must act as a matter
of necessity in relation to its temporal affairs through its human
3 4agency, the mahant. In Guranditta v. Amar Pass where the defendant
contended inter alia that the suit land was secular but not debutter,
Mudholkar, J. observed for the Supreme Court that
"a Mahant of an Akhara represents the Akhara and has both 
the right to institute a suit on its behalf as also the 
duty to defend one brought against it."^
But it was Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. who stated the law in very clear
terms when his Lordship pronounced in the Bombay High Court in BabajiRao
v. Laxmandas^ that
"this suit, brought for the recovery on behalf of the math 
of its property, has properly been so brought in the name 
of Laxmandas” L*he mahant of the math in question], "not 
because the legal title is with him, but because he is the 
manager of the math, and so its appropriate representative 
for the purpose of any litigation necessary to enforce the 
rights of the math."?
b. Mahant's Power to Borrow Money or to Alienate Math Property
In so far as the administration of a math property is concerned the
1. Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21) 48 IA 302, $11; Pushpagiri 
Mutt v* RamsLLinga Sastri (1979) 1 MU 31*, 55; Krishna Singh v. Mathura 
Ahir AIR 19&0 SC 707, 726, see above p.362; Swami Harbansa Chari Ji 
v. State AIR 1981 MP 82, 87.
- 2. Sarangadeva v. Ramaswami AIR 1966 SC 1603, 1606.
3. Babaji Rao v. Laxmandas ILR (1904) 28 Bom 213, 223, see above,
see also Sarappadera v. Ramaswami AIR 1966 SC 1603, 1606 and Krishna 
Singh v. Mathura Ahir AIR 1980 SC 707, 726.
4. AIR 1965 SC 1966.
3. Ibid., p. 1969»
6. ILR (1904) 28 Bom 213. The main issue was whether the suit by the 
mahant to recover the possession of the suit house was barred by 
limitation.
7. ILR (1904) 28 Bom 213, 225-
373
power of a mahant to borrow money for the purposes of the math is similar
1
to that of a shebait of a deity. If there is security for borrowing
money and if the creditor lends the amount after bona fide enquiries, a
decree may be made making the amount recoverable from the endowed property
2in spite of the fact that no charge was created to that effect. In this
respect the decree can be issued even after the death of the mahant, for
the succeeding mahants and the math will be bound by the decree.^ The
4principle in Prosunno Kumari Debya's case that the succeeding shebaits 
form a continuing representation of the debutter applies also in the case 
of the mahant's administration of the math property. In Kuber Sahib v. 
Phunnan Rai^ where the suit was brought by the mahant for the time being 
who alleged inter alia that the suit property had been transferred illegally 
by a former mahant and where the latter entered into a compromise with the 
transferee, the Allahabad High Court referred to Prosunno Kumari Debya v.
Golab Chand Baboo^ and applying the said principle of the Privy Council case 
in the facts of the case observed that "This case" i.e., the Privy Council
7
case, "governs the present case on all fours." It may be added here 
that a mahant's borrowing money by executing a promissory note will also 
bind the math,if the money so borrowed is spent for the necessary purposes 
of the math the law of which we have already discussed in detail in Section 4 
of the fourth chapter when discussing the shebait's power of alienating 
debutter property.
1. "The Mahant is on the whole as much a limited owner as a shebait, and 
can be called to account equally with him" - Derrett, IMHL, 516. See 
also Vardachari, op.cit., 135»
2. B.K. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed.
3. "There is a perpetual succession amongst mahants. The acts of one 
will bind his successor, and decrees passed against him bind the
math, exceptions are cases where alienations are made without necessity"
- Derrett, IMHL, 5^ 5*
4. (1874-75) 2 IA 145, 150. 5. AIB 1933 All 255.
6. (1874-75) 2 IA 145. 7. Per Ganga Nath, J. AIH 1935 All
255, 256.
y?b
It may be interjected that in so far as the alienating power of the 
property in the hands of both the mahant and the shebait is concerned 
it is limited by the rules laid down in Prosunno Kumari Debiya1s case, 
which we have referred to extensively in section 4 of the fourth chapter, 
where we have dealt with the question of the power of a shebait to 
alienate a debutter property. There we have made out clearly that in 
relation to the alienation of the debutter or the math,the positions of 
the mahant and the shebait are both on the same footing. So in this 
section we will be laying stress on the points which are .neither dealt 
with in detailror touched upon in the said section of the previous chapter.
Now the points that the shebait and the mahant occupy exactly the same
position in relation to the alienation of a debutter, and that Prosunno 
2Kumari Debya is applicable to both the alienations of the mahant and the
3
shebait, are illustrated in Biram v. Narendra where the mahant sold
practically an entire dharmashala at Hardwar. Ramaswami, J. pronounced for
the Supreme Court
"In Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (1874-75) 2 Ind 
App. 145 (P.C.) it was observed by the Judicial Committee that 
notwithstanding that property devoted to religious purposes is, 
as a rule, inalienable, it is competent for a shebait to incur 
debts and borrow money for the service of the idol and preservation 
of its property to the extent to which there is an existing 
necessity f<r doing so, his power in that respect being analogous 
to that possessed by the manager of an infant heir."
It may be pointed out tint a math is often traditionally a going concern 
with financial interests which can be of advantage to society. A tendency 
to allow a mahant to take far-seeing steps regarding its investments would 
be understandable. We note with interest that the Courts are not always 
guided by the stringent test of legal necessity in a case relating to a 
mahant’s borrowing money for the purposes of the math. They,on many
1. (1874-75) 2 IA 145.
5. AIR 1966 SC 1011.
2. Ibid.
4. AIR 1966 SC 1011, 1016.
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occasions, approve a mahant's expenses for the purposes of the math
on the short ground of 'prestige of the institution'. Thus in Niladri
Sahu v. Mahant Chaturbhu.j, the mahant borrowed money to discharge
previous loans for constructing a building to accommodate more visitors
2
and in Vibhudapriya Thirtha Swamiar v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar the 
mahant borrowed money for the expenses of a festival intending to carry-on 
the prestigious expense of feeding a large number of Brahmins. These 
cases are plainly not examples illustrating preservation of the debutter. 
Feeding a large number of Brahmins as arose in Vibhuda JEfriya Thirtha 
Swamiar's case^ is certainly not connected with the preservation of the 
math property but it might well be related to the prestige of the math.
It is on the ground of prestige that the expense of the mahant could be 
said to be upheld by the Privy Council as the valid one. The expense of 
constructing an extra building in Niladri Sahu's case related definitely 
to the question of the prestige of the institution,because the accommodation 
of visitors (in particular rich visitors) was not only the source of extra 
income for the math but also of the prestige of the institution in the 
sense that it could further the presence of the rich people in the institution. 
Moreover, in holding that the loans, obtained by the mahant by mortgaging 
the debutter properties to pay off his original loansjinade not for the 
legal necessity, were valid, the Privy Council had in effect condoned the
unauthorised loans of the mahant spent for the construction of the building.
Truly unauthorised loans should, strictly speaking, bind not the math itself 
but the mahant personally, because in case of the original loans the lender 
did not enquire into the actual necessity^ of the construction of the
1. (1925-26) 53 IA 253. 2. (1926-27) 5^ IA 228.
5. Ibid. k. (1925-26) 53 IA 253.
5. The onus of proving that the debt is for necessary purposes of a math 
lies on the alienee. Thus in Murugesam Pillai v. Manichavasara Pandara 
AIR 1917 PC 6 = (1916-17) ^  IA 98 where the main issue to be determined 
by the Privy Council was whether the debt in question incurred by the 
mahant for the expense of litigations was a necessary expense
(continued on next pageO
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building, to find out whether they were made to avoid an impending peril
to the institution itself, and are therefore unprotected. To discharge
his personal liability of making unauthorised loans how could the mahant
bind the math itself by mortgaging its properties,raising extra sums
to discharge loans which were not spent for the necessary purposes of
the institution? The Privy Council*s decision that *’the debt should be
1
paid by the shebait personally” is correct but the ruling that otherwise
2it should be ’’realized from the profits of the debutter property” seems 
to be a very weak one.
It seems that a traditional viewpoint, viz. that preservation is the
only allowable object, must be taken to be good law, until the Supreme
Court or the legislature(s) provide otherwise. It is submitted that the
4+
Courts should ignore the oft quoted dictum in Niladri Sahu’s case that 
it is ’’the immediate not the remote cause, the causa causans, of the 
borrowing which has to be considered”.^  Instead they should concentrate 
on the issue whether a particular loan made by a mahant is connected with 
any cause, immediate or remote, relating to the preservation of the math 
property. The point of preservation and the benefit of the endowment 
should only be given due consideration, not the prestige of the institution. 
The prestige of an institution is certainly not so important as its survival.
(continued from previous page)
for the purpose of the math concerned. Lord Shaw, speaking for 
the Judicial Committee, observed that ’’The Board does not wish to cast 
any doubt upon the proposition that, in the case of mortgages granted 
over the security of an adhinam or math by the head thereof, it lies 
upon the mortgagee, or those in his right, to prove that the debt was 
a necessary expense of the institution itself” - at p. 102 (1916-17) 
kk IA 98.
1. (1925-26) 53 IA 253, 267.
2. Ibid., p. 267.
3* This view, however, should not be construed as altering my earlier 
opinion that social needs of the country come first and the nation*s 
wealth tied up in religious endowments should be subject to taxation.
See above, pp. 181-182.
(1925-26) 53 IA 253. 5* Ibid., p. 267*
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The ground of prestige should not and cannot be grounds of necessity.
Yet, the buying of even an elephant binding the math was accepted by the
Court as an expense for the necessary purposes of the math. Thus in Sri
1
Thakurji Ramji v. Mathura Prasad the Patna High Court ignoring the correct
argument of the plaintiff's counsel that "even assuming that an elephant
was necessary, it was not such a necessity as would justify borrowing by
2a mahant on mortgage of the Asthal properties," held that "To a religious 
institution like a math its prestige and influence are of vital importance. 
Preservation of its prestige and influence are no less necessary than
3
preservation of its property". But the law has neVer permitted alienation of 
a deity's property on the ground of prestige and the math as a juristic 
person should not be bound by any transaction of its mahant if it is made only 
for prestige and influence. It is not the prestige of the institution, 
but the individual prestige of the mahant which is concerned in such an 
expense, as approved in the Patna High Court case.
c. Debutter or Math property is not a Business
kNow, as a general rule,a debutter or a math property is inalienable.
But a mahant can create derivative tenures conformable to usage without 
5
legal necessity; but a permanent lease or absolute alienation of a math
£
property without legal necessity is not within the powers of his management, 
but if the consideration for which a permanent lease is granted is not 
applied to the necessary purposes of the endowment,a point may arise whether 
the transaction can be upheld as a valid transaction for the necessary 
purposes of the endowment.
1. AIR 19 1^ Pat 33^ . 2. Ibid., p. 359. 3- Ibid., p. 359
k, Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo (187^ -75) 2 IA 1^ 3, 150.
3. Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo (1869-70) 13 MIA 
270, 273; Mukherjea op.cit.,
6. Palaniappa Chetty v.Deivasikamony AIR 1917 PC, 331 36; Srimath Ponnambala 
Desikar v. Periyanan Chetti (1935-36) 63 IA 261. C.J. Mutt, Tirupathi v. 
C.V. Purushotham AIR 197** AP 175» 165.
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Before we go into the details of the issue,I must point out that the
law as it has stood for more than a century is that the power of a
manager of a debutter for the purpose of administration of the estate
is analogous to the power of a manager of an infant’s estate. The Courts
have never countenanced the view that speculation with the debutter property
could be made by the shebait. Debutter is not a business. This point
was explicitly made by the Privy Council in Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasi- 
2kamony, where the shebait of a temple situated in the district of Madura
brought the suit challenging the transaction (granting of the kaul) of
his predecessor. In that case the Judicial Committee observed inter alia
that however ’’attractive and lucrative money-lending may be in India, it
is needless to point out that a shebait would not be justified in selling
debutter land solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the
money-lending business”.^  In so far as alienation of a debutter is concerned
the Privy Council's ruling is a very important one. It is a disguised
warning to managers of religious endowments that they are not dealing with
properties as managers of profit-making businesses.
Again,any transaction of a mahant or a shebait to alienate debutter by
mortgage, lease or sale must be of defensive character and it must be
calculated to preserve the property from some threatened danger. In his
management of the debutter a mahant's power to charge the debutter in case
of danger or need is a limited power analogous to that of a manager of an
if
infant's estate only. In Behari Lai v. Radha Ballabh Ji where the Allahabad
High Court had to deal with the question of alienating a building by the
shebait, Gurtu, J. pronounced for the Allahabad High Court that
’’the test would be as to whether a person who as the guardian 
of a minor owning such property in similar circumstances would
1. After the decision in Prosunno Kumari Debya's case (1874-75) 2 IA 145.
2. (1916-17) 44 IA 1V7. 3. Per Lord Atkinson, 156.
4. AIR 1961 All 73.
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as a prudent person have sold the property having regard  ^
to its structural condition and surrounding circumstances.'1
2
So the view that the principle of ’the benefit of the estate1 is 
not limited to transactions which are of defensive character in the case 
of a manager of a joint Hindu family is not applicable to a case of the 
mahant of a math or a shebait of the debutter. Yet the Court sometimes 
mixes up the role of a shebait or a mahant with that of a manager of a 
joint Hindu family and it applies the principles applicable to the case
of a manager of a joint Hindu family to the case of a mahant or a shebait
3 kof a debutter. In Manikka Narasimhachari v. Ramsubbier the Madras High
Court approved the alienation of a property belonging to a Hindu charitable
trust on the basis of the principle governing an alienation of a manager
of a joint Hindu family property. The principle applied on the facts of
the Madras case was laid down by the Supreme Court in Balmukand v. Kamla 
5
Wati, which is not at all related to an alienation of a shebait or of a 
mahant; on the contrary, it was concerned with the transaction of an eldest 
brother as the manager of a joint Hindu property. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court ruling that "for a transaction to be regarded as one which is of
benefit to the family it need not necessarily be only of a defensive
6 7character" which is applied in the Madras case , is based on the decisions
1. AIR 1961 All 73, 76.
2. Amraj Singh v. Shambhu Singh AIR 1932 All 632 (FB).
3. See Ramchandraji Maharaj v. Lalji Singh AIR 1959 Pat 305, a case of 
religious endowment, where the High Court of Patna, it seems wrongly, 
applied the principles applicable to transactions of a manager of a 
joint Hindu family to the facts of the case where the shebait granted 
a perpetual lease of the debutter property. See specially p.3^ where 
the Court ruled on the basis of the ruling in Jan Mohammad v. Bikoo Mahto, 
AIR 1929 Pat 130 that "The test in each case is whether it was a transaction 
into which a prudent owner could enter in the ordinary course of management 
in order to benefit the estate" - per Singh, J. See also Baidyanath Prasad
v. Kunja Kumar AIR 19^9 Pat. 75, 76.
4. (1970) 1 M U  337.
5. AIR 196*f SC 1385.
6. Ibid., p. 1387*
7. (1970) 1 M U  337, 3^ 1.
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1 2 in Jagat Narain v. Mathura Das and Sital Prasad v. Ajablal Mander
which had no connection with debutters but were related to transactions
of managers of joint Hindu family properties. So, in so far' as an
alienation of debutter is concerned Manikka Narasimhacharifs case^ is
of doubtful authority.
An alienation of a joint Hindu family property by its manager and such
an act by a mahant should not be placed oh the same level. The law does
not permit a shebait either to speculate like a businessman or to act
prudentially like a manager of a joint Hindu family property with the
sale proceeds of an alienated property. As long as the deity's property
is not burdened with debts or its estate is not in danger of extinction
no shebait is allowed to alienate any debutter and his activities, in this
respect, must be limited by the decision in Prosunno Kumari Debya's case
which indicates that they must be of a defensive character. The same
will apply to maths.
5
Yet in Niladri Sahu v. Mahant Chaturbhuj the mahant was allowed to borrow 
on the security of the math properties to pay debts incurred earlier in order 
to enlarge facilities (by the construction of buildings for accommodation) 
for pilgrims (visitors), particularly rich ones, thereby making extra 
income for the math. In those circumstances the role of the mahant might
not be inconsistent with the purposes of the institution,^ but he engaged
1. AIR 1928 All 454 (FB).
2. AIR 1939 Pat 371.
3. (1970) 1 M U  337.
4. (187^ -75) 2 IA 1^5. 5. (1923-26) 53 IA 253.
6. "The defence of the math's property from litigation, protection against
destruction or loss, and other defensive acts are obviously within his 
powers. He may also invest in projects which will plainly bring in a 
bigger income from offerings or otherwise consistently with the purposes 
of the math" - Derrett, IMHL, 5^ 6.
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himself in speculative business far the.future income of the math which,
it is submitted, was not consistent with the role of a manager of an infant’s
estate; on the contrary, the mahant played the part of a manager of a
joint Hindu family which was never extended to mahants or shebaits by
2
the law laid down in Prosunno Kumari Debya*s case.
An alienation of property may be held valid for the purposes of a
family business for making more profit, , but that object does not apply
to the alienation of an endowed property the main object of which is.the
fulfilment of spiritual desire. In Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal^ the deceased
father of the defendants executed a mortgage deed to raise money inter
alia to buy two shops. Singh, J. of the Allahabad High Court held that
”a manager of an ancestral joint family trading business has 
full authority to take loans and make alienations to raise 
money for the purpose of that business. Such a transaction 
will be binding on the entire family including the minor members.
The creditor is not bound to enquire into the finances of the 
business so long as the business forms the purpose of the debt.
All that is necessary for him to see is that the money is really 
required for the proper purpose of the business and there is no 
element of speculation or gambling in the transaction”.
So,in a secular property like joint family property or a joint family
business the motive behind any alienation is the material prosperity of
the family, and there is no scope for the fulfilment of any spiritual desire.
”If the manager were confined to pure defensive acts, enterprise would be
5
stifled and the family would stagnate.”
1. To this effect the Privy Council (at p.261) pointed out that "the 
building project which the defendant” (the mahant) "promoted has been 
successfully effected by the use of a portion of the moneys borrowed 
by the defendant; that it has been completed in great part if not 
entirely; that it is functioning as contemplated by its author; that 
the math is to a great extent benefited by it, in that worshippers are
more numerous and of a richer class, than theretofore visited the math
for devotional purposes, attracted presumably by the increased and more 
civilized accommodation the new buildings afford.”
2. (187^ -75) 2 IA 1^ 5.
3. AIR 1935 All 221 (FB).
k. AIR 1935 All 221 (FB), 232.
5. Derrett, IMHL, 269-
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In the case of an alienation of a joint family property the law must
1
be taken as settled by the decision in Balmukand v. Kamla Wati.
Thus,relying on the Supreme Court case the Allahabad High Court held
2in Hari Singh v. Umrao Singh, a case where the plaintiff brought the 
suit for specific performance relating to an agreement for sale entered 
into by the manager of a joint Hindu family, that a transaction of a manager 
to be regarded for the benefit to the family need not be of a defensive 
nature.^
But in so far as debutter is concerned an alienation of a shebait
must be of defensive character. The dead hand feared in the West in
renaissance times seems to figure in India. The Courts have never given
the mahant or the shebait the powers of enterprise willingly acceded to
the manager of a joint Hindu family property. A mahant's or a shebait's
obligations are to see that the objects of the endowment materialise. A
mahant's or a shebait's power to alienate a debutter is for defensive
measures and must not be for purposes of material prosperity or
aggrandisement. Moreover, the character of a debutter is different from
that of a joint Hindu family property. This point is well dealt with in
Medikenduri v. Venkatayya^ where a mother, as the guardian of her minor
sons, instituted the suit against their father who as manager of the joint
property sold an ancestral property (property of his adoptive mother) to
buy some other lands. Holding the transaction of the manager as valid
C. Reddy, J. said, in the judgement for the Madras High Court that
"there is a real distinction between an alienation by a 
manager of a joint Hindu family and an alienation by a 'shebait' 
of a temple. In my opinion, the powers of a manager of a joint 
Hindu family property are larger than those of a 'shebait' of a 
temple in this respect.
1. AIR 1964 SC 1385. 2. AIR 1979 All 65.
3. Ibid., p. 67.
4. Nagendra v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Cal 490, 501.
5. AIR 1953 Mad 210.
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"In this connection, the dictum laid down by the Privy 
Council in Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussamat Babooee 
Munraj Koonwaree'1 ... that
'The actual pressure on the estate, the danger 
to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred
upon it in the particular instance is a thing to
be regarded'
does not countenance the contention that in order to 
validate a sale of ancestral land by the father the 
benefit should be purely of a defensive or protective 
character."2
It is submitted that this is an original judgement in the sense that 
it has explained clearly that a mahant's alienation of a math property 
cannot be guided by the same consideration as an alienation by a manager 
of a joint Hindu family property or an ancestral Hindu family property.
For an ancestral family business and a debutter or math are not of the
same character. A debutter is not a business and any alienation of that 
must be of defensive character. Where the Courts have, from time to 
time, found mahants engaging in a money-lending business, conflict between 
the facts on the ground and the law as consistently laid down by the Courts 
is noteworthy.
SECTION 3
(a) THE MAHANT'S POWERS OR RIGHTS and (b) HIS DUTIES
a. The Mahant1s Powers or Rights
By discussing, in the above two sections, the various issues relating 
to the nature of a mahant, mahantship and the administration of math 
property we have already substantially dealt with the question of the 
mahant's powers or rights. One important aspect of mahantship, that is
1. (1856) 6 MIA 393.
2. AIR 1933 Mad 210, 212.
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to say, the mahant's right of property, will be dealt with in detail 
below in section 5 of this chapter. So, in this sub-section, we will 
try to avoid repetition of developing those points which have been 
developed or will be developed in other sections.
We have already seen that the right to manage and possess the
math property belongs to its mahant except in a case where the founder
1 2 has directed otherwise. In Sarangadeva v. Ramaswami and Guranditta
v. Amar Dass^ the Supreme Court applied the famous rule in Jagandindra 
i 4Nath Roy s case that the right to use in respect of the debutter was 
vested with the shebait. But the point that the rule in the Privy
Council case,as applicable to a shebait of an idol, is -equally applicable
r\ 5
to a mahant was made clear m  Saragadeva v. Ramaswami. The Supreme 
Court in Guranditta's case^  did not refer to any case, not even to the 
Privy Council case. Yeti it made the rule that the mahant had the right 
to conduct suits on behalf of a math (Akhara) and the duty also to defend 
one instituted against it. The Court should have referred to the Privy 
Council case.
The point that the mahant has a large interest, larger than the shebait 
of an idol, in the debutter, enormous powers in the management of math 
property and ample discretion in applying the funds of the institution
1. Arunachallam v. Venkatachalapati AIR 1919 PC 62, 68.
2. AIR 1966 SC 1603.
3. AIR 1963 SC 1966.
4. (1903-4) 31 IA 203i 210, Supra sec. 2 3rd chapter, where the principles
in the case have been discussed.
5. AIR 1966 SC 16031 1606; see the previous section, p.384, where the 
principles in that case have been stated.
6. AIR 1965 SC 1966, 1969.
385
1
has been spelt out in different decisions of the Privy Council, the
2 3
Supreme Court and the High Courts. It is the mahant*s power of alien­
ation of math properties which seems, in the final analysis, to be
k
responsible for the introduction of statutes curbing powers and channel­
ling the utilisation of math funds for proper purposes.
The mahant's powers in disposing of the income of the math are unlimited,
because (amazingly) he is not bound to spend the income in a particular
5
way. Again, if the mahant is left with any surplus income after spending
the necessary expenses of the math, he can dispose of it in any way he
likes. Thus in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami^ the
Madras High Court held that after meeting the expenses of the institution
the surplus income is at the disposal of the mahant who can spend it
7
at his discretion. It is very difficult to understand why the courts 
have never imported a resulting trust. The only explanation available is 
that custom consistently negates it. It must be pointed out here that 
the surplus income is the surplus amount belonging to the math and the 
income of the math is not limited to that of the original endowment only 
An income of the institution arises also from offerings made by the
1. For example, Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21) *+8 IA 302 , 3*11.
2. For example, Commr., H.B.E. v. L.T. Swamiar AIR 195*+ SC 282, 288.
3. For example, , Vidyapurna v. Vidyanidhi ILR (190*0 27 Mad. *+35» *+55;
Lakshni Narayan"*v. State AIR 197^ Pat 330, 33*1 •
*+. Sec. 5 of this chapter deals with statutes controlling public trusts 
including maths.
5. "Though it is objectionable that the math's income, or any of it, 
should be spent on purposes inconsistent with the math's functions 
...", the mahant is not positively obliged by any rule of Hindu law 
to spend this vsy or that way — Derrett, IMHL, 5^ 6.
6. ILR (190*+) 27 ^d. *+33.
7* TTR (190*+) 27 Mad *+35* *+55• See below, sec. 5* where the statement of
Ayyangar, J. has been quoted, p.*+11. See also Derrett, IMHL, 5^ 6, where
he summarises the law that "When as a result of good administration
there arises a surplus income over and above the needs of the math and
its usual functions, the mahant may apply it at its discretion11.
386
1 2 followers. The offerings which are made to the mahant are of two
types; one may be made for the purposes of the math and the other
may be meant for the mahant for his personal use. The offerings made
he can spend in any way he likes. But both kinds of offerings are received
by the mahant and when they are made for the purposes of the institution
k
he receives them as a representative of the math. It appears that the 
law does not allow him an absolute discretion in distinguishing between
the two classes of gifts. The offerings made to a mahant personally are
generally his personal properties but in exceptional cases by custom they
3 6belong to the institution itself. In Commr., H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar
Mukherjea, J. as he then was, observes on the point of offerings or gifts
made personally to a mahant that
"Ordinarily a mahant has absolute power of disposal over such
gifts, though if he dies without making any disposition, it is
reckoned as the property of the math and goes to the succeeding 
mahant... It may be that according to custom prevailing in a 
particular institution, such personal gifts are regarded as 
gifts to the institution itself and the mahant receives them
tative of the institution: but the general
So, there cannot be any doubt that as regards the offerings made to the 
mahant personally it is the general law that he is the absolute owner of 
them.
The mahant's large powers of disposal of the funds of the institution 
and his right to create derivative tenures or to make permanent aienation
1. See Vidyapurna v. Vidyanidhi ILR (190*0 2? Mad *f35» **55»
2. See sec. 3 where an elaborate discussion on the subject will be offered.
3. Kumudban v. Tripura (1922) 35 CLJ 188, 190.
4. The mahant represents the math - see on this point Guranditta v. Amar 
Pass AIR 1965 SC 1966, 1969.
5. Varadachari, op.cit., 15**-
6. AIR 1952* SC 282.
7. AIR 195** SC 282, 293.
to the mahant for his use form the personal income of the mahant^ which
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without any necessity are the manifestations of his beneficial interest
in the endowment or endowments attached to the institution. Though the
2
Supreme Court in the Shirur Math case did not point out the right of a
mahant to alienate a debutter property permanently without any necessity
until the end of his mahantship as a manifestation of his beneficial
interest in the debutter, it must be stressed that this right like other
rights also invests the mahantship with the character of proprietary right.
Because of the mahant*s ample powers in dealing with the math property
3
and its income, irregularities occur. To check him from abusing powers 
and to make use of the math funds for the proper purposes many State 
statutes for controlling maths publicly have been introduced. It is 
expected that in the near future alleged abuses^ by the mahant could be 
stopped to a great extent either through more legislation concerning 
problems of the math and mahantship, or through a development of the case- 
law such as would give guidance to mahants as to the more propitious use 
of their powers.
b. The Mahant*s duties 
Though '’the mahant is the master of the property*,'^  his primary duty as
1. The mahant's permanent alienation without necessity is valid till the 
end of his tenure of office - see Srimath Daivasikhamani Ponnambala v. 
Periyanan Chetti (1933-36) 63 IA 2£>1, 27^. "A permanent lease of Mutt 
property granted by a Mohunt is not void altogether. It is operative 
at least during the tenure of office of the grantor.'1 - Mukherjea, op 
cit, kth ed., 377*
2. AIR 195^ SC 282, 298. See above, sec. 1, p.363 where the famous statement 
of B.K. Mukherjea, J. on the conception of mahantship has been quoted.
3* Derrett, IMHL, 5^7.
Derrett, ibid., p. 517. For various statutes controlling public trusts 
including maths, see below sec. 3 of this chapter.
3* Abuses of mahants are not limited to unauthorised alienations or spending
of trust funds. There are cases where so-called mahants had been more
enthusiastic in acquiring wealth by money-lending businesses than giving
spiritual training. See Mahant Ganeshgir v. Fatechand (193^ 31 Nag LR 
282 and Gur chair an Prasad v. Krishnanand Giri (1969) 1 SCJ 180. The 
institutions involved in those two cases were so-called maths; in reality 
they were money-lending institutions but posing as maths - see Derrett, 
Critique, 235*
6. Derrett, IMHL, 516.
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the head of a spiritual fraternity is to give and encourage spiritual 
1
training. The proprietary interest of the mahant in his office is
2
"appurtenant to his duties”. It appears therefore that this is functional.
In Commr., H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar,^  B.K. Mukherjea, J., as he then was, 
observed that
”A Mahant*s duty is not simply to manage the temporalities of 
a Math. He is the head of a spiritual fraternity and the 
purpose of Math is to encourage and foster spiritual training 
by maintenance of a competent line of teachers who could impart 
religious instructions to disciples and followers of the Math 
and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school 
or order, of which they profess to be adherents."**
As a manager of the math the mahant is entitled to sue on behalf of
5
the institution but it is his duty to "defend one brought against it".
Now, though the mahant * s power of alienation is primarily for the benefit
of the math, i.e., for the preservation of the debutter, it can be interpreted
as a duty imposed on the mahant as an administrator of the debutter to
protect it even at the cost of alienating some portions of math property.
The question whether he cam go beyond this in the interests of the institution
is still at large: an instance of potential growth in the case-law.
The mahant is not the trustee of the math property, yet he holds a
fiduciary relation to the endowed property; he heads the institution as
a religious preceptor and manages its property, having obligations to discharge
in pursuance of the purposes of the institution for which it has been 
£
founded. In view of these obligations and duties attached to his office
7
he is accountable as a trustee for any maladministration. As a manager
„ ^na eel.,
1. Varadachari, op.cit.,/120. "The position of the Mahant is...quite
different from that of a manager, dharmakarta or shebait of a temple.
He is not a mere employee or subordinate in a math but its head whose
duty (it) is to promote learning and further the interests of religion."
(sic), Arora, op.cit., 235-
2. Commr., H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar AIR 195** SC 282, 289.
3. Ibid. k. Ibid., p. 289.
3. Guranditta v. Amar Pass AIR 1965 SC 1966, 1969*
6. Mukherjea, op.cit., kth ed., 362.
7. Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21) ^8 IA 302,
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1
of a debutter he is to discharge the duties of a trustee as well.
Now, the head of a math is under a legal obligation to maintain his
disciples out of the fund6 of the math but apart from custom a disciple
2
is not entitled to maintenance. ’’Here, however, as elsewhere, custom 
is the foundation of the law controlling the math, and there are no pre­
sumptions or analogies which ought to be applied until custom has been 
consulted.1’^
k
In Ramamohan Das v. Basudeb Pass where the plaintiff chela instituted
the suit against the mahant for his maintenance out of the math funds,
Jagannadhadas, J., observed for the Orissa High Court that
’’while the head of the Muth is bound to maintain his 
disciples, and the proper maintenance of disciples is a
legitimate expenditure of the muth property and its income,
no specific right in favour of individual disciples or 
chelas can be recognised apart from u s a g e . ”5
One would naturally assume that a teacher could dismiss a disciple at
his option. The duties of a mahant are not appurtenant to his rights but
the other way round.^ Duties are not subordinate to rights, ”it is the
7
rights that are subordinate and appurtenant to the duties...” The duties 
of a mahant should be considered as the substance of mahantship and his
g
rights or powers should be regarded as an appurtenance of his duties.
1. Commr., H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar AIR 1954 SC 282, 288.
2. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 362.
3. Derrett, IMHL, 511.
4. AIR 1950 Ori. 28.
5. Ibid., p. 36.
6. Commr., H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282, 289.
7. Sundarambal v. Yogavanagurukkal AIR 1915 Mad 561, 564.
8. Nagendra v. Rabindra AIR 1926 Mad 490, 496, followed the Madras case
(ibid.) on the point.
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SECTION k
CONTROL OF MAHANTS AND SMARTHA VICARA
a. Control of Mahants
We have seen that in so far as the activities and the property of
a math are concerned the mahant is all in all and as Derrett aptly
points out "the mahant is the master of the property and may alienate
for any purpose for so long as he remains incumbent. Otherwise what
1
is authorised by law depends upon the circumstances". It is true
that in many of the Indian state statutes, which we will be discussing
.in the next section which, it may be pointed out, is complementary to
this section, have been introduced to see that funds of maths are used
for the purposes for which they were founded. Yet we find that in practice
because of the position a mahant holds in the society, or in a sect, he
is difficult to control and irregularities happen in spite of the fact
that there are remedies open to the persons interested in a math. For
"the difficulty was to take initiative effectively in the face of super-
2
stition, collusion and secrecy".
In the states in which statutes have not yet been introduced to control 
mahant’s irregularities or the existing statutes controlling maths as 
public trusts have not yet disturbed the provisions of sec. 92 of the 
Civil Procedure Code as amended in 1976 (which we have already discussed 
in sec. k of the previous chapter dealing with rights of worshippers to 
sue in the deity’s name to protect the interest of the endowment), 
remedies against mismanaged maths are available to the persons interested 
in the maths under sec. 92 as it stands now.
In West Bengal and the Punjab where no state statute has yet been
1. Derrett, IMHL, 5^6.
2. Derrett, ibid., p. y\l.
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introduced to control any public trusts including maths, worshippers 
and other persons interested in maths will naturally have no other 
statutory remedies other than provided in sec. 92 to protect the 
interests of the institutions, whereupon the traditional Hindu law 
will apply.
Now, in the case of a mismanaged math any two members of the sect
interested in a particular math with the leave of the Court may institute
a suit under sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for the removal of the
mahant, for rendition of accounts, for the appointment of a receiver and/or
2for framing a scheme, for the better administration of the math.
Though the mahant is the master of the math property, though he can 
do virtually anything he likes with the math property, the ownership of 
any debutter over which he is the head, does not vest in him. So, if there 
is any maladministration of the debutter, involving the obligations and 
duties in his office,he is unanswerable as a trustee.^
A mahant can be removed for misappropriation of trust funds, complete
failure to keep accounts of income and expenses of the institution,
immorality, an act contrary to the tenets of the sect or against the
4
usagesof the math, but not for his inefficiency or improvidence. In
5
Thiruvambala v. Manikkavachaka where the head of the math concerned 
purported to remove his junior Pandarasannadhi on grounds inter alia of
1. Maths are generally public institutions. The question whether there 
can be private maths is a controversial issue. The Supreme Court 
once expressed doubt regarding the existence of a private math
(see Srinivas Das v. Surjanarayan AIR 1967 AP 256, 260). But the 
controversy seems to linger on for some time because of the contra­
dictory decision of the Supreme Court itself affirming the existence 
of private maths in State of Bihar v. Biseshwar Das, AIR 1971 SC 
2057, 2063, Mukherjea*s 3rd ed. cited by the Supreme Court to 
support its decision. Varadachari does not think that trusts can 
be private, op.cit., 2nd ed. 118-119, but the 1'Report of the Hindu...
Endowments Commission" accepts that there are private trusts, op.cit., 34.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 517-318. 3- Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1920-21)
48 IA 302, 311
k. Derrett, IMHL 518; Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 38 .^
5. ILR (1917) ^0 Mad 177.
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a charge of immorality, Sheshagiri Ayyar, J. held that "if the head
of the mutt or the junior is proved to be living an immoral life, he
1
is liable to be removed’1. What is * immoral’ is an open question. The 
Court may be bound to discover from evidence what the morality of the 
sect is in this regard.
2
In Satish Chandra v. Dharanidhar where the finding of the Court was 
that the mahant of the shrine of Taraknath, situated near Calcutta, 
’’rendered himself accountable for the various acts of malversation-and 
breaches of trust committed in the course of his management”^ the 
Judicial Committee upheld the decision of the High Court which in turn 
accepted the view of the trial Court that the defendant, the mahant of the 
shrine, ’’was not a fit and proper person to continue as mahant, that he 
was removed from that office...” In short, the mahant of the shrine of 
Tarakeswar was removed in that case from his office for misappropriation 
of the math property.
5
In Tiruvengadath Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar where the suit 
was brought to remove an office-holder of a devastanam committee, the 
appellant of the case who showed partiality towards a trustee of his own 
sect by sanctioning an expenditure of the temple funds for the liquidation 
of a fine inflicted on the trustee, the Madras High Court held that ’’mere
error in judgement” is not "sufficient to disqualify an office holder in
6 7the position of the appellant”. Similarly, in Anna.ji v. Narayan where
the plaintiff brought the suit on the alleged grounds of mismanagement of
the trust property, where the defendant Annaji, a hereditary trustee, was
not aware of his legal position in relation to the trust concerned
1. ILR (1917)* ^0 Mad 177, 199*
3* Ibid., p. **8.
3. ILR (1899) 22 Mad 361.
7. ILR (1897) 21 Bom 55.6.
2. (1939-^0) 67 IA 32.
4. Ibid., p. 33*
6. Ibid., p. 36 .^
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and whose "idea was that he was entitled to manage the endowment free 
from control and very much as though he was its absolute owner" , the 
Bombay High Court, refusing to accept the contention of the plaintiff, 
held that
"it would ... be going too far to hold that a mistake by the 
defendant as to his true legal position ..• should of necessity 
afford a ground for removing a hereditary trustee of such an 
institution as this from his post of manager and entrusting it 
to new hands".^
In the said case,the finding of the Bombay High Court was that the 
trustee manager was mistaken about his legal status in relation to the 
trust. But if a managing trustee, whether he is hereditary or not, claims 
the endowed property to be his personal estate, and uses its funds for 
his personal use, then the Court may rightly consider the circumstances 
to be sufficient for an order of the removal of the trustee. In
3
Chintaman Bajaji v. Dhando Ganesh where the plaintiffs brought the suit 
for the removal of the managing hereditary trustees, the defendants, 
who claimed the endowed property as their own property, the Bombay High 
Court ruled that the assertion of the defendants* right to treat the 
trust property as their private estate was sufficient to justify their 
removal from the trust.
It may be interjected here that the jurisdiction which the Court 
exercises in removing a mahant is a civil and not a penal jurisdiction 
which it uses as its duty to see that the execution of trusts is properly
5
made. Whether there is a ground for the removal of a trustee,or whether a 
mahant should or should not be removed,is a matter "for the consideration 
of the Civil Court, which, must necessarily enjoy a wide discretion to 
decide what form of punitive or ameliorative order will suit the requirements
1. ILR (1897) 21 Bom 556, 559. 2. Ibid., p. 559.
3. ILR (1891) 15 Bom 612. k. Ibid., p. 623.
5. Mukherjea, op.cit., ^th ed. 38 .^
39^
1
of the case”.
A mahant can be removed from his office, to put it in a nutshell,
2
for his gross misconduct, generally by an appropriate proceeding; but 
there exist usages whereby a particular religious brotherhood is entitled
3
to appoint the mahant and also to remove him for his misconduct.
I*
If a- mahant, bound by the vow of celibacy marries, he may be removed.
But the marriage of a mahant by itself is not a disqualification for 
being a mahant in all cases. In some Sudra maths a married person can 
be a mahant.^ Thus in Sathappryyar v. Periasami^ where the mahant was 
married the Madras High Court held that the mahant or ”the pardesi for
7
the time being may be either an ascetic or a married man”.
Now, like a lawful mahant, a de facto mahant is also subject to control
8and his alienations too cannot go without any question. In Mahadeo Prasad
9 •v. Karia Bharti where the math property was divided into two by a
compromise deed creating two de facto mahants, the wrongful alienation
of one de facto mahant was recovered by the other de facto mahant, the 
10plaintiff. Again, a de facto mahant may be a right person to conduct
suits in the interests of a math, while a lawful mahant might plead that
11he was improperly ousted by the de facto mahant. In Vikrama Das v.
12Daulat Ram where the de facto mahant brought the suit in the interests 
of the math and the first defendant was claiming that the Asthan property 
was his^private property, the Supreme Court, holding the trust concerned to be 
a public one, ruled that,
1. Satish Chandra v. Dharanidhar (1939-**0) 67 IA 32, ^6, see above in
this section, p.392.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 5^8 3* Mukherjea, op.cit. kth ed. 383*
k. Tiruvambala v. Manikkavachaka ILR (1917) ^0 Mad, 177, 199; Swami
Harbansa Chariji v. State AIR 1981 MP 82, 89-90.
Mukherjea, op.cit. kth ed. 383* 6. ILR (1891) 1  ^Mad 1.
7. Ibid., p. 11. 8. Derrett, IMHL, 518. 9. (193^ -1935) 62 IA k7.
10. Ibid., p. 50. 11. Derrett, IMHL, 518. 12. AIR 1956 SC 382.
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’’Now the ordinary rule that persons without title and who 
are mere intruders cannot sue as of right is clear. But 
where public trusts are concerned, Courts have a duty to 
see that their interests and the interests of those for 
whose benefit they exist are safeguarded.”1
It may be pointed out here that extensive legislation has been intro-
2duced through the enactment of many State statutes, subjecting maths
and the mahant*s alienating power to public control,”^ but the legislation
khas not yet covered the whole of India, the notable exception being
West Bengal;^ moreover, the existing Statutes do not cover all eventualities.
Thus there are still serious limitations in the Indian legal system
in controlling mahants. In cases where the relief can be petitioned from
the Court there is a paramount necessity not to defeat the trust.
This point was long ago made clear by the Privy Council in Mohan Lalji v.
Gordhan Lalji,^  a case where the plaintiffs brought the suit for the
7
right to joint shebaitship of a temple. Referring to the rule laid
g
down in Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee Mr. Ameer
Ali pronounced for the Judicial Committee that
’’This rule must, from the very nature of the right, be 
subject to the condition that the devolution in the ordinary 
line of descent is not inconsistent with or opposed to the Q 
purpose the founder had in view in establishing the worship.”
1. AIR 1956 SC 382, 390.
2. See next section where elaborate discussion on the statutes controlling 
public trusts has been offered.
3. See Derrett, IMHL, where he cited, for example:, statutes of 
Bombay, Madras and Orissa.
k. ’’Extensive legislation has been introduced to enable maths to be 
publicly controlled, as a result of which undoubtedly in many cases 
a greater proportion of math funds has been used for genuine 
charitable purposes. The statutes have perhaps not yet reached 
their final shape...” Derrett, IMHL
5. Varadachari, op.cit., 289.
6. (1912-13) **0 IA 97.
7. The rule referred to is that the shebaiti vests in the heirs of the founder.
8. (1888-89) 16 IA 137* See above, sec. 5 of the ^th chapter.
9. (1912-23) **0 IA 97, 103.
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The Privy Council, in effect, laid down the law that the purposes 
of an endowment, not the shebaits* interest, come first. This law 
has so far not been used creatively and that is why some states have 
developed the powers of the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments 
to ensure that endowments are administered and incomes thereof appro­
priated properly.
Again, the in custodia legis situation is not adequate for any creative
1
work at law. In Dhyan Singh v. Chandradip Sing, the endowment concerned 
was a public religious endowment and it was neither in the possession of 
a shebait nor was it under any management committee for its proper 
administration. "The concurrent finding” was that "the properties belonged 
to a public religious endowment and neither the plaintiffs nor the
2
defendants have any title to the properties nor any right to possess them."
The negative powers of the Court, e.g. the removal of a mahant from
3
his office, are well illustrated at Bhagwan Pass v. Jairam Pass, a case
* could
where it was held that the mahant/be removed because of his asserting
adverse title to and making unauthorised alienations of the endowed property.
if
Again in Digiadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji Varu v. State the mahant was
suspended from his office because of an enquiry concerning serious charges,
e.g. immoral life and misappropriation, pending against him.
In this context, it must be urged that the Court certainly has ideas
about what a religious trust is for. In Surendra Nath v. Dandiswami 
5
Jagannath Asram the main issue was in respect of the appointment of the 
mahant. Rejecting the judgement of the lower Court, the High Court of 
Calcutta ruled in effect that religious endowments were meant for the
1. (1969) 1 SCWR 2k2.
3. AIR 1965 Punj. 260. 
5. AIR 1953 Cal 687.
2. Ibid., p. 2kh.
(1969) 2 SCWR 831.
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faiths and beliefs of the worshippers. K.C. Das Gupta, J. pronounced 
that
"the Court should have respect for the faiths and beliefs 
of worshippers of such institutions and should not substitute 
its own ideas^however modern they may seem for those faiths 
and beliefs.”
This is no doubt a realistic approach to the subject concerned.
Sometimes a particular statute may provide powers for the Commissioner
to take positive steps in the case of the mismanagement of a trust. In
2S.D.G. Pandarasannadi v. State of Madras, though the Supreme Court judged
the case under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,
1951i it upheld the validity of sec. 45 of the Madras Hindu Religious
and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959* Sec. 45 provides inter alia that
the Commissioner may appoint an executive officer for the purpose of the
administration of a trust. Referring to sec. 45 Subba Rao, J, as he
then was, observed for the Supreme Court that
"Such a drastic provision may be necessary in a case where the 
temple is mismanaged or if there are other circumstances 
which compel such an appointment."*
On the other hand#a statute may compel a Commissioner or the like not
to take any positive steps. His good notions may fall flat because of
the provision of a particular statute. In Pureiromda Deity v. Chief
Commissioner the Chairman of the Social Welfare Committee applied to
the Manipur Administration for a piece of land belonging to a deity,
for carrying on social welfare work, and the Chief Commissioner ordered
1. AIR 1953 Cal 687, 688.
2. (1966) 2 M U  1 (SC).
3. (1966) 2 M U  1 (SC), 6.
4. AIR I960 Man 20.
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that the said land be allotted for social welfare. The Judicial 
Commissioner held the order to be invalid because the Chief Commissioner 
did not follow the provisions of a statute, the Land Acquisition Act, 
189^.1
b. Smartha Vicara
It is odd that the removal of a mahant is the only way one can attempt
to ensure that the mahantfs duties are performed! This can hardly be
satisfactory. For if the mahant wins a Court case in spite of the fact
that in reality he is dishonest, no power on earth cam compel him to
vacate his office. The Hindu kings used to discharge their religious
obligations towards their subjects in various ways including Smartha
vicara (Smartha enquiry). Brahmins versed in religious affairs were
appointed to enquire into any complaint regarding a religious or caste
matter. A Brahmin acquainted with Smrti, i.e. a Smarthan, was to be
included in such an enquiry. Any complaint against a mahant was looked
into by a Smartha enquiry, and the mahant was kept under control.; hence
did not need to be removed to make sure his duties were performed. Thus
the ancient kings, or even nineteenth century kings of Madras or Cochin,
used to discharge their religious obligations through Smartha vicara.
2
In Vallabha v. Madusudanan, the plaintiff was declared an outcast
3
after the result of a Smartha enquiry into the charge of adultery against
1. "If the land is necessary for a public purpose by any Government 
then the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 189^ will apply 
and the Government have to follow the said provisions before taking 
over the said land". Ibid., p. 2k,
2. ILR (1898) 12 Mad k95.
3. The local king appointed "a Smarthan (a Brahmin acquainted with 
Smrti), four Mimamsakars (men versed in sifting evidence) and 
two others ... to aid in the investigation" - ILR (1889) 12 Mad 
<*95, ‘W.f
•P* However, nngangsakars are scholars who can recognise a true
•St^ cg.S^ ? ltS SenSe and l i c e n c e -  ,
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1the plaintiff. The charge involved religious (caste) questions.
The persons involved in a Smartha enquiry are the counterparts 
of the officials of a present-day department of Hindu Religious 
Endowments but they, unlike the officials, were versed in religious 
affairs. Hindu kings protected the religious endowments through 
the ecclesiastical authorities,and mahants were thus kept in control, 
without being removed. In present-day India Smartha enquiries may 
be reintroduced for investigating complaints against mahants.
Smarthans and other Hindu ecclesiastical authorities are the fittest 
persons to look into the affairs of maths and mahants because they are 
religious matters. Religious affairs should not be the concern of 
secular authorities in present-day India; they should be handed over to 
those persons versed in and concerned with religious matters.
1. See also Sirkar v. Narayanan Kesavan (1915) 5 Tra-Co U
a case where the plaintiff was excommunicated and forbidden 
to enter temples because of the finding of a Smartha vicara 
that he had committed adultery. The case followed the Madras 
Court case cited in the preceding footnote.
koo
SECTION 5
STATUTES CONTROLLING PUBLIC TRUSTS AND THE MAHANT'S RIGHT OF PROPERTY
a. Statutes controlling Public Trusts 
The point that there was jurisdiction of the ruling authority for
controlling endowments before British rule was established in India
has already been discussed above in Sec. 6 of the previous chapter.
But the law, in a statute of the present type^  for the purpose of controlling
religious endowments does not seem to have been in existence before the
British established their rule in the sub-continent. Ever since the
acquisition of jaghir by the East India Company in the Madras Presidency
in l6k0 the law concerning religious endowments in the presidency had
begun to develop. Prior to the introduction of Regulation 19 of 1810 in
Bengal and Regulation 7 of 1817 in Madras in relation to public religious
and charitable endowments^ with the main object of promoting their trade
and to consolidate their rule, the East India Company began to involve
itself in the affairs of local religious institutions. The earliest
function of the Company was the maintenance of law and order and to
achieve this it used to intervene even in the religious disputes
occurring among the local peoples. But the positive function of the
companyfVas to give to the local people their laws and their institutions
5
and to allow them to carry on their customs as freely as before”.
1. It means an assignment by the state of a district and its revenue 
either to a body or to an individual with the power to administer 
it. See The Concise Oxford Dictionary, H.W. Fowler and F.G. Fowler 
(ed ) 5th ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 196^ , 6^ 9; it 
also means hereditary assignment and its rent as annuity. See C.Y. 
Mudaliar, op.cit., p.1 where he cited H. Yule and A.C. Burnell 
Hobson-Jobson, A Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and 
Phrases, London, 1903»
2. "The law and policy relating to the religious institutions within 
the territory of the East India Company had been shaping itself since 
the acquisition of jagir by the company in l6*f0"- Mudalier, op.cit., 1.
3. Mukherjea, op.cit., kth ed., k$6, Mudaliar, op.cit., 2-3.
5. Mudaliar, ibid., p. 3»
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The Bengal Regulation 19 of 1810 and the Madras Regulation 7 of l8l7
defined the jurisdiction within which the British Government was to
exercise its sovereign rights in relation to religious and charitable 
1
endowments. Like the said two Regulations there was also a Regulation
in Bombay called Regulation 17 of 1827* But these regulations were not
2meant for the whole of India; they were confined to the Presidencies.
In so far as they were concerned with purely religious endowments, the
aforesaid regulations were repealed by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863
(Act 20 of 1863)^ which was applicable to public religious endowments
only. The Act of 1863 transferred the power of the Board of Revenue to
control religious endowments to non-official committees to be constituted
under the provisions of the Act.^
Though the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (Act 6 of 1890), was a
Central Act, it was introduced for the administration of public trusts
for charitable purposes only.^ But the Charitable and Religious Trusts
Act, 1920 (Act 4 of 1920) was introduced to be applied to both public
7charitable and religious trusts.
The whole procedure of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920
g
was of a summary character; no decision made on any point was final.
But the main advantage of the Act was that the persons interested in a 
trust might gain material information of the trust by following the procedure 
laid down in the Act, and in the case of a trustee's refusal to divulge 
information a petitioner would be empowered to bring suit under sec. 92 of 
the Civil Procedure Code, which we have already referred to in the previous
1. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 456. 2. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 457.
3. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 458. 4. Varadachari, op.cit.,2nd ed. 291.
5. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 458.
6. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 463.
7. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 464.
8. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 465.
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chapter, because the trustees’ refusal to give information would be
construed as a breach of trust within the meaning of sec. 92.
Again, in so far as the Religious Endowments Act is concerned, the
only relief to be claimed under the Act is the removal of a trustee.
There is neither provision for an appointment of a new trustee nor one
2
fcr settling a scheme. But in the case of a public religious endowment
a petitioner can avail himself either of the provisions of the Act or
of those of sec. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Sec. 92 unquestionably
provides larger remedies to a petitioner applying in the interests of an
endowment, because a suit brought under the section is a regular suit
and unlike a suit under the Charitable and Religious Endowments Act, 1920,
it is not to be tried summarily.^
Neither the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, the Charitable Endowments
Act, 1890 and the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 nor the
remedies available under sec. 92 are exhaustive in relation to all problems
of a public religious or a charitable endowment. Hence, most of the
Indian states have introduced legislation dealing with public religious
if
and charitable trusts and the primary object is ”to ensure the efficient 
administration of Hindu religious endowments and to prevent the trustees
5
of temples from misusing the funds of temples for their personal benefits.” 
The following statutes^ dealing with public religious and charitable 
trusts have been enacted:-
i. The Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions 
and Endowments Act, 1966 (Andhra Act 17 of 1966).
ii. The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951)*
iii. The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Bombay Act 29 of 1950).
1. Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 465. 2. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 467•
3. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 467* 4. Varadachari, op.cit. 2nd ed. 289.
5* K. Rajayogananda Murty, ”Hereditary Archakas of Temples in Andhra
Pradesh” (1965), 2 An. W.R. Jnl. 16-17, 17.
6. For the texts of the different state statutes see B.K. Mukherjea, 
op.cit., 4th ed., Appendixes 3-15, PP* 590-1069.
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iv. The Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 (Madhya Pradesh Act 30 
of 1951).
v. The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 
(Madras Act 22 of 1959).
vi. The Mysore Religious and Charitable Institutions Act, 192?.
vii. The Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1969 (Orissa Act 2 of 
1970).
viii. The Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 42 of 1959).
ix. The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951* is 
applicable to Kerala as amended, for example, by the Kerala Act 41 of 1963* 
the Kerala Act 12 of 1968, and the Kerala Act 11 of 1981.
x. The Uttar Pradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions (Prevention 
of Dissipation of Properties) Act, 1962 (Uttar Pradesh Act 22 of 1962),
In this context,the notable exceptions are the states of the Punjab and
West Bengal which have not yet introduced statutes dealing with religious 
2
endowments. The Acts in different states have been made with a view to
making better provision for the administration of public trusts and the
powers of supervision and control of those trusts have been vested in a
board consisting of a Commissioner of endowments with a hierarchy of
subordinate officials. The common objective of these statutes is to check
any possible misuse by trustees of trust funds and to see that endowment
3
funds are used for the purposes of the trust. Most of the statutes have
1. Varadachari, op.cit., 575* 2. Varadachari, ibid., p. 289.
3* "The desire for reform of Hindu religious endowments operates for 
the improvement of amenities of the temples, trying to make them 
more accessible to more people, to improve the standard of learning 
of their ministrants, to make the lives of their staffs more edifying, 
to turn idle endowment funds (where these still survive) to educational 
and charitable uses for the benefit of the Hindu community or for India 
at large. But this could not be* achieved without a positive structure 
of administration and supervision, operating not merely by threats but 
by constructive advice, and co-operation with the temple authorities.
It was not enough to leave the initiative in the hands of members of
(continued on next page)
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1
provision for the compulsory registration of public trusts. The trustees
are bound by the Acts to keep regular accounts of the receipts and
expenditure of the trusts and 6uch accounts are subject to compulsory
annual audit. For example, sec. 63 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts
Act, 1950 provides that the accounts of every religious endowment are to
2
be audited every year by a qualified accountant acting as an auditor.
The duty of keeping the accounts of income and expenditure of an endowment
does not lie on the managing trustee only; it is the duty of all trustees
to get the accounts audited as required by state legislation.”^ Thus in
If
State v. Anil Kumar where the trustees did not get their accounts audited
as required under sec. 33 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, Divan, J.
held for the Bombay High Court that,
"It is clear from sec. 32 that it is the duty of every trustee 
that the accounts are properly maintained. That duty cannot 
be shifted merely to the managing trustee and it is the duty of 
all the trustees in the light of Rule 17^ to see that the accounts 
maintained by them are audited as required by the Rules. "6
7
Most of the statutes provide for settling schemes for the management of
(continued from previous page)
the public, who might be intimidated by the mahants or shebaits and 
their associates in peculation; the power of inspection of accounts was 
given to a public official. At the same time that the legal machinery, 
to correct abuses and to enable misappropriated property to be recovered, 
was being made more efficient, new machinery was created in some states 
to enable the properties of endowments to be preserved, in certain cir­
cumstances, to be gathered in, and to be spent on worthwhile undertakings" 
Derrett,"The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments, op.cit., 328.
1. For example, sec. 18 of the Bombay Trusts Act, 1950 requires the trustee 
of a public trust to apply for the registration of the trust concerned.
See Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed. 719* But the Madras and Orissa Acts are 
more meticulous about the registration of trusts. According to sec. 29 
of the Madras Act and sec. 22 of the Orissa Act for every religious 
institution there must be a "prepared and maintained register" indicating 
inter alia the particulars of the endowment or endowments. See p. 639 and 
p. 912 respectively of Mukherjea's book, 4th ed.
2. For the text of the law see Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 613*
3. Varadachari, op.cit., 259* AIR 1972 Guj. 125.
5. It means Rule 17 of the Bombay Public Trusts Rules, 1951» see Mukherjea,
6. AIK 1972 Guj. 125, 126. 2El — ’ kth 6d’ 78° - ?81
7. For example, see sec. 93 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious 
Institutions Act, 1950 for the text Mukherjea, op.cit., %th ed., 877*
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endowed properties. But the Uttar Pradesh Act, 1962 has not provided 
sufficient provision for the administration of public trusts; it has 
omitted to provide the vital provision for settling a scheme. Moreover, 
some state statutes for example the Bombay, Madras and Orissa Acts have 
curtailed the mahant's power of alienation in the sense that he cannot
alienate a math property without the prior consent of the charity
. . 2 commissioner.
The statutes enacted by the different states and the state administration
pursuing the provisions seem to be doing well.^ The Report of the Hindu
Religious Endowments Commission (1960-1962) points out that every state
A
should have a statute dealing with Hindu religious endowments and this
indicates that existing state statutes are working well in the field of
religious endowments.
"Thus Public temples have been brought under active, if (one is 
told) not always perfectly efficient control, because the 
commissioners or their officers are in effect a layer of super- 
shebaits, whose sanction to proposed expenditure by the 
trustee is a valuable privilege, which exists surely, in order 
to be exercised with discretion..
Extensive legislation introduced by way of state statutes has no doubt
1. "The Uttar Pradesh statutes are of very limited scope and reflect 
the tenderness of the public there to trustees of such endowments"
- Derrett, RLSI 498. When Derrett says about "statutes" instead of 
a "statute" he may have in his mind both the Uttar Pradesh Act 22
of 1962 as mentioned above and the Uttar Pradesh Hindu Public Religious 
Institutions (Prevention of Dissipation of Properties) Rules, 1966.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 517.
3. "Extensive legislation has been introduced to enable maths to be 
publicly controlled, as a result of which undoubtedly in many cases
a greater proportion of math funds has been used for genuine charitable 
purposes" - Derrett, IMHL, 517>
4. P. 30; see also Derrett, RLSI, 498. At page 30 of the Report of the
Hindu Religious Endowments Commission (1960-1962)
op.cit.*, the Commission says that "It is in our view a matter of 
imperative necessity that suitable legislation should be undertaken 
by states having no legislation governing Hindu religious endowments, 
namely Assam, Punjab, West Bengal and U.P."
5. Derrett, RLSI, 4931 where the author also cites Rajayogananda Murty's 
article, op.cit., to point out that several officials were squeezed by
the reforms of Hindu religious endowments.
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resulted in a greater proportion of math funds being used for genuine
1 2 
religious or charitable purposes. Mudaliar in her study also pointed
out in effect that the state supervision of public religious trusts
through the implementation of the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious
and Endowments Act, 1959* in Madras has an overall good effect on the
endowments themselves. It may be unquestionably accepted that the object
of the Madras Act, 1959* was to seek the utilisation of the funds of
Hindu public endowments for the purposes for which they were provided.
The reform intended and made by the Act is beyond any objection. It does
not seem to involve any political motivation as one can find in the Tamil
respect of which,when it was challenged by the archakas and the mahants
k
in Seshammal v. Tami Nadu, the Supreme Court ruled, ’’the Amendment Act as
a whole must be regarded as valid.” The Amendment Act virtually abolished
the hereditary priesthood and introduced a provision which would conceivably
alter the language of religious worship from Sanskrit to Tamil. Pressler
points out that the Supreme
’’Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1970 archaka act, 
but did so in such a way as to render the act ineffective.
While it confirmed that the Government could abolish heredity 
as a principle of priest appointment, it also confirmed that the 
state was bound not to violate the regulations laid down by the 
religious agamas. The agamas, in turn, declare that only persons 
following certain traditions and born of certain parents are 
competent to perform worship, and this obviously comes to much the 
same thing as heredity.”5
1. Derrett, IMHL,. 517-
2. See. above, p. 33* footnote 4.
3. This Act was introduced in 1970 when the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K.), 
a political party having traditionally an anti-Brahmin ideology, was in 
power in Madras. "The Government at this time was under the control of
the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K.), a political party which, historically, 
had exposed a distinctly anti-Brahmin ideology” - F.A. Presler,”The 
Legitimation of Religious Policy in Tamil Nadu (A Study of the 1970 '
Archaka Legislation)” in B.L.Smith (ed.) Religion and the Legitimation of 
Power in South Asia, Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1976, 106-133, 106.
Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment)
(1972) 3 SCR 815. 5. Presler, op.cit., 131-132.
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In this context, Derrett comments that
"The problem is how can India, a secular state, validly 
pass laws interfering with a hereditary priesthood and 
demote it to "temple-servant" status, and subsequently 
instruct managers of temples to^have the rituals performed 
in Tamil, instead of Sanskrit?"
This is a sound and definitive view of the matter.
It is submitted that in any reform in the field of religious endowments,
no political motive should be pursued against a particular section of the
community. The Madras Amendment Act of 1970 was politically motivated and
reveals a vindictive attitude of a particular political force in Madras
against Brahmins of the state.
It is suggested that a central law should be introduced which will cover
not only the religious endowments of Hindus but also those of every other
2
community. At least in one case, the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, we 
might find a model for future central legislation covering public trusts 
belonging to all communities, but it must be stressed that any future 
legislation covering only public trusts will not do, it must be a compre­
hensive legislation covering private religious endowments as well, because 
from the standpoint of the nation’s wealth and the amount of wealth involved, 
the regulation and control of private religious endowments are no less 
important than the regulation and control of public religious trusts. It 
will be observed that Muslim wakfs are subject to comparable statutory 
supervision (Wakfs Act, 195*0? whether public or private in nature. Although 
there is no statute dealing with private Hindu religious endowments, there 
are settled views on so many aspects of the institution of the private 
Hindu religious endowment that it will not be difficult for Parliament to
1. See the review by Derrett of Peligion and the Legitimation of Power in 
South Asia, B.L.Smith (ed.) op.cit., where he appreciated very much the 
article of Presler, op.cit. and comments on it that "This is a first-rate 
appendix to C.Y. Mudaliyar's" book, op.cit. See Derrett's review in 
Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 76, Jahrgang 1981 Nr. 6, 595-594, 594.
2. "Legislation in any case should be uniform for all communities and not 
be confined to Hindus" - Derrett, RLSI, 498.
3. The Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954 (Act 29 of 1954).
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sift out the settled principles either from the decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the Privy Council or from the different text books especially 
of Mukherjea, Varadachari and Ganapati Iyer. Above all, Parliamentarians 
wishing to do reform in this field may take into consideration the 
arguments and suggestions for reform in the field of Hindu religious 
endowments put forward by Derrett in his various works, particularly in
the article "The Reform of Hindu Religious Endowments" and text books,
2 3
Religion, Law and the State in India and A Critique of Modern Hindu Law.
For Mukherjea, Iyer or Varadachari wrote compilations of accepted
legal principles, and in consequence very few suggestions for reform can
be found there. With due respect to those learned writers their books
represent the law for what it is, but for the law of what it should be one
must listen to positive suggestions from other quarters, not ignoring
if
aspects brought to light by an intensive study of wakfs.
The Mahant*s Right of Property
5Like shebaiti, mahantship is a ’property*. Mahants "had and have ample
discretion in the application of the funds of the institution, but always
subject to certain obligations and duties, equally governed by custom or
6
usage". A mahant*s right to property was given the status of fundamental 
right by the Supreme Court in the "Shirur Mutt" case*^  when B.K. Mukherjea, J 
as he then was, pronounced that
1. D.E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, 311-336.
2. Faber and Faber, London, 1968.
3. N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1970.
k. M.N. Hoque,"A Critique of the Law of Wakf in Bangladesh", thesis
(unpublished), Ph.D. (London, 1982).
5. Commr. H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar AIR 19^ SC 282 , 288.
6. Vidya *Var.uthi v. Balusami (1920-21) *t8 IA-302, 311.
7. AIR 193^ SC 282. The view w&s affirmed in S.T. Swamiar v. Commr. H.R.
& C.E., Madras, AIR1963SC 966, 971.
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’’There is no reason why the word 'property* as used in Art 1^ 90 )(f) 
of the Constitution, should not be given a liberal and wider con­
notation and should not be extended to those well-recognised 
types of interest which have the insignia or characteristics of 
proprietary right. As said above the ingredients of both office 
and property of duties and personal interest are blended together 
in the rights of a Mahant and the Mahant has the right to enjoy 
this property or beneficial interest so long as he is entitled to 
hold his office. " 1
Art. 190)(f) (to the disgust of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission)
used to guarantee the fundamental right to property until the introduction
of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, which abolished that
2fundamental right. To appreciate the catastrophic nature of this change
we must remind ourselves of the ancient right of property. In S.T. Swamiar
3
v. Commr. H.R. & C.E. Madras the Supreme Court emphasised the point of the
large proprietary interest of the mahant in the debutter when it held that
"Mahant is not a mere manager or custodian nor is he a trustee 
in the strict sense holding the office of a mahant by custom 
and usage of the institution. He has, besides large powers of 
management and disposal, certain proprietary rights over the 
property of the math. But he is by virtue of his office under 
an obligation to discharge the duties as a trustee and is answer- 
able as such".
It was all too evident that the ’answerability' was feeble.
Again, the mahant has not only proprietary interests in his office and
the endowed property but also he is the "master of the property and may
alienate for any purpose for so long as he remains incumbent. Otherwise
5
what is authorized by law depends upon the circumstances". It would be 
misleading to say that he is a mere manager of the math property as held 
in the leading case of Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami or that he "has to
1. AIR 1954 SC 282, 288.
2. For the text of the Act see Acts of Parliament, 1979» Ministry of Law, 
New Delhi, 1980, 197.
3. AIR 1963 SC 966. 4. AIR 1963 SC 966, 971.
5. Derrett, IMHL, 5^ 6.
6. (1920-21) 48 IA 302, 311.
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discharge the duties of a trustee qua the institution and answerable as 
1
such". He is neither a trustee nor a mere manager of the math property
but on the contrary he is,by tradition and in the eye of the law a
beneficiary of the property itself, as well as the manager of the entire
debutter separate from his proprietary interest in his office as manager.
So, it can actually be contended that:
"The law has made a hypocritical attempt to keep his interest 
within bounds, asserting that he is merely a trustee for the mutt.
But it is perfectly notorious that he in fact represents the mutt, 
that he has entire disposal over its assets subject to general 
controls which in practice were of very little effect until the 
recent legislation, and that he has never been ousted from personal 
enjoyment from any presents made to him as mahant".^
Though the position of a mahant cannot be equated with that of a trustee,
the property of the math is in some sense trust property; it is generally
inalienable - which we have already mentioned above in sec. 2 of this
chapter. In^ Sammantha Pandara v. Shellappa Chetti  ^where the previous
mahant contracted debts for the purposes of the math, Sir Charles Turner
C.J. and Ayyar, J. explained the law in relation to the mahant*s position.
Their lordships held that the property of a math
"is in fact attached to the office and possessed by inheritance 
to no one who does not fill the office. It is in a certain 
sense trust property, it is devoted to the maintenance of the 
establishment, but the superior has large dominion over it, and 
is not accountable for its management nor for the expenditure of 
the income, provided he does not apply it to any purpose other 
than what may fairly be regarded as in furtherance of the objects 
of the institution".5
Again, in Commr. H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar^ B.K. Mukherjea, J., as he then 
was, observed that
1. S.T. Swamiar v. Commr. H.R. & C.E. AIR 1963 SC 966, 972.
2. Derrett, RLSI, 490. ....
3. ILR (1879) 2 Mad 173, 179-
4. The same views were held in Krishna Singh v. Mathura AIR 1980 SC 707, 713 •
5. ILR (1879) 2 Mad 175, 179. 6. AIR 195^ SC 282.
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♦•under the law, as it stands, the Mahant has large powers of 
disposal over the surplus income and the only restriction is 
that he cannot spend anything out of it for his personal use 
unconnected with the dignity of his office” . 1
This last is a suggestio falsi, as Derrett has pointed out that
’’there is no rule of Hindu law which positively obliges the 
mahant to save or spend in a particular manner, or to be liable 
as if he were a technical trustee for unauthorized spending.
He can sever surplus income from the pool constituted by the 
math's general income, and, although he cannot make it legally 
his own, he can dispose of it at his pleasure”.
For in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami^ Ayyangar, J.
pronounced for the Madras High Court that
"In the case of mutts defined and specific purposes, connected 
with the maintenance of the mutt as an institution, are, in 
the nature of things, very limited and a large part of the 
income derived from the endowments of the mutt as well as from 
the money offerings of its disciples and followers - which 
offerings as a rule are very considerable - is at the disposal 
of the head of the mutt for the time being, which he is expected 
to spend, at his will and pleasure, on objects of religious charity 
and in the encouragement and promotion of religious learning. His 
obligation to devote the surplus income to such religious and 
charitable objects is one in the nature only of an imperfect or 
moral obligation resting in his conscience and regulated only by 
the force of public opinion and he is in no way, whether as a 
trustee or otherwise, accountable for it in law”.'
So, without being a legal owner of the debutter the mahant can enjoy the 
benefit of the math property practically as an owner thereof. The power of 
the sect to control him, once installed on the gaddi, is feeble at best.
Now, when the offerings are made to the mahant by a donor intending to 
advance the purposes of the institution, hei as the representative of the 
institution receives those offerings*the income of which belong to the math 
itself. But the offerings made to him personally, but not for any purpose
of the math, form the personal property of the mahant which he can dispose of
5
in any way he wishes. To determine the intentions of the donor is often
5. "When the offerings are made to the head of a mutt, not personally to him, 
but, for purposes appurtenant to it, they will be regarded as the property 
of the mutt and should be utilised for the purposes of the mutt. Where, 
however, they are made to the head of a mutt personally or individually, 
out of veneration for him, they belong to him and not to the mutt” - 
Varadachari, op.cit., '\$k.
1. AIR 1954 SC 282, 293.
3. ILR (190^ ) 27 Mad 435.
2. IMHL, 516-517
4. ILR (1904) 27 Mad 433, 5^5-
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difficult. These offerings are called either pranamis or padakanikais
1
and generally belong to the mahant as his personal properties. In
p
Kumudban v. Tripura where one of the questions to be settled was in effect
the question whether offerings made to a mahant were his personal property,
Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, A.C.J., referring to Girijanund v. Sailajanund^
observed for the Calcutta High Court that
"there is a fundamental distinction between the offerings made 
to the Deity and the offerings made to the mahant personally.
If offerings are made to the Deity, they belong to the endowment 
and must be applied for the purpose of the endowment; on the 
other hand, if offerings are made by the faithful to the mahant 
personally,^they do not become merged in the income of the 
endowment".
In support of his view Sir Asutosh pointed out inter alia the cases of
5 6Dhadphale v. Gurav and Kashi Chandra v. Kailash Chandra. Again,in the
same judgement Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, A.C.J. laid down an important principle
which was complementary to his above statement of law. He observed that
"whether a particular offering is made to the deity or the mahant 
personally depends upon the intention of the faithful devotee 
and no inflexible rule can be formulated, no general test can be 
prescribed, to determine whether on a particular occasion the _ 
offering has been made to the Deity or to the mohunt personally.1*
Now, returning to the question of a mahant in relation to the math property,
it may be pointed out that the law which was laid down more than one hundred
g
years ago in Sammantha Pandara v. Shellappa Chetti which we have discussed
1. Varadachari, op.cit., 15^ »
2. (1922) 35 CU 188.
3. ILR (1896) 23 Cal 64-5, a case where the suit was instituted against the
high priest of the temple Baidyanath for the recovery of a certain amount 
and for a declaration that that amount could be realised by attachment of 
the surplus of.offerings given to the deity concerned.
k. (1922) 35 CLJ 188, 190.
3. ILR CL881) 6 Bom 122. A very interesting case where the plaintiff as a 
temple servant brought the suit claiming damages against the defendant, 
because the latter as a worshipper did not make any offering of food to 
the deity for a year which he used to make every day.
6. ILR (1889) 26 Cal 356, a case relating to certain turn or pala of the
deity and to a piece of land.
7. (1922) 35 CLJ, 188, 190. 8, ILB (1879) 2 Mad 175, 179-
8a. Regarding the Court’s reluctance to interfere with, the fundamental 
right To property in the case of ma^t® '• there was another method of 
supporting the state’s action and deafeating mahants* claims,and that 
is well illustrated in Jiban Chandra v. State of Assam. ATT? 1966 Assam 
and Nagaland 51* On toe validity of the Seventeenth AmBndmerrfc- ■ --,1964,
S©0 V.N.Shukla, Const, of India, 6th edn., Lucknow, 1975,149;Seervai,op.cit» 
, vol.2,1 577£Gola-k Nath,AIR 1967 SC 1643, overrulled in Kesavananda,AIR 
1973 SC 1461, only prospectively overruled such Amendments'^
I<~
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above is still a firm law.since it was reiterated by the Supreme Court in
-j
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir in 1980. In the Supreme Court case Sen, J,
2referred inter alia to Sammantha Pandara's case and observed that
"The property belonging to a math is in fact attached to the 
office of the mahant, and passed by inheritance to no one 
who does not fill the office. The head of a math, as such, 
is not a trustee in the sense in which that term is generally 
understood, but in legal contemplation he has an estate for 
life in its permanent endowments and an absolute property in 
the income derived from the offerings of his followers, subject 
only to the burden of maintaining the institution. He is bound 
to spend a large part of the income derived from the offerings 
of his followers on charitable or religious objects. The words 
'burden of maintaining the institution’ must be understood to 
include the maintenance .of the math, the support of its head 
and his disciples and the performance of religious and other 
charities in connection with it in accordance with usage”.
5
The word "offering” in the Supreme Court observation is meant offerings
made to a mahant for the use of the math. Otherwise, the Supreme Court would
not hare spcken. about "the burden of maintaining the institution"^ and on the
basis of the Supreme Court proposition that a mahant "has an estate for life .
7
in its permanent endowments..." it may be pointed out that B.K. Mukherjea's
g
statement that "a Mahant is neither a life tenant nor a corporation sole" , 
it is submitted, is not true.
Now the Amendment of Art. 19(1)(f) by the Constitution Forty-fourth 
Amendment Act, 1978 has abolished the fundamental right of property for 
every citizen including mahants’ or shebaits* fundamental right of property
in mahantship or shebaiti as formerly held by the Supreme Court in Commr.
9
H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar when Mukherjea, J., as he then was, ruled that 
"the word 'property' as used in Art. 19(l)(f) should" be extended to
I. AIR 1980 SC 707. 2. ILR (1879) 2 Mad 175.
3. See Derrett, "The Concept of Property...", AIR 1968 JbvI.2-8, cited above 
where (at page 5) he observes that "maths were given to mahants as their 
property with the tacit intention that it should descend to their disciples 
in each case, the senior or the best disciple being the next mahant seems 
quite certain. Many inscriptions signify that this must have been the case."
4. AIR 1980 SC 707, 713. 5. Ibid., p. 713.
6. Ibid., p. 713. 7. Ibid., p. 713*
8. Op.cit., 4th ed. 363. 9- A-IR 195^ SC 282.
?
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1
mahantship as well. The Amendment Act has already prompted what were 
previously unthinkable reforms in the field of religious endowments.
Thus Kerala introduced the Payment of Rajabhogam to Thekkemadom
2
Swamiyarv Mathapram (Abolition) Act, 1980 (Kerala Act 15 of 1981).
According to sec. 3 of the Kerala Act, landholders of the endowed lands 
who used to pay assessment (Rajabhogam) to the mahant (the Thekkemadom 
Swamiar Mathapram at Trichur) will not have to pay the same any longer when 
the law comes - into force, extinguishing the proprietary right of the 
mahant to receive Rajabhogam. The Kerala Statute is perfectly valid because 
it will not infringe any fundamental right of the Mahant of Trichar to receive 
assessment from the landholders of endowed lands. The Act would not have 
been valid but for the introduction of the Constitution Forty-fourth 
Amendment Act in 1979 which abolished fundamental right of property of 
every citizen along with the fundamental right of property involved in a 
mahantship.
The mahant's right of property in certain respects may be taken away 
by a valid state statute as we have seen in the case of the mahant of 
Trichur, but it will not be easy even for any Parliamentary statute to 
take away the right of a mahant to administer a math's property. For such 
a statute will not only infringe the fundamental right provided under 
Art. 26(d) of the Constitution, entitling a religious denomination to 
administer its own property, but also destroy the institution of mahantship 
itself. In the Shirur Math case  ^the impugned Madras Hindu Religious and 
Charitable Endowments Act, 19511 entitled the Commissioner of Hindu Religious 
Endowments to take away the administration from a mahant in certain circum­
stances and the Supreme Court ruled it to be violative of Art. 26(d) of 
4
the Constitution and, holding that the interest of a mahant in mahantship
1. AIR 1934 SC 282, 291. 2. See Appendix IID for the text.
3* AIR 195^ SC 282. For critiques on the case see Derrett, RLSI, 49*f-^ 97,
and Mudaliar, op.cit., 178-182.
^  AIR 195^ SC 282, 291.
415
'I
was a property within the meaning of Art. 19(l)(f), also ruled that
"To take away this beneficial interest and leave him merely to the
discharge of his duties would be to destroy the character as a Mahant 
2
altogether'*. No statute can substitute a Commission's discretion for
the mahant's in the general management of the math.
Moreover, the alienating power of a mahant is an ingredient of his
management of debutter and such a power cannot be taken away without
3
amending the Constitution. No doubt his acts may be voidable or even 
void without the Commissioner's prior consent, but it is he who alienates, 
not the Commissioner. But if the mahant's power of alienating debutter 
were to be taken away then how could a mahant administer a math property 
how could he save the debutter from any threatened danger or how could he 
play, as it were, the role of a manager of an infant's estate to protect 
a debutter? It seems that without changing the conception of mahantship 
it may not be possible to introduce satisfactory improvements in this field.
Though it may not be either possible or desirable to abolish the alien­
ating power of a mahant altogether, this power of the mahant has been 
If
limited by the provisions of different state statutes such as Andhra
5 g n
Pradesh, Bombay, Madras . In this context, it must be stressed that the 
limitation imposed on the powers of a mahant or a hereditary trustee in 
relation to endowed properties by a state statute has regularly been regarded
1. AIR 1954 SC 288. 2. Ibid., p. 282, 288, 289.
3. "Mahants” right of property in the mutt's assets comes to his aid, and 
his right to take the initiative in disposing of them cannot be taken 
away from except by amending the Constitution appropriately, or by 
abolishing his right of property by statute" - Derrett, RLSI, 493-494.
4. See on this point Derrett, IMHL, 517.
5. Sec. 74 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments 
Act, 1966, see Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 1028.
6. See sec. 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950» Mukherjea, ibid., 
p. 729.
7. See sec. 34 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 
1959 where previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner is necessary in 
case of alienation. Mukherjea, ibid., p. 642.
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as a reasonable limitation or restriction. Thus in Commr. H.R. & C.E.
2v.-'S.T. Swamiar, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of the impugned 
Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951» as amended by the Madras Act 
of 195*S in sec. 52(1)(f) providing that an application of the funds of any 
religious institution for purposes not connected with those of the institution 
would be a ground for removal of the mahant. Shah, J. observed for the 
Court that
MBy s. 52(1)(f) application of funds or properties for purposes 
unconnected with the institution i.e. purposes for which the custom 
of the institution does not warrant application is a ground for 
removal. It cannot be said that by enacting a provision which enables 
a Court, in an appropriate case, to remove a mahant, if it be found 
that he has applied the funds or the properties of the institution 
for purposes unconnected with the institution, any unreasonable 
restriction is sought to be placed".-^
So, the power of Mahant's alienation of debutter for purposes other than the
purposes of the math can be validly restricted by a statutory provision.
But who is to establish which purposes are 'of the math', which customs
apply, and what the mahant's discretion amounts to? The Commissioner is not
given such judicial power (understandably), and the abuses are not tackled
at source. Customary payments to a mahant may be abolished, but there is
no power (and indeed no desire) to limit free will offerings by pilgrims or
devotees of the sect, and these may be considerable.
SECTION 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is an undisputed fact that the institution of the math or any other
1. Restrictions imposed by the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu 
Religions Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966, on hereditary trustees 
were held reasonable by the Supreme Court in K.A. Samajam v. Commr. H.R. 
& C.E. AIR 1971 SC 891, 897.
2. AIR 1965 SC 966.
3. Ibid., p. 972.
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religious endowment stands for religious purposes and that pious 
intentions should be carried out, but in the context of the present 
needs of India it may be pointed out that where any profit accrues to 
anybody, whether he is a mahant or a temple servant, he must account for
The religious activities of a math are guided by custom or usage, but
the needs of the society come first* Therefore, activities involving expenses
2
of an institution such as buying an elephant or spending enormous amounts 
for any other alleged purpose of the math should not be held as necessary 
expenses for the institution in spite of the fact that those expenses might 
have been justified by an (antiquated) custom*
3
Mahants, in general, do not command the same respect from the members of
4 5their sects which their predecessors used to do. Modern India does not
regard the mahants1 and shebaits' rights as sacrosanct. The fundamental
right of property was abolished for all Indians; mahants and shebaits were
1. The question of what is a religious purpose is considered in sec* 2 of the 
2nd chapter, above. Saraswati Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal AIR 1953 SC 491
is an important case on the subject. See above,pp;99“100, 110-113*
All purposes which are charitable under English law are also religious 
or charitable under Hindu law. But there are other purposes in addition 
which according to Hindu law are also valid as religious or charitable 
purposes. According to Hindu law acts of construction and maintenance 
of temples, tanks, gifts of food, places for drinking water, relief of 
the sick and promotion of education are religious or charitable purposes. 
These purposes are valid in the public*s interests. See Ramchandra v. 
Shree Mahadeoji AIR 1970 SC 4^8, 464. See above, p. 99*
2. See Sri Thakurrji Ramji v. Mathura Prasad AIR 1941 Pat 35^* supra, sec. 2 
of this chapter.
3. How can the public respect all mahants alike when some of them may act 
as drug-pedlars? See Mohant Kaushalya Das v. State of Madras AIR 1966 
SC 22 where the hereditary mahant of a Bairaghi math in Madras acted as 
a drug (ganja) pedlar.
4. "The public believes that mahants make good moneylenders and they perform
a function parallel to that of banks (no doubt under the advantage of 
their immunities from revenue demands)11 - Derrett, Critique, 386.
5. They were sanyasis in the real sense and vedantic philosophers - see 
generally Mukherjea, op.cit., 4th ed., 324.
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not excepted. In other words, the introduction of the Forty-fourth
Amendment Act, 1978 dissiezed the mahants as well as other non-religious
persons of their fundamental right of property.
We have seen that the mahant both as a religious leader and manager of
the math not excluding any debutter therewithin, has ample powers in using
the funds of the math. Because of the powers he can wield in the sect,
he is very difficult to be brought to book. Again, old methods of control
2
under the Civil Procedure Code are negative. Under the provisions of 
section 92 to bring any suit either for the protection of the math or 
debutter or for the removal of the mahant, persons interested in an endowment 
are to await a wrong already done to the math or debutter. Moreover, by the
time persons interested in the endowment can come to know about any wrongful
alienation by the mahant, or can sue to protect the endowment, an alienee*s 
title to the property might be perfected by the operation of the Law of 
Limitation! A vast amount of endowment funds has already gone into secular^ 
use and large sums will also go in future if in this field the law of
if
limitation is not abolished. Though the new methods, i.e. the provisions 
of the State statutes, place the responsibility of taking care of the 
endowments on a public body^ and have been successful to a great extent
1. For an effect of this amendment on the mahant's right of property see
the Kerala Statute as discussed in the previous section.
2. Derrett, **The Reform of Hindu.. .Endowments*' cited above, 328.
3. Derrett, ibid., p. 329*
J+. The Hindu Religious Endowments Commission also suggests (see the 
Report of the Hindu Religious Endowments Commission, op.cit., 182) 
that "there should be no limitation in respect of proceedings to 
recover or to follow up and obtain an account of the proceeds of 
the institution in the hands of alienees." This view has been 
incorporated in sec. 109 of the Madras Hindu Religious and 
Charitable Endowments Act, 1959* Derrett, ibid., p. 332.
5. Derrett, ibid., p. 329*
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in making use of trusts' funds for genuine charitable purposes,
the different statutes themselves have not yet reached their final 
shaped
Now, we have already suggested in section 5 that a central law should
be introduced covering endowments of different communities. There
should not be so many hindrances in Parliament's way to introduce such
a statute. The Commission of Hindu Religious Endowments very clearly
held the view that "there is no insuperable difficulty or complication
in enacting a uniform" legislation incorporating many provisions of the
2
Religious Trusts Bill, I960, which provided inter alia that the trusts 
with the jurisdiction of the Commissioner must be properly administered 
and the income thereof duly used and applied to the purposes of such 
trusts.^
The aforesaid Commission pointed out that every religious institution
6hould utilise its surplus money inter alia for liberal education in the
4
ideals and faith which have found expression in such an institution.
It also suggested that there should be a pool -for the surpluses’of different
institutions which may be utilised in opening centres of institutions in
different parts of India on the lines of the theological universities of
5
the West. These suggestions seem to be impractical in the context of
Hindu society. Hindus are not Christians and mahants are not bishops. 
Moreover, temples and maths are not churches. Instead of utilising 
surpluses for religious degrees of the universities to be established on 
the analogy of the West they can be used of course for religious training 
in traditional Hindu schools or for any training to uplift the moral
1. Derrett, IMHL, 517*
2. For the text of the Bill see Appendix^II E.
p.74.
J. "The Report of the Hindu...Endowments-Commission" cited-above,31. 4‘.Ibia.,/
5* See Derrett's extensive comments on these suggestions at p. 332 of "The 
Reform of the Hindu Religious Endowments..." cited above, and at p.507 
of his RLSI. His comments may be read as not favourable to the 
Commiss ion's suggestions.
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standard of a mahant, so that the respect of the public in the institution
of the mahantship can be restored, or far temple or math repairs, purposes
of the visitors or pilgrims, etc. But what about their use for the needs
of all communities as a whole? If the act of dedication in every Hindu
religious endowment, private or public, is for jagathitSya or for the
benefit of the world, then there should not be any objection from Hindu
institutions in allowing their surpluses to be spent for all Indians alike,
i.e. for the social needs of India.
The existing custom in relation to hereditary or other successions to
the office of a mahant must be observed and no regularity can be imposed
2
either on this or that math. But if a math is used mainly as a money- 
lending institution the State may interfere and dissolve it,^ unless a 
scheme can be formed securing both the purposes of the sect and the maintenance 
of a going concern under the entrepreneurial leadership of a competent mahant• 
There must not be any place for any illusory religious institutions with 
an endowment attached to it which may exist only to evade the general law 
and where under cover of religion a so-called mahant or mahants foist 
things on the public in their nominal interest which are really at their 
expense. It is suggested that a statute may be introduced with the effect 
that illusory endowments made chiefly for secular purposes may be approp- 
riated by the state. In the context of genuine religious endowments
1. Derrett, Critique, 377*
2. "Obviously the existing customs relating to hereditary and other 
successions to mahantship must be observed. The usual criterion of 
custom will serve well enough here. No regularity can be imposed upon 
this, any more than it can be imposed on mutts themselves" - Derrett, 
ibid., p. 385»
3. Derrett, ibid., p. 385*
4. If the mahant uses "a mutt...chiefly as a money-lending business the State
can interfere and 6ay, "Either occupy yourselves with religious matters
or we shall dissolve you". This threat is to appropriate the property by
statute, which is quite possible if the Supreme Court pursues its policy
of not recognising as religious and (so protected by the Constitution) 
purely secular activities connected with a religious institution not 
essential for the religious purposes of that institution" - Derrett,
ibid., pp.. 385-6.
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founded for carrying out pious intentions only, it may be said that 
if any profit accrues personally to individuals, mahants or shebaits 
whilst carrying out those intentions they must be taxed on it like other 
earners.
hZZ
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS
The Constitution of India does not discourage, in any of its 
provisions, religious activities other than those associated with 
Untouchability, neither does it encourage any one religion in preference 
to others. Art. 25 of the Constitution provides freedom of religion to 
every individual but a proper examination of the article reveals that 
it does not give so much importance to the right to freedom of religion 
as to the two secular aspects of 'social welfare' and 'reform'.
But no reform is possible by the introduction of statutes alone, 
unless the Courts interpret statutes liberally, if necessary, reviewing the 
precedents faithfully but keeping the needs of the country in view.
The needs of modern India come first. In the Hindu community the caste 
system is (as is generally agreed) an evil which must (in course of time) 
be abolished and in this respect the Courts must play a positive role, 
not ignoring those issues which are purely caste questions. The traditional 
view that the Courts will not interfere in any caste questions unless 
they are involved with property rights of individuals (cf.. the construction 
of CiviL Procedure Code, sec. 9 as amended) must be, if not actually 
abandoned, then most strictly construed, and the fundamental right given 
to castes to excommunicate at will any of their members, being irrecon­
cilable with the needs of the society, must no longer be held unconditionally 
valid. Indeed the attempt to abolish excommunication in Bombay cannot be 
regarded as an utter failure, and the Protection of Civil Rights Act 
(formerly the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955)as amended in 1976
1. See Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 
SC 853* See also Derrett's comments on the judgement of the Supreme 
Court, RLSI, V75-V76.
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entrenches upon it in sec. 7 (2).
Nevertheless the religious aspirations of the public and any section 
thereof are entitled to protection - including constructive and 
imaginative protection - from the Courts. The British administration, 
true to a long-lasting policy, tended to be supine and to let sleeping 
dogs lie.
Now the pre-British king was not so much concerned with the express 
intention of the founder of a religious endowment as with its use for 
worship by pious subjects. Even as late as the nineteenth century, the 
Hindu kings of Cochin and Madras used to perform their religious obligations 
through Smartha vicara (Smartha enquiry). As the Constitution of India 
is not anti-religious, it must accept some responsibility to protect and 
maintain Hindu religious endowments, not least Hindu private religious 
trusts which have not yet been the subject of any committee set up by 
any Central or State Government to divine the problems and suggest 
remedies therefor.
Many statutes are already serving as machinery for supervising and 
controlling Hindu public religious endowments in different provinces in 
India but not a single statute has yet been introduced in any state to 
control the evident malpractices and maladministration of managers of 
private Hindu religious endowments. The amount of what is, in effect, 
the Nation's wealth involved in private endowments is no less than that 
involved in public religious trusts; thus, urgent reform is needed in 
the field of private religious endowments.
In the states where private endowments are common a Government 
department should be set up to keep a record of all private endowments 
and to observe the way they work. Such an initiative has been taken
1. Subsection 2 of sec. 7 provides inter alia that any person denying to 
anyone of his community, any right or privilege to which that person 
is entitled, or who takes part in the excommunication of such a person 
arising from refusal to practise "untouchability" or pursuance of actions 
in furtherance of the objects of this Act, shall be punished with 
imprisonment or fine or both.
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regarding Muslim wakfs. The duty of the State is to protect genuine 
Hindu private religious endowments, real debutters, but that does 
not mean it is obliged to protect nominal debutters or bogus dedications. 
Bogus dedications masquerading as Hindu private religious endowments 
must be discouraged as illusory trusts. They have no right to exist in 
any society under the mask of religion only to satisfy shebaits* and 
their families' material needs. As long as a private religious endowment 
is used for religious purposes it is for universal benefit (jagat-hitaya) 
and so it can claim a place in Hindu society. It is gratifying to find 
that it can claim the protection of the Constitution which, by the Supreme 
Court's consistent interpretation,protects religion but neither superstition 
nor secular activities masquerading as religions.
Genuine religious endowments are to be protected by the State but that 
does not reflect in any way on the duty of every endowment to contribute, 
by paying taxes, to the needs of the Country. The deity may be a juristic 
person; it is established that he/she/it is not immune from income-tax!
In the case of a private endowment only the surplus income after expenditure 
for the religious purposes of the endowment is assessable to tax and the 
same principle should surely be followed in the case of a public endowment.
However, with its vast population, India cannot afford to allow areas 
of land to be locked up as debutter free from rules against perpetuity.
So, in the construction of wills the Courts should regularly incline against 
holding endowments as absolute debutter, because India needs mobility of 
capital and accessibility of land to fulfil its social purposes. The 
social needs of the Country must come first.
The present classification of temples into private and public is not 
satisfactory. The existing law does not make any distinction between a 
private temple founded for the spiritual welfare of the founder which 
allows members of the public to enter it for worship and a private temple
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established by an individual or a family mainly to receive income out 
of the offerings of visitors who are allowed to enter it. One would 
welcome a reform of law to the effect that the mere fact that the members 
of the public are allowed to enter a temple will not characterise a temple 
as public but the fact of the public entering will change the character 
of the temple if it is used by a family or limited proprietors or impropri­
ators to earn income out of public offerings.
So far as Hindu religious endowments are concerned, it is (no doubt) of 
the greatest importance to remember that the mahant or the shebait is not 
a bare trustee or a mere manager. The legal position of this functionary 
is sui generis; he is not a legal owner in the sense that he cannot alienate 
either debutter or a math property permanently without legal necessity but 
it is he who enjoys almost the same advantages as those of a full owner.
An idol or a math can own legally but it itself cannot enjoy any profits 
of the property it owns. It is plainly absurd to pretend otherwise. In 
so far as a shebaiti is concerned, the remedy is not to abolish the 
institution but to bring in the account book. A remedy to prevent a 
shebait misusing debutter funds, especially those of a private endowment, 
must be worked out. Our study strongly suggests that a mere suit to remove 
him and to frame a ’scheme1 is not adequate for the country's needs.
A shebait or a mahant is at present the effective beneficiary of a Hindu 
religious endowment. In the context of the shebait's ownership along with 
the deity in the debutter it may be suggested, in order to overcome the 
problems concerning shebaiti as property vis-a-vis the ownership of an 
idol as a juristic person, that the shebait or shebaits jointly own the 
assets subject to a trust which the Court must supervise when asked to do 
so by an interested person suing in the name of the idol and for its welfare. 
The same remedy would be suitable for a mahant or a manager of any Hindu 
religious endowment. This would amount to an admission that India knows
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the distinction between‘legal and equitable estates which she has steadily 
refused to face since the introduction of English jurisprudence to India, 
let it may provide a solution.
For the effective administration of debutter the rule that all the 
co-shebaits must join together to make any alienation of debutter property 
must be abandoned in favour of a new rule to the effect that, whether in 
a case of legal necessity or for the deity's benefit, when a managing 
shebait has the consent of the majority of competent shebaits to make an 
alienation, he should be entitled to make it. The old law concerning a 
widow's right to adopt in Madras may be taken as a suitable analogy; 
according to that law the want of consent of some saplndas could be 
ignored."'
It is suggested that if the benefit of the endowment or the necessity 
of the deity or the preservation of the debutter or math property is of 
paramount importance, and if the debutter can be alienated because of 
unavoidable circumstances by way of sale, mortgage, or permanent lease, 
then it is imperative that for the necessity of the deity or of a math 
there should be no bar to the shebait's or the mahant's alienating a 
portion of the endowed property to meet any legal necessity to borrow 
money, and to execute a promissory note if that is more reasonable.
Yet this alone is not enough.
In so far as a Hindu religious1 endowment is concerned, a shebait's 
or a mahant's power of alienation exists at present for defensive measures. 
The view that the principle of 'the benefit of the estate' is not limited 
to transactions of a defensive character, as in the case of a manager of 
a joint Hindu family, cannot at present be applied to a case of a mahant 
of a math or a shebait of a debutter. Debutter or math property is not
1. T. Naidu v. K. Naidu AIR 1970 SC 1673 < 1679 C. S.V. Sharma v. Ramalak- 
shamma AIR 1972 AP 270, 273-271*. On this point see above, sec. 7 of 
the- 5th chapter.
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regarded or accepted as a business. As.long as the deity's property 
is not in danger of extinction a shebait is not yet allowed to 
alienate any debutter, and his transactions with the debutter must be 
of a defensive character. The same principle is in theory applied to 
maths. The shebait is not entitled to speculate as a businessman or 
even to act as a prudent manager of a joint Hindu family property with 
the sale proceeds of an alienated math or debutter property. A more 
imaginative and realistic definition of the.incumbent1s powers is called 
for in the public interest.
So far as the endowed properties belonging either to the deity or to 
maths are concerned, a law must be made to the effect that an acquirer 
of a debutter or a math property by adverse possession will not gain a 
valid title of ownership by the lapse of a certain period as provided 
in the Law of Limitation. The law must incorporate the ancient rule 
that God's property (or, we should say, charity assets) can never be 
acquired by lapse of time. Yet even this is, in our submission, not 
enough.
If a shebait does not discharge his duties properly he should be served 
with a writ analogous to mandamus to carry out the purposes of the endowment 
by which he is appointed. It is not sufficient that his powers should be 
widened: he should be compellable to use them. The law must emerge to
the effect that the Court can be moved by a petitioner to make a delinquent 
shebait or shebaits of an endowment, private or public, perform their 
duty not merely of protecting the endowment against encroachment of any 
kind, but also of anticipating calamities and opportunities.
In so far as private religious endowments are concerned the present 
uncertainty regarding the question as to who can sue on behalf of the 
deity must be settled by an appropriate reform. The new rule should 
incorporate the principle that any person, whether a member of the family
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or a stranger who has a continued interest in the family endowment, 
may be entitled to sue on behalf of the deity, in order to protect 
its interests without the prior permission of the Court. One is aware 
of the enormous delays attending litigation in territories where 
debutters are common. The Court should apply its mind less to the locus 
standi of an applicant than to the substance of the complaint.
Finally, as a relatively minor recommendation, it is suggested that 
the Court must widen its jurisdiction to entertain bequests such as 
bequests for dharma, general bequests to God or bequests for raising 
samaahis and making worship thereat. As these bequests are believed by 
some Hindus to have religious merit, they must be held valid. The Court's 
jurisdiction to decide what is not religion has, in our submission, been 
abused in the past.
Now, considering the extent of the Nation’s wealth involved in religious 
endowments belonging not only to the Hindu community but also to non-Hindu 
communities, it is suggested that a comprehensive Central law should be 
introduced without delay to control and regulate them. An urgent treatment 
of the problems of endowments is needed to satisfy the social needs of 
the present State of India. The abolition of the former constitutional 
protection of the fundamental right of property has opened the door to 
comprehensive and imaginative reforms, which ought surely not be confined 
to one community.
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APPENDIX I
YAJAMANA-VRITTI, SHISHYA-SANCHARAK AND OTHER RIGHTS RELATED .TO 
PRIESTLY OFFICE. -
The question whether yajamana-vritti (priestly occupation) or an
analogous right e.g. shishya-sancharam (initiating shishyas (pupils))
is a right cognizable by a civil Court is a controversial issue. Both
the Madras and the Andhra High Courts are of the opinion that such rights
are not legal rights which can be enforced in a civil Court. The High
Court of Bombay is always consistent in holding the view that yajamana-
vritti is a nibandha, being analogous to immovable property. But the
rest of the High Courts do not seem to show consistency in their view on
the point at issue.
Before we go into the details of the subject of yajamana-vritti it may
2
be pointed out that the view held in different decisions that the 
performance of spiritual duties is neither a right nor an office unless 
it is attached to an institution is now obsolete because of the provision 
in Explanation II of section 9 of the present Civil Procedure Code.^
According to the said Explanation a right to an office, in order to be 
enforced in a civil Court, need not necessarily be the right to an office
attached to a particular place. So the view of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court relating to the right to perform spiritual duties as held in
1. See Derrett’s Critique, Appendix I, 401 ff, where in the context of 
his critique of Tiruvenkatachariar1s case, AIR 1969 AP 303 (FB), he 
elaborately discusses the subject in question and points out (at p.417) 
that i♦shishya-sancharam ... is heritable, and partible family property. 11
2. Tholappala Charlu v. Venkata Charlu ILR (1896) 19 Mad 62, 64; Chunnu
Datt Vyas v. Babu Nandan ILR (1910) 32 All 527, 539; Saripaka China
Mahadeva v. M. Surjyaprakasam (1914) MWN 379, 380-381; Sri Bhashyam 
Konayamma v. Sri Bteshyam Ramaswami AIR 1928 Mad 851, 852;Tiruvenkatachariar 
v. Andalamma AIR 19'69 AP 303 C-FB), 31*f.
3. For the text of section 9 see below, Appendix II B.
430
Tiruvenkatachariar v. Andalamma  ^which may be taken as the representative 
of the view expressed in various decisions of different High Courts that 
the performance of spiritual duties is not a legal right unless attached
to an institution, is no longer valid. In that case the main issue was whether
2
avocation of shishya-sancharam was a justiciable right and Vaidya, J. spoke
for the High Court that
”the performance of spiritual duties, even though it may be 
hereditary, is neither a right nor an office unless it is 
attached to a temple or an institution; nor is it property; 
and is not enforceable in any Civil Court.”
Reverting to the issue whether yajamana-vritti or an analogous right
is a legal right, and the divergence of opinion held about it by the different
High Courts in their various decisions, let us first discuss the cases in
which the High Courts held such a right to be not a legal right. In Sri
if
Bhashyam Konayamma v. Sri Bhashyam Ramaswami the widow of a guru claimed
her share of offerings (shishyadayam) made by joint disciples of her late
husband and his brother, and the Madras High Court held that a suit to
recover a share of offerings made by disciples to their gurus could not be
sued for in a civil Court when the existence of any office relating to
5
voluntary offerings had not been established. This decision in effect 
laid down the law that shishya-sancharam was not a legal right.
In Sarwar Lai v. Ram Narayan  ^the main issue to be decided by the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court was whether a right to priestly dues or voluntary
offerings of yajamanas for performance of funeral rites or ceremonies was
a legal right and the High Court held that Maha-brahmana-vritti was neither
1. AIR 1969 AP 303 (FB).
2. It consists ”in visits to villages and initiating uninitiated members
of the sect, giving instruction, and collecting offerings...” - Derrett, 
"Brit Jajmani and Cultural Continuity” (1972) A U  Jn3 ., xlv-xlvi, xlv.
3. AIR 1969 AP 303 (FB) 314. 4. AIR 1928 Mad 851.
5* Ibid., p. 852.
6. AIR 1959 AP 307 = (1958) 2 An WR 433-
an office nor a civil right nor does it constitute property. In
2
Tiruvenkatachariar v. Andalamma it was held that when gurus received
presents from their disciples those earnings were their separate property
and could not be partitioned, but, as in the instant case the earnings had
been mergedvith the joint-family property, the plaintiff who demanded
partition was allowed her share of them. ”The ultimate result, that she
was entitled to a share, could not be objected to ... But the treatment
of the institution known as shishya-sancharam is altogether unrealistic,
though founded (to all appearances) upon the unexceptionable Anglo-Indian
jurisprudence which was presented to the court with seeming elaboration.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court analysed and cited cases on rights relating
to yajamana-vritti, Maha-Brahmana-vritti, and analogous rights and came to
the conclusion that shishya-sancharam is neither a heritable nor a partible 
k
property. In support of its conclusion the Full Bench referred inter alia 
to cases in which the point of determination was not the nature of the right 
to priestly dues but, rather, in those cases the main issue to be decided 
was the monopoly of the priests to give spiritual ministrations. One of
the cases referred to by the Full Bench was Gour Moni Devi v. Chairman of
5
Panihati Municipality where a Hindu Brahmin lady filed the suit to officiate 
at the cremation of all dead bodies brought to a burning ground and the main
issue to be decided by the Calcutta High Court was the monopoly of the
priests performing funeral rites. The case of Saripaka China Mahadeva v. 
Muthura Suryaprakasam^ where the plaintiffs claimed the purohitship of 
all villages in a zemindary was also concerned with the monopoly issue, as 
was the Calcutta case. Similarly the Full Bench decision of the Hyderabad
1. AIR 1959 AP307, 509-
2. AIR 1969 AP 303 (FB).
3. Derrett, Critique, Appendix I,.*f02. 
k. AIR 1969 AP 303 (FB), 317*
5. (1909-1910) 1** OWN 1057.
6. AIR 1915 Mad 597 = (191*0 26 MLJ **82.
hj,2
1
High Court in Gopal Rag v. War Nisi was a judgement relating to the 
monopoly issue, i.e. the right of a purohit to perform religious duties 
to the exclusion of others. The said three cases have not much relevance 
to considerations of shishya-sancharam; nevertheless,it was pointed out 
in effect in the decisions of those cases that yajamana-vritti or other 
similar priestly rights were not of legal character. But the most relevant
citation of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was the case
2
of Sri Bhashyam Konayamma v. Sri Bhashyam Ramaswami in which it was held 
that a suit for a share of shishya-sancharam would not lie. On the other 
hand the Full Bench cited inter alia cases^ in which it was upheld that 
yajamana-vritti was a legal right constituting property. That yajamana- 
vritti is a legal right, nibandha, analogous to immovable property, is a
if
consistent view held in the different decisions of the Bombay High Court
which the Andhra Pradesh High Court refused to accept in its Full Bench
decision. "Their long review of cases on the yajamana-vritti and closely
analogous rights reveals that their lordships in Andhra Pradesh could not
be persuaded that such relationships were equal to "property". To this
one may object that what was claimed for shishya-sancharam was only analogous
to yajamana-vritti, and that if it was adequately proved as a custom it
deserved to be treated seriously in its own right and irrespective of the
5
fluctuating and unsettled fates of similar or analogous institutions."*^  
Unlike the Madras and the Andhra Pradesh High Courts the Bombay High 
Court consistently held that yajamana-vritti was analogous to immovable 
property. In Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat  ^where the plaintiff suedt©
1. AIR 1953 Hyd 1 (FB).
2. AIR 1928 Mad 851.
3. For example Sarda Kunwar v. Gajanand AIR 19^2 All 320; Gur Prasad
v. Gur Prasad AIR 19^ Ough 321.
k. For example, Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat ILR (1869) 6 BHCR 137; :
Balvantrav v. Purshotam Siddheswar ILR (1872) 9 BHCR 99 .(FB).
5. Derrett, Critique, Appendix I, k0$, 6. (1869) 6 BHCR 137.
^33
establish his right to officiate as a priest and to share the proceeds 
of the ceremonies, Couch, C.J. observed for the Bombay High Court that
though the office of a priest was ”an incorporeal hereditament of a
1 2 personal nature”, it was ranked with immovable property by Hindu custom.
Likewise the Oudh High Court held in Gaya Din v. Gur Din, where the
parties were Maha-brahmanas, that yajamana-vritti was immovable property.
Following Sukh Lai v. Bishambhar the Court also held that Maha-brahmana-
5
vritti was immovable and partible property.
In Bhurthu v. Bhusan Prasad  ^where the only point for determination was 
whether the priesthood belonging to the family in question was capable of 
being partitioned, the Nagpur High Court held that under Hindu law the 
hereditary priesthood was regarded as immovable and partible property.
7
In Ghisibai v. Mangilal where the suit was brought for a declaration 
regarding the share of income derived from the yajamana-vritti the Madhya 
Bharat High Court discussed the distinction between Mana-vritti and yajamana- 
vritti and held that in the case of Mana-vritti the relation between a 
yaiamana and the priest (purohit) was casual and as such Mana-vritti was 
a casual property, but yajamana-vri11i created a permanent relation, and
g
was regarded as a heritable property.
The Allahabad High Court in its many decisions held that yajamana-vritti
9 10was a heritable property. In Sarda Kunwar v. Gajanand, a case where the
dispute was concerned with rights in respect of yajamana-vritti or Brit
Jajmani of Gangaputras or Hindu priests who ministered to pilgrims visiting
pilgrimage sites on the banks of the Ganges, receiving offerings from them,
Das, J. observed for the High Court of Allahabad that ”Birt Jajmani right
11is a heritable property and in some cases transferable....”
1. (1869) 6 BHCR 137, 139. 2» » P* 139.
3. AIR 1929 Oudh 257. ILR (1917) 39 All 196.
3. AIR 1929 Oudh 257, 262. 6. AIR 195*+ Nag 307.
7. AIR 1953 Madh. Bha 7. 8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Sukh Lai v. Bishambhar AIR 1917 All 115=ILR( 1917)39 All 196; Ram Chandar v. 
Chhabbu Lai AIR 1923 All 350; Sarda Kunwar v. Gajanand AIR 19 2^ All 320; 
Sidhe Nath v. Prem Club AIR 1972 All 32^ which is discussed in detail below.
10 AIR 19^2 All 320. 11. Ibid., p. 322.
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1
In Raghoo Pandey v. Kassy Parey where the suit was filed for
redemption of certain shares of a right to officiate as priest at
funeral ceremonies the Calcutta High Court held that the right in
question was in the nature of immovable property. The same High Court
2in Narayan Lai v. Chunhan Lai held that presents made by pilgrims were 
presumed to be the personal property of the priest but the members of the 
family might agree amongst themselves that whatever anyone of them might 
earn as officiating as a priest was to be kept in a common fund and divided 
among them in certain proportions; "thus the books containing the pilgrims* 
names, etc., are partible property."^ It is submitted that the said common 
find to be divided in certain proportions was in reality the partible joint- 
family property.
4In Sidhe Nath v. Prem Club the defendant club intended to promote 
healthy sports including swimming on the bank of the Ganges at Kanpur, and 
at the same place some Gangaputras practised as religious preceptors to 
pilgrims by performing certain religious ceremonies at the edge of the 
Ganges. The reliefs claimed by the Gangaputras were, inter alia, to 
restrain the club from interfering with their exercise of Brit Jajmani 
rights over the land in dispute. But the lessee, the Prem Club, took the 
land clear of any right due to the action of the Uttar Pradesh Government 
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. But in the present context what is 
of relevance in the judgement is the fact that obiter Mr. Justice Shukla 
considered the nature of the right to be as claimed by the Gangaputras.
In determining the right of the Gangaputras the High Court of Allahabad 
gave careful consideration to the arguments relating to the distinction 
between Brit Jajmani and Man Brit rights, and held that so long as the 
Gangaputras maintained more than casual contact with their yajamanas
1. ILR (1884) 10 Cal 73- 2. (1912) 15 CLJ 376.
3. Derrett, Critique, Appendix I, 411.
4. AIR 1972 All 324.
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(pilgrims) they had a Brit Jajmani right which was heritable and alienable
property. The Court held the right of the Gangaputras as Brit Jajmani right.
It showed the difference between Brit Jajmani and Man Brit, and to this
2effect cited with approval Sarda Kunwar v. Gajanand and Ghisibai v. 
Mangilal,^ in which cases it was held that in the case of Man Brit the 
relationship between a yajamana and purohit was of casual nature whereas 
Brit Jajmani or yajamana-vritti created a permanent relationship between 
yajamanas and a purohit which was a heritable and partible right. The Court 
pointed out that Man Brit was not a right to be enforced legally but it 
held that
”it is well established that the right of Brit Jajmani is a 
right in the property. It is heritable and in some cases 
even transferable and therefore legally enforceable.”^
Now the view of the Andhra Pradesh and the Madras High Courts regarding
the nature of the rights involved in yajamana-vritti and shishya-sancharam,
5
as reflected in the decision in Tiruvenkatachariar1s case, that such
rights are not legal rights, is no longer true because of the decision of
the Supreme Court in Ram Rattan v. Bajrang Lal^ on the question whether the
hereditary office of a shebait was immovable. This point we have already
discussed in section k of the fourth chapter where we have seen that the
Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, i.e. the hereditary
office of a shebait was an immovable property. But what is of interest in
the Supreme Court decision is that in deciding the said issue the Court
7
cited with approval inter alia the cases where yajamana-vritti was held
1. ”In sum, a truly Indian institution was received happily into Indian law. 
Whether the right could be founded on agreement (with an unidentified 
number of people!), a lost grant (by an unidentified sovereign!), usage 
(again as between unidentified and even unidentifiable groups), or custom 
(with unenforceable conditions!) did not matter” - Derrett, ”Brit Jajmani 
and Cultural Continuity”, op.cit., xlvi.
2. AIR 19^2 All 320. 3- AIR 1933 Madh Bha 7.
4. AIR 1972 All 32^ , 327. 5- AIR 1969 AP 303 (FB).
6. AIR 1978 SC 1393,1397. 7. Ibid., p. 1396.
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to be immovable property. It accepted the view of the nature of the
right involved in yajamana-vritti as expressed in Krishnabhat v. Kapabha^-and
2
Balvantrav v. Purshotam that such a right was a legal right constituting 
property. The Supreme Court first accepted that yajamana-vritti was 
immovable property and then concluded that as an analogous right to 
yajamana-vritti shebaiti was also immovable. So if yajamana-vri11i is 
accepted by the Supreme Court as a right constituting property then no 
one will argue that shishya-sancharam is not an analogous right to yajamana- 
vritti; the Andhra Pradesh High Court cited and discussed the cases on 
yajamana-vritti extensively only to arrive at its decision that shishya- 
sancharam was not a legal right. The Court would not cite those cases if 
it was in doubt that they were „ relevant to the determination of the 
issue of shishya-sancharam. But the decision of the Court is •ob­
solete. Following the Supreme Court decision it can be said that yajamana- 
vritti along with shishya-sancharam are legal rights constituting property, 
and, like shebaiti, they are heritable and partible.
1. (1869) 6 BHCR 137.’ ’
2. (1872) 9 BHCR. 99 (FB).
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APPENDIX II
STATUTES AND BILLS
A. The Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963)
PART VIII.-SUITS RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUST PROPERTY 
Description of suits Period of 
Limitation
Time from which period 
begins to run
92 To recover possession of 
immovable property conveyed 
or bequeathed in trust and 
afterwards transferred by 
the trustee for a valuable 
consideration.
93 To recover possession of 
movable property conveyed 
or bequeathed in trust and 
afterwards transferred by 
the trustee for a valuable 
consideration.
94 To set aside a transfer of 
immovable property com­
prised in a Hindu, Muslim 
or Buddhist religious or 
charitable endowment, made 
by a manager thereof for a 
valuable consideration.
93 To set aside a transfer of 
movable property comprised 
in a Hindu, Muslim or Budd­
hist religious or charitable 
endowment, made by a manager 
thereof for a valuable 
consideration.
Twelve
years
Three
years
Twelve
years
Three
years
When the transfer becomes 
known to the plaintiff.
When the transfer becomes 
known to the plaintiff.
When the transfer becomes 
known to the plaintiff.
When the transfer becomes 
known to the plaintiff.
Description of suits Period of Time from which period
Limitation begins to run
The date of death, 
resignation or removal 
of the transferor or the 
date of appointment of the 
plaintiff as manager of 
the endowment, whichever 
is later.
by a previous manager for 
a valuable consideration.
B. The Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Code of
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 10b of .1976).
9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred 
The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have 
jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which 
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
Explanation I - A suit in which the right to property or to an office
is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right 
may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or 
ceremonies.
Explanation II - For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial 
whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in
Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular
place.
92. Public charities
(1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust 
created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where 
the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of 
any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an 
interest in the trust and having obtained leave of the Court, may institute 
a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original 
jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the Local
96 By the manager of a Twelve
Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist years
religious or charitable 
endowment to recover 
possession of movable or 
immovable property com­
prised in the endowment 
which has been transferred
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Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or 
any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree -
a) removing any trustee;
b) appointing a new trustee;
c) vesting any property in trustee;
d) directing accounts and inquiries;
e) declaring what proportion of the trust-property or of the 
interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object 
of the trust;
f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust-property to be 
let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;
g) settling a scheme; or
h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the 
case may require.
(2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 18631 no suit 
claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted 
in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity 
with the provisions of that sub-section.
(3) The Court may alter the original purposes of an express or constructive 
trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and 
allow the property or income of such trust or any portion thereof to be 
applied c£ pres in one or more of the following circumstances, namely:-
(a) where the original purposes of the trust, in whole or in part,-
(i) have been, as far as may be fulfilled; or
(ii) cannot be carried out at all, or cannot be carried out according 
to the directions given in the instrument creating the trust or, where 
there is no such instrument, according to the spirit of the trust; or
(b) where the original purposes of the trust provide a use for a 
part only of the property available by virtue of the trust; or
(c) where the property available by virtue of the trust and other 
property applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in 
conjunction with, and to that end can suitably be made applicable to any 
other purpose, regard being had to the spirit of the trust and its applic­
ability to common purposes; or
(d) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, were laid down 
by reference to an area which then was, but has since ceased to be, a unit 
for such purposes; or
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(e) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, have, since 
they were laid down,-
(i) been adequately provided for by other means, or
(ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community, or
(iii) ceased to be, in law, charitable, or
(iv) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective
method of using the property available by virtue of the trust,
regard being had to the spirit of the trust.
C. The Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978 (Kerala Act 14 of 1978)
Chapter II 
THE COMMITTEE
3* Incorporation.- (1) The administration, control and management 
of the Devaswom shall be vested in a Committee constituted in the manner 
hereinafter provided.
(2) The Committee shall by the name of '‘the Guruvayoor Devaswom 
Managing Committee" be a body corporate and shall have perpetual succession 
and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued through the 
Administrator.
4. Composition of Committee.- (1) The Committee shall consist of 
the following members, namely:-
(a) the Zamotin Raja;
(b) the Karanavan for the time being of the Mallisseri Illom at
Guruvayoor;
(c) the Thanthri of the Temple, ex-officio;
(d) a representative of the employers of the Devaswom nominated by 
the Hindus among the Council of Ministers;
(e) not more than five persons, of whom one shall be a member of a
Scheduled Caste, nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers
from among persons having interest in the Temple.
(2) A person shall be disqualified from being nominated under 
clause (e) of sub-section (1), if-
(i) he believes in the practice of untouchability or does not profess 
the Hindu Religion or believe in temple worship; or
(ii) he is an employee under the Government or the Devaswom; or
(iii) he is below thirty years of age; or
(iv) he is engaged in any subsisting contract with the Devaswom; or
(v) he is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in 
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (3) of S 5«
(3) The members of the Committee shall, at its first meeting, 
elect one of its members as its Chairman.
(k) Every member of the Committee shall, before entering upon his 
office, make and subscribe in the presence of the Commissioner an oath in 
the following form, that is to say-
”1, A B, do 6wear in the name of God that I profess the Hindu Religion 
and believe in temple worship and that I do not believe in the practice of 
untouchability".
5* Term of office of non-official members, resignation and removal 
of such members and casual vacancies in their office.- (1) A member 
nominated under clause (d) or clause (e) of sub-section (1) of S. 4 shall 
hold office for a period of two years from the date of his nomination and 
shall be eligible for renomination.
D. The Payment of Rajabhogam to Thekkemadom Swamiyar Mathapram 
(Abolition) Act, 1980 (Kerala Act 15 of 1981)
An Act or provide for the extinguishment of the right of the Thekkemadom 
Swamiyar Mathapram to receive, and the liability of the landholders to pay, 
Rajabhogam, and for matters connected therewith.
Preamble:- WHEREAS it is necessary in the public interest to provide 
for the extinguishment of the right of the Thekkemadom Swamiyar Mathapram 
to receive, and the liability of the landholders to pay, Rajabhogam, and 
for matters connected therewith;
BE it enacted in the Thirty-first Year of the Republic of India as 
follows:-
1. Short title and commencement - (1) This Act may be called the 
Payment of Rajabhogam to Thekkemadom Swamiyar Mathapram (Abolition) Act,
1980.
(2) It shall come Into force on such date as the Government may, 
by notification in the Gazette, appoint.
2. Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:-
(a) "appointedday" means the day on which this Act comes into
force;
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(b) "landholder" means a person holding any sanketham lands 
and liable to pay Rajabhogam to the Mathapram;
(c) "Mathapram" means the Thekkemadom Swamiyar Mathapram at
Trichur;
(d) "Rajabhogam" means the assessment on the sanketham lands, 
payab.le to the Thekkemadom Swamiyar Mathapram, whether called Muppara
or Ettilonnu;
(e) "Sanketham lands" means the lands in the Manickamangalam 
village in the Alwaye Taluk of Ernakulam District, in respect of which 
Rajabhogam is payable to the Mathapram.
/thing
3* Abolition of Rajabhogam:- Notwithstanding any contained in 
any law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order 
of any court, or in any contract or other document with effect on and 
from the appointed day, -
(a) the right of the Mathapram to receive Rajabhogam shall 
stand extinguished; and
(b) the landholder shall have no liability to pay Rajabhogam 
to the Mathapram.
k. No compensation be payable,- Notwithstanding anything contained 
in any law for the time being in force, or in any contract or other document, 
no compensation shall be payable to the Mathapram for the extinguishment 
under S. 3 of the right of the Mathapram to receive Rajabhogam from the 
landholders.
5. Arrears of Rajabhogam,- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this Act, all arrears of Rajabhogam which accrued due before 
the appointed day or on behalf of the Mathapram in the same manner as they 
recoverable immediately before the appointed day.
6. Power to make rules,- (1) The Government may, by notification in 
the Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(2) Every rule made under this section shall be laid, as soon as 
may be, after it is made, before the Legislative Assembly while it is in 
session for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one 
session or in two successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the 
session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, the 
Legislative Assembly makes any modification in the rule or decides that 
the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only
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in such modified form or by of no effect, as the case may be; so 
however that any such modification or annulment shall be without 
prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that 
rule.
I
E. The Religious Trusts Bill, i960
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Preliminary
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Powers and Duties of the Commissioner
3. General powers and duties of Commissioner.
6. Application for registration of religious trusts.
7. Inquiries for registration.
8. Entries in register.
9. Amendment of register.
10. Special provision for religious trusts registered under any 
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11. Budgets of religious trusts.
12. Maintenance of accounts.
13. Investment of trust money.
1^ . Audit of accounts.
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f < In the light ‘of oar present investigation, ' it is *-■> ,
.. " if this B£L1 goes to the Statute Book in its present ±orm -t-J even 
solve the problems raised in this thesis. See thp • would not
^*ndations at pages^,. ^  conclusions and re-
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The Religious Trusts Bill, i960 
(As introduced in Lok Sabha)
A
BILL
to provide for the better supervision and administration 
of certain religious trusts.
Be it enacted by Parliament in the Eleventh Year of the Republic of
India as follows
CHAPTER I 
Preliminary
1. Short title, extent and commencement.- (1) This may be called the 
Religious Trusts Act, I960.
(2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir.
(3) It shall come into force in a State on such date as the State 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint,
2. Definitions,- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) ’’Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Religious Trusts appointed 
under sub-section (1) of section 3 and includes a deputy Commissioner or an 
assistant Commissioner appointed under sub-section (2) of that section;
(b) "manager”, in relation to a religious trust, means a person who, 
either alone or in association with any other person, administers or deals 
with the trust-property;
(c) "person interested", in relation to a religious trust, means -
(i) any person who has a right to worship or to perform any rite,
or to attend at the performance of any worship or rite in any religious 
institution connected with such trust, or to participate in any 
religious or charitable ministration made under such trust,
(ii) the founder or any descendant of the founder of such trust,
and
(iii) the trustee;
(d) ’prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act;
(e) "religious trust" means any express or constructive trust existing 
or created for public purposes of a religious nature, whether associated 
with purposes of a charitable nature or not, but does not include a 
private endowment for religious purposes in which the public are not 
interested;
(f) "trustee" means a person in whom either alone or in association 
with any other person the trust-property is vested, and includes a 
manager;
(g) "trust-property" means any movable or immovable property forming 
the subject matter of a religious trust.
CHAPTER II
The Commissioner and Other Authorities
3. Appointment of Commissioner and other authorities.- (1) The State 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a person 
to be the Commissioner of Religious Trusts for the State for exercising 
the powers conferred, and performing the duties imposed, on him by or under 
this Act.
(2) The State Government may also, by like notification, appoint as 
many deputy Commissioners or assistant Commissioners as it thinks fit, and 
every such deputy Commissioner or assistant Commissioner shall, subject to
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the general superintendence and control of the Commissioner, perform his 
functions within such local limits as may be specified in the notification; 
and in the discharge of these functions, a deputy Commissioner or an 
assistant Commissioner shall have and shall exercise the same powers as 
the Commissioner.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Commissioner 
under sub-section (1) unless he is, or has been, a district judge or is 
qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court.
*t. Advisory Board.- (1) The State Government may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, constitute an Advisory Board consisting of such number of 
members, not exceeding ten, as it thinks fit, to advise the State Government 
in relation to the administration of religious trusts.
(2) The members of the Advisory Board shall be chosen from amongst 
one or more of the following categories of persons, namely:-
(a) members of the State Legislature and members of Parliament
representing the State;
(b) persons connected with religious activities in the State;
(c) persons connected with social, charitable or educational
activities in the State; and
(d) persons having special knowledge of administration, finance or
law.
(3) The Commissioner shall be an ex officio member of the Advisory 
Board.
(*0 The State Government shall nominate a member of the Advisory Board 
to be the Chairman thereof.
(5) The number of persons to be appointed as members from each of the 
categories specified in sub-section (2), the functions of, the procedure to 
be followed in the discharge of their functions by, the term of office of, 
and the manner of filling casual vacancies among, the members of the Advisory 
Board shall be such as may be prescribed.
CHAPTER III
Powerg»and Duties of the Commissioner
5. General powers and duties of Commissioner.- (1) Subject to the provisions 
of this Act, the Commissioner may do all such things as may be reasonable and 
necessary to ensure that all religious trusts within his jurisdiction are 
properly administered and that the income thereof is duly appropriated and 
applied to the objects of such trusts and in accordance with the purposes for 
which such trusts were founded or for which they exist, so far as the objects
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and purposes can be ascertained.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub­
section (1), the powers and duties of the Commissioner shall be -
(a) to maintain a record containing full information relating 
to the origin, nature, extent, income and objects of all religious 
trusts in the State;
(b) to ensure that the accounts of religious trusts are properly 
maintained and audited;
(c) to ensure that the income from every trust property is 
properly applied to the objects of the religious trust and the 
surplus is invested in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(d) to give directions, wherever necessary, for the proper 
administration of any religious trust in accordance with the law 
governing such trust and the wishes of the founder, in so far as such 
wishes can be ascertained;
(e) to settle schemes of management for religious trusts in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(f) to perform the functions imposed on the Commissioner by or
under this Act;
(g) generally do all such acts as may be necessary for the proper 
supervision and better administration of religious trusts.
6. Application for registration of religious trusts.- (1) It shall be 
the duty of the trustee of every religious trust to make an application to 
the Commissioner for the registration of the trust.
(2) Such application shall be made in writing, in such form and manner, 
and accompanied by such fee, as may be prescribed and shall, as far as may
be, contain the following particulars, namely:-
(a) the designation by which the religious trust is or shall be 
known or the name of the trust;
(b) the names and addresses of the trustees and the manager;
(c) the mode of succession to the office of the trustee;
(d) the movable and immovable properties forming the subject 
matter of the trust and a description thereof sufficient for their 
identification;
(e) the approximate value of the movable and immovable trust- 
property ;
(f) the gross annual income from such property;
(g) an estimate of the expenses annually incurred in connection
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with such religious trust;
(h) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) Every application shall be accompanied by a copy of the trust 
deed or, if no such deed has been executed or a copy thereof cannot be 
obtained, the application shall contain full particulars, as far as they 
are known to the applicant, of the origin, nature and object of the trust.
(4) Every application under this section shall be signed and verified 
by the applicant in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, 
for the signing and verification of pleadings.
(5) The Commissioner may require the applicant to supply such further 
particulars or information relating to the trust as the Commissioner may 
consider necessary.
(6) Every application for registration shall be made -
(a) in the case of a religious trust existing at the commencement 
of this Act, within six months from such commencement; and
(b) in the case of a religious trust created after such commence­
ment, within six months from the date of the creation of the trust.
7. Inquiries for registration.- (1) On receipt of an application under 
section 6, the Commissioner shall, in the prescribed manner, make such 
inquiries as he thinks fit in respect of the application and the correctness 
of the particulars therein and may, in particular, make an inquiry in".respect 
of all or any of the following matters, namely:-
(a) whether there is a trust and whether such trust is a religious 
trust;
(b) whether any property is the property of such trust;
(c) whether the whole or any substantial portion of the trust-
property is situated within his jurisdiction;
(d) the names and addresses of the trustees and the manager;
(e) the mode of succession to the office of the trustee;
(f) the origin, nature and object of such trust;
(g) the gross average annual income and expenditure of the trust;
(h) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(2) If, on an application made to him by a person interested in a
religious trust or otherwise, the Commissioner has reasons to believe that 
there is any religious trust which should be registered under this Act, he
may make such inquiries as he thinks fit in respect of the matters mentioned
in sub-section (1), but no such inquiry shall be made without giving the 
trustees an opportunity of being heard.
(3) On the completion of an inquiry under this section, the Commissioner
/
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shall record his findings with reasons therefor in respect of the matters 
mentioned in sub-section (1), and make an order in relation to the religious 
trust.
8. Entries in register.- (1) The Commissioner shall maintain a register 
of religious trusts in such form and containing such particulars as may
be prescribed.
(2) When an order for the registration of a religious trust is made 
under section 7» the Commissioner shall cause entries in respect thereof 
to be made in the register in accordance with the findings recorded under 
that section.
9. Amendment of register.- (1) Where any change occurs in any of the 
entries recorded in the register maintained under section 8, the trustee 
shall, within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of such change, 
send a report to the Commissioner in the prescribed form giving notice of 
the change.
(2) On receipt of a report under sub-section (1) or otherwise,the 
Commissioner may hold an inquiry for ascertaining whether auiy change has 
occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register in relation to a 
religious trust.
(3) If the Commissioner, after holding such an inquiry, is satisfied 
that a change has occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register 
in relation to a religious trust, he may make an order to that effect and 
shall cause entries in the register in respect of that trust to be amended 
accordingly.
10. Special provision for religious trusts registered under any other 
enactment.- (1) Where any religious trust has been registered in a State 
before the commencement of this Act under any other enactment relating to 
trusts in force in that State, the religious trust shall be deemed to have 
been registered under this Act as from such commencement.
(2) The Commissioner shall issue a notice to the trustee of such a 
religious trust for the purpose of recording entries relating thereto in 
the register maintained under section 8 and the Commissioner may, after 
making such inquiry as he thinks fit, record his findings with reasons 
therefor in respect of the matters mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 7 
and make an order in relation to the trust and the provisions of sections 7 
and 8 shall, as far as may be, apply to such order.
11. Budgets of religious trusts.- (1) The trustee of every religious 
trust shall prepare every year, in such form and within such time as may 
be prescribed, a budget of the estimated income and expenditure of such
trust for the next financial year and shall forthwith send a copy thereof 
to the Commissioner:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to a religious 
trust having an annual income of less than five thousand rupees.
(2) The Commissioner may, after giving notice to the trustee in the 
prescribed manner and after considering his representation, if any, make 
such alterations or modifications in the budget as the Commissioner thinks 
fit.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (2) shall be deemed to authorise 
the Commissioner to restrict or prohibit the observance of any religious 
practice or the performance of any act in pursuance of any religious belief 
to alter or modify any budget in a manner or to an extent inconsistent with 
the wishes of the founder of the trust so far as such wishes can be ascertained 
or with the provisions of this Act.
12. Maintenance of accounts.- (1) The trustee of every religious trust 
shall keep regular accounts in such form and containing such particulars 
as may be prescribed.
(2) The accounts kept under sub-section (1) shall be balanced each year 
on the 31st day of March or such other day as may be fixed by the Commissioner 
in the case of any particular trust, having regard to the circumstances thereof.
(3) For the purpose of ensuring the proper maintenance of accounts of 
any religious trust, the Commissioner may, after consulting the trustees of 
the religious trust, appoint a person to keep accounts for the trust.
Provided that no such appointment shall be made in respect of a trust 
having an annual income of less than twenty-five thousand rupees.
13. Investment of trust money.- (1) Where the whole or any portion of the 
trust-property consists of money which cannot be applied immediately or at 
an early date to the purposes of the religious trust or where there is a 
surplus in the funds of the religious trust after meeting all lawful 
expenditure in connection with such trust, the trustee shall be bound, subject 
to any direction contained in the deed of trust, to invest the money or the 
surplus in the following securities and in no others, namely:-
(a) securities of the Central Government or State Government;
(b) stocks, shares or debentures of companies, the interest or 
dividend on which has been guaranteed by the Central Government or 
any State Government; and
(c) debentures or other securities for money issued by or on 
behalf of any local authority or corporation in exercise of the powers
conferred by any Central Act or any Provincial or State Act:
Provided that the Commissioner may, by general or special order,permit 
the trustee to invest the money or the surplus in any other manner consistent 
with the trust deed or purpose of the nsLigious trust.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect any investment made before 
the commencement of this Act.
14. Audit of accounts.- (1) The accounts of every religious trust having an 
annual income of not less than five thousand rupees shall be audited annually 
by an auditor to be appointed by the Commissioner, after consultation with 
the trustees, from among such chartered accountants within the meaning of 
the Chartered Accountants Act, 19^ 9* as have been approved in this behalf 
by the State Government.
(2) The auditor shall have access to the accounts, books, vouchers, 
documents and other records relating to such trust in the possession or 
control of the trustee and may, by written notice, require the attendance 
before him of any person responsible for the preparation of the accounts 
to enable him to obtain such information as he may consider necessary for 
the proper conduct of the audit.
(3) The auditor shall in his report specify all cases of irregular, 
illegal or improper expenditure or failure or omission to recover moneys
or other property belonging to the religious trust or of loss or waste of money 
or other property thereof and state whether such expenditure, failure, omission, 
loss or waste was caused in consequence of a breach of trust or misapplication 
of trust-property or any other misconduct on the part of the trustee or any 
other person.
(b) Within a month of the completion of the audit, the auditor shall 
prepare a report on the accounts.audited and shall submit the same to the 
Commissioner and deliver a copy thereof to the trustee concerned.
(5) The cost of the audit of the accounts shall be borne by the State 
Government.
13. Inspection and returns.- (1) The Commissioner or any officer authorised 
by him by a general or special order shall have power -
(a) to enter upon and inspect, or cause to be entered upon 
and inspected, any trust-property;
(b) to call for or inspect any book, records, correspondence, plans, 
accounts, or title deed relating to a religious trust in the possession 
or control of the trustee:
Provided that in entering upon any trust-property as aforesaid, reasonable 
notice shall be given to the trustee and due regard shall be had to the
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religious practices or usages, if any, of the trust.
(2) The trustees of every religious trust shall, within such time 
or such extended time as may be fixed by the Commissioner, furnish to 
him such returns, statistics, accounts or other information as the 
Commissions: may, from time to time, require.
16. Ahenation of immovable property.- No transfer by a trustee of any 
immovable property of a religious trust by way of sale, mortgage, gift 
or exchange or by way of lease for a term exceeding three years shall be 
valid, unless it is made with the previous sanction of the Commissioner:
Provided that no such sanction shall be given unless the Commissioner 
is of opinion that the transfer is necessary or beneficial to the religious 
trust.
17. Power to determine the object to which trust property shall be applied 
where the object has ceased to exist or is incapable of achievement.-
(1) Where on an application made in this behalf by two or more persons 
interested in a religious trust or otherwise, the Commissioner is of opinion 
that any object of the religious trust has ceased to exist or is incapable 
of achievement, he may, after issuing notice in the prescribed manner to 
the trustees of such trust and to such other persons as may appear to him 
to be interested therein, hold an inquiry into the matter and if after such 
inquiry, the Commissioner is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, he 
may, by order direct that the property or income of the trust or so much of 
the property or income thereof as was previously expended on or applied to 
that object, shall be applied to any other object which shall be similar 
or as nearly as practicable similar to the original object.
(2) In making an order under this section in relation to a religious 
trust, the Commissioner shall have due regard to the original intention of 
the founder of the trust or the object for which the religious trust was 
created and the wishes of the trustees or persons interested in the trust 
and no order shall be made directing the application of the trust-property 
or any income thereof to any purpose other than a religious purpose 
recognised by the religion to which the trust belongs.
18. Power of Commissioner to settle schemes for proper administration of 
religious trusts.- (1) Where on an application made in this behalf by 
two or more persons interested in a religious trust or otherwise, the 
Commissioner is of opinion that, in the interest of the proper administration 
of the religious trust, a scheme should be settled for it, the Commissioner 
may, after issuing notice in the prescribed manner to the trustee of such 
trust and to such other persons as may appear to the Commissioner to be
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interested therein, hold an inquiry into the matter in the prescribed 
manner and if, after such inquiry, the Commissioner is satisfied that 
it is necessary or desirable so to do, he may, by order, settle a scheme 
for the administration of the religious trust.
(2) The Commissioner may also, in like manner and subject to the 
like conditions, modify any scheme settled under this section or under 
any other law or substitute another scheme in its stead.
(3) Every scheme settled, modified or substituted under this section 
shall be in accordance with the law governing the trust and shall not be 
contrary to the wishes of the founder of the trust, so far as such wishes 
can be ascertained.
19. Power of Commissioner when trusts are mismanaged.- (1) Where on 
receipt of any report of the auditor in respect of a religious trust or on 
an application made in this behalf by two or more persons interested in the 
trust or otherwise, the Commissioner has reasons to believe that the affairs 
of. the religious trusts are being mismanaged or that the trustee is neglecting 
or failing to discharge the obligations imposed on him by the deed of trust, 
the Commissioner may, after issuing notice in the prescribed manner to the 
trustee of such trust and to such other persons as may appear to the 
Commissioner to be interested therein, hold an inquiry into the matter in 
such manner as may be prescribed.
(2) If after holding such an inquiry, the Commissioner is satisfied -
(a) that the trustee has neglected or failed to discharge the 
obligations imposed on him by the deed or trust or that the affairs 
of the religious trusts have not been managed in accordance with the 
terms of the trust, or have otherwise been mismanaged, or
(b) that any trustee is guilty of misappropriation of trust 
property,
the Commissioner may, without prejudice to any other action that may be taken 
against the trustee, make an order giving directions to the trustee for the 
discharge of the obligations imposed on him by the deed of trust or for the 
proper management of the trust, or removing the trustee from his office, or 
directing the trustee to pay to the trust fund such amount not exceeding 
the amount of loss caused to the trust as the Commissioner thinks fit.
20. Power to remove trustees in certain other circumstances.- Notwithstanding 
anything contained in the deed of a religious trust, the Commissioner may, 
after issuing notice in the prescribed manner to the trustee of such trust
and holding such inquiry as he thinks fit, by order remove the trustee from 
his office, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the trustee -
s:
k$k
(a) has been convicted more than once of an offence punishable 
under this Act; or
(b) has been convicted of an offence of criminal breach of trust
or any other offence involving moral turpitude.
21. Power to appoint trustee when vacancy occurs.- (1) Where there is 
a vacancy in the office of trustee of a religious trust and there is no 
one competent to be appointed as trustee under the terms of the deed of 
such trust or where there is a bona fide dispute as to the right of any 
person to act as trustee or where there is a vacancy caused by the removal 
of the trustee under section 19 or section 20, the Commissioner may, after 
issuiing notice in the prescribed manner to such person as appears to him to
be interested in the trust and holding such inquiry as he thinks fit, appoint 
a new trustee to fill the vacancy, wherever possible, in accordance with the 
terms of the trust deed or custom or usage relating to such matter.
(2) In appointing a trustee under sub-section (1), the Commissioner 
shall, as far as possible, select a person of the religious denomination or
section to which the trust belongs.
(3) When a trustee has been removed from his office by an order made 
under section 19 or section 20, the Commissioner may direct the trustee to 
deliver possession of trust-property to the new trustee or where the new 
trustee has not been appointed, to any person authorised by the Commissioner 
in this behalf pending such appointment.
CHAPTER IV 
Miscellaneous
22. Procedure and powers at inquiries under the Act.- (1) Subject to 
any rules that may be made under this Act, every inquiry made thereunder 
shall be held as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable 
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits.
(2) The Commissioner shall, for the purpose of holding an inquiry under 
this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following 
matters, namely:-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person 
and examining him on oath:
(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document;
(c) the reception of evidence on affidavits;
(d) requisitioning any public record from any court or office;
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(e) issuing any commission for the examination of witnesses;
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed.
23. Appeals.- An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order
of the Commissioner made under this Act within a period of sixty days from 
the date of the order:
Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry
of the said period, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
24. Trustee to carry out orders of Commissioner and execution of such orders.-
(1) Every trustee shall carry out all directions which may from time to time 
be issued to him by the Commissioner under any of the provisions of this Act.
(2) An order made under this Act shall, on an application made in this 
behalf by the Commissioner, be enforced by a civil court having local 
jurisdiction in the same manner as a decree of such court.
23. Offences and penalties.- (1) If any person -
(a) fails to apply for the registration of a religious trust
within the time specified in sub-section (6) of section 6: or
(b) furnishes or causes to be furnished to the Commissioner any 
return statistics, accounts or other information which he knows, or 
has reasors to believe, to be false; or
(c) obstructs the Commissioner or any officer in the exercise
of his power under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of 
section 15s
he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees.
(2) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under 
sub-section (1) except upon a complaint in writing made to the Commissioner.
(3) No court inferior to that of a presidency magistrate or a magistrate 
of the first class shall try an offence punishable under this Act.
26. Contributions.- (1) For the purpose of defraying the expenses in
connection with the administration of this Act, the trustee of every 
religious trust registered under this Act shall pay annually to the State 
Government, in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, such 
contributions by way of fees, not exceeding three per cent of its gross 
annual income, as the State Government may, from time to time, determine.
(2) If any amount payable as contribution under subjection (1) is 
not paid within the time prescribed, the Commissioner may issue a certificate 
for the amount due to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same 
in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
27. Furnishing of copies of extracts from register.- (1) The Commissioner 
may, on an application made to him in this behalf by any person, furnish
to the applicant copies of any extract from the register maintained under 
section 8 on payment of such fee as may be prescribed and subject to such 
conditions as may, from time to time, be determined by the Commissioner.
(2) Such copies may be certified in the manner provided in section 76 
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
28. Finality of orders.- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, 
every order made by the Commissioner shall be final and shall not be called 
in question in any suit, application or proceeding.
29. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred in respect of certain matters.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being 
in force, no. civil court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in so far
as it relates to any question or matter which the Commissioner is empowered by 
this Act to decide.
(2) No civil court shall entertain a suit for the enforcement of a 
right on behalf of a religious trust unless such trust has been registered 
under this Act.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall also apply to a claim of 
set off or other proceeding to enforce a right on behalf of a religious trust 
which has not been registered.
30. Notice of certain suits to be given to the Commissioner.- (1) In every 
suit or proceeding (except in suits instituted by a trustee for the recovery 
of arrears of rent and proceedings in execution of decrees passed in such 
suits) in respect of any religious trust or property belonging to such trust, 
whether instituted by a trustee or by any other person, the court shall 
issue a notice of the institution thereof to the Commissioner.
(2) The Commissioner may apply to the court in which any such suit or 
proceeding as is referred to in sub-section (1) is pending, to be added as 
a party to the suit or proceeding and shall thereupon be added as a party 
thereto.
(3) If the notice required under sub-section (1) to be issued to the 
Commissioner in respect of any suit or proceeding is not issued, the decree 
on order passed in such suit or proceeding shall, if the Commissioner makes 
an application to the court in this behalf, be set aside.
31. Protection of action taken in good faith.- No suit, prosecution or 
other legal proceeding shall lie against the State Government or the 
Commissioner or any deputy or assistant Commissioner or any officer authorised
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by the Commissioner in respect of anything which is in good faith done 
or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules or orders 
made thereunder.
32. Commissioner, etc., to be public servants.- The Commissioner and all 
deputy Commissioners and assistant Commissioners shall be deemed to be 
public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.
33* Power to give directions.- The State Government may, from time to 
time, give to the Commissioner in writing such general or special directions 
on questions of policy as it thinks fit, and the Commissioner shall, in the
performance of his functions under this Act, comply with such directions.
3^ . Act not to apply to certain classes of trusts.- The provisions of this 
Act shall not apply to -
(a) any Sikh Gurdwara to which the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925* 
applies; or
(b) the Durgah Khawaja Saheb, Ajmer, to which the Durgah Khawaja 
Saheb Act, 1955* applies or to any other wakf as defined in the Wakf
Act, 195^ 1 or in any Provincial or State Act relating to wakfs in any
State; or
(c) any religious trust existing or created for the benefit of 
Christians, Jews or Parsis or any section thereof.
35. Power to exempt.- The State Government may, by notification in the 
Official Gazette, exempt any religious trust or class of religious trusts
to which any special enactment applies from the operation of all or any of
the provisions of this Act.
3 6. Power to make rules.- (1) The State Government may, by notification 
in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act:
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following 
matters, namely
(a) the functions of, the procedure to be followed by, the
number and terms of office of, and the manner of filling casual vacancies 
among, the members of the Advisory Board;
(b) the form and manner of making application for the registration 
of religious trust and the particulars it may contain;
(c) service of notice and orders under this Act;
(d) the procedure to be followed by the Commissioner in holding 
any inquiry under this Act and the powers of a civil court which may 
be vested in the Commissioner;
(e) the levy and collection of fees in respect of any application
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under this Act for registration of religious trusts and supply of 
copies of extracts from the register maintained under section 8 ;
(f) the form of the register of religious trusts maintained 
under section 8 and particulars it may contain;
(g) the form in which and the time within which the budget in respect 
of a religious trust may be prepared;
(h) the form and manner in which accounts of a religious trust may
be maintained and the particulars it may contain;
(i) the. time at which and the manner in which the accounts of a 
religious trust may be audited;
(j) the form and manner in which any report, return, statistics 
or other information may be furnished to the Commissioner by any 
trustee under this Act;
(k) the manner in which, and the time within which, contribution 
is to be paid by the trustee of a religious trust;
(1) the form and manner in which copies of extracts from the
register of religious trusts may he furnished;
(m) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.
57. Repeal.- The following enactments, namely
(i) The Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (XX of 1863)»
(ii) The Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (VI of 1890);
(iii) The Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 (XIV of 1920);
(iv) Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; 
shall not apply to any religious trust to which this Act applies.
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GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT TERMS
a-gama 
_ ✓
asrama
devata
dharma
dharmasastra
ishfca
karma
matha (mutt)
mimamsa
mimamsakarcu
nibandha
pujari
punya
purta
saniadhi
samarpana
sangha
sapinda
sanyasi
*71
sastra
/_ —r
sastri
smrhtiV
smart/a
vedang;a
a sacred work
stage, stage of life, status 
godhead, deity 
righteousness, duty 
science of dharma
regarded as good
action or ritual
seminary, orthodox college
One of the three great divisions of 
orthodox Hindu philosophy (divided into 
two systems viz. purva-mTrriamsa or karma-
mimamsa and the Mimamsa
means interpreting religious injunctions, 
a scholar of the mimamsa philosophy
corrody, pension, stipend
a priest
religious merit
an act of pious liberality (such as 
feeding a Brahmin, digging a well, etc.)
a tonib (generally of a saint) 
offerings, giving away 
comnunity
close relation, within seven degrees on 
the father's side or five on the mother's
ascetic, one who has renounced the world 
a law book or whole body of written laws 
% scholar or professor of the skstra
recollection, verse or treatise of 
traditional learning
scholar in srnrti
certain works regarded as auxiliary to 
and even in some sense part of the Veda
